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Editorial EYIEL 9 (2018)
Ownership, exploitation and use of natural resources as well as trade and investment
in these resources have been core subjects of international economic law for many
decades. In its Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 on “Permanent
sovereignty over natural resources”, the General Assembly of the United Nations
declared that
[t]he exploration, development and disposition of such resources, as well as the import of the
foreign capital required for these purposes, should be in conformity with the rules and
conditions which the peoples and nations freely consider to be necessary or desirable with
regard to the authorization, restriction or prohibition of such activities
thus, pointing to the necessity of regulating natural resources in both domestic and
international law. While the 1960s and 1970s were dominated by general debates
about national sovereignty and the right to expropriate natural resources, the 1980s
and 1990s saw movements towards trade liberalisation and the attraction of foreign
capital to develop and exploit natural resources. Since the 2000s, natural resources
law is increasingly shaped by the requirements of sustainable development and the
impact of natural resources exploitation on the environment, human rights and social
development. Indeed, many of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals declared by
the World Summit in 2015 are intrinsically linked to natural resources use and
management.
In light of the continuing importance and relevance of natural resources as a
matter of international economic governance, but also considering new challenges
and topics such as natural resources in outer space or the deep sea, volume 9 of the
European Yearbook of International Economic Law (EYIEL) devotes its main
thematic section on natural resources law as part of international economic law.
Consequently, the contributions of Part I of this volume of the yearbook focus on
various aspects of natural resources in international and European trade, investment
and commercial law as well as other matters of economic law in the broader sense.
Considering the shift towards sustainable development in natural resources law in
recent years, it seems more than appropriate to address this matter from the outset:
Maximilian Oehl argues that the concept of sustainable development can be seen as
v
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an overarching principle of natural resources law. He portrays the core elements of
sustainable development as a norm of international law and shows the corresponding
legal effects. He concludes that sustainable development can be regarded as the
ultimate object and purpose of natural resources law. Placing sustainable develop-
ment at the heart of the matter inevitably leads to tensions with more narrowly
defined economic and commercial objectives.
Apart from questions of exploitation and use of natural resources, trade in natural
resources has been the subject of significant disputes between nations given the
uneven distribution of certain natural resources across the globe. This was felt
nowhere more than in the WTO. Recent cases involving Chinese export restrictions
are ample proof of this as analysed and discussed by Ilaria Espa. She argues that as a
result of these cases China is left with basically no margin of manoeuvre to
legitimately use export restrictions to achieve economic diversification goals. This
may conflict with sustainable development goals. Next to trade disputes, natural
resources are also increasingly becoming a subject of WTO accessions as shown
through the comparative analysis of WTO Accession Protocols by Friedl Weiss and
Anna Marhold. They demonstrate that energy and fossil fuels have become prom-
inent topics in accession negotiations, resulting in an increasing amount of commit-
ments on transit and export duties on raw materials and fossil fuels. Trade in natural
resources may not only be the source of commercial disputes, but also contribute to
military conflicts and human rights violations. This is especially the case for
diamonds and gold. Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer assesses the schemes regulating
gold, diamonds and minerals stemming from conflict zones and reviews the com-
patibility of these regulatory frameworks with global trade law. She considers
whether the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme could—and should—serve as
a model for deeper integration of human rights considerations into the WTO system
and concludes that the international community should not worry too much about
WTO rules when trying to effectively resolve human rights violations in supply
chains.
Moving from trade to investment law, Tarcisio Gazzini examines the legal
protection of foreign investment in the natural resources sector arguing for the
need to strike a balance between the private and public interests at stake. He
concludes that the clarification and preservation of the right of states to exercise
regulatory powers in recent international investment treaties is an important step
towards a more efficient and balanced legal framework on foreign investment in
general and in the natural resources sector in particular. As investments in natural
resources are not only a subject matter of international investment agreements but
also of state-investor contracts, Lorenzo Cotula examines how these contracts
provide the legal basis for natural resource projects. He identifies shifts towards
greater contract transparency and growing experience with community-investor
agreements in recent practice suggesting new agendas for research and action
which require interdisciplinary approaches cutting across traditional boundaries
between research and practice and between academic disciplines. Applying princi-
ples of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and international investment
law to the case of shale gas extraction by means of fracking, Leonie Reins, Dylan
vi Editorial EYIEL 9 (2018)
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Geraets and Thomas Schomerus ask if the case of fracking is merely another
example of the tension between the rules that govern international economic rela-
tions and domestic policy considerations, or whether it represents a potential turning
point in the way the international community perceives these constraints on domestic
policymaking. They focus in particular on the pending Lone Pine investment
arbitration case which takes place against the background of increasing public
discontent with investor-state dispute settlement and a reconsideration of this con-
cept by several states.
Trade, sustainable development and energy management are also core matters of
European economic law. Jörg Philipp Terhechte therefore calls for the concept-
ualisation of a genuine European natural resources law. This should focus, he argues,
on safety, sustainability and efficiency in the supply locating the new field of
European natural resources law between environmental and economic law. The
EU Timber Regulation which establishes a legal regime for trade in timber and
timber products could be seen as part of the emerging field of European natural
resources law. Concetta Maria Pontecorvo assesses the effectiveness of this regu-
lation in the light of its actual implementation and whether it could serve as a model
for other EU legislative regimes trying to ensure that EU trade with other countries
contributes to sustainable development and the protection of human rights.
The final three chapters of the first part of this yearbook address elements of
natural resources law reaching beyond traditional frontiers. As deep seabed mining
may soon become a commercial reality, Joanna Dingwall evaluates the international
legal regime applicable to mining activities in this area. This includes the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) and the activities of the
International Seabed Authority. Similar to deep seabed mining the exploitation of
natural resources in the Arctic is still, in many cases, merely potential. However, the
consequences of climate change could change this soon. Fernando Loureiro Bastos
shows that the exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic is currently heavily
regulated by domestic and international environmental law and subject to activities
of the Arctic Council. A future legal regime for natural resources in the Arctic should
not be based on traditional territorial approaches but on cooperation and joint
management maintaining a demanding environmental framework. Finally,
Mahulena Hofmann and Federico Bergamasco provide an overview of the interna-
tional and domestic legal frameworks relevant for the upcoming space mining
activities. As existing international agreements do not provide for any specific
rules on space mining, a future international regime should take into account that
space resources activities have a potential to boost existing space activities and
enable further long-time projects, including the long stay of human beings in outer
space.
Part II of this EYIEL volume on regional developments focuses on two regions
which normally do not feature too prominently in scholarly literature and in political
debates, but are of significant importance for the EU. Seljan Verdiyeva reports on the
law and politics of trade in energy in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)
established in 2014 between the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia
and the Kyrgyz Republic. Despite the significant role of energy resources in these
Editorial EYIEL 9 (2018) vii
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countries, the formation of the common energy market faces difficulties inter alia
due to the lack of trust between the members, monopolisation of the energy sectors
and dependence on single source of energy, mainly fossil fuel. David Berry intro-
duces the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). He reviews the development of
regional integration law through the treaty-interpreting jurisprudence of the Carib-
bean Court of Justice (CCJ) and draws comparisons between Caribbean develop-
ments and the EU.
The section of the EYIEL on institutions (Part III) contains—as usual—up-to-
date analyses of trade and investment treaties and case law: Catherine Titi reports on
recent developments in international investment law including newly concluded
agreements as well as the proposals to reform the international investment dispute
settlement system. Jan Bohanes, Panagiotis Kyriakou, Christian Vidal and Tatiana
Yanguas focus on WTO case law in 2016; a large proportion of the case law
concerns trade remedies, in particular anti-dumping measures. Furthermore,
Hoang Pham, Anjum Rosha and Bernhard Steinki discuss the inclusion of the
Renminbi in the Special Drawing Right (SDR) Basket of the International Monetary
Fund which raises the Chinese currency into the club of the most important global
currencies. This is the most significant change to the SDR basket in over four
decades and may have a lasting impact on the international monetary system.
The final part of the yearbook contains book reviews which partly take up the
subject of the main part such as Jörn Griebel’s review of Integrating Sustainable
Development in International Investment Law by Manjiao Chi, Fernando Dias
Simões’ review of Charting the Water Regulatory Future: Issues, Challenges and
Directions by Julien Chaisse and Christian J. Tams’ take on Die Bewirtschaftung
der genetischen Ressourcen des Meeresbodens by Matthias J. Annweiler as well as
Der Meeresboden by Mario Starre. Other reviews address Ben Saul’s The Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Travaux Préparatoires
(reviewed by Ibrahim Kanalan); Jorun Baumgartner on Treaty Shopping in Inter-
national Investment Law (reviewed by Yun-I Kim); and David Kennedy on A World
of Struggle (reviewed by Gail Lythgoe) and the Research Handbook on Trade in
Services edited by Pierre Sauvé and Martin Roy (reviewed by Charlotte Sieber-
Gasser).
Volume 9 of the EYIEL also introduces a number of editorial reforms. One
novelty is that EYIEL now enables articles to be published online as soon as the
final version of an article has been reviewed by the editors. This means that authors
who concluded their contributions early will also have the benefit of an earlier
publication date. Other editorial changes concern the EYIEL team: Most impor-
tantly, the editors are happy to welcome Judith Crämer to the newly established
position of an Assistant Editor of EYIEL. Judith Crämer is Research Assistant at
Leuphana University Lüneburg and assumed her new position in February 2018. She
already bore most of the managerial tasks and responsibilities in the final phase of
Volume 9 of the EYIEL. Without her tremendous engagement and enthusiasm, this
volume would not have seen the light of the day. The editors are therefore most
grateful to her. Judith Crämer was supported by student assistants in Erlangen and
Lüneburg. We therefore owe special thanks to Rachel Hoepfer and Zedlira Shefkiu.
viii Editorial EYIEL 9 (2018)
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Finally, Anja Trautmann who already worked with the EYIEL when still at Saarland
University moved to Springer in Heidelberg and took up the responsibility of
managing the EYIEL from there for which we are ever thankful.
Saarbrücken, Germany Marc Bungenberg
Erlangen, Germany Markus Krajewski
Glasgow, UK Christian J. Tams
Lüneburg, Germany Jörg Philipp Terhechte
Lausanne, Switzerland Andreas R. Ziegler
October 2018
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The Role of Sustainable Development
in Natural Resources Law
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1 Introduction
Natural resource (NR) management is a key element for achieving Sustainable
Development (SD). According to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) #12,
more precisely its sub-target 12.2, the international community is held to “achieve
the sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources” by 2030.1
The author would like to thank Markus Krajewski for his valuable comments on an earlier draft of
this chapter. All remaining errors are naturally my own.
1Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda For Sustainable Development, 21 October 2015, UN
Doc. A/RES/70/1, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/
docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2018), p. 22.
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The factual significance of NR management for SD and vice versa is manifold
and ambiguous. For one, in economic terms NR either provide the raw material for
processed, e.g. industrial goods or constitute economic goods themselves.2 Second,
they also often represent the objects of environmental protection measures. And
third, NR are frequently a or even themajor source of state revenue and therefore the
basis not only for the economic, but also the overall social development of societies.
Moreover, NR activities, especially in the extractive industries, create numerous
governance challenges for all stakeholders involved—host and home governments,
international organizations, corporations and civil society.3 Apart from the in situ
governance challenges, such as the protection of a specific watercourse against
harmful uses, the award of exploration and extraction rights or adequate consultation
of local populations whose livelihoods may be concerned by NR activities, the
overall economic challenge is for states to continuously reap the benefits of resource
development and to effectively utilize those for the advancement of society.4
Some characteristics of the NR sector make it particularly fit to contribute to
SD. Its long-term, capital-intensive projects often constitute promising business
opportunities, which attract foreign investment while at the same time potentially
generating substantial revenue for host states.5 For the so-called group of Commod-
ity Dependent Developing Countries (CDDCs), these revenues are vital—if not even
the only means—to foster development.6 Moreover, extractive industries typically
require vast infrastructure as well as a net of suppliers and other partners in the
supply chain. This creates opportunity for local content development and technology
transfer through so-called “spillover effects”.7
2Both can be summed up under the term “commodity” in the sense of the definition provided by
Article 56(1) of the 1948 Havana Charter.
3Sachs L (2013) On Solid Ground: Toward Effective Resource-Based Development. World Politics
Review, https://beta.extractiveshub.org/servefile/getFile/id/1616 (last accessed 7 February
2018), p. 6.
4Cf. instructively on the range of governance challenges in the commodity sector Bürgi Bonanomi
E et al. (2015), “The Commodity Sector and Related Governance Challenges from a Sustainable
Development Perspective: The Example of Switzerland and Current Research Gaps”, WTI Work-
ing Paper, 14 July 2015, https://www.wti.org/media/filer_public/38/38/38387f2d-b6b5-40d3-9bf5-
dc42b8d3eefa/wti_cde_iwe_working_paper_july_2015_2_the_commodity_sector_and_related_
gov.pdf (last accessed 7 February 2018).
5Sachs L (2013) On Solid Ground: Toward Effective Resource-Based Development. World Politics
Review, https://beta.extractiveshub.org/servefile/getFile/id/1616 (last accessed 7 February
2018), p. 2.
6CDDCs are defined as those states in which the ratio of the value of commodity exports to
the value of total merchandise exports exceeds 60%, ‘The State of Commodity Dependence
2016’ UN Doc UNCTAD/SUC/2017/2, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/suc2017d2.pdf
(last accessed 7 February 2018), p. 19. For the list of CDDCs cf. ‘The State of Commodity
Dependence 2016’ UN Doc UNCTAD/SUC/2017/2, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
suc2017d2.pdf (last accessed 7 February 2018) cf. pp. 23–24.
7Sachs L (2013) On Solid Ground: Toward Effective Resource-Based Development. World Politics




However, in order to thus “make the commodity [or NR] sector work” for SD, all
stakeholders are held to pursue targeted SD policies.8 This political agenda is
mirrored in SD as a legal concept of international law.9 Regarding its legal dimen-
sion, both corporations and governments are for instance held to commit to the
highest environmental, social and human rights standards in order to support SD.10
SD as a concept insofar represents a fascinating and equally nebulous object of
study. While SD generally can be perceived as both an analytical as well as a
normative concept,11 this study examines first and foremost the legal normativity
of SD as a concept of international law. After casting some definitional bases (Sect.
2), it discusses in detail the evolution of SD from a political objective (Sect. 3) to a
concept of international law (Sect. 4). It thus seeks to contribute to the constantly
evolving body of treatises, which aim at clarifying the functioning of SD as a legal
concept.12
2 What Is Natural Resources Law?
For the purposes of determining what can actually be described as Natural Resources
Law, we shall first define the objects it applies to, i.e. natural resources.
While Principle 2 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration refers to “natural resources
[. . .], including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially representative
samples of natural ecosystems”, international law does not provide a clear definition
of the term.13 Beyerlin and Scholz describe it as being “narrower than that of
‘nature’, but broader than that of ‘biological diversity’.”14
8Blasiak R et al. (2016) Making the Commodity Sector Work for Developing Countries
Local Impacts, Global Links, and Knowledge Gaps. Swiss Academies Factsheet, Vol. 11,
No. 2, https://iwe.unisg.ch/-/media/dateien/instituteundcenters/iwe/afactsheet2016commodities2.
pdf (last accessed 7 February 2018).
9The usage of the term ‘concept’ throughout the study is not meant to refer to a specific normative
categorization of SD, but rather a placeholder until its conclusive classification in the final section of
the main part, cf. Sect. 4.4.
10Natural Resource Governance Institute (2014) Natural Resource Charter, 2nd edition, https://
resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/NRCJ1193_natural_resource_charter_19.6.14.pdf (last
accessed 7 February 2018), precepts #11 and #12.
11Sachs (2015), pp. 3–8. Sachs seems to understand “normativity” rather in the sense of a value
decision in favour of complexity and thus less in a legal sense, p. 7.
12Schrijver and Weiss (2004), Schrijver (2008), Barral (2012), and Cordonnier Segger and
Weeramantry (2017).
13Cf. Schrijver (1997), pp. 14–15; for “natural wealth” Schrijver employs the following definition:
“those components of nature from which natural resources can be extracted or which serve as basis
for economic activities”; Beyerlin and Holzer (2013), para. 1; under the 43 US Code of Federal
Regulations Sec. 11.14, natural resources are defined as “land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water,
ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in
trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States”.
14Beyerlin and Holzer (2013), para. 1.
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Legal dictionaries refer to a natural resource i.a. as
[a]ny material from nature having potential economic value or providing for the sustenance
of life, such as timber, mineral, oil, water, and wildlife.15
Schrijver likewise seems to employ a rather economic understanding of the term and
defines natural resources as
supplies drawn from natural wealth which may be either renewable or non-renewable and
which can be used to satisfy the needs of human beings and other living species.16
He also alludes to the differentiation between non-renewable “stock” resources and
renewable “flow” resources, yet not without pointing to the blurry nature of the line,
which frequently runs between these two categories.17 Some point to the fact that the
general duty to preserve natural resources for the benefit of present and future
generations is amplified with regard to the former—vital renewable resources such
as wildlife and natural ecosystems.18
Natural Resources Law is the field of law, which regulates all NR-related
activities, especially exploration, exploitation or other commercial usage, and pres-
ervation. For the purposes of this study, NRL depicts the body of those norms of
international law, which address corresponding regulatory objectives.19 As such, it
represents a crosscutting subject of international law, which adopts a NR-specific
perspective on the body of international law thus identifying those norms, which
create the regulatory picture as it applies in the NR sector.20
15Garner (2009), p. 1127; cf. Majzoub and Quilleré-Majzoub (2013), p. 10361.
16Schrijver (1997), p. 19.
17Schrijver (1997), pp. 13–14.
18del Castillo-Laborde (2010), para. 4.
19On the US example of domestic NRL Fischman (2007).
20Cf. With regard to international energy law, cf. Vinuales (2013). On conceptualizations of fields
of law cf. expertly Aagaard (2010). A parallel notion to NRL is the narrower field of International
Commodity Law (ICL). It has a stronger economic connotation as it focuses exclusively on those
items originating from natural resources—or, under Schrijver’s terminology, “natural wealth”—
that are typically being traded and/or refined/processed for specific end uses as e.g. foodstuffs or
industrial goods. Therefore, its concept and terminology are preferable whenever one is seeking to
address this specific economic use of natural resources—or, for that matter more precisely,
commodities. In this sense, the broader field of NRL appears to be the more favourable concept
whenever, beyond their use as commodities also other economic usages of natural resources, such
as navigation, or energy generation and their related governance challenges are concerned.
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3 SD as a Political Objective
The notion of SD has witnessed a remarkable evolution in the past decades. While
the concept of sustainability has its origins already in eighteenth century theories on
sustainable forest management,21 it has increasingly been linked to the challenge of
generating wholesome economic growth starting in the 1970s.22
Following the realization that while the First UN Development Decade between
1960 and 1970 had been successful in terms of economic growth, but issues of mass
poverty and environmental protection remained or even worsened, the UN intro-
duced a new chapter on “Human Development” to its overall development strategy
for the Second Development Decade in 1970.23 Subsequently, in 1972, the Stock-
holm UN Conference on the Human Environment addressed the challenge of
upholding sustainability in the context of economic growth, i.a. by linking the
need for development to the objective of environmental protection (principle #8
Stockholm Declaration) or calling for integrated development planning (principle
#13 Stockholm Declaration).24
The concept of SD as such appeared on the scene of international politics in 1980
when the IUCN published its World Conservation Strategy with the subtitle Living
Resource Conservation for Sustainable Development.25 Its popularity increased
significantly with the famous 1987 Brundtland report, which defined SD as a
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs.”26
Thus having earned international attention, SD featured prominently in the 1992
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which in its Principle #1 puts
human beings at the centre of concerns for SD.27 Another outcome document of the
Rio conference, the so-called Agenda 21 launched a “new global partnership for
21Proelß (2017), para. 50; Gehne (2011), p. 11.
22Gehne (2011), p. 21 with reference to the UN GA International Development Strategy for the
Second United Nations Development Decade, 24 October 1970, UN Doc. A/RES/2626(XXV),
http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2626.htm (last accessed 7 February 2018).
23UN GA International development strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade,
24 October 1970, UN Doc. A/RES/2626(XXV), para. 8; cf. Gehne (2011), p. 21. In addition, “the
Founex Report ‘Development and Environment’ of 1971 pointed to the linkage of long-term
development goals and environmental protection”, cf. Beyerlin (2013), para. 2.
24Sachs (2015), p. 4.
25Cf. before also UN GA International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations
Development Decade, 5 December 1980, UN Doc. A/RES/35/56, cf. Beyerlin (2013), para. 3.
26Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future,
4 August 1987, UN Doc. A/42/427, http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf (last
accessed 8 February 2018), Chap. 1, para. 49.
27It is furthermore expressly contained in Principles 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 20, 21, 22, 24 and 27 of the
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 12 August 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/
26 (Vol. I), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm (last accessed
8 February 2018).
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sustainable development” thus setting in motion an almost universal process guided
by a broad catalogue of recommendations.28 The Agenda 21 marked the beginning
of a process, which eventually made way for the pivotal status that SD is holding in
international relations today.
In 2000, environmental sustainability was included in the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals, as Goal #7. Two years later, in 2002, SD set tone and agenda for the
Johannesburg World Summit on SD. Its outcome document, the WSSD Plan of
Implementation explicitly built on the achievements since the 1992 Rio conference
and covered a broad range of SD-related issues from poverty eradication, consump-
tion and production patterns, natural resource management as base of economic and
social development, health and SD to the institutional framework for SD.29 In the
2005 World Summit Outcome Resolution, the UN General Assembly reaffirmed SD
as a “key element of the overarching framework of United Nations activities.”30
In 2012, at the so-called Rio+20 conference, the international community
renewed its commitment to SD, now increasingly summarizing SD by reference to
three constituent elements: economic and social development as well as environ-
mental protection.31 In order to focus the joint efforts on specific targets, the
document called for the elaboration of a set of sustainable development goals
(SDGs).32
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development titled Transforming Our World
provides those SDGs. In the corresponding 2015 Resolution of the UN General
Assembly, the latter describes the adoption of said agenda as an “historic decision on
a comprehensive, far-reaching and people-centred set of universal and transforma-
tive Goals and targets.”33 The SD Agendamarks the end point of the evolution of SD
from a notion originating in forest management and later gaining relevance in
environmental protection policy to the universal political agenda of our time.
Mindful of the great weight this agenda carries, the UN General Assembly describes
it as:
. . .an Agenda of unprecedented scope and significance. It is accepted by all countries and is
applicable to all, taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of
development and respecting national policies and priorities. These are universal goals and
28Cf. Beyerlin (2013), para. 5.
29Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 4 September 2002,
UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/
WSSD_PlanImpl.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2018).
302005 World Summit Outcome, 24 October 2015, UN Doc. A/RES60/1, http://www.un.org/en/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/RES/60/1 (last accessed 8 February 2018), para. 10.
31The future we want, 11 September 2012, UN Doc. A/RES/66/288, http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/RES/66/288&Lang¼E (last accessed 8 February 2018), para. 1.
32The future we want, 11 September 2012, UN Doc. A/RES/66/288, http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/RES/66/288&Lang¼E (last accessed 8 February 2018), para. 246.
33Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda For Sustainable Development, 21 October 2015, UN
Doc. A/RES/70/1, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/
docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2018), para. 2.
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targets which involve the entire world, developed and developing countries alike. They are
integrated and indivisible and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development.34
While therefore the status of SD as the universal political objective of the interna-
tional community is clearly spelled out and—not least due to its overarching,
integrated nature—remains largely undisputed,35 the situation is less clear with
regard to the legal weight SD carries as a concept of international law. Its legal
contours are regularly said to remain of some vagueness36; also its nature as a
principle, a concept or some other kind of law has been the subject of quite a few
debates in international legal scholarship and jurisprudence in the past decades.37 As
has been stated by others elsewhere,38 now seems to be the time to seek greater
clarity in this regard—not least in order to flank the endeavour to operationalize SD,
especially through the SDGs, with the legal instruments necessary.
4 SD as a Concept of International Law
Subsequently, the conceptual content of SD (Sect. 4.1) as well as its legal effects
(Sect. 4.2) will be portrayed before approaching the debate on its legal status under
international law (Sect. 4.3). Lastly, this paper examines the hypothesis that SD
constitutes a fundamental regulatory objective of the international legal order (Sect.
4.4) as well as the object and purpose of NRL (Sect. 4.5) and what effects such claim
brings about.
4.1 The Conceptual Content of SD
Despite the vagueness mentioned that is said to be surrounding the legal nature of
SD, the core elements of its conceptual content have crystallised quite clearly over
the past decade. As portrayed above, the Brundtland report initially employed a
mainly intergenerational understanding of the concept of SD focusing on the
conservation of the planet for future generations. Subsequently, however, SD
evolved normatively to a concept that puts human beings and their need for sufficient
34Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda For Sustainable Development, 21 October 2015, UN
Doc. A/RES/70/1, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/
docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2018), para. 5.
35See already Schrijver (2008), p. 251.
36Cordonnier Segger and Weeramantry (2017), p. 5.
37Cordonnier Segger and Weeramantry (2017), p. 5; Lowe (1999); Schrijver and Weiss (2004);
Schrijver (2008); Beyerlin (2013), para. 15.
38Cordonnier Segger and Weeramantry (2017), p. 5.
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socio-economic development at the centre, thus emphasizing intragenerational
elements, yet without fully abandoning the intergenerational perspective.39
Beyond references to SD in the reports mentioned, the conceptual content of SD
was first elaborated in legal terms in the, however non-binding, Rio Declaration of
1992.40 Principle 4 Rio, resembling the operational language of a legal rule, for
instance postulates that
[i]n order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an
integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it.
While 12 of the 27 Rio Principles expressly refer to SD, its so-called social or third
pillar had only been added 5 years later when the UN General Assembly adopted its
Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21.41 In the meantime, SD
had already been referred to in various international agreements, such as Article 3
(4) of the 1992 UNFCCC, Article 8 lit. e) of the 1992 Convention on Biological
Diversity (1992), i.a. Articles 2, 4 and 5 of the 1994 UN Convention to Combat
Desertification and Drought (1994), Article 1 lit. c) of the International Tropical
Timber Agreement (1994), or the preamble of the 1994 WTO agreement—yet
without defining the concept.42
Despite its inclusion in further documents and agreements of international and
supranational law respectively, such as the Doha Declaration of Ministers of
14 November 2001, Articles 2 and 6 of the EC treaty or i.a. Article 1 of the 2001
Cotonou Agreement no further clarifications as to the conceptual contents of SD
were made.43 However, the 2002 Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and
Sustainable Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Northeast
Pacific provided the following detailed definition for ‘sustainable development’ in its
Article 3(1)(a):
. . .[S]ustainable development means the process of progressive change in the quality of life
of human beings, which places them as the centre and primary subjects of development, by
means of economic growth with social equity and transformation of production methods and
consumption patterns, sustained by the ecological balance and life support systems of the
region. This process implies respect for regional, national and local ethnic and cultural
diversity, and full public participation, peaceful coexistence in harmony with nature, without
prejudice to and ensuring the quality of life of future generations.44
39Barral (2012), pp. 380–381 thus defines the element of socio-economic growth as a matter of the
intragenerational, the element of environmental protection as the intergenerational equity that SD
postulates.
40Barral (2012), p. 381.
41Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21, 28 June 1997, UN Doc. A/RES/S-19/2,
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/spec/aress19-2.htm (last accessed 8 February 2018), Annex,
para. 3; cf. Barral (2012), p. 381.
42Beyerlin (2013), para. 6.
43Cf. Schrijver (2017), p. 100.
44The 2002 Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and Sustainable Development of the
Marine and Coastal Environment of the Northeast Pacific, 18 February 2002, CISDL Translation
available online: http://www.cep.unep.org/services/nepregseas/Convention_English_NEP.doc (last
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Also international jurisprudence has referred to SD in various instances. In its 1997
judgement in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, the ICJ described the “need to
reconcile economic development with protection of the environment” as “aptly
expressed in the concept of sustainable development.”45 In his corresponding sep-
arate opinion Judge Weeramantry spoke of SD as a “principle of normative value”.46
One year later, in 1998 the WTO Appellate Body in the US-Shrimps case applied SD
as a guiding principle in the interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX GATT,
which “must add colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of the agreements
annexed to the WTO agreement.”47 In 2005, the arbitral tribunal in the Iron Rhine
case noted that international law “require[s] the integration of appropriate environ-
mental measures in the design and implementation of economic development activ-
ities.”48 And in its 2010 Pulp Mills case, the ICJ recognized a legal obligation for the
Parties to “strike a balance between the [commercial] use of the waters and the
protection of the river consistent with the objective of sustainable development.”49
While these prominent statements stemming from international jurisprudence to
some extent sharpen the notion of SD—as requiring the balancing of economic
development and environmental protection—further conceptual clarity as regards
the content of SD is provided by a wide range of declarations, resolutions and reports
originating from States or international organizations.50
As some authors point out, the synthesis of these documents exhibits a remark-
able degree of consistency with regard to the core concept of SD.51 Starting in 1997,
since the adoption of its Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21,
accessed 8 February 2018); cf. What is Sustainable Development Law?. A CISDL Concept Paper,
Montreal, 2005, http://cisdl.org/public/docs/What%20is%20Sustainable%20Development.pdf (last
accessed 8 February 2018).
45Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ
Reports 1997, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/92/092-19970925-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (last
accessed 8 February 2018), p. 78, para. 140; cf. Beyerlin (2013), para. 16.
46Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry to Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/
Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ Reports 1997, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/92/092-19970925-JUD-01-03-EN.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2018), p. 88; cf. Beyerlin
(2013), para. 16.
47United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate
Body, 12 October 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language¼E&CatalogueIdList¼58544&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex¼0&FullTextHash¼&
HasEnglishRecord¼True&HasFrenchRecord¼True&HasSpanishRecord¼True (last accessed
8 February 2018), para. 153; cf. Gehne (2011), p. 294.
48Award in the Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren Rijn”) Railway between the
Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, decision of 24 May 2005, 27 RIAA
(2005) 35, http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXVII/35-125.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2018),
para. 59; cf. Barral (2012), p. 387.
49Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, ICJ Reports
2010, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/135/135-20100420-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (last
accessed 8 February 2018), p. 74, para. 177.
50Cf. Barral (2012), p. 381; Wälde (2004), p. 121.
51Barral (2012), p. 380.
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the international community generally refers to SD as requiring “the integration of its
economic, environmental and social components.”52 Subsequently, the 2002 WSSD
Plan of Implementation speaks of “economic development, social development and
environmental protection” as the “interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars”
of SD.53 Ever since, this definition of SD has been constantly repeated in various
documents issued by the international community or the UN respectively, such as
the 2005World Summit Outcome,54 the Rio+20 outcome document “The Future We
Want”55 or the SD Agenda56—in just slightly differing wordings.
What they, as well as the definitions of SD circulating within international legal
scholarship,57 all share are their references to the three constituent elements of SD:
environmental protection, social and economic development. Some authors and
international documents respectively in addition accentuate the forward-looking
perspective SD employs,58 a tribute to the intergenerational origins of the concept.
Others add an indication of the integrated manner in which SD shall be pursued, also
described as the integration principle.59
Depending on what degree of comprehensiveness one prefers, the definition of
SD thus generally contains between three and five express elements. Its core
conceptional content can be defined as the consolidation of socio-economic devel-
opment and environmental protection. Both, the reference to the long-term focus of
SD as well as the integration principle, are therefore at the same time logical
supplements and somewhat inherent to the concept of SD—with the
intergenerational perspective in a sort operating as guideline and measuring tool of
the integrated pursuit of SD.60
52Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21, 28 June 1997, UN Doc. A/RES/S-19/2,
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/spec/aress19-2.htm (last accessed 8 February 2018), Annex,
para. 3.
53Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 4 September 2002,
UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/
WSSD_PlanImpl.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2018), para. 2.
542005 World Summit Outcome, 24 October 2015, UN Doc. A/RES60/1, http://www.un.org/en/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/RES/60/1 (last accessed 8 February 2018), para. 10.
55The future we want, 11 September 2012, UN Doc. A/RES/66/288, http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/RES/66/288&Lang¼E (last accessed 8 February 2018), para. 3.
56Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda For Sustainable Development, 21 October 2015, UN
Doc. A/RES/70/1, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/
docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2018), para. 2.
57E.g. SD as the “conceptual bridge” between right to social and economic development and the
imperative to protect the environment, Cordonnier Segger and Weeramantry (2017), p. 6.
58Gehne (2011), p. 291.
59Barral (2012), p. 381; cf. also ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law
Relating to Sustainable Development, 2 April 2002, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/8, 9 August 2002,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/CONF.199/8&Lang¼E (last accessed
8 February 2018), principle #7.
60These two elements, however, to my mind rather constitute additional components of SD, which
serve to further clarify its functioning and especially to guide its application. I therefore suggest to
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This conceptual content of SD, however, is not merely an end in itself, but much
rather inspired by and henceforth guides a body of law, which has been described as
International SD Law. It is defined as the corpus of international law that regulates
the relevant intersections between international environmental, economic and social
law in order to foster SD.61 SDL can be defined as the intersection of social,
ecological and economic subject-matters of international law.62
Further precision to this body of SDL is being provided by the so-called New
Delhi Principles Relating to SD.63 These principles have been elaborated by a
committee composed of international legal scholars under the auspices of the
International Law Association (ILA) in 2002.64 Instead of defining SD itself, they
rather portray the precepts either emanating from or pursuing the objective of SD.65
The ILA Committee elaborated the following, non-exhaustive seven principles:
1. The duty of States to ensure sustainable use of natural resources,
2. The principle of equity and the eradication of poverty,
3. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities,
4. The principle of the precautionary approach to human health, natural resources
and ecosystems,
distinguish between these supplements of SD and the core concept of SD. cf. in the same vein,
Proelß (2017), para. 52.
61What is Sustainable Development Law?. A CISDL Concept Paper, Montreal, 2005, http://cisdl.
org/public/docs/What%20is%20Sustainable%20Development.pdf (last accessed 8 February
2018), p. 1.
62Gehne (2011), p. 54.
63ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Develop-
ment, 2 April 2002, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/8, 9 August 2002, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_
doc.asp?symbol¼A/CONF.199/8&Lang¼E (last accessed 8 February 2018); Schrijver
(2008), p. 173.
64The ILA, which was founded in 1873, today has more than 4300 members worldwide, among
them renowned personalities who are holding or held prestigious positions in international juris-
prudence and academia, cf. http://www.ila-hq.org/index.php/about-us/aboutus2 (last accessed
8 February 2018). It constitutes one of the most authoritative organisations producing international
legal scholarship, many of its reports are being widely perceived by international and governmental
organisations as well as academia. The 2002 ILA Principles feature prominently in many treatises
on the topic of SD and thus appear to have been recognized as an accurate account of the law
relating to SD, cf. i.a., Schrijver (2008); Grosse Ruse-Kahn (2010); Cordonnier Segger (2017);
Schrijver (2017).
65In a preambular paragraph, however, SD is defined as an “objective” that “involves a compre-
hensive and integrated approach to economic, social and political processes, which aims at the
sustainable use of natural resources of the Earth and the protection of the environment on which
nature and human life as well as social and economic development depend and which seeks to
realize the right of all human beings to an adequate living standard on the basis of their active, free
and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting
therefrom, with due regard to the needs and interests of future generations”, ILA New Delhi
Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development, 2 April
2002, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/8, 9 August 2002, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?
symbol¼A/CONF.199/8&Lang¼E (last accessed 8 February 2018).
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5. The principle of public participation and access to information and justice,
6. The principle of good governance,
7. The principle of integration and interrelationship, in particular in relation to
human rights and social, economic and environmental objectives.
In the last preambular paragraph of the 2002 New Delhi Declaration, it added that
in its view the “consolidation and further development” of these seven principles
“would be instrumental in pursuing the objective of sustainable development in an
effective way.”66
The subsequent sections elucidate the specific relationship between SD as a legal
concept and NRL.
4.2 The Legal Effects of SD
The two major legal effects of SD are reflected in its core conceptual content.
For one, SD obliges states to conduct a balancing exercise between economic,
ecological and social aspects before coming to a decision. This is the effect demon-
strated in the cases Gabcikovo-Nagymaros and Pulp Mills.67 In NRL, it is reflected
in the principle of sustainable use, which is deemed to be an emerging customary
rule.68 This obligation has been identified as the clear, primary rule, which ulti-
mately mandates states to “act sustainably”.69 Evidently, such a rule can only be
respected in a relative manner—relative to the other objectives the respective legal
subject is obliged to pursue.70 Barral insofar speaks of an “obligation of means” that
SD imposes on states, in that it only requires the state to make the efforts necessary to
perform the balancing exercise and not to reach a specific result.71
Whether or not a state has conducted the balancing exercise correctly and
therefore fulfilled its duty according to the SD rule, can be assessed through
66ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Develop-
ment, 2 April 2002, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/8, 9 August 2002, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_
doc.asp?symbol¼A/CONF.199/8&Lang¼E (last accessed 8 February 2018).
67Cf. previous section, Sect. 4.1.
68ILA 2012 Sofia Conference, Committee on International Law on Sustainable Development, Final
Report, http://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId¼1177&
StorageFileGuid¼7dcf2ffb-6010-48cf-ad92-32453d8ee2b9 (last accessed 8 February 2018),
p. 14, Annex, Guiding Statement #3.
69Cf. Proelß (2017), para. 56; Gehne (2011), p. 314 in this respect describes SD as “multipolar
programme norm”; Barral (2012), p. 388.
70Cf. Gehne (2011), p. 314. However, given the universal nature of SD, many, if not most of the
objectives a state is typically pursuing can generally be subsumed under one of the three pillars
of SD.
71Barral (2012), p. 388.
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“measuring tools”, such as the precautionary principle, including e.g. the obligation
to perform an Environmental Impact Assessment.72 What exact standards have to be
met in order to act in conformity with SD, however, will vary according to the
specific circumstances, especially whether a particular treaty applies and whether
this treaty specifies the balancing obligation.73 The SDGs, including its 169 targets
and sub-targets may serve to further specify the “how” of the balancing exercise that
states need to perform according to the rule contained in SD—especially if and
where international judges contribute to the development of legal instruments for
operationalizing them.74
For the other, SD also operates as a methodical norm that regulates how certain
legal elements have to be applied or interpreted.75 This effect is clear, where SD
expressly features in a specific treaty, e.g. in the preamble as in the US-Shrimp case
before the WTO Appellate Body.76 SD here added “colour, texture and shading” to
the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the term “exhaustible natural resources” of
Article XX(g) GATT, essentially functioning as an interpretation guideline.77
On the basis of these legal effects of SD as a primary rule on the one hand and a
methodical norm on the other, we shall now turn to the question what legal status SD
exhibits.
4.3 The Legal Status of SD
The legal status of SD has remained unclear and debated for quite some time now.
Some argue that this might have been due to the need to appease economic interest
groups that otherwise could have voiced opposition against SD as a clearly spelled
out, strong legal concept.78 This author agrees that, after many legal scholars over
the past decade have paved the way therefore, the time has now come to seek greater
72Cf. Barral (2012), p. 388; Proelß (2017), para. 56.
73Barral (2012), p. 388 speaks of varying circumstances rationae materiae, temporis, personae, and
loci. Proelß (2017), para. 56 points to the wide margin of discretion that should be conceded to state
actors as to the “how” of the balancing exercise given the political nature of the task. This indicates
that the SD rule will mainly influence discretionary decisions of the legislative and executive
branches.
74Cf. also Proelß (2017), para. 57.
75Gehne (2011), p. 324. In this dimension, SD thus particularly influences decisions of the judiciary
branch.
76United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the
Appellate Body, 12 October 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_
Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language¼E&CatalogueIdList¼58544&
CurrentCatalogueIdIndex¼0&FullTextHash¼&HasEnglishRecord¼True&
HasFrenchRecord¼True&HasSpanishRecord¼True (last accessed 8 February 2018), para. 153;
cf. Gehne (2011), p. 294.
77Cf. Barral (2012), p. 392.
78Cordonnier Segger and Weeramantry (2017), p. 5.
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clarity as to the legal status of SD especially given the universal role SD has
meanwhile obtained as a political objective of the international community. It is a
requirement central also to the obligation of the international community, according
to i.a. Principle 27 of the 1992 Rio Declaration to further develop the international
law fostering SD.79
4.3.1 The General Debate
The opinions on the legal status of SD differ to a large degree. On the one end of the
spectrum, some authors argue that SD would constitute a mere political ideal without
any normative force.80 They, however, disagree as to whether SD could have the
effect of creating subsequent norms of international law that could flow from it.81
Others describe SD as a “constitutional guiding concept” or “meta principle”.82 The
functioning of such meta principles has been described as “set[ting] the bounds for
the types of proposals and arguments that can be made” in international negotiations.
As such they are said to “establish the context” for the development of more specific
norms, e.g. in international treaties.83 Lowe thus described SD as belonging to a
category of “modifying” or “interstitial” norms, which “are pushing and pulling the
boundaries of true primary norms” in cases where they interfere.84 These modifying
norms are said “not [to] seek to regulate the conduct of legal persons directly”,
i.e. not to legally bind subjects.85 Instead their application is limited to the applica-
tion, especially interpretation of the law.86
While this view seems long to have dominated the debate, more and more authors
have abandoned this standpoint. Categorizing SD as a “modifying” and thus sec-
ondary norm of international law, according to Proelß can serve to circumvent the
discussion as to whether it has obtained customary status as a “primary norm”.
However, he points to the fact that one has to clearly distinguish between the
79Cf. already Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common
Future, 4 August 1987, UN Doc. A/42/427, http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf
(last accessed 8 February 2018), Chap. 12.
80Beyerlin (2007), pp. 444–445; cf. Proelß (2017) para. 53; also Beyerlin (2013), para. 19.
81Beyerlin (2013), para. 19 referring to Lowe (1999), p. 30 deems excluding such an effect “hardly
persuasive”.
82Scheyli (2008), pp. 296–298, 352–353; cf. Proelß (2017), para. 53.
83Bodansky (2009), 203; cf. Proelß (2017), para. 53.
84Lowe (1999), pp. 31, 33; cf. Proelß (2017), para. 53; Beyerlin (2013), para. 17.
85Lowe (1999), p. 33; cf. Barral (2012), p. 387.
86Gehne (2011), pp. 32–322; Lowe (1999), p. 34; cf. Barral (2012), p. 387.
16 M. Oehl
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
classification of SD according to its normative nature and questions related to its
binding effect.87
Mindful of treating these matters separately, authors increasingly now highlight
that despite its open, flexible nature SD does provide a clear rule,88 which obliges
states to “act sustainably”89 or, more concretely, “to balance social, economic and
ecological interests”.90
4.3.2 SD as a Principle of International Law?
One way to clarify the legal nature of SD could lie in defining it as a principle of
international law—a question that has equally sparked intense debates.
According to Statement #1 of the 2012 Sofia Guiding Statements issued by the
ILA,
recourse to the concept of ‘sustainable development’ in international case-law may, over
time, justify a hardening of the concept itself into a principle of international law, despite a
continued and genuine reluctance to formalise a distinctive legal status[.]
The ILA statement alludes to another contentious issue in international legal meth-
odology—the question what constitutes a principle of international law and in what
way a new principle can be identified.
The usual, obvious starting point of treatises on this matter is Article 38 of the ICJ
Statute, which prominently portrays the sources of international law. Next to inter-
national conventions (lit. a)), international custom (lit. b)) and “the general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations” (lit. c)) are being listed as such. Judicial
decisions “and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations” according to Article 38 lit d) serve as subsidiary means for the determina-
tion of rules of law. The interpretation of Article 38 lit. c) ICJ Statute, however, is
controversial. “General principles” are being understood as either principles of
87Proelß (2017), para. 54. The ILA scholars in this respect call for more “flexibility” in the
assessment of the normative quality of SD in order to facilitate an accurate capture of its legal
effects, ILA 2012 Sofia Conference, Committee on International Law on Sustainable Develop-
ment, Final Report, https://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId¼1177&
StorageFileGuid¼7dcf2ffb-6010-48cf-ad92-32453d8ee2b9 (last accessed 8 February 2018), p. 6.
88Barral (2012), p. 378 refers to SD as a primary norm of international law, which “purports to
directly regulate conduct and has properly material and direct legal implications”.
89Gehne (2011), p. 314.
90Proelß (2017), paras. 54–55; also Barral (2012), p. 388; Proelß (2017), para. 56 sees this rule to
have obtained the status of customary international law. Referring to the great number of interna-
tional legal documents, in which SD is contained, he makes this claim in relation to the “if” of a
balancing exercise. In his view, the customary content of SD requires states to conduct this
balancing exercise. Yet, he also points out that IL—at least for now—provides little to no guidance
as to how such a balancing exercise shall be conducted.
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domestic law, principles of international law or those principles of domestic law,
which apply to international relations.91
SD originates from the international legal order and therefore most aptly falls
within the second category.92 While principles of domestic law are typically being
identified through an exercise of comparing domestic legal orders, principles of
international law are generally being derived from either international treaty law or
custom.93 The exercise of assessing the status of a particular norm as either custom
or a principle of international law can therefore overlap.94
Characteristics of General Principles
Herczegh in 1969 defined a principle of law as “a norm of general validity which is
manifested not in a single statutory provision, but by a group of mutually
interdependent legal rules or their system.”95 MacCormick refers to “principles as
statements that give expression to the purposes and values behind individual
norms.”96 Eckhoff and Sundby see principles as “guidelines”, which, in contrast to
“rules”, guide the decision especially of judges where there are no uncontroversial
individual norms regulating the particular situation.97 Koskenniemi distinguishes
between a normative and a descriptive theory of principles.98 According to the
former, principles contain norms that have an effect on substantive decision-mak-
ing—either as guidelines or as elements describing the “background” of the inter-
national legal order, in which the individual judge or “Rechtsanwender” needs to
make his decision.99 Under the descriptive theory, the “organizational function” of
principles is being emphasized. They are seen as instruments “to describe and
systematize the totality of [a certain set of] individual norms”.100 As such, principles
constitute “theoretical concepts [. . .] whose validity is dependent on the validity of
the norms or statements to which they refer”.101
91Shaw (2017), pp. 73–74; Thirlway (2010), p. 109; Jennings and Watts (1992), pp. 36–40.
92Given that SD has as of now also found proliferation in many domestic legal orders, it could over
time also evolve to a domestic principle of law that applies to international relations.
93Cf. Thirlway (2010), p. 109.
94This question again is to be distinguished from the one relating to the binding nature of SD;
cf. also Sect. 4.4.4 below.
95Koskenniemi (2000), p. 371 with reference to Herczegh (1969), p. 36.
96Koskenniemi (2000), p. 371 with reference to MacCormick (1978), pp. 65–72.
97Koskenniemi (2000), p. 373 with reference to Eckhoff and Sundby (1976); Similarly Cordonnier
Segger (2017), p. 61 with reference i.a. to Dworkin (1977), pp. 22–31.
98Koskenniemi (2000), p. 367.
99Koskenniemi (2000), pp. 368–370.
100Koskenniemi (2000), pp. 381–383.
101Koskenniemi (2000), p. 382.
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When it comes to SD, both its normative and descriptive dimension can be
witnessed in international law. As to the latter, especially its organizational function
relating to the elaboration of SDL and the New Delhi Principles respectively come to
mind. With regard to the normative dimension of SD, things become a little more
intricate. In its Gabčikovo-Nagymaros and Pulp Mills judgments the ICJ saw an
obligation for the Parties to reconcile economic development with environmental
protection. While laying out this obligation, the court, however, was not guided by a
hypothetical “principle” of SD in the sense that it required the judges to arrive at a
certain result. Much rather, SD here had the effect on the court to at all set out said
obligation to balance economic and ecological aspects, in the end merely demanding
the Parties to e.g. “look afresh at the effects on the environment of the operation of
the Gabčíkovo power plant.”102 This however does not necessarily imply that SD
does not constitute a principle, but much rather points to its conceptual content,
which—at least for now—primarily provides for the “if” of the balancing exercise,
but less so for the “how”.
The Constructivist Exercise of Forming Principles of International Law
While SD thus exhibits some of the traits usually common for legal principles, it is
not yet clear, whether SD actually constitutes a principle of international law. While
Koskenniemi alludes to the constructivist exercise necessary in order for a new
principle to emerge, the perception of what principles are, seems to still be domi-
nated by the positivist view that law is to be seen as equivalent to state behaviour.
According to Virally, whose view is paradigmatic for this perception, “. . .the
existence or non-existence of common principles is a question of fact to be solved
by examination rather than a priori opinion.”103 Koskenniemi describes this view as
“perhaps the view of the majority of international lawyers today”, which sees
principles as “generalizing descriptions of certain regularities in State behaviour.”104
It may be due to this view that the ILA scholars recognise a “continued and genuine
reluctance to formalise a distinctive legal status” of SD.
At this point, one could now, in an attempt to assess whether or not SD in fact
constitutes a principle of international law, refer to the many treaties, resolutions,
declarations and examples of international as well as national jurisprudence, which
refer to SD in one way or the other. At the end of an exercise that resembles the
assessment of international custom according to state practice and opinio juris and
102Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ
Reports 1997, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/92/092-19970925-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (last
accessed 8 February 2018), p. 78, para. 140.
103Virally (1968), p. 147; cf. Koskenniemi (2000), p. 385.
104Koskenniemi (2000), p. 385.
The Role of Sustainable Development in Natural Resources Law 19
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
somewhat narrows the legal analysis regarding the emergence of a new principle
down to a “matter of relative numbers”, some would likely deem the result to be
sufficient for making such determination, while others probably would not.105
The author agrees with ILA Guiding Statement #1 that this situation could over
time be remedied through judges that, by recourse to SD, render decisions, which
further specify scope and nature of SD as a legal principle. Such a development may,
first of all, however require that judges capacitate themselves to do so—by at least
partly departing from the still dominant methodology when it comes to discerning
principles of international law.
As many have already argued, rigid approaches to the identification of emerging
norms of international law can create major problems for the international legal
order.106 While of course we are far from the tumultuous, deadlocked scenarios of
the interwar period, this thought is still worthy to be borne in mind when
approaching the task of determining whether or not a specific norm has emerged
to become part of international law today. The former president of the ICJ, R. Y.
Jennings already in 1981—referring to customary international law—prompted the
international law community to
face squarely the fact that the orthodox tests of custom – practice and opinion juris – are
often not only inadequate but even irrelevant for the identification of much new law today.
And the reason is not far to seek: much of this new law is not custom at all, and does not even
resemble custom. It is recent, it is innovatory, it involves topical policy decisions and it is
often the focus of contention.107
In Jennings’s view, the categorization of the sources of international law according
to Article 38 ICJ Statute, including the methodology they entail, need to be read and
applied mindful of the fact that they have their origins in the 1920s—and may
therefore be somewhat out-dated. He states to be convinced that “mould[ing]” the
new trends and techniques of how law emerges and is being identified “into one or
the other compartments [of Article 38 ICJ Statute]” would be a mistake.108 Instead,
new modes of emerging rules of international law require more flexibility in thinking
and the methodological approaches to assessing them.109 This corresponds to
another observation that Jennings makes—the fact that today the importance of
105Insofar, cf. Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry to Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ Reports 1997, http://www.icj-cij.org/
files/case-related/92/092-19970925-JUD-01-03-EN.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2018), p. 104
who already in 1997 saw “plentiful indications”, which justify giving “the principle of sustainable
development the nature of customary law”. In favour also Proelß (2017), para. 56; Barral (2012),
p. 386; arguably Sands (2012), p. 217 as well. Cautious Cordonnier Segger (2017), p. 92. Against
Beyerlin (2013), para. 18; Lowe (1999), p. 33.
106In lieu of many Jennings (1998), p. 737 with reference to the difficulties in developing or
changing customary international law in the interwar period.
107Jennings (1998), p. 738.
108Jennings (1998), p. 742.
109Cf. ILA 2012 Sofia Conference, Committee on International Law on Sustainable Develop-
ment, Final Report, https://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId¼1177&
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judicial decisions as well as publications by international scholars may be greater
than ever before, especially when it comes
to bring[ing] certainty and clarity in the places where the mass of material evidences is so
large and confused, as to obscure the basic distinction between law and proposal.110
This description comes remarkably close to the situation of SD as a legal concept
today. As repeatedly mentioned above, there is a great volume of documents and
evidences of state practice with regard to SD, yet as of now, it has rather brought
about confusion than clarity. This calls for the international legal scholars, be they
performing the duties of international judges or of publicists, to provide further
clarity.
It is questionable whether judges and publicists will be able to answer this call by
the former President of the ICJ if they stick to an analysis of the law that is to a large
degree a “matter of relative numbers.”111 As Koskenniemi rightly points out, a judge
finding a principle, or any other type of emerging rule for that matter, through an
empirical exercise rather resembles an ideal than an accurate description of what is
actually going on.112 Judges are constructing principles or rules based on what they
perceive as the fundamental goals and values of the international legal order they are
operating in.113 These form the “appropriate testing ground” for emerging legal
principles.114
Now, what one has to give to the empirical approach is that it attempts to make an
impression of international law making as a reliable, objective exercise—an endeav-
our, which is honourable given that it may help convince many of the legitimacy and
objectivity of the law itself. The constructivist approach, to the contrary, decreases
the reliability of the law making exercise since the constructions of the fundamental
goals and values that serve as the testing ground for new rules may differ from,
particularly, judge to judge that is performing the task.115
In the specific case of SD, however, this problem does not appear to arise. Given
the acceptance of SD as the universal agenda of the international community—that is
even specified by respective goals, targets and sub-targets—the testing ground is
StorageFileGuid¼7dcf2ffb-6010-48cf-ad92-32453d8ee2b9 (last accessed 8 February 2018),
p. 6.
110Jennings (1998), p. 749.
111Referring to international custom Dissenting Opinion of Judge Yusuf to Jurisdictional Immuni-
ties of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, 3 February 2012, ICJ Reports
2012, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/143/143-20120203-JUD-01-05-EN.pdf (last
accessed 8 February 2018), p. 297.
112Koskenniemi (2000), p. 389.
113Cf. also Shaw (2017), p. 52. On the “myth of (in)determinacy” in international law,
Bianchi (2010).
114Koskenniemi (2000), p. 390.
115Cf. Koskenniemi (2000), p. 396: “In this discourse, general principles come in when other norm-
formulations do not seem to provide coherence for the legitimation of the solution which is
intuitively experienced as correct. Such intuition is not, however, an uncontrolled impulse. . .”.
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spelled out as precisely and unambiguously as one could possibly imagine. This
circumstance in fact should be valued as a remarkable opportunity for international
jurisprudence and international publicists respectively to elaborate a set of norms
that finds the support of the entirety of the international community. Of course, this
task—especially balancing diverging interests, capabilities and understandings
between (state) actors—becomes more and more intricate the more specific the
rules to be elaborated need to be. Yet given the frequently articulated need for new
legal instruments fostering SD, there appears to still be a lot of room for the
ascertainment of new norms even before one enters these challenging realms.
The Fruitless Nature of the Debate on the Legal Status of SD to Date
All in all, however, whether or not SD can be seen as principle of international law or
not, whether Judge Weeramantry who saw an according status confirmed, or the
majority of his colleagues that merely referred to the “concept” of SD were right in
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros decision of the ICJ is, particularly if one bears in mind
what President Jennings had to say with regard to new kinds of international law that
are constantly emerging, a rather secondary question—if not to say “sterile” as the
ILA had already put it in 2008.116
SD is indeed a perfect example for a legal concept that deserves to “be released
from the shackles of legal formalism in order to be given operational meaning”,
because in the end, what really counts are the practical, legal effects it elicits.117 As
will be portrayed in the subsequent section, leaving the classical “boxes” of the
sources of international law may serve to not only aptly categorize SD, but also to
conflate its legal effects as a primary rule and a methodical norm.
4.4 SD as Regulatory Objective
As stated repeatedly throughout this chapter, SD has evolved to become the univer-
sal political objective of the international community.118 Against this backdrop, it
116ILA 2008 Rio de Janeiro Conference, Committee on International Law on Sustainable Devel-
opment, Report, http://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId¼1179&
StorageFileGuid¼3d118f92-d796-4ad5-9b78-c22fb3bb3b1c (last accessed 8 February 2018),
p. 7; cf. ILA 2012 Sofia Conference, Committee on International Law on Sustainable Development,
Final Report, https://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId¼1177&
StorageFileGuid¼7dcf2ffb-6010-48cf-ad92-32453d8ee2b9 (last accessed 8 February 2018), p. 6.
117ILA 2012 Sofia Conference, Committee on International Law on Sustainable Development,
Final Report, https://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId¼1177&
StorageFileGuid¼7dcf2ffb-6010-48cf-ad92-32453d8ee2b9 (last accessed 8 February 2018), p. 6;
cf. also Sands (2012), p. 217 who states in a nonchalant manner that SD “is recognized as principle
(or concept) of international law”.
118Cf. above Sect. 3; Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda For Sustainable Development,
21 October 2015, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migra




seems natural that SD also constitutes a regulatory objective, or object and pur-
pose,119 due to i.a. two factors: for one, political objectives are usually—at least to
some extent—being pursued through legal instruments (Sect. 4.4.1). For the other,
law generally seeks to foster the development of society (Sect. 4.4.2). As will be
demonstrated, it features as such in various treaty regimes (Sect. 4.4.3) and can also
have this effect regardless of treaty law (Sect. 4.4.4).
4.4.1 The Typical Evolution from Political to Regulatory Objective
Political objectives are typically being formulated as the outcome of decision-
making processes within the respective government. Once a political objective has
been set, the government usually moves to the implementation phase. Most likely all
states, yet certainly their majority, take legal measures in pursuit of an objective.120
Therefore, one can constitute that on the national level, as a rule, a clearly identified,
articulated political objective at some point evolves to become the regulatory
objective of the legal instruments, which are meant to implement it.
On the international level, the situation is essentially the same. Whenever the
international community defines a political objective, for instance after a decision-
making process in the UN General Assembly, the Security Council or any other UN
institution, it usually adopts a resolution, which not rarely itself constitutes the
instrument for the implementation of the objective. Typically in such cases, the
political objective features in a preambulatory paragraph, thus becoming the regu-
latory objective of the respective resolution.121 The operative paragraphs serve to
fulfil the objective, which thus has been transformed into a legal element. Even
where the international community decides to first articulate the objective in a purely
declaratory, non-legal nature,122 usually the application of legal instruments follows
on the international or national levels at a later stage.123 Insofar the reference to the
119The notions “regulatory objective” and “object and purpose” are being used synonymously here,
both describing the ultimate ends a particular legal rule, instrument or field is intended to serve.
120Even dictatorships/repressive regimes tend to carry out their actions in legal form. cf. only the
disastrous example of Nazi Germany, which exhibited a rule of law that served the most unlawful
purposes, including war crimes and the Holocaust. In an attempt to set to rights these repugnant
conditions i.a. Radbruch (1946).
121This holds true regardless of the binding or non-binding nature of the resolution.
122Many resolutions and other UN acts are typically qualified as soft law, cf. Knauff (2014),
pp. 387–389; non-legal acts below this threshold can consist of e.g. statements at press conferences
or other purely reporting acts.
123If, for instance, in the 2002 WSSD Plan of Implementation, the Heads of State commit
themselves to “promote coherent and coordinated approaches to institutional frameworks for
sustainable development at all national levels”, such institutional frameworks will generally be
implemented through law, thus rendering SD the regulatory objective of such endeavours, Plan of
Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 4 September 2002, UN Doc.
A/CONF.199/20, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_
PlanImpl.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2018), para. 162(a); cf. also Transforming Our World:
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“aspirational” nature of the SDGs in e.g. the Rio+20 outcome document or the SD
Agenda cannot be understood as a rebuttal of the claim that SD constitutes a
regulatory objective: while the specific goals and targets may be aspirational, the
measures that governments—who are supposed to drive the implementation
according to the SD Agenda124—are taking, will typically be of a legal nature and
therefore pursue SD as a regulatory objective.125
Since this is an observation of general validity with regard to any political
objective, it could generally also be said to be true when it comes to SD. Yet, it is
not ruled out that in some exceptional cases, a political objective never features in
any legal instrument and thus never becomes a regulatory objective. Therefore, the
question is whether SD constitutes one of these exceptional cases.
As outlined above, there had for long been a debate as to whether SD can actually
be qualified as having normative character. These discussions, however, revolved
around the classification of SD as either a concept or a principle of law and its
customary character respectively. As Cordonnier Segger puts it, these debates may
simply have been asking the wrong question126—they did not assess whether SD
constitutes a regulatory objective let alone make a statement to the contrary.
Furthermore, the ICJ, while refraining from explicitly classifying the legal nature
of SD, referred to it as a “concept” of international law, which likewise cannot be
read as an expression contrary to the claim that SD constitutes a regulatory objective.
Quite the opposite, the WTO Appellate Body inUS-Shrimps stated that the preamble
of the 1994 WTO Agreement “explicitly acknowledges ‘the objective of sustainable
development’.”127 In fact, the Appellate Body essentially applied methodology,
The 2030 Agenda For Sustainable Development, 21 October 2015, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1, http://
www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_
RES_70_1_E.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2018), para. 21, which pledges that the agenda needs to
be implemented on global, regional, national levels.
124Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda For Sustainable Development, 21 October 2015, UN
Doc. A/RES/70/1, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/
docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2018), paras. 39–47.
125Cf. the catalogue of measures that states shall implement in order to foster SD in Transforming
Our World: The 2030 Agenda For Sustainable Development, 21 October 2015, UN Doc. A/RES/
70/1, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/
globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2018), para. 41: “We recognize
that these will include the mobilization of financial resources as well as capacity building and the
transfer of environmentally sound technologies to developing countries on favourable terms,
including on concessional and preferential terms, as mutually agreed. Public finance, both domestic
and international, will play a vital role in providing essential services and public goods and in
catalysing other sources of finance.” Naturally the implementation of such measures requires legal
instruments.
126Cordonnier Segger (2017), p. 72 speaks of a “search in the wrong direction”.
127United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the
Appellate Body, 12 October 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/
FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language¼E&CatalogueIdList¼58544&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex¼0&
FullTextHash¼&HasEnglishRecord¼True&HasFrenchRecord¼True&HasSpanishRecord¼True
(last accessed 8 February 2018), para. 129.
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which is usually being used for handling the object and purpose of a particular
agreement: to interpret individual provisions in its light, the so-called teleological
interpretation.128 Further examples of international agreements, such as the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD), which will be discussed in further detail below, give
indication that SD does feature as the regulatory objective in quite a few legal
instruments.129 Consequently, an exceptional case is not given in its regard.
4.4.2 Law as an Instrument Fostering the Development of Society
Another element—which relates more to the conceptual content of SD—makes it
appear natural for it to constitute a regulatory objective. It is the observation that
generally, law is conceptually meant to ultimately foster the development of the
respective society it applies for. Every individual instrument, in fact every rule,
contributes its modest or greater part to the functioning of a greater whole, which is
at least intended to or portrayed as advancing the development of its constituents.130
When it comes to the international legal order, in this light even the law of consular
relations can be seen as ultimately implementing the objective of development: by
regulating international relations, it contributes to stability in international diplo-
macy and thus potentially peace—a major factual precondition for the development
of a society.131 The same claim can be made with regard to any rule of international
law, of course with the “causal chain” between the norm’s operation and the ultimate
objective of development being of varying lengths.132
128On the “teleological school of thought” briefly Shaw (2017), p. 707.
129Cf. Sect. 4.4.3 below; also Art. 9(1), 10(2)(a) UNCCDD, which call for national action
programmes to be designed and implemented for SD. Many of such policies will be implemented
through legal instruments, which will generally feature SD as their regulatory objective.
130Again even repressive governments usually portray their policies and thus legal instruments as
being implemented for the benefit of the people, the advancement of the state etc. cf. e.g. the
example of North Korea, which portrays its nuclear weapons programme as a “road of indepen-
dence and justice”, Ellis R and Cuevas M (2017) North Korea says it’s not backing down on
nuclear development in 2018. CNN International Edition, 30 December 2017, https://edition.cnn.
com/2017/12/29/asia/north-korea-statement-on-nuclear-development/index.html (last accessed
9 February 2018).
131Now one could of course argue that also war can contribute to the development of a society. The
jus cogens prohibition of force in Article 2(4) UN charter however is one of the foundational pivots
of the international legal order—which thus clearly gives preference to a development based on
peace, and not on war, cf. also Article 1(1) UN charter as well as principle #24 of the Rio
Declaration according to which “[w]arfare is inherently destructive of” SD. Apart from this
normative aspect, also factually human societies develop better in times of peace, cf. instructively
Sen (1999), pp. 3–4 and his perception of “development as freedom”. War in this context is an
“unfreedom” that needs to be removed in order for society to prosper.
132Take for example international humanitarian law, which regulates an orderly conduct in times of
war, thus decreasing atrocities and fatalities, which in turn contributes to human resources being
depleted in a less speedily manner. In addition, of course, it also contributes to a climate between the
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Therefore, the contention that law, as a general concept, pursues the ultimate
objective of contributing to the development of society is quite easy to make—
despite potentially remaining debates between the political organs or other stake-
holders, what approaches are the right ones in order to reach the goal of develop-
ment, it nonetheless is generally at least intended to or, in case of a rogue
government, portrayed as fostering development.133
Yet the question remains why (international) law should be seen as pursuing the
objective of sustainable development. The answer relates to the arguably only or at
least most prominent alternative that can be witnessed in the history of humankind—
a purely economic development.134
parties at war, which may increase the likelihood of later peaceful stable relations once the fighting
has seized for some time. Or a procedural rule which features in the statutes of any international
court, tribunal or commission: since these institutions are typically created in order to remedy
injustice—and thus tensions between either states, particular social groups or individuals—it
contributes to strengthening the rule of law, thus to the stability of a nation or even the international
community as a whole, which again is the precondition for i.a. economic growth and therefore
development. cf. in this respect e.g. Article 1 of the 1948 Havana Charter, which explicitly
recognizes “the determination of the United Nations to create conditions of stability and well-
being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations” before addressing the
measures necessary to foster economic prosperity; cf. also the Preamble of the 2014 UN Arms
Trade Treaty, https://www.un.org/disarmament/att/ (last accessed 9 February 2018), which does not
omit to mention that “peace and security, development and human rights are pillars of the United
Nations system and foundations for collective security and [. . .] development, peace and security
and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing”.
133I thus do notmean to contend that all of international law actually contributes to the development
of our global society. Proponents of the TWAIL movement and International Development Law
have expertly demonstrated, what normative and institutional changes may be necessary in order for
international law to more vigorously work towards reducing inequalities between global centre and
periphery, cf. e.g., the strong stance voiced by Mutua and Anghie (2000). However, these obser-
vations to my mind do not refute my statement that law—conceptually speaking—is meant to foster
development. Lawmakers will generally at least pretend to be pursuing this objective. In fact, the
TWAIL critique (and others) further underlines this conceptual purpose of the law: the authors are
dissatisfied with the current legal regime since it does not sufficiently foster development. Their
critique thus does not counter my statement regarding law as an instrument for pursuing develop-
ment, but instead addresses the notion and precise aims of ‘development’ one employs. Likewise,
the fact that, conversely, the development of a society may frequently shape the applicable law does
not rebut my statement—both can be held to be correct: law is conceptually intended to foster
development and development drives the creation of law. These simple observations become
intricate only once one enters the debate as to what law shall be created for which kind of
development.
134While in the ancient or medieval times, war glory, the pursuit of religious motives or the
intention to rule the greatest possible share of territory may have been the articulated objective of
many policies, these pursuits likewise can be seen as individual perceptions of what kind of actions
may contribute to the development of a state or society in terms of a “specified sense of advance-
ment”, cf. Oxford Living Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/development
(last accessed 9 February 2018). If not in all policies, at least in most the advancement of the
state in economic terms, e.g. the increase of a nation’s wealth through conquering enemy territory,
securing important geostrategic positions etc. will regularly have featured as, at a minimum, a
secondary objective. On early signs of sustainable approaches to economic development however,
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Without further discussing political objectives in the pre-industrial era, we may
jump right to a moment in history when purely economic development was explicitly
articulated as a central political—and regulatory—objective. According to Article
1 of the 1948 Havana Charter (HC) the Parties, i.a. seeking to institute an Interna-
tional Trade Organization,135 were pursuing objectives such as the “attainment of the
higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social
progress and development” pledging, for that purpose, i.a. “[t]o foster and assist
industrial and general economic development.” According to Article 8 HC,
Members recognize that the productive use of the world’s human and material resources is of
concern to and will benefit all countries, and that the industrial and general economic
development of all countries, particularly of those in which resources are as yet relatively
undeveloped, as well as the reconstruction of those countries whose economies have been
devastated by war, will improve opportunities for employment, enhance the productivity of
labour, increase the demand for goods and services, contribute to economic balance, expand
international trade and raise levels of real income.
Evidently, development here is understood primarily in economic terms. While it is
seen as a precondition for an improvement also of social development, the latter
equally is understood especially economically—in the sense of “higher standards of
living” or “raise[d] levels of real income”—and unlike today does not refer to an
advancement of society also as regards the respect for the rule of law and Human
Rights respectively. The objectives set out by the UN charter are slightly different in
that they call for, in the preamble, “the promotion of the economic and social
advancement of all peoples” yet at the same time for “promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”, Article 1(3) UN charter.
Consequently, while the reference to environmental protection is missing in these
early yet highly authoritative texts, they already set economic and—under different
perceptions—social development as an overarching objective of international law.
While one could now of course argue that this objective has—especially given
that there has not been any modification of the UN Charter in the meantime—
remained exactly the same, this would mean nothing more than to ignore the
significant amount of state practice, which defines SD as regulatory objective ever
since the notion of SD made its appearance on the international scene. As mentioned
before, SD has obtained the status of being the universal political agenda of the
international community.136 While some actors, especially in the private sector, but
occasionally also states, may still be favouring the purely economic understanding of
cf. instructively Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry to Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Pro-
ject (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ Reports 1997, http://www.icj-cij.
org/files/case-related/92/092-19970925-JUD-01-03-EN.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2018),
pp. 107–108.
135The ITO was never established mainly due to domestic opposition within the US, Sacerdoti
(2014), para. 10.
136Transforming OurWorld: The 2030 Agenda For Sustainable Development, 21 October 2015, UN
Doc. A/RES/70/1, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/
docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2018), para. 5.
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development and even act accordingly,137 this observation cannot suffice to counter
the claim that SD has obtained the status of a regulatory objective. This is because
whenever a state pursues purely economic objectives, it would do so, yet without
claiming, at least as regards the international legal order, that its behaviour would
actually be lawful. Instead, in many instances, it would likely attempt to justify its
actions as still remaining within the boundaries of what SD requires, by e.g. pointing
to pretextual environmental impact assessments or the like—thus demonstrating
respect of the SD rule even in times where it (secretly) aims to ignore it.138 In
other words, those state acts that pursue a purely economic objective, thus leaving
out the idea of sustainability, are typically being taken without corresponding opinio
juris.139
Many aspects thus allude to SD having become a regulatory objective of inter-
national law. Subsequently, this contention shall experience further examination.
137Take, for instance, the US government’s recent decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.
While such action has been taken in a move to challenge the presumptions revolving around climate
change, not even the US government seems to challenge SD as an overall regulatory objective with
regard to the other objectives it entails, cf. the remarks by incumbent US president Donald J Trump:
“Not only does this deal subject our citizens to harsh economic restrictions, it fails to live up to our
environmental ideals. As someone who cares deeply about the environment, which I do, I cannot in
good conscience support a deal that punishes the United States — which is what it does –– the
world’s leader in environmental protection, while imposing no meaningful obligations on the
world’s leading polluters”, Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, 1 June
2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-
accord/ (last accessed 9 February 2018).
138This of course at the same time illustrates the weakness of the current operation of SD as an
element of international law. It can only be remedied through further (judicial and or scholarly)
elaboration as to the “how” of the balancing exercise required from states, cf. Cordonnier Segger
and Weeramantry (2017), pp. 5–6.
139This is indicated inter alia by the fact that all states agreed on the SD Agenda. It can furthermore
be witnessed in countless examples of state practice in the form of public statements, declarations
etc. Apart from that, state practice does not have to be “in absolutely rigorous conformity” with a
particular customary rule in order for the latter to be recognized as such,Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment,
27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/70/070-19860627-JUD-
01-00-EN.pdf (last accessed 9 February 2018), p. 98: “If a State acts in a way prima facie
incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or
justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact
justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule”.
On the “two factor test” for determining international custom and its applicability to SD as an object
and purpose, cf. Sect. 4.4.4 below.
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4.4.3 SD as Regulatory Objective in Treaty Regimes
The categorization of SD as a regulatory objective can be further supported by an
analysis of those international agreements that reference SD—they generally include
it as a regulatory objective.140
The 1992 UNFCCC in its Article 2, which is titled “Objectives” sets out that the
overall aim of the convention to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions should be
achieved within a time frame sufficient to “enable economic development to proceed
in a sustainable manner”. In addition, the UNFCCC sets forth the “principle” that “[t]
he Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development”, Article 3
(4) UNFCCC. According to Article 1 of the 1992 CBD, one of the objectives of the
treaty is the sustainable use of the components of biodiversity. Article 8(e) of the
CBD obliges states to “promote environmentally sound and sustainable develop-
ment in areas adjacent to protected areas”.
Article 2 of the 1994 UN Convention to Combat Desertification and Drought puts
the direct aim of the agreement to combat desertification in context with the
objective to achieve “sustainable development in affected areas”. Pursuant to Article
4(2)(b) of the treaty, the Parties are under the general obligation to contribute to
“establishing an enabling international economic environment conducive to the
promotion of sustainable development”. Article 1(c) of the 1994 International
Tropical Timber Agreement defines “[c]ontributing to sustainable development” as
one of the objectives of the agreement. The same holds true for many other
International Commodity Agreements, such as Article 1(3) of the 2007 International
Coffee Agreement, which calls for the development of a sustainable coffee sector,
Article 1(2) of the 2015 International Agreement on Olive Oil and Table Olives,
which aims to “ensure the integrated and sustainable development of the sector” or
Article 1 of the 2010 International Cocoa Agreement, which seeks to support the SD
of the global cocoa sector. Article 2 of the 1995 Straddling Stocks Convention sets
the objective to “ensure the [. . .] sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly
migratory fish stocks”. As already mentioned, the preamble of the 1994 WTO
agreement likewise sets “the objective of sustainable development”. The 2015
Paris Agreement, according to its Article 2(1) “aims to strengthen the global
response to the threat of climate change [. . .] in the context of sustainable
development”.
Further examples include the preamble of the 1991 (Espoo) Convention on
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, the preamble of
the 1992 (Ospar) Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
140Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda For Sustainable Development, 21 October 2015,
UN Doc. A/RES/70/1, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/
generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2018), para.
5, many of which will generally be qualified as soft law, the emphasis here is on binding
international agreements.
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North-East Atlantic,141 Articles 2, 10 and 12 of the 1998 UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol,
Article 4(3) of the 2004 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterra-
nean,142 Article 2(3) of the 1998 Danube River Protection Convention, Articles 1.1
and 6.2 lit. f) of the 2009 FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for
Food and Agriculture (“Seed Treaty”),143 Article 1(2)(a) of the Energy Charter
Treaty, the preamble as well as Article 915(c) of the NAFTA,144 Article 1(2) of
the 2001 EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement, Article 1(a) of the 2008 EU-CARIFORUM
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), Article 1(a) of the 2016 EU-SADC-EPA,
the preamble, Articles 22.1 and 24.2 of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA), Article 3 of the 2014 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement as
well as Articles 3(3) and (5), 21(2)(d) and (f) of the EU-treaty and Article 11 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.145 Also the German commodity partnership
agreements concluded with Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Peru expressly include the
objective of SD.146
All these provisions serve as evidence that SD has on numerous occasions been
expressly included as regulatory objective in international treaty law. We shall now
turn to the question whether SD can also operate as a regulatory objective outside the
treaty regimes it features in.
141Updated text of 2007; the preamble speaks of “sustainable management”, yet clearly refers to the
definition of SD when stating that such management shall be conducted in a manner that the marine
ecosystem will “continue to meet the needs of present and future generations”.
142Here, SD is referenced under the heading “general obligations”, yet essentially used as a
regulatory objective as well, since the specific obligations of the Parties are spelled out “in order
to [. . .] contribute to the sustainable development of the Mediterranean Sea Area”.
143Cf. Cordonnier Segger (2017), p. 81.
144The latter provision defines SD as a legitimate objective for the introduction of technical barriers
to trade (TBT).
145Cf. also the catalogues provided by Schrijver (2017), p. 100 and Barral (2012), p. 388, Fn. 59. On
the EU-CARIFORUM-EPA and SD as an objective Grosse Ruse-Kahn (2010).
146Cf. preamble, Article 1(2) and Article 2(1) of the Germany-Peru commodity partnership
agreement, Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der
Regierung der Republik Peru über Zusammenarbeit im Rohstoff-, Industrie- und
Technologiebereich, signed 14 July 2014, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/A/
abkommen-zwischen-brd-und-peru-partnerschaft-rohstoff-industrie-und-technologiebereich.pdf?
__blob¼publicationFile&v¼6 (last accessed 9 February 2018); Articles 1(2) and 2(2) of the
Germany-Kazakhstan commodity partnership agreement, Abkommen zwischen der Regierung
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Regierung der Republik Kasachstan über
Zusammenarbeit im Rohstoff-, Industrie- und Technologiebereich, signed 8 February 2012,
https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/A/abkommen-zwischenbrd-und-kasachstan-
partnerschaft-rohstoff-industrie-und-technologiebereich.pdf?__blob¼publicationFile&v¼1 (last
accessed 9 February 2018); Articles 1(2) and 2(2) of the Germany-Mongolia commodity partner-
ship agreement, Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der
Regierung der Mongolei über Zusammenarbeit im Rohstoff-, Industrie- und Technologiebereich,
signed 13 October 2011, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/A/abkommen-
zwischen-brd-und-mongolei-zusammenarbeit-rohstoff-industrie-technologie.pdf?__
blob¼publicationFile&v¼1 (last accessed 9 February 2018).
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4.4.4 SD as Regulatory Objective Outside Treaty Regimes
According to the ILA’s 2012 Guiding Statement #2,
treaties and rules of customary international law should, as far as possible, be interpreted in
the light of principles of sustainable development and interpretations which might seem to
undermine the goal of sustainable development should only take precedence where to do
otherwise would be to undermine territorial boundaries and other fundamental aspects of the
global legal order, would otherwise infringe the express wording of a treaty or would breach
a rule of jus cogens[.]147
The ILA scholars, which are notably referring to SD here as “goal”, appear to
advocate for an application of SD which is tantamount to the teleological interpre-
tation of all treaties and custom in the light of SD and its related principles
respectively. In a domestic law context, such effects can usually be perceived with
regard to constitutional objectives—all law typically needs to be interpreted in their
light. Only where they conflict with other constitutional norms or objectives, they
need to be balanced with the latter.148
In addition, States, according to ILA statement #3 with regard to NR and
generally according to the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, Pulp Mills and Iron Rhine deci-
sions are held to “act sustainably”, i.e. to perform a balancing exercise whenever
taking action. Thus not only existing law needs to be interpreted in light of SD, but
also new law that is being created—or any measures that are being taken—needs to
be designed mindful of the objectives of SD.
Both of these effects of SD, as a methodical norm on the one hand and a primary
norm on the other can be seen as characteristic for the object and purpose of e.g. a
field of law or constitution.149
Now the question arises how, i.e. on what grounding as regards legal doctrine,
such effects of SD in the international legal order can be both explained and
legitimized.150 For one, the primary rule of SD could be classified as a rule of
customary international law.151 The dimension of SD as a methodical norm could be
understood as forming a principle of international law, which is equally derived from
147ILA 2012 Sofia Conference, Committee on International Law on Sustainable Development, Final
Report, https://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId¼1177&StorageFileGuid
¼7dcf2ffb-6010-48cf-ad92-32453d8ee2b9 (last accessed 8 February 2018), Annex, Guiding State-
ment #2.
148The ILA here, to stick with the comparison with domestic legal orders, defines four of such
potentially conflicting “constitutional” objectives or principles: territorial boundaries, fundamental
aspects of the global legal order, the express wording of a treaty or a rule of jus cogens.
149On the domestic level, if the legislator seeks to introduce e.g. a new norm of criminal law, it
needs to adequately balance the various objectives of this field of law—for instance protecting the
population, preventing it from committing crime and at the same time ensuring pathways to the
rehabilitation of offenders.
150Barral (2012), p. 391 appears to see such effects of SD as an “extraneous conventional rule” and
thus regardless of its status as international custom.
151Proelß (2017), para. 56; Barral (2012), p. 386.
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custom. This, however, would entail the usual issues related to the identification of
new custom. Paradigmatically, some authors recognize a customary status of SD—
while others do not.152
Another approach would be to classify SD as a general principle, which is derived
from domestic law and applicable to international relations. Similarly to the diffi-
culties in identifying custom, such a principle first, however, would have to be
identified through a comparative exercise—an endeavour that can bring about
equally ambiguous results and would certainly go beyond the scope of this study.
It therefore appears to be both expedient and simpler to leave the classical
“boxes” of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute and recognize the fact that SD may constitute
a source of international law in its own right—as a fundamental object and purpose
of international law.153
Now what follows from this categorization with regard to the binding nature of
SD outside treaty law? One possible starting point would be to assess the quality of
SD as a sort of “customary object and purpose”. As a consequence, one would have
to conduct the usual “two factor test” and analyse relevant state practice as well as
corresponding opinio juris.154
However, given the particular nature of SD, this assessment appears rather
inappropriate, as it cannot serve to adequately appraise the legal value that States
have attributed to it. While the element of state practice can be held to maintain its
relevance also when examining the normative force of a regulatory objective, the
subjective element of opinio juris needs to be modified given that we are dealing
with a different type of norm.155 Instead of asking whether states considered SD to
entail a legal obligation, we shall ask—more precisely—whether they wanted to set
SD as a regulatory objective, thus expressing their consent to the typical legal effects
it brings about. Given the natural “kinship” between political and regulatory objec-
tives, the proliferation of SD as a regulatory objective in international treaty law, the
fact that law generally seeks to foster development and the universal nature of the SD
Agenda I believe that there are good reasons to answer this question in the positive.
152Cf. already above, Sect. 4.3.2.
153Similarly Cordonnier Segger (2017), p. 93 as well as Schrijver (2017), p. 101; referring to SD as
an “objective” also Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April
2010, ICJ Reports 2010, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/135/135-20100420-JUD-01-00-
EN.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2018), p. 74, para. 177; on the need to leave the “boxes” of
Article 38 cf. Sect. 4.3.2 above on the remarks by Jennings (1998).
154In addition, one could also assess the “fundamental norm creating character” of SD, cf. Cordonnier
Segger (2017), pp. 69–72.
155In my view, there is room for methodological flexibility here i.a. since it is fair to speak of a
certain “presumption” for a universal political objective such as SD to acquire the status of a legally
binding regulatory objective. The opinio juris of states to a certain degree is thus somewhat already
inherent to the universal objective, especially when States express their will to “operationalize” it
intensively. This does not mean, of course, to entirely ignore opinio juris beyond this point,
particularly if there should be indications of a changing opinion or a modification of the political
objective. However, there are no such signs with respect to SD.
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As a consequence, SD can be said to unfold its normative force also outside treaty
regimes it is expressly included in.156
4.5 SD as the Overall Object and Purpose of NRL
Now what results from these observations for the status of SD within NRL?
As has been outlined already at the outset of this chapter, the factual correlations
between SD and NR are manifold. The same statement can also be held to be
accurate with regard to the interrelations of SD as a legal concept and the interna-
tional law regulating NR activities, NRL.
As likewise laid out above, SD as a legal concept consists of the three core
dimensions of social and economic development as well as environmental protec-
tion. All of these three dimensions are relevant when it comes to NR, with SD as a
legal concept thus far particularly playing a role in NRL in situations in which NR
are being exploited for economic purposes and at the same time require environ-
mental protection.
Quite tellingly, nearly all prominent cases dealing with SD as a legal concept that
have been treated by international jurisprudence relate to natural resources. In the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, for instance, a conflict between the Parties arose over
the construction of a dam on the river Danube; and also in the only other judgement
in which the ICJ touched upon SD, the one issued in the Pulp Mills case, the
contentious matter revolved around pulp mills that Uruguay had built on River
Uruguay. As already briefly stated above, in the first case the court ruled that SD
required the Parties to “reconcile economic development with [the] protection of the
environment”.157 In Pulp Mills, the court, referring to Article 27 of the applicable
treaty, notably emphasizes the
156As argued by Barral (2012), p. 394 with reference to the Iron Rhine decision, this external
normative force can be of such intensity as to even “revise” an individual treaty norm. According to
Article XII of the 1839 Treaty, Belgium would have had to bear the costs for the construction of the
railway, while in the end the tribunal, interpreting the provision i.a. in light of SD, ruled that costs
would have to be shared between the Parties, i.a. in order to factor in the obligation carried by the
Netherlands to construct the railway in conformity with contemporary environmental standards,
Award in the Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren Rijn”) Railway between the Kingdom
of Belgium and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, decision of 24 May 2005, 27 RIAA (2005)
35, http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXVII/35-125.pdf (last accessed 8 February 2018),
pp. 115–121.
157Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ
Reports 1997, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/92/092-19970925-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (last
accessed 8 February 2018), p. 78, para. 140.
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interconnectedness between equitable and reasonable utilization of a shared resource and the
balance between economic development and environmental protection that is the essence of
sustainable development.158
The balancing of environmental protection requirements, which naturally seek to
protect NR, and the interest in an infrastructure development project was also central
to the Iron Rhine arbitration.159 In US-Shrimps, the WTO Appellate Body
interpreted the term “natural resources” under Article XX lit. g) GATT as also
comprising marine turtles. And also the Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion issued
by the ITLOS in 2011 is concerned with NR, detailing the obligations for states
conducting seabed-mining operations both under the UNCLOS and customary
international law. In fact, in its opinion the ITLOS discusses a broad range of issues
and obligations that are also reflected in the New Delhi principles, which further
underlines the great intersection of NRL and SDL.160
In addition, also the large majority of international treaties in which SD is
expressly being referred to are part of NRL, such as the International Commodity
Agreements, the UNFCCC, or the Espoo and Ospar Conventions.161 With regard to
international legal scholarship, Wälde already in 2004 pointed out that “[t]here is
virtually no academic work in the field of [. . .] natural resources of recent times that
does not emphatically rely [on SD] as a foundational reference.”162
Also the specific principles, which relate to SD are of great relevance in NRL.
Again taking up the New Delhi principles as their most articulate collection, all
seven principles are pertinent when it comes to managing NR. Such is evident
regarding the duty of States to ensure sustainable use of natural resources (principle
#1) and the precautionary approach to human health, natural resources and ecosys-
tems (principle #4). The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities
(principle # 3) must be borne in mind in NR protection efforts, particularly with
regard to shared resources. Evidently, good governance (principle #6) is key when it
comes to sustainably managing NR (and thus fulfilling the duty of principle #1),
158Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, ICJ
Reports 2010, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/135/135-20100420-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (last
accessed 8 February 2018), p. 74, para. 177.
159In depth analysis by Baetens (2017).
160ILA 2012 Sofia Conference, Committee on International Law on Sustainable Development,
Final Report, http://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId¼1177&
StorageFileGuid¼7dcf2ffb-6010-48cf-ad92-32453d8ee2b9 (last accessed 8 February 2018),
p. 12 French (2011), p. 526. Further cases that concerned NR and touched upon SD or related
concepts include Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening),
Judgment, 31 March 2014, ICJ Reports 2014, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/148/
148-20140331-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (last accessed 9 February 2018), p. 226; Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, http://
www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/95/095-19960708-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf (last accessed
9 February 2018), p. 226.; cf. the list provided by Schrijver (2017), p. 100 and the extensive
list of cases in Cordonnier Segger and Weeramantry (2017), pp. x–xxvi.
161Cf. Sect. 4.4.3 above.
162Wälde (2004), p. 119.
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including the need to ensure adequate public participation and access to information
and justice (principle #5) for all stakeholders concerned by a particular NR activity
and pursuing integrated approaches in particular in relation to human rights and
social, economic and environmental objectives (principle #7). Correctly managed,
NR activities contribute to both inter- and intragenerational equity and to the
eradication of poverty (principle #2).
After this brief analysis, one can draw the following interim conclusion: for one,
SD is a core concept of NRL with regard to both of its effects as a primary norm
requiring the balancing of social, economic and environmental factors and as a
methodical norm, which influences the interpretation of key terms of NRL; for the
other, the rules and principles of NRL play a key role in pursuing the regulatory
objective of SD.
Consequently, the interrelationship of SD and NRL are converged in the opera-
tion of SD as the object and purpose of NRL: the sustainable use of natural resources
(New Delhi Principle #1),163 which has emerged to a customary rule—at least in
regard to shared or common resources—and essentially requires states to integrate
considerations of sustainability in all their NR activities,164 insofar represents the
counterpart of the primary rule contained in the core concept of SD, yet specified for
the NR context; in addition, all rules and principles of NRL—including the term
“NR” as reflected in the US-Shrimps case—need to be interpreted in the light of SD.
Identifying SD as such entails the benefit of further strengthening its effective-
ness. As the overall object and purpose, operating on a somewhat meta level, SD
“spearheads” the entire field of NRL, therefore impacts the application and interpre-
tation of all of its rules and ultimately ensures the greatest possible degree of
integration and coherence. As a result, NRL becomes a sub-branch of SDL. In
addition, it creates ample opportunity for judges and scholars to elaborate new rules
e.g., based on the interpretative evolution of existing norms.
5 Conclusions
This chapter has illustrated the evolution of SD from a political objective to a
fundamental regulatory objective of international law. The conceptual content of
SD exhibits a remarkable degree of consistency, with social and economic develop-
ment as well as environmental protection constituting the three universally accepted
pillars. Its legal effects can generally be held to be twofold—it operates as a primary
163ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Devel-
opment, 2 April 2002, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/8, 9 August 2002, http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/CONF.199/8&Lang¼E (last accessed 8 February 2018).
164ILA 2012 Sofia Conference, Committee on International Law on Sustainable Development, Final
Report, http://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId¼1177&StorageFileGuid
¼7dcf2ffb-6010-48cf-ad92-32453d8ee2b9 (last accessed 8 February 2018), Annex, Guiding State-
ment #3.
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norm, which obliges states to perform a balancing exercise in the interest of
sustainability and as a methodical norm, which mandates the interpretation of all
of international law in the light of SD.
Both of these legal effects are characteristic for the functioning of a regulatory
objective or the object and purpose of a field of law or constitutional framework.
Given the large evidence of state practice especially in international treaty law,
which employs SD as a regulatory objective, its universal nature and acceptance,
the multitudinous state acts on global, regional, national and local levels which seek
to implement SD objectives and the fact that law generally and international law in
particular typically seeks to foster the development of society, it appears fair to say
that SD has evolved to become a fundamental regulatory objective of the interna-
tional legal order.
In view of the close relationship and interrelatedness of SDL and NRL and its
integrated nature, SD can be identified as the object and purpose of NRL. Indeed, for
all these reasons, it appears not to be entirely unlikely that it might evolve even to the
ultimate object and purpose of the body of international law itself. Such a perception
of SD could inspire a judicial law making, which keeps pace with the times—and
particularly with the new global consensus on where our world should be headed.
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1 Introduction
In the summer 2016, the US and the European Union (EU) initiated a new dispute
against China at the World Trade Organization (WTO), which concerned the export
duties and the export quotas imposed by the Chinese government on various raw
materials of mineral origin (namely, antimony, chromium, cobalt, copper, ferro-
nickel, graphite, indium, lead, magnesia, talc, tantalum and tin).1 Consultations
I. Espa (*)
Università della Svizzera italiana, Lugano, Switzerland
World Trade Institute, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
e-mail: ilaria.espa@usi.ch
1Request for Consultations by The United States, China – Export Duties on Certain Raw Materials,
G/L/1147, WT/DS508/1, 14 July 2016, later supplemented by Request for Consultations by The
United States, Addendum, China – Export Duties On Certain Raw Materials, G/L/1147/Add.1,
WT/DS508/1/Add.1, 25 July 2016. Request for consultations by the European Union, China – Duties
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018
M. Bungenberg et al. (eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2018,
European Yearbook of International Economic Law (2019) 9: 39–60,
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among the parties have hitherto been launched and failed; a single panel was thus
established on 23 November 2016.2 This is the third time China’s regime of export
restrictions on raw materials gets under scrutiny at the WTO since 2009.3 In a first
dispute, China – Raw Materials, the measures at issue were the export duties and the
export quotas that China maintained on various forms of bauxite, coke, fluorspar,
magnesium, manganese, silicon metal, yellow phosphorous and zinc.4 A second
case, China – Rare Earths, challenged the export duties and the export quotas
imposed on rare earth elements, tungsten and molybdenum.5
The series of raw materials disputes targeting China reflects China’s peculiar
position as a leading supplier of mineral resources in the international market, on the
one hand, and as an emerging economy sustaining unprecedented economic trans-
formation though a variety of instruments of “green” industrial policy such as export
restrictions, on the other hand.6 At the same time, it is arguably a reflection of the
specific obligations on the export side that China has assumed in addition to standard
disciplines contained in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the
context of its WTO accession.7 The former aspect has made it a privileged target on
the part of those net-importing countries that depend on access to Chinese natural
resources to feed the needs of key manufacturing sectors.8 The latter aspect has
rendered its export regime exceptionally vulnerable to WTO challenges.
Not surprisingly, WTO disputes on export restrictions have all targeted China so
far and repeatedly condemned any of the measures at issue: under paragraph 11.3 of
its Accession Protocol, in the case of export duties, and under Article XI:1 GATT, in
and other Measures concerning the Exportation of Certain Raw Materials, G/L/1148, WT/DS509/1,
25 July 2016, later supplemented by Request for consultations by the European Union, Addendum,
China –Duties and other Measures concerning the Exportation of Certain RawMaterials, G/L/1148/
Add.1, WT/DS509/1/Add.1, 23 August 2016.
2Dispute Settlement Body—Minutes of meeting held in the Centre William Rappard on
23 November 2016, WT/DSB/M/389, 23 January 2017, pp. 6–7.
3The third raw materials dispute will be henceforth referred to with its official short title: China –
Raw Materials II.
4See Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw
Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012,
DSR 2012:VII (hereinafter Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials), p. 3295.
5See Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths,
Tungsten and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/AB/R, WT/DS432/AB/R, WT/DS433/AB/R, adopted
7 August 2014, DSR 2014:IV (hereinafter Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths), p. 1127.
6As it is known, export restrictions depress the price of raw materials in the imposing country. This
may lead to a reduction of domestic production, which in turn contributes mitigating the negative
environmental externalities linked to extractive activities by slowing the pace of extraction, and,
consequently, the rate of depletion of finite resources. It may however also boost the domestic
downstream industries that avail themselves of the cheaper raw materials to the detriment of foreign
competitors. For a thorough discussion on this duality, see Wu and Salzman (2014), pp. 426–430.
7See Sect. 3.
8As one of the largest exporter of critical minerals and metals, China can affect world supply and
drive up world prices through the use of export barriers, in addition to artificially lowering domestic
prices. See Sect. 2.3.
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the case of export quotas. Significantly, moreover, China’s efforts to defend its
mineral export restraints as measures forming part of comprehensive environmental
and/or conservation strategies under Article XX(b) and Article XX(g) GATT were
also dismissed: Article XX GATT was found a priori unavailable for violations of
China’s export duty commitments as contained in its Accession Protocol; China’s
Article XI:1 GATT-inconsistent quantitative restrictions were instead condemned as
constituting an instrument of industrial policy.9
The approach espoused by the Appellate Body in the first disputes seems to leave
very little room to China for defending its export duties and quotas in the latest
pending dispute, inasmuch as China – Raw Materials II revolves around the same
core legal issues. What it is more, it arguably exposes China to a very high chance to
be subject to other similar WTO challenges as long as China’s export regime
continues to encompass the same type of measures that were condemned in previous
raw materials disputes.10
In light of all the foregoing, this article aims at dissecting the factual circum-
stances and the legal premises that made China’s export regime the target of a raw
materials “saga” with a view to exploring whether and, if so, under which conditions
the recent WTO case law on (mineral) export restraints makes it any more likely for
new similar disputes to be initiated against it. This article is thus organised as
follows: Sect. 2 illustrates the driving factors behind the raw materials disputes
launched against China’s export duties and quotas on mineral resources. This is
followed by an analysis of the WTO obligations on the export side binding on China
(Sect. 3). Section 4 discusses the implications with regards to China’s regulatory
autonomy to impose export restrictions for alleged sustainable economic develop-
ment needs compared to other resource-endowed WTO Members. Finally, Sect. 5
provides some general conclusions on the likelihood of new WTO disputes on
(mineral) export restraints involving China.
9As it is known, GATT Article XX(b) and (g) justify, respectively, measures necessary to protect
human, animal and plant life or health, and measures related to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources. Pursuant to the introductory paragraph of Article XX, any such measure cannot
nevertheless be “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade.” For a detailed analysis of China’s defensive arguments, see for all Espa (2015),
pp. 194–208.
10For a detailed explanation of how the so-called likeness of success argument conditions the choice
of disputes, see De Bièvre et al. (2017), pp. 411–425.
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2 Driving Factors Behind Chinese Natural Resources
Disputes
China is not the only country imposing export restrictions on raw materials.11 Yet,
several factors explain why WTO disputes have repeatedly targeted Chinese export
restrictions. First, China’s regime of export restrictions has not precedent in scope
and coverage among resource-endowed WTO Members, at least for what concerns
hard commodities. Second, among those such commodities are raw materials of
mineral origin that are strategically important to key manufacturing sectors. Third,
China is a global leading producer (if not the sole producer) of many of the restricted
raw materials.
2.1 Pervasiveness of China’s Regime on Export Restrictions
China’s regime of export restrictions is pervasive and comprises both export duties
and quantitative export restrictions. Both categories of measures are systematically
applied on a wide range of commodities and overall administered by the Chinese
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM).
The Ministry reviews and publishes every year in December a Tariff Implemen-
tation Plan, which contains the list of products to be subject to a new and/or adjusted
export tax rate, in accordance with the Regulations on Import and Export Tariffs.12
The number of HS 8-digit tariff lines subject to statutory export duties has been
increasing in recent years, going from 95 HS 8-digit tariff lines in 2009 to 102 in
2015.13 According to latest data provided by the WTO Secretariat, moreover, China
still maintained interim export duties (i.e. duties applied for a limited period) on
314 tariff lines at the HS 8-digit level in 2015.14 When imposed on items which are
already subject to a statutory rate, interim export duties prevail and are normally
lower, ranging from 0 to 35% compared with the 20–50% range of statutory export
duties.15 In most cases, however, interim export taxes are applied on additional tariff
11For a detailed description of the magnitude and the distinguishing features of the current wave of
proliferating export restrictions on primary commodities, more generally, and on mineral resources,
more specifically, see Espa (2015), pp. 8–34.
12The Regulations on Import and Export Tariffs came into force on 1 January 2004. See Trade
Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/300/Rev.1, 27 May 2014, p. 79.
13Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/264/Rev.1, 20 July 2012,
p. 58; Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/300/Rev.1, 7 October
2014, p. 80; Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/342, 15 June
2016, p. 73.
14Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/342, 15 June 2016, p. 73.
15Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/342, 15 June 2016, p. 73.
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lines items which are not subject to statutory export taxes.16 Based on this system,
China still cumulatively subjects 4.1% of all tariff lines at the HS 8-digit level to
export duties (including both statutory and interim duties).17 Such overall incidence
has only slightly decreased since 2013, showing China’s reluctance to phase out its
export duties beyond what strictly necessary to ensure the implementation of the
Appellate Body rulings in China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths.18
China also maintains the most comprehensive (and complex) system of export
quotas among WTOMembers. It is based on a series of measures consisting of basic
framework legislation (the Foreign Trade Law), a set of implementing regulations
aimed at governing the administration of the imports and exports (the Regulation on
the Administration of the Import and Export of Goods), as well as specific annual
measures indicating all products subject to export quotas for each year (the annual
Export Licensing Catalogue) and the related annual quota amounts (the annual
Export Quota Amounts).19 Both the Catalogue and the annual total amounts are
formulated and announced by MOFCOM on 31 October of each year for the
following year.20 Exporters can apply for an export quota until 15 November of
each year. Annual quotas are then generally allocated by 15 December and, in some
cases, twice a year through a “first batch” and a “second batch” occurring in
December and July, respectively. The allocation of quotas is done either directly
or through a quota bidding system.21 In both cases, MOFCOM sets out general
16Interim duty rates may also be flanked by “special” duty rates which are mainly seasonal and
substantially higher than interim duty rates. For instance, in 2013, thirteen HS 8-digit tariff lines
were subject to a 75% special duty rate. Interim duty rates are revised from time to time, but are
normally in place for many years and sometimes even decades. Trade Policy Review Body, Report
by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/199/Rev.1, 12 August 2008, p. 74.
17Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/342, 15 June 2016, p. 73.
18See Espa (2015), p. 83.
19For a thorough account of the functioning of China’s export quota regime, see Panel Reports,
China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/R,
WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R, adopted 5 July 2011 (hereinafter Panel Reports, China – Raw
Materials), paras. 7.172–7.201.
20Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/300/Rev.1, 27 May
2014, p. 81.
21In the former case, MOFCOM determines the total ceiling for quotas in light of a number of
objectives, including the safety of the national economy, the protection of limited domestic
resources, the development of national industries and the state of demand on the international and
the domestic markets. MOFCOM also allocates the quotas directly or through local administrative
authorities based on criteria that include export performance, the utilization ratio of the export
quota, the business management/operation capacity of the applicant and its production scale. See
China’s Export Quota Administration Measures, Article 10 and Article 19, cited in Panel Reports,
China – Raw Materials, paras. 7.177–7.178. In the latter case, any interested enterprise submits a
bidding price and a bidding quantity to China’s Export Quota Bidding Committee, which is
established within MOFCOM and determines the quantity of the export quotas along with
governing each step of the bidding procedure. China’s Bidding Office determines the winning
bidders by ranking all bids received from applicants in descending order (i.e. from the highest bid
prices to the lowest) and matching them with the related bidding quantities until the total bidding
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eligibility requirements for enterprises, which frequently vary depending on the
nationality of the enterprises. Sector-specific eligibility requirements are also
established and have often included prior export experience or export performance
requirements.22 Often, foreign-invested enterprises are required to satisfy additional
requirements.23
According to the WTO Secretariat and the OECD, such a system still applied to
almost 200 tariff lines at the HS 8-digit level, including more than 40 types or groups
of minerals before the China – Rare Earths reports were adopted.24 Similarly to what
happened in the case of export duties, however, China has reluctantly eliminated the
sole measures targeted by the Appellate Body rulings.25
2.2 Criticality of Targeted Raw Materials
China’s regime of export restrictions covers a wide range of raw materials of mineral
origin that are essential to key manufacturing sectors such as construction, metal-
lurgy, electronics and telecommunication, equipment manufacturing, transportation
(including automotive, aeronautics, train and shipbuilding), chemicals, plastic and
glass.26 These sectors cover a predominant share of the total value added for the
manufacturing sector.27 Significantly, the economic importance of such materials is
determined by their irreplaceability for the manufacture of new high-tech
quantity equals the annual total amount available for each product. See China’s Export Quota
Bidding Measures, Article 26, cited in Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials, paras. 7.187–7.199.
22See, e.g. the requirements established for exporters of bauxite, coke, fluorspar, silicon carbide and
zinc, detailed in Panel Reports, China – RawMaterials, paras. 7.177–7.186 and paras. 7.198–7.201.
See also the requirements imposed on exporters of rare earth elements, molybdenum and tungsten
described in Panel Reports, China –Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten
and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/R, WT/DS432/R, WT/DS433/R, adopted 26 March 2014 (hereinaf-
ter Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths), paras. 7.204–7.235.
23Morrison WM and Tang R (2012), China’s rare earths industry and export regime: economic and
trade implications for the United States, US Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for
Congress, 30 April 2012, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42510.pdf (last accessed 15 January 2018).
24Fliess et al. (2014), p. 13; Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/342,
15 June 2016, p. 73.
25At first, the Chinese government seemed determined not to bring its regime into compliance with
the Appellate Body recommendations. See Espa (2015), p. 328.
26For a detailed description of the most common end-uses of mineral resources subject to export
restrictions by the Chinese government, see Korinek and Kim (2010), pp. 123–130. More detailed
profiles covering the main end-use markets of each material were prepared by the European
Commission. See European Commission (2014) Report on critical raw materials for the EU:
non-critical raw materials profiles, http://www.catalysiscluster.eu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/
05/2014_Critical-raw-materials-for-the-EU-2014.pdf (last acceded 15 January 2018).
27Espa (2015), p. 58.
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applications, including clean energy technology equipment and, more generally, a
variety of environmentally friendly technologies.28
Not surprisingly, such critical minerals and metals are the most intrusively
affected by China’s regime of export restrictions compared to other categories of
commodities. In particular, the highest export duty rates imposed by China are the
ones applied on minerals and metals, more generally, and on the critical minerals and
metals targeted by the WTO raw materials disputes, more specifically.29 Interest-
ingly, China also frequently resorts to progressive taxation, namely taxing ores and
concentrates higher then oxides and semi-processed and processed products.30
Mutatis mutandis, the same holds true for China’s export quotas, which have not
only mainly targeted minerals and metals but also been gradually tightened along the
years, both in terms of absolute value and as a percentage of total Chinese
production.31
All these elements have made China’s export restrictions instrumental to promot-
ing local downstream processing industries, in apparent contradiction to the goals of
environmental protection and resource protection consistently purported by the
Chinese government before the WTO adjudicators.32 Chinese domestic production
and exports of higher value-added intermediate products have in fact systematically
expanded in coincidence with the use of mineral export restraints.33 This has been
possible due to the combination of the price depression effect induced on restricted
materials in the Chinese market compared to world market levels and the compre-
hensive industrialization programmes launched by the Chinese government in recent
years.34 Among them, the Twelfth and Thirteenth National Five-Year Plans
(2011–2015 and 2016–2020, respectively) have targeted the expansion of many
industries that avail themselves of restricted minerals and metals (namely, iron/steel
and non-ferrous metals, construction, equipment manufacturing, shipbuilding and
automotive) in addition to boosting leading-edge manufacturing sectors (including,
energy conservation and environmental protection, new generation information
technology, biotechnology, high-end manufacturing equipment, new energy and
materials and new-energy vehicles), which again comprise large raw material-
28See Espa (2015), pp. 56–58.
29See Espa (2015), pp. 77–80.
30OECD Inventory on export restrictions on Industrial Raw Materials, https://qdd.oecd.org/subject.
aspx?Subject¼ExportRestrictions_IndustrialRawMaterials (last acceded 20 January 2018).
31A striking example in this respect is the evolution of the allocated export quotas imposed on rare
earth elements, which went from 59,643 metric tons in 2007 through 49,990 metric tons in 2008 to
30,259 metric tons in 2010. Although the number of total allocations always remained within the
range of 30,000–31,000 metric tons until 2014, from 2011 the list of products covered by the quota
was updated to include various ferro-alloys that were not covered before. This de facto reduced the
2011 rare earths export quota by as much as 30%. See Espa (2015), pp. 91–92.
32Espa (2015), pp. 114–115.
33Korinek and Kim (2010), pp. 118–119; Price and Nance (2010), p. 91; Fung and Korinek
(2014), p. 19.
34Wu (2017), pp. 673–691.
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using downstream firms.35 The Plans have furthermore been followed-up by a
number of sector-specific plans aimed at imposing targeted objectives for the
reinforcement of “national champions” in different industries, including the raw
materials industry.36
In conclusion, although China has consistently denied that export restrictions
were implemented with a view to lowering the price of domestic raw materials as
part of its industrial policy, such instruments have often played a crucial role in the
development and/or the expansion of strategic industrial sectors instead of
disincentivising Chinese mining production as predicted by theoretical economic
models.37
2.3 Magnitude of the Economic Effects of China’s Export
Restrictions
China is the world’s leading producer of many of the raw materials of mineral origin
subject to export restrictions.38 It also remains or has until recently been the sole
producer of a number of targeted raw materials (e.g. rare earth elements).39 This is
not solely due to the geographical concentration of mineral resources, as in most
cases the global distribution of reserves is much more widely dispersed than the
Chinese dominance in world’s mine production would suggest.40 It is also a reflec-
tion of decades-long mine dismantling processes in relatively-abundant countries,
including advanced economies such as Australia, Canada and the US, which resulted
from a combination of Chinese dumping practices dating back to the 1970s, eco-
nomic considerations related to the cost-effectiveness of expanding production
capacity during a prolonged time of low commodity prices lasted until the
mid-2000s and the increasing regulatory costs associated with compliance with
environmental regulations.41
As one of the largest exporters of critical minerals and metals, China can affect
world supply and drive up world prices through the use of export barriers, in addition
35Wu (2017), pp. 686–687.
36Espa (2015), pp. 114–115.
37According to standard economic theory, the domestic price decline induced by export restrictions
should in turn generate a reduction in domestic production. Fung and Korinek (2014), p. 15. Yet, a
substantial body of literature has pointed to contradicting evidence when it comes to assessing the
adequateness of export restrictions as environmental tools. For an overview of this literature, see
Espa (2015), pp. 119–122.
38China’s dominance in global mining production was thoroughly assessed. Espa (2015),
pp. 58–61.
39Wu (2017), pp. 678–680.
40Korinek and Kim (2010), p. 108.
41See, e.g. Gu (2011), p. 774; Wu (2017), p. 686.
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to artificially lowering domestic prices.42 As a result, import-dependent countries are
exposed to severe competitiveness losses without readily being able to rely on
alternative suppliers or indigenous production capacity. With a view to understand-
ing the magnitude of such resulting competitive disadvantage, the OECD has
specifically assessed the impact of a number of export restrictions applied by
China on various minerals and metals including coke, rare earth elements and,
more generally, several materials that China predominantly produces worldwide.
In the case of coke, China’s export restrictions created a substantial contraction of
Chinese exports and a corresponding price differential of 241 USD per metric ton
between world prices and Chinese domestic prices.43 This translated into a cost
advantage of almost 145 USD per metric ton for Chinese steel producers over
foreign companies, equal to more than 20% of the international market price for
carbon steel.44 China’s export restrictions on rare earth elements have also caused
great distortions in the world market, creating a de facto dual pricing regime whereby
Chinese rare earth processors were paying 31% less than their foreign competitors in
2008.45 Access to supply was also compromised for foreign consumers after China
tightened quota levels below global demand in 2009.46 Similar effects on Chinese on
downstream producers and foreign competitors were induced by China’s export
regime on tungsten articles.47
In light of the foregoing, other relatively well-endowed countries such as
Australia and the US have resumed production of critical mineral resources, but
they are still dwarfed by Chinese production due to the lagged response of supply in
the mining sector.48 US- and EU-based companies dependent on restricted inputs
have started relocating manufacturing facilities to China in order to circumvent the
economic impact of China’s export restrictions and thus remain competitive with
Chinese downstream firms.49 Yet, the threat of manufacturing jobs loss is a scenario
that both the US and the EU cannot afford at a time where economic stagnation is
leaving them vulnerable to anti-trade political rhetoric. Not surprisingly, they have
opted for the judicial option within the multilateral trading system to protects their
national economic interests.
42Fung and Korinek (2014), p. 17.
43Price and Nance (2010), p. 91.
44Price and Nance (2010), p. 91.
45Korinek and Kim (2010), pp. 118–119; Fung and Korinek (2014), p. 31.
46Gu (2011), p. 768.
47European Commission (2010) Annex V to the report of the Ad-hoc Working Group on defining
critical raw materials, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/eip-raw-materials/en/commu
nity/document/annex-v-report-ad-hoc-working-group-defining-critical-raw-materials (last accessed
22 January 2018).
48Even if mining companies decide to increase investment, actual capacity expansion requires at
least 5 years and sometimes even decades to become operational due to decision and implementa-
tion lags. Korinek and Kim (2010), p. 104; Peeling et al. (2010), p. 159.
49Wu (2017), p. 687.
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3 China-Specific WTO Obligations on the Export Side
As shown above, China’s extensive regime of export restrictions, matched with its
dominance in mine production, plays a big role in explaining the series of raw
materials disputes brought at the WTO. Another important part of the story, how-
ever, is arguably played by the comprehensiveness of China-specific obligations on
the export side.
3.1 China’s WTO Obligations on the Use of Export Duties
China’s WTO obligations on the use of export duties were assumed by virtue of
paragraph 11.3 of its Accession Protocol50 and the related provisions of its Working
Party Report.51 According to paragraph 11.3:
China shall eliminate all taxes and charges applied to exports unless specifically provided for
in Annex 6 of this Protocol or applied in conformity with the provisions of Article VIII of the
GATT 1994.
Annex 6 to China’s Accession Protocol, labelled “Products Subject to Export Duty”,
lists 84 HS 8-digit products for which maximum levels of export duty are provided.
With respect to these commitments, a Note to Annex 6 clarifies:
China confirmed that the tariff levels included in this Annex are maximum levels which will
not be exceeded. China confirmed furthermore that it would not increase the presently
applied rates, except under exceptional circumstances. If such circumstances occurred,
China would consult with affected Members prior to increasing applied tariffs with a view
to finding a mutually acceptable solution.
Among the 84 products listed in Annex 6 are mostly mineral raw materials, from iron
and ferro-alloy metals to non-ferrous metals and industrial minerals.52 The bound
export duty rate ranges from 20% to 40%. Significantly, however, China’s maintains
50Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 November 2001.
51See paragraphs 155 and 156 of China’s Working Party Report, WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October
2001. These paragraphs fall under Section C “Export Regulations” and deal solely with China’s
specific obligation to eliminate export duties. Paragraph 155 reads: “taxes and charges should be
eliminated unless applied in conformity with GATT Article VIII or listed in Annex 6 to the Draft
Protocol.” Paragraph 156 confirms: “China noted that the majority of products were free of export
duty, although 84 items, including tungsten ore, ferrosilicon and some aluminium products, were
subject to export duties.”
52Out of 84 listed products, only 4 are fishery products or products of animal origin. See Annex 6 to
China’s Protocol of Accession.
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export duties on a range of mineral raw materials which far outnumbers the listed
products.53
Whether China can still lawfully maintain such export duties and, if so, under
which conditions, depends on the level of flexibility built in paragraph 11.3 of its
Accession Protocol and the related Working Party Report provisions. In China –
Raw Materials, the Appellate Body affirmed that a combined reading of paragraph
11.3, Annex 6 and the Note to Annex 6 indicates that China must not impose export
duties other than those falling within the scope of a specific set of exceptions: those
covered by GATT Article VIII54 and those applied in conformity with Annex 6. In
its view, this implies that (1) China cannot apply export duties on products not listed
in Annex 6;55 (2) the “exceptional circumstances” provided for in the Note to Annex
6 cannot be invoked to impose export duties on non-listed products;56 (3) in the case
of the 84 listed products, China can increase the applied export duties only up to the
maximum rate set out in Annex 657 by invoking the “exceptional circumstances”
exception provided for in the Note to Annex 6, but only insofar as it fulfils the prior
consultation requirement.
The Appellate Body also found that paragraph 11.3-inconsistent export duties
an not be subject to Article XX GATT defences in China – Raw Materials and
China – Rare Earths. It considered in particular that the unavailability of Article XX
GATT stems from (1) the fact that China’s export duty commitments were assumed
under an individual accession protocol provision, paragraph 11.3, rather than being
negotiated as export duty concessions directly incorporated within the GATT frame-
work and (2) the fact that paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol does not
exhibit an “objective link” to the GATT flexibilities, mainly in the form of an express
reference to the GATT Agreement or to the WTO Agreement, more generally, or to
Article XX GATT itself, more specifically.58
The Appellate Body made clear that ascertaining the existence of a discernible
“objective link” to any GATT flexibilities requires a case-by-case analysis of
individual accession protocols provisions, having due regard to the specific language
53In addition, the export duties applied on all listed products are set already at the maximum bound
rate indicated under Annex 6, but the listed products are by far outnumbered by the mineral products
restricted at the exportation. Espa (2015), pp. 150–151. See also Sect. 2.1 above.
54The Appellate Body clarified that the export duties regulated under paragraph 11.3 of China’s
Accession Protocol do not fall within the scope of Article VIII GATT. Appellate Body Reports,
China – Raw Materials, para. 290.
55Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 284.
56Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 284.
57Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 285. This is because the word “further-
more” in the second sentence of the Note to Annex 6 was interpreted by the Appellate Body to mean
that the obligation contained in the second and third sentences of the Note (i.e. the exceptional
circumstances requirement and the consultation requirement) are “in addition to China’s obligation
under the first sentence not to exceed the maximum tariff levels provided for in Annex 6.”Appellate
Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 287.
58For a thorough analysis of the Appellate Body’s reasoning and its systemic implications, see Espa
(2015), pp. 194–208.
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of the provision taken in its context and in light of the purpose of the WTO
Agreement, as well as to the specific circumstances of the case (including the
measure(s) at issue and the nature of the alleged violation)59; yet, it follows from
its reasoning on the limits inherent to the way paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession
Protocol was drafted that China would also be prevented from renegotiating its
export duty commitments in accordance with GATT-specific procedures available to
duty concessions.60
3.2 China’s WTO Obligations on the Use of Export
Quantitative Restrictions
As regards its use of export quotas and, more generally, quantitative types of export
restrictions, China’s obligations arise exclusively from the GATT. As it is known,
the Agreement outlaws any type of quantitative restrictions on exports as per Article
XI:1, which reads:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made
effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any
other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the
territory of any other contracting party.
Contrary to what happens in the case of export duties, this general elimination
obligation applies across the board to all WTO Members and is indeed a cornerstone
of the overall GATT architecture.61 Accordingly, it has been consistently interpreted
in a broad manner in GATT/WTO case law.62 WTO dispute settlement bodies have
in particular made clear that the scope of Article XI:1 does not solely cover formal
quantitative restrictions, such as quotas, but also any types of “restrictions”,
irrespective of their legal status or their de jure or de facto nature, as long as they
have a limiting or restrictive effect on the volume of exports.63
59Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 5.74.
60The classical way for members to renegotiate their tariff concessions is the deconsolidation
procedure under Article XXVIII GATT. For a more detailed explanation, see Espa (2015),
pp. 202–204.
61Panel Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/R,
19 November 1999, as modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS34/AB/R, 22 October 1999,
DSR 1999:VI, p. 2363, para. 9.63.
62At the time of writing, out of the seven cases that have dealt specifically with quantitative
restrictions on exports under Article XI:1 GATT, all the measures challenged were considered to
fall within the meaning of “prohibitions or restrictions. . .on the exportation”. For a thorough
analysis of Article XI:1 GATT jurisprudence on the export side, see Espa (2015), pp. 169–175.
63In China – Raw Materials, in particular, the Panel clarified that “the very potential to limit trade
constitute[s] a ‘restriction’ within the meaning of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.” Panel Reports,
China – Raw Materials, para. 7.1081 (original emphasis).
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Against this backdrop, it is unambiguous that any of the quantitative export
restrictions applied by the Chinese government, a fortiori those export quotas
challenged at the WTO, unambiguously fall under the remit of Article XI:1
GATT.64 It is also undisputed, however, that China could seek justification for
such measures, just like any other WTOMember, by invoking the GATT exceptions
relevant to mineral export restraints—in contrast to what happens for its paragraph
11.3-inconsistent export duties.
Several GATT exceptions have been invoked by China to defend its export
quotas as measures allegedly forming an integral part of comprehensive environ-
mental and/or conservation strategies ultimately seeking to fulfil “sustainable eco-
nomic development” goals.65 In China – Raw Materials, China sought justification
for the export quotas imposed on refractory-grade bauxite under Article XI:2
(a) GATT, which shelters Article XI:1-inconsistent export prohibitions or restric-
tions that are “temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of food-
stuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party.”66 In China –
Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths, China invoked both Article XX(b) GATT,
which covers measures that are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health” and Article XX(g) GATT, which provides justification for measures “related
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”67
In the latter case, however, its strategy has gradually shifted towards focusing on the
conservation exception due to the higher evidentiary burden entailed by the neces-
sity test incorporated into Article XX(b) GATT.68
Up until now, China has consistently refrained from considering other general
exceptions more directly relating to industrial needs. Article XX(i) GATT, in
particular, allows to justify measures “involving restrictions on exports of domestic
materials necessary to ensure essential quantities of such materials to a domestic
processing industry during periods when the domestic price of such materials is held
below the world price as part of a governmental stabilization plan.” Article XX
(j) GATT shelters those measures that are “essential to the acquisition or distribution
of products in general or local short supply; Provided that any such measures shall be
consistent with the principle that all contracting parties are entitled to an equitable
share of the international supply of such products . . . ”. It remains to be seen whether
64A variety of export restrictive measures have been considered to fall within the remit of Article
XI:1 GATT in existing WTO case law, from export quotas through non-automatic export licensing
schemes to minimum export prices. For a complete overview, see Espa (2015), pp. 169–172.
65For a description of how export restrictions have served both industrial and environmental goals,
see Sects. 2.2 and 2.3.
66Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, paras. 323–337.
67As it is known, measures falling under one of the listed exceptions must also meet the test of the
chapeau to Article XX GATT, which requires that they not be applied “in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.”
68For a broader discussion, see Espa (2015), pp. 209–213.
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China will change its defensive strategy in China – Raw Materials II in light of the
ambivalent rationale of its Article XI:1 GATT-inconsistent export quotas.69
4 Assessing China’s Regulatory Autonomy to Impose
(Mineral) Export Restraints
The analysis of the obligations binding upon China with respect to the use of export
restrictions has shown that China has undertaken uniquely stringent export duty
commitments in the context of its accession, both with regards to their scope and
coverage and to their level of inflexibility. As explained below, such commitments
leave it with minimal margin of manoeuvre to lawfully use export duties,
irrespective of what their rationale may be, as compared to other resource-endowed
WTO Members. China is thus left with the harder task to seek justification for
GATT-inconsistent, yet more trade-distortive types of export restrictions, such as
export quotas, under Article XX GATT.
4.1 Regulatory Autonomy to Impose Export Duties
When looking at China’s export duty commitments as arising from paragraph 11.3
of its Accession Protocol and interpreted in recent WTO jurisprudence, China’s
regulatory autonomy to introduce (mineral) export restraints appears severely lim-
ited for two main reasons.
First, the scope and coverage of its obligations are extensive. China shall abstain
from imposing export duties on any products except for the 84 HS 8-digit tariff lines
listed in Annex 6 to the Protocol and, even in this case, it can only increase its
applied rate up to the maximum duty rate indicated in Annex 6 of its Accession
Protocol insofar as “exceptional circumstances” occur and after consulting with
affected Members. The Appellate Body has not yet interpreted the expression
“exceptional circumstances” so it remains open to question whether it is intended
to refer to (any of the) GATT flexibilities. Based on the principle of effective
interpretation, however, it seems very unlikely that it could be considered to overlap
with Article XX GATT.70
As such, China’s obligations are unprecedented among resource-endowed Mem-
bers, be it WTO Members exclusively bound by standard GATT disciplines or
newly acceded WTO Members that have assumed country-specific export duty
69Espa (2015), pp. 111–118.
70According to the principle of effective interpretation, all applicable provisions of a treaty should
be interpreted in a way so as to give effect to all of them without rendering them useless, redundant
or irrational. See Van Damme (2009).
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commitments in their accession protocols. The former group of countries, which
includes all original WTO members and 23 out of the 35 newly acceded members,
are in fact under no obligation to either eliminate or reduce export duties as per
Article XI:1 GATT, although they do remain free to negotiate export duty conces-
sions on a voluntary basis following the same procedure envisaged for import tariffs
under Article II:1(b) GATT.71 To date, however, Australia is the only Member that
has engaged in such practice, although by means of including very targeted export
duty concessions in its Schedule.72 All other Members exclusively bound by GATT
obligations, including large world suppliers of raw materials, can thus lawfully
introduce and/or maintain export duties, irrespective of whether they use them for
developmental purposes or for GATT Article XX-consistent purposes.
Paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol not only goes much further than
standard GATT disciplines, but also has a much broader scope than the export duty
commitments assumed by most other newly acceded Members, including any of the
resource-endowed countries among such Members. At the moment of writing, in
particular, 12 other members (Mongolia, Latvia, Croatia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam,
Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Montenegro, Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Afghanistan, in order of accession) have assumed
country-specific obligations on the use of export duties in the context of their
accession,73 but only Montenegro and Tajikistan have abided by general elimination
obligations, albeit mitigated by a list of export tariff bindings in the case of the latter,
similarly to China.74 They are however neither large suppliers in the international
market of minerals and metals nor have they imposed any export restrictions on such
71Once included in GATT schedules, export duty concessions are binding and legally enforceable
by virtue of Article II:1(a) and Article II:7, and could be subject to the deconsolidation procedure
under Article XXVIII. For a more detailed explanation, see Espa (2015), pp. 131–135.
72Australia has negotiated export duty concessions on a set of 11 HS 8-digit tariff lines (namely,
iron ore, titanium ore, zirconium ore, coal, peat, coke, refined copper, unwrought nickel, nickel
oxide, and lead waste and scrap) by means of inserting an ad-hoc mandatory note in Section 2 of
Part I of its Schedule on “MFN [most-favoured nation] import tariff commitments on
non-agricultural products.” The note states: “There shall be no export duty on this product.”
Australia’s Uruguay Schedule, AUS1-201 through AUS1-204.
73See Espa (2017), pp. 368–370.
74Tajikistan committed to eliminate all export duties except those admitted by Table 9 of its
Working Party Report or applied in conformity with Article VIII GATT, while omitting reference
to Article XX GATT or any other general reference to the GATT 1994 or the WTO Agreement.
Montenegro committed not to introduce any export duty without negotiating the incorporation of
explicit or implicit references to Article XX flexibilities. Other newly acceded Members, such as
Latvia, Mongolia and Saudi Arabia, promised to eliminate only the export duties applied on a
limited number of products. The other newly acceded Members committed to phase down and bind
the export duties applied on a specific list of products (for instance, Vietnam and Kazakhstan). For a
thorough analysis, see Espa (2015), pp. 202–204.
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materials susceptible to influence world prices and/or supply.75 The one key
resource-endowed Member, which did accept to phase down and/or eliminate export
duties on more than 700 tariff lines, the Russian Federation, committed to do so by
means of negotiating export duty concessions in a new, specific part (Part V “Export
Duties”) of its GATT Schedule.76 Accordingly, its obligations are directly incorpo-
rated into the GATT framework and thus grant access to GATT-specific exceptions
and adjustment procedures applicable to duty concessions.
This consideration leads to the second reason, namely that China’s obligations on
export duties are inflexible. As discussed above, such inflexibility stems from the
“objective link” approach developed by the Appellate Body to assess the availability
of GATT flexibilities to violations of export duty commitments contained in indi-
vidual accession protocol provisions, which do not incorporate GATT flexibilities.77
Here again, China is not the only newly acceded Member that has assumed export
duty commitments through such legal technique, but it is the only large raw materials
supplier among them.78
The unparalleled stringency of China’s export duty commitments makes it
particularly vulnerable to WTO disputes as they cannot be derogated from or
modified a priori, at least insofar as the Appellate Body confirms the soundness of
its “objective link” approach.79 On this point, it is worth-noting that, although the
WTO legal system is not based on the principle of stare decisis, at least two
considerations suggests that the Appellate Body will hardly revert its reasoning.
First, the Appellate Body arguably conceived the “objective link” approach as a
general guiding framework for assessing the relationship between the provisions of
post-1994 accession protocols, on the one hand, and the WTO Agreement and/or the
Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto, on the other hand. In this sense, it
seemed inspired by the broader goal to properly situate accession protocols within
the overall WTO legal framework more than just merely deciding on the availability
of Article XX GATT to violations of paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession Proto-
col.80 Second, in China – Rare Earths China did raise four allegedly novel legal
arguments with a view to seek the reversal of the Appellate Body’s finding in China
– Raw Materials, which revolved around: (1) the interpretative value of the WTO’s
fundamental environmental objectives, as stated in the Preamble of the Marrakesh
Agreement; (2) the meaning of textual silence in paragraph 11.3; (3) the existence of
an “intrinsic relationship” between paragraph 11.3 and the GATT 1994 and, (4) the
75See OECD Inventory on Export restrictions on Industrial Raw Materials, https://qdd.oecd.org/
subject.aspx?Subject¼ExportRestrictions_IndustrialRawMaterials (last acceded 20 January 2018).
76See Espa (2015), pp. 156–159.
77See Sect. 3.1.
78Espa (2015), pp. 204–208.
79The extent to which China’s obligations could be renegotiated seems to depend on whether
paragraph 11.3 of its Accession Protocol itself can be amended. China’s accession protocols (as all
other accession protocols), however, do not contain any amendment provisions and therefore the
matter is still far from settled. Qin (2012), p. 1157.
80See Espa (2015), pp. 204–206.
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interpretation of the term “nothing in this Agreement” in the chapeau of Article XX
GATT.81 In examining each argument, however, the Panel did not conduct a de novo
determination but merely aimed at discerning whether they presented “cogent
reasons” for departing from the prior Appellate Body report and concluded that
this was not the case.82 Although this finding was not appealed, the Appellate Body
similarly confirmed the soundness of the approach endorsed in China – Raw
Materials by stating: “[w]e also see no reason to revisit the ruling of the Appellate
Body in China–Raw Materials.”83
In light of the above, it seems unlikely that a new set of challenges against
China’s export duties will result in a different outcome given the extremely narrow
policy space left to China under paragraph 11.3 of its Accession Protocol. As shown
by the evolution of China’s defensive strategy under Article XX GATT along the
various raw materials disputes, however, this level of inflexibility has induced China
to use more trade-distortive, but GATT-inconsistent, export quantitative restrictions
when seeking to address legitimate concerns coming under one of the public policy
goals recognised under GATT general exceptions with a view to seek justification
under Article XX GATT.
4.2 Regulatory Autonomy to Impose Export Quotas
China’s regulatory autonomy to use (mineral) export restraints covered under Article
XI:1 GATT can be assessed by way of testing the extent to which China may
successfully defend export restrictions on the basis of available GATT exceptions.
As mentioned above, the exceptions relevant to mineral export restraints are Article
XI:2(a), the general “environmental” exceptions (Article XX(b) and (g)) and the
general “industrial” exceptions (Article XX(i) and (j)).84
While the latter exceptions have never been interpreted by WTO case law,85 the
reach of Article XI:2(a) GATT and the general “environmental” exceptions have
recently been explored in China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths.86
As to the shortage of supply exception under Article XI:2(a), the Appellate Body
narrowly interpreted this provision in China – Raw Materials and identified three
81Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, paras. 7.62–7.104.
82Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 7.115.
83Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 5.65.
84For a more detailed account, see Espa (2015), pp. 208–209.
85Even so, the potential of “industrial” Article XX exceptions to justify mineral export restraints is
considered to be quite limited inasmuch as they target very specific situations of emergencey. Espa
(2015), pp. 221–223.
86Although such an interpretation and application of Article XX(g) GATT was given by the
Appellate Body in the context of two disputes involving China, the same approach is likely to
apply with regards to any WTO Member imposing mineral export restraints due to the fact that
Article XI:1 is a standard GATT rule generally applicable across-the-board. See Sect. 3.2.
Chinese Natural Resources Disputes: A Never-Ending Story? 55
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
main requirements to be met cumulatively: first, the “temporarily applied” require-
ment, which demands that the restrictions or prohibitions be limited in time; second,
the “critical shortage” requirement, which refers to deficiencies that amount to a
situation of decisive importance or that reach a vitally important or decisive stage;
third, the “essentialness” requirement, which requires that the product be important
or necessary or indispensable to a particular Member have due regard to the
particular circumstances faced by that Member at the time when it applies the
restriction or prohibition.87 In essence, Article XI:2(a) GATT cannot be invoked to
justify export restrictions responding to situations of physical scarcity and/or
exhaustibility of essential mineral resources (that is, situations of permanent short-
ages),88 hence making it arguably unlikely for Chinese measures to pass the three-
tier test.
The odds of convincing the Appellate Body are similarly not good in the case of
mineral export restraints purportedly used for “environmental” purposes. As shown
in China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths, in particular, the Appellate
Body made clear that mineral export restraints are difficult to justify because
environmental externalities and depletion risks derive from domestic mine produc-
tion rather than exports.89 In the same vein, it warned against invoking the principle
of sustainable development and the principle of sovereignty over natural resources as
pretexts to shelter export restrictions under the conservation exception when they are
rather used as instruments of industrial policy.90
Although condemning China’s export restrictions in both disputes, the WTO
adjudicators did elaborate on the space left to WTOMembers for sustainable natural
resources management, with particular reference to Article XX(g) GATT.91 They
did so by shedding light on the relationship between “conservation” under Article
XX(g), sustainable development and permanent sovereignty over natural resources.
They accepted that the term “conservation” in Article XX(g) incorporated the notion
87For a thorough analysis, see Espa (2015), pp. 180–185.
88For more details, see, among others, Howse R and Josling T (2012) Agricultural export restric-
tions and international trade law: a way forward, International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy
Council (IPC) Position Paper, http://www.agritrade.org/Publications/documents/Howse_Josling_
Export_Restriction_final.pdf (last accessed 25 January 2018), p. 14.
89Espa (2015), pp. 209–213.
90Espa (2015), pp. 214–221.
91China’s strategy has progressively focussed on advocating for an evolutionary interpretation of
the conservation exception under Article XX(g) in light of the principle of sustainable development
and the principle of sovereignty over natural resources. In particular, it invoked the latter to sustain
that China’s “... right to ‘manage the supply’ of exhaustible natural resources is inherent to its
sovereignty over exhaustible natural resources, which [. . .] allows resource-endowed Members to
‘freely use and exploit their natural wealth and resources. . .for their own progress and economic
development’.” Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 7.457. In addition, it argued that the
principle of sustainable development, as enshrined in the Preamble of the WTOAgreement, informs
the interpretation of the conservation exception as to allow Members to “adopt measures, including
export quotas, that foster the sustainable development of their domestic economies consistently with
general international law and WTO law.” Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 7.457.
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of exercising rights over natural resources in the interests of a Member’s economic
and sustainable development, and accordingly recognised the right of WTO Mem-
bers to design their conservation programmes based on “their own assessment of
various, sometimes competing, policy considerations and in a way that responds to
their own concerns and priorities.”92 However, they clarified that, while “conserva-
tion” policies may take sustainable economic development into account, measures
that have a “sustainable economic development” objective, such as supply manage-
ment, cannot be pursued under the rubric of “conservation” within the meaning of
Article XX(g) GATT.93 In other words, Article XX(g) cannot be “stretched” into an
exception protecting measures that pursue industrial policy goals.94 This conclusion
lies in the premise that the exercise of sovereignty over natural resources cannot be
intended to enable Article XX(g) to allow a WTO Member to allocate the available
stock of a product between foreign and domestic consumers because, once extracted
and in commerce, natural resources are subject to WTO law.95
Accordingly, several factors were taken into consideration by the WTO adjudi-
cators to condemn China’s measures. First, albeit forming part of China’s compre-
hensive conservation policy, China’s export quotas lacked the requisite close and
genuine connection with the conservation goal inasmuch as they burdened foreign
consumers while reserving a supply of low-price raw materials to domestic down-
stream industries.96 Second, the design and structure of China’s export quotas
system were not even-handed in the sense required by Article XX(g) in as much
as the extraction, production and export quotas were applied “at different dates, on
different products, and denominated in different values without any apparent coor-
dination among them”,97 and the domestic caps were set at levels which were lower
than the expected demand for the period during which they were intended to apply.98
All this notwithstanding, the Appellate Body did admit that “Article XX(g) of the
GATT 1994 does not exclude, a priori, export quotas or any other type of measures
from being justified by a WTO Member pursuing the conservation of an exhaustible
92Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 7.459.
93Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 7.460. The Panel reiterated that “measures adopted for
the purpose of economic development . . . are not ‘measures relating to conservation’ but measures
relating to industrial policy.”
94Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, paras. 7.451–7.452 and 7.459–7.460.
95Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 7.462. As noted by the panel in China – Raw
Materials, “a State’s sovereignty is also expressed in its decision to ratify an international treaty
and accept the benefits and obligations that such ratification entails. In becoming a WTO Member,
China has of course not forfeited permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, which it enjoys
as a natural corollary of its statehood. Nor . . . has China or any other WTO Member ‘given up’ its
right to adopt export quotas or any other measure in pursuit of conservation. China has, however,
agreed to exercise its rights in conformity with WTO rules, and to respect WTO provisions when
developing and implementing policies to conserve exhaustible natural resources.” Panel Reports,
China – Rare Earths, para. 7.270.
96Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, paras. 7.419–7.488.
97Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 7.611.
98Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 7.550.
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natural resource.”99 On a more practical level, however, the very nature of export
restrictions as “measures that increase the cost of [a raw material] to foreign
consumers but decrease their costs to domestic users” was considered in both
China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earths as “difficult to reconcile with the
goal of conservation.”100
5 Conclusion
The analysis of China’s WTO obligations on the export side, as interpreted by recent
case law, shed light on China’s extreme vulnerability to WTO raw materials
disputes, irrespective of whether it purports to use export restrictions to achieve
“sustainable economic development” goals. This holds true with respect to export
duties (that is, the only type of export restrictions otherwise available under standard
GATT disciplines to achieve economic diversification goals), due to the uniquely
stringent and inflexible export duty commitments assumed by China under para-
graph 11.3 of its Accession Protocol;101 and, it also applies to the choice of
quantitative types of export restrictions covered under Article XI:1 GATT, such as
export quotas, including when introduced within the context of comprehensive
environmental and/or conservation strategies.102 The Appellate Body has in partic-
ular made clear that a Member’s sovereign rights over its natural resources cannot be
invoked to transform the conservation exception under Article XX(g), even if
available, into an industrial policy exception meant to assist downstream processing
industries.103
Based on such developments, China is arguably left with basically no margin of
manoeuvre to legitimately use export restrictions to achieve (even indirectly) eco-
nomic diversification goals. This makes the outcome of the third raw materials
dispute highly predictable and, moreover, it exposes China, at least in principle, to
as many new, easy-to-win disputes as the pervasiveness of its export regime still
allows. Otherwise said, until China will not dismantle its comprehensive, yet
apparently WTO-inconsistent export regime, the weapon of litigation will always
be readily available to affected Members. What is more, the criticality of many of the
mineral raw materials that it restricts on the exportation, on the one hand, and its
dominance in world’s mine production, on the other hand, render such scenario ever
more concrete, especially in the context of the recently revived trade tensions
99Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 5.162.
100Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 7.434; Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para.
7.541.
101See Sects. 3.1 and 4.1.




between China and advanced economies that are typically dependent on the impor-
tation of raw materials such as the US and the EU.104
China’s persistence in maintaining export duties and export restrictions, however,
seems far to fade away against the threat of WTO litigation. Scholars have advanced
different theories as to why this is so, with some attributing it, more generally, to
Chinese disdain for a legal system it participates in as a rule-taker,105 and other more
specifically linking it to the lack of retrospective remedies in WTO law, which would
give China a “‘free pass’ for temporary breach”.106 While these theories certainly
play some role in explaining China’s behaviour, it is submitted that China’s
ill-concealed reluctance to get rid of its export regime also reflects a more “ideolog-
ical” stance against what it feels it amounts to a permanent loss of regulatory
autonomy to use export restrictions as legitimate developmental tools.107 This
applies in particular to the use of export duties owing to the uneven playing field
created by the WTO accession regime on export duties, which contrasts with the
paucity of commitments on the part of the vast majority of WTO Members, but also
holds true with respect to the use of export quotas as an “inevitable” avenue to
reserve the right to invoke relevant GATT flexibilities.108
In conclusion, the outcome of and the approach espoused in recent WTO case law
on mineral export restraints will continue to make China highly vulnerable to similar
legal actions until its export regime is integrally dismantled. Yet, checkmating China
throughWTO litigation would arguably fail to move this goal much closer inasmuch
as it could bring back into the spotlight the more general issue of policy space
available to developing country Members after the enforcement of a proliferating
number of (uneven) WTO-plus commitments and, accordingly, raise more general
questions as to the overall legitimacy of a system that allegedly frustrates the
developmental aspirations of its Members.
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1 Introduction
This contribution seeks to analyse and compare WTO Accession Protocols, partic-
ularly the interpretations given relevant commitments made in them regarding
energy and fossil fuels.
Much has changed in global trade relations since the launch of the Doha Round of
multilateral trade negotiations in November 2001. While these negotiations have
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hitherto been virtually dead-locked, regional arrangements and various protectionist
practices continue to proliferate. Nonetheless, WTO economists have issued a strong
upward revision to their forecast for 2017 trade expansion due to a sharp acceleration
in global trade growth in the first half of the year.1 At the same time the WTO edges
steadily closer towards near universal membership.2 It also gradually consolidates
and extends its disciplines to cover ever wider areas of international commerce.3
This evidently shows that despite its manifold shortcomings which are much
debated, the WTO still remains the trusted guardian of the world’s system of
multilateral trade governance.
2 Accession to the GATT and the WTO
Except perhaps for the ICJ’s First Admission Case regarding accession to member-
ship in the United Nations, accession to membership in international organisations
has seldom been subject of legal analysis.4
Accession to the WTO, governed by the provisions of Article XII of the WTO
Agreement, is open to “any state or separate customs territory possessing full
autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters
provided for in the Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements. . .on terms to
be agreed [and] . . .shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agree-
ments annexed thereto” (Art.XII:1).5 This provision also confirms that the principle
of the “single undertaking” as stated in Article II:2 WTO is applicable to acceding
countries.6 As the procedural aspects are not regulated in Article XII WTO, a
“Handbook on Accession” to the WTO, provides guidance to what essentially
constitutes continuation of pre-established GATT practice. Accordingly, upon appli-
cation directed to the Director General the General Council may establish a ‘Work-
ing Party’ (WP) generally given standard terms of reference “to examine the
1WTO upgrades forecast for 2017 as trade rebounds strongly, 21 September 2017, PRESS/800,
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres17_e/pr800_e.htm (last accessed 27 May 2018).
2Since 29 July 2016 the WTO has 164 Members and covers ca. 98% of world trade. According to
the most recent list of Current AccessionWorking Parties 22 countries seek membership, 6 of which
are Least-Developed Countries (LDCs), List of Current Accession Working Parties, WT/ACC/17/
Rev.6, 18 December 2017.
3See e.g. Agreement on Trade Facilitation (TFA), WT/L/940, in force since 22 Feb. 2018; Weiss
(1998), pp. 71–117.
4Conditions of Admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of
28 May 1948, Reported in International Law Quarterly, 2(3): 483–519.
5Compare the similar yet different wording of Art. XXXIII, General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 (‘GATT’); see also Parenti (2000), pp. 141–157.
6Article II:2 of the WTO Agreement provides that the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annexes
1, 2 and 3 are “integral parts” of the WTO Agreement, Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
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application of the Government of... . .to accede to the WTO under Article XII and to
submit to the General Council recommendations which may include a draft Protocol
of accession”.7
The process of accession, briefly summarised, consists of negotiations on the
terms of accession, the so-called ticket of admission. One track of negotiations, the
“bilaterals”, deal with market-access commitments in the fields of goods and ser-
vices. The other track, operating at the multilateral level of the WP, is concerned
with examining the compliance of the applicant’s internal legislation with WTO
provisions of the covered agreements and with discussion on how to secure such
compliance upon accession.8 The results of the two-track negotiations will be
recorded in the WP Report and in the attached schedules of concessions comprising
the consolidated schedules of concessions for goods and services, the outcome of the
so-called “bilaterals”. The WP Report normally contains a description of the foreign
trade regime of the acceding country and of the commitments it will undertake upon
accession, mainly commitments assuring compliance with the covered agreements,
but may also contain other commitments, e.g. to submit annual reports on progress of
a privatization process etc. Lastly, the WP Report also includes the drafts of the
accession decision by the General Council and of the all-important Protocol of
accession. After adoption of the completed WP Report by the WP which signals
its formal conclusion, it will be sent to the Ministerial Conference or, if not in
session, to the General Council for final approval of the terms of accession. This
approval, however, does not constitute the end of the accession process. The General
Council merely decides that the applicant country ‘may accede to the WTO’ upon
acceptance of the protocol—normally by signature of one of its authorised repre-
sentatives—which enters into force 30 days after the acceptance.9 This Protocol,
including the specific commitments made by the acceding country, both regarding its
internal legislation and market access referred to in the WP Report, shall form an
integral part of the WTO Agreement for the acceding country.10 Violation of the
provisions of the Accession Protocol will, therefore, be subject to the disciplines of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
7Accession to the World Trade Organization, Procedures for Negotiations under Article XII,
WT/ACC/1, 24 March 1995 as revised by Accession to the World Trade Organization, Procedures
for Negotiations under Article XII, Note by the Secretariat, WT/ACC/22/Rev.1, 5 April 2016.
8Parenti (2000), p. 151.
9See e.g. Accession of Ukraine, Decision of the General Council, WT/L/718, 13 February 2008,
para 8.
10E.g. Accession of Ukraine, Decision of the General Council, WT/L/718, 13 February 2008, para
2.
Energy and Fossil Fuels as a Topic of WTO Accession Protocols 63
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
3 Energy and Fossil Fuels in WTO Accession Protocols
Two landmark rulings of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)—“China-Raw
Materials”11 and “China-Rare Earths”12 provided authoritative, yet to some extent
ambivalent guidance on a series of complex legal issues involving the use of various
types of export restrictions by WTO Members.
Both cases involved several complainants and numerous third party participants.
In each of them the Appellate Body (AB) concurred with the three complainants. In
the case of China-Raw Materials the AB, with a few exceptions only, also broadly
agreed with the Panel Report that China had violated WTO law and gave short shrift
to certain export restrictions maintained by the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.).
Commentators observed that the AB’s decision would set the tone for export
restrictions on natural resources and energy products and that it will undoubtedly
have far reaching consequences for raw-material exporting countries. However, the
AB also adopted a somewhat controversial finding with potentially significant
implications for international trade in mineral products as well as for agricultural
and energy products. The AB in effect ruled that due to the wording of China’s
Accession Protocol under which it had assumed additional commitments with
respect to export duties,13 China was not permitted to invoke, as a defence, public
policy justifications such as environmental protection, though widely accepted
amongst the WTO membership.
These cases triggered intense debates amongst trade policy experts and trade law
scholars both on issues relating to the general status of raw materials in trade law and
on the legal characteristics and interpretation of Accession Protocols containing
commitments regarding raw materials.14
3.1 Status of Raw Materials in Trade Law
As for the first set of issues, the status of raw materials in trade law, suffice it to recall
that while the abortive Havana Charter for an International Trade Organisation (ITO)
of April 194815 contained a chapter on Intergovernmental Commodity Agreements
11Appellate Body Reports, China –Measures Related to the Exportation of Various RawMaterials,
WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012.
12Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten
and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/AB/R, WT/DS432/AB/R, WT/DS433/AB/R, adopted
29 August 2014.
13Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 November 2001:
E.g. under Article 18 of Appendix 1A of the Accession Agreement, China is required to make
annual notifications of non-automatic export restrictions.
14For an account of the historical background and terminological usage see e.g. Weiss (2015),
pp. 296ff.
15Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, UN Doc. E/Conf.2/78, 24 March 1948.
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and a definition of raw materials, the GATT does not contain its own rules on trade
with raw materials as it was not drafted in contemplation of such trade. Instead it
incorporates those of the Havana Charter through a series of complex cross-
references, most importantly Article XX (h), which covers export or import quotas.16
In fact the GATT Contracting Parties never managed to agree on standards for
agreements on raw materials as envisaged under Article XX (h) GATT, nor was
any such agreement ever submitted to them, whether for their approval or disap-
proval. Generally speaking, the GATT remained passive in this respect, prompting
discontent and criticism on the part of developing countries.
3.2 WTO Accession Protocols
The focus of this article, however, is on the second set of issues, the AB’s novel
approach to the interpretation of commitments made regarding natural resources and
energy in Accession Protocols.
In recent years, interdependence within the global economy has deepened.
Particularly after the global financial crisis in 2008, disputes over “behind-the-
border” measures have been increasing steeply, amid clashes of multiple sets of
trade rules and industrial policies. In fact export restrictions represented the fastest
growing type of trade restriction accounting for 27% of all new trade restrictive
measures introduced by WTO Members in the years 2013–2014, the highest ever
recorded since the start of the crisis.17 In the extractive sectors, export restrictions
have been particularly controversial due to their ambivalence. Indeed, by slowing the
pace of extraction and hence depletion of finite resources they are apt to mitigating
negative environmental consequences associated with extractive activities. On the
other hand, by also de facto “subsidizing” domestic downstream producers, they
serve industrial policies. In order to uphold the WTO’s “rule-oriented” approach
during turning points in the international economic order, it seems that analysis of
such measures needs to be extended to cover the objectives and backgrounds for
their introduction, and even their secondary effects, so that the objective structure of
the measures themselves can be accurately understood. Otherwise, measures osten-
sibly taken e.g. for environmental or safety reasons can provide pretexts for “murky”
protectionism. Export restrictions on natural resources and foodstuffs have become
problematic in terms of international trade, and have repeatedly been subject of
discussions and analysis,18 including in the WTO Doha Round negotiations in the
16Article XX(h) GATT and Note Ad Article XX(h) GATT.
17Report to The TPRB from the Director-General on Trade-Related Developments, WT/TPR/OV/
W/8, 27 June 2014, p. 23. Despite their pledge to roll back protectionist measures, G-20 economies
alone have introduced 1441 trade restrictive measures including trade remedies since 2008; 75% of
these were still in place by October 2015, cf. Key findings in Joint OECD-WTO-UNCTAD Report
on G-20 Trade and Investment Measures, 30 October 2015.
18OECD (2014).
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fields of Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and agriculture.19 Quantitative
restrictions (QRs) have habitually focused on imports, but it is noteworthy that a
number of WTO Members20 implement restrictions and controls on exports.21
Disciplines over export restrictions prescribed in WTO Agreements including
Accession Protocols were several times subject to interpretation and elucidation in
WTO dispute settlement proceedings.22
4 Energy in Accession Protocols 1996–2015
Since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, 34 new countries have joined the
Organization, bringing the total amount of WTOMembers to 164 in 2018.23 Several
of these countries, such as China, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Russia
and Ukraine are major energy producing, exporting, importing and/or transporting
countries and have taken up commitments relevant for this sector. This section will
highlight the most important of these commitments in chronological order of
accession. It will discuss the main commitments made by seven WTO Members
that are, in various ways, particularly important players on the global energy stage.
Several of these countries, namely Ecuador, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Russia and
Kazakhstan are major fossil fuel producers. Moreover, Ecuador and Saudi Arabia
are also members of the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC). We also
discuss the contrasting example of China, the WTO Member which is both the
world’s biggest solar panel producer and energy importer. Last but not least, we will
also look at the accession commitments of one of the most contested energy transit
countries worldwide: Ukraine.
19Japan, along with Switzerland, has made a proposal regarding export restrictions from the
perspective of food importing countries aiming at tightening conditions for the implementation of
export restrictions and for monitoring their continued use.
20E.g. China, ASEAN, USA, Canada; on food stuff after 2010 e.g. Russia, Ukraine, India, Pakistan,
Argentina, Kazakhstan.
21Depending on their objectives several categories of export restrictions may be distinguished:
(1) Export tariffs (taxes) to generate fiscal revenue; (2) Export restrictions/export tariffs (taxes) to
protect domestic industries; (3) Export limits/export tariffs, taxes to protect domestic supply;
(4) Investment-related export demand; (5) Miscellaneous other export restricting measures,
e.g. diplomatic measures (pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions, international treaties,
international export control frameworks).
22Liu (2014), pp. 751–771.
23See WTO, ‘Protocols of accession for new members since 1995, including commitments in goods
and services’, 30 November 2015, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.
htm (last accessed 27 May 2015).
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4.1 Ecuador (1996)
Ecuador is one of the thirteen Members of OPEC. The country joined the WTO
briefly after its establishment, in 1996.24 At that time, energy discussions were not
centre stage in the multilateral trading forum, when the newly established Organi-
zation and its Members had plenty of other matters to deal with. Perhaps for this
reason, energy did not feature prominently in Ecuador’s Accession Protocol. Energy
(oil and gas), are mentioned with respect to economic policies and state trading
enterprises, as the only sector where prices were controlled by the state.25 Never-
theless, no stringent commitments were made in this sector. The country did,
however, take up some commitments in the energy services sectors (services inci-
dental to mining).26
4.2 Oman (2000)
While Oman is not a Member of the OPEC (though often mistaken for one), it is a
prominent oil producer and exporter. It acceded to the WTO in 2000. In contrast to
Ecuador, energy issues already played a bigger role in Oman’s accession. Leading
up to its efforts to accede to the WTO, Oman for instance significantly liberalized its
markets.27 Aside from going through a process of privatisation, it agreed to consider
its national oil company, Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) as a State Trading
Enterprise in the sense of the GATT Article XVII.28 It also opened its service sector
with respect to reservoir exploration and electricity distribution without any
24Protocol for The Accession of The Republic of Ecuador to the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, WT/ACC/ECU/6, 22 August 1995; Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of Ecuador, WT/L/77 + Corr.1, 7 August 1995.
25Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ecuador, WT/L/77, 14 July 1995, para 7: ‘The
only prices controlled by the State were internal prices of certain oil and gas products for domestic
consumption, pharmaceuticals and electricity.’; Para 63 on State-Ownership and Privatization;
State Trading Enterprises: ‘Furthermore, there were no monopolies in Ecuador except in the case of
natural gas and some petroleum products.’ And, Pricing Policies, para 52: ‘The price-setting policy
Ecuador had established in the 1970s had been virtually dismantled. The exceptions to this trend
were fuels and gas for household use, where prices were set by the Ministries of Finance and
Energy and Mining; and medicaments.’
26UNCTAD (2001), p. 211.
27Protocol of Accession of The Sultanate of Oman to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, (WT/ACC/OMN/28, 3 November 2000); Report of the Working Party
on the Accession of Oman, WT/ACC/OMN/26, 28 September 2000, para 14; Also see IBP
(2015), p. 114.
28Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Oman, WT/ACC/OMN/26, 28 September 2000,
paras 109–114, at para 112; Also see Jimenez-Guerra (2001), p. 23.
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conditions.29 Last but not least, Oman signed up to the Agreement on Government
Procurement (AGP), which is a plurilateral trade agreement binding only those WTO
Members which have accepted it.30 This implies that when procuring energy prod-
ucts, Oman has to abide by the rules of this Agreement, which has far-reaching
consequences for the country.
4.3 China (2001)
China joined the WTO in 2001.31 While it is not a major energy producer, it is the
world’s biggest importer of energy as well as the main manufacturer of solar panels
worldwide.32 It is, therefore, imperative to discuss the country in this context.
Because China’s domestic market is so vast, concerns were raised with respect to
price controls that the country maintains on various products.33 Energy (gas and
electricity) is also subject to these price controls.34 In its Accession Protocol, China
has agreed to apply its price controls in a WTO consistent manner, although it was
permitted to maintain them.35 China is also expressly allowed to maintain an import
quota on processed oil (a WTO-minus commitment).36
With regard to State Trading, China also undertook WTO-minus commitments,
as it retained the right to impose import and export state trading measures on crude
and processed oil, but has to do so in a fully transparent and WTO-compliant
29Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Oman, WT/ACC/OMN/26, 28 September 2000,
paras 109–114, at para 112; Also see Jimenez-Guerra (2001), p. 23.
30Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Oman, WT/ACC/OMN/26, 28 September 2000,
p. 121; Article II:3, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154; Annex 4, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154.
31Protocol on The Accession of The People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 November 2001;
Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/MIN(01)/3, 10 November 2001.
32Earth Policy Institute, Annual Solar Photovoltaics Production by Country, 1995–2012, 31 July
2013, www.earth-policy.org/datacenter/xls/indicator12_2013_2.xlsx (last accessed 27 May 2018).
33Milthorp and Christy (2011), p. 314.
34Milthorp and Christy (2011), p. 314 and Annex 4 to Protocol on The Accession of The People’s
Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 November 2001.
35Milthorp and Christy (2011), p. 314 and Annex 4 to Protocol on The Accession of The People’s
Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 November 2001 and Protocol on The Accession of The People’s
Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 November 2001, para 64: ‘In response, the representative of
China confirmed that China would apply its current price controls and any other price controls
upon accession in a WTO consistent fashion, and would take account of the interests of exporting
WTO Members as provided for in Article III:9 of the GATT 1994. He also confirmed that price
controls would not have the effect of limiting or otherwise impairing China’s market-access
commitments on goods and services. The Working Party took note of these commitments’.
36Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/MIN(01)/3, 10 November 2001,
p. 134, Table 2.
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manner.37 Last but not least, as discussed above, it is well known that China agreed
to tie its export duties on several raw materials and rare earths, not to mention that it
would eliminate other export restrictions (such as licensing), central issues in the
China-Raw Materials and China-Rare Earths cases.38 While not directly pertaining
to energy, this is relevant for the wider debate concerning restrictive measures
affecting raw materials and natural resources. Additionally, it is important with
regard to the (im)possibility of Members to invoke GATT Article XX Exceptions
to its obligations flowing from Accession Protocols.39
4.4 Saudi Arabia (2005)
Saudi Arabia’s WTO Accession marked the entry of one of the world biggest oil
producers and the most prominent OPEC Member. Dual energy pricing issues were
a key issue in its accession.40 After heated negotiations, especially in the context
with the EU (back then still the EC), Saudi Arabia did eventually take up the
commitment that it would not sell its petroleum domestically below the world market
price41:
In response to a question from a Member of the Working Party, the representative of Saudi
Arabia stated that all petroleum-based and natural gas-based products in Saudi Arabia were
made available to all users regardless of whether the users were Saudi or foreign owned. He
37Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/MIN(01)/3, 10 November 2001,
p. 134, Table 2, Annex 2A2 (‘Products Subject to State Trading Import’), paras 50–57 and 58–73,
respectively, and Annex 2A2 (‘Products Subject to State Trading Export’), items 31–49, list coal,
crude oil and processed oil.
38Appellate Body Reports, China –Measures Related to the Exportation of Various RawMaterials,
WT/DS394/AB/R/WT/DS395/AB/R/WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 2012:
VII, p. 3295; Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw
Materials, WT/DS394/R, Add.1 and Corr.1/WT/DS395/R, Add.1 and Corr.1/WT/DS398/R,
Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted 22 February 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Reports
WT/DS394/AB/R/WT/DS395/AB/R/WT/DS398/AB/R, DSR 2012:VII, p. 3501; Appellate Body
Reports, China –Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum,
WT/DS431/AB/R/WT/DS432/AB/R/WT/DS433/AB/R, adopted 29 August 2014; Panel Reports,
China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum,
WT/DS431/R and Add.1/WT/DS432/R and Add.1/WT/DS433/R and Add.1, adopted 29 August
2014, upheld by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS431/AB/R/WT/DS432/AB/R/WT/DS433/AB/R;
note that paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol (n 31) does not include a reference to the
GATT, in contrast to newer Accession Protocols (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan).
39Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials,
WT/DS394/R, Add.1 and Corr.1/WT/DS395/R, Add.1 and Corr.1/WT/DS398/R, Add.1 and
Corr.1, adopted 22 February 2012, paras 7.124–7.129; Appellate Body Reports, China –Measures
Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R/WT/DS395/AB/R/WT/
DS398/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012, paras 279–285.
40Milthorp and Christy (2011), p. 306 ff.
41Milthorp and Christy (2011), p. 306 ff.
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noted that currently domestic sales of heavy naphtha were not subject to any discount and
were priced at the prevailing international price. Prices of exports of these products, he
confirmed, were based entirely on international market conditions.42
In view of the fact that Saudi Arabia and OPEC (still) have considerable influence on
the world market price of oil, by means of the production quota they apply on crude
petroleum, the question arises to what extent this is really a firm commitment to
eliminate dual pricing. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s dual pricing policies may be
administered in different ways than just through a low domestic price of petroleum
(e.g. by administering export taxes on petroleum (not regulated by the GATT),
which may not be included in the calculation of the world market price).
Apart from petroleum, there are large quantities of natural gas in Saudi Arabia,
mostly in the form of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) produced as a by-product of oil
exploration. In its accession report, the country did note that natural gas was sold
domestically at a regulated price, as this gas is not intended for export.43 As this was
subjected to considerable criticism from the EU, the representative from Saudi
Arabia in the Report of the Working Party stated that:
Saudi Arabia would apply its price regulations and profit controls in a WTO consistent
fashion, taking into account the interests of exporting WTO Members as provided for in
Article III:9 of the GATT 1994 and in Article VIII of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS).44
Because it is so closely tied to its petrochemical sector, State Trading was another
issue that attracted much attention in Saudi Arabia’s accession negotiations.45
Paragraphs 44–52 of the Working Party Report dealt with this matter. State Trading
Enterprises that are especially relevant for the Saudi energy sector are the Saudi
Arabian Basic Industries Cooperation (SABIC), the Saudi Electricity Company
(SEC) and the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Aramco). Concerning the first,
SABIC, the report stated that the company, although state owned, does not enjoy
any special or exclusive privileges and there are no legal impediments to competi-
tion.46 The same statement was made regarding SEC.47 Saudi Aramco plays a
prominent role in exploiting domestic energy resources and the country’s investor
42Protocol on the Accession of The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, WT/L/627, 11 December 2005;
Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, WT/ACC/SAU/61,
1 November 2005, para 28.
43But it emphasised that this price was available to all on the domestic market, whether from
domestic or foreign origin. See especially Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (n 24) para 29; This is not deemed to be contrary to Article III.9 GATT.
44Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, WT/ACC/SAU/
61, 1 November 2005, para 37, incorporating by reference the list in Annex A, which includes an
exhaustive list of goods that are subject to price controls.
45Milthorp and Christy (2011), p. 311 ff.
46Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, WT/ACC/SAU/
61, subparagraph 44(i).
47Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, WT/ACC/SAU/
61, subparagraph 44(iii).
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climate in the energy sector remains restricted, although it has opened up in recent
years.48 With regard to its procurement procedures, the Report stated that:
Saudi Aramco’s procurement procedures afforded full opportunity for all qualified suppliers
of goods and services of WTOMember countries to compete for participation in competitive
bidding. The company selects the most technically and financially qualified contractor
whose bid represented the least overall cost to Saudi Aramco.49
All in all, it is clear that energy issues were an important topic in Saudi Arabia’s
accession negotiations. While perhaps not to the desired degree of all negotiating
parties, the countries concerned did undertake important commitments in the energy
sector.
4.5 Ukraine (2008)
In the above-mentioned list of acceding countries, Ukraine represents a unique
example. Although it is not a significant energy producer, it may be the most
important and controversial energy transit State in the world. It is the gateway for
Russian and Central Asian gas to Europe, apart from being highly depended on gas
imports itself. In the 2000s, the Ukraine was at the centre of heated gas transit
disputes with its neighbour Russia, that left the EU partially in the cold.50 Since these
events occurred around the time of Ukraine’s accession negotiations to the WTO,
transit issues received special attention. The result was that transit commitments
made by Ukraine in the energy sector were most comprehensive, both with respect to
goods and services. Concerning GATT Article V, especially third-party access was a
much discussed issue.51 Eventually, Ukraine committed itself to the following:
The representative of Ukraine confirmed that Ukraine would apply all its laws, regulations
and other measures governing transit of goods (including energy), such as those governing
charges for transportation of goods in transit, in conformity with the provisions of Article V
of the GATT 1994 and other relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement. The Working
Party took note of this commitment.52
These commitments indicate that transit trough fixed infrastructures such as pipe-
lines is covered by GATT Article V, at least for those countries that have accepted
48Milthorp and Christy (2011), p. 312.
49Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, WT/ACC/SAU/
61, subparagraph 44(vi).
50Chiefly in the winters of 2005/2006 and 2009/2010.
51Third party access policy requires the owners of natural monopoly infrastructure, such as gas
pipelines and electricity grids, to grant access to those facilities to parties other than their own
customers, usually competitors in the provision of the relevant services, often from other countries,
on commercial terms comparable to those that would apply in a competitive market.
52Protocol on the Accession of Ukraine, WT/L/718, 13 February 2008; Report of the Working Party
on the Accession of Ukraine, WT/ACC/UKR/152, January 25, 2008, para 367.
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WTO-plus commitments with respect to transit (see also the discussion re Kazakh-
stan below). In its services schedule, Ukraine moreover undertook commitments
regarding ‘Services incidental to energy distribution’ and ‘Pipeline transportations of
fuels’.53 In addition, Ukraine committed itself to:
Provide full transparency in the formulation, adoption and application of measures affecting
access to and trade in services of pipeline transportation. Ukraine undertakes to ensure
adherence to the principles of non-discriminatory treatment in access to and use of pipeline
networks under its jurisdiction, within the technical capacities of these networks, with regard
to the origin, destination or ownership of product transported, without imposing any
unjustified delays, restrictions or charges, as well as without discriminatory pricing based
on the differences in origin, destination or ownership.54
These commitments, especially in combination with Ukraine’s State Trading obli-
gations, can be interpreted as a requirement for the country to give access to its gas
transport network and operate it in a non-discriminatory (MFN) manner.55
Regarding State Trading Enterprises (STEs), the Accession Report lists three
national energy and energy distribution companies, UkrGasEnergo, Naftogas and
Energorynok as State Trading Enterprises.56 The language used in the Accession
Report with respect to STEs is very similar to that contained in Saudi Arabia’s
Protocol, partly because it had to satisfy US trading demands.57 Last but not least,
regarding price controls on energy maintained by Ukraine, although discussed in the
WP, no commitments were made regarding them.58
53Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ukraine, WT/ACC/UKR/152/Add.2, 25 January
2008 (services incidental to energy distribution), and 33 (Pipeline Transport, and (a) transportation
of fuels (CPC 7131)); Both sectors record commitments of ‘None’ in modes 1, 2 and 3, and
‘Unbound’ in mode 4 for both market access (right to participate in the market) and national
treatment (non-discrimination against non-nationals).
54Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ukraine, WT/ACC/UKR/152/Add.2, 25 January
2008 (services incidental to energy distribution), and 33 (Pipeline Transport, and (a) transportation
of fuels (CPC 7131)); Both sectors record commitments of ‘None’ in modes 1, 2 and 3, and
‘Unbound’ in mode 4 for both market access (right to participate in the market) and national
treatment (non-discrimination against non-nationals).
55Milthorp and Christy (2011), pp. 317ff.
56Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ukraine, WT/ACC/UKR/152, January 25, 2008,
para 44.
57Milthorp and Christy (2011), p. 318; The language agreed was sufficient for the US President to
make the certification required by Section 1106.
58Milthorp and Christy (2011), p. 317 referring to paras 63–67 of the Report of the Working Party
on the Accession of Ukraine, WT/ACC/UKR/152, January 25, 2008.
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4.6 Russia (2012)
Russia’s accession process was particularly lengthy and cumbersome, covering
almost two decades.59 While Russia did undertake some commitments with regard
to energy, they are perhaps not as far-reaching as all negotiating parties would have
wanted (e.g. especially the EU tried to commit Russia to eliminate dual pricing
policies).60 Additionally, some of the commitments Russia undertook were framed
in the context of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).61 Overall, it seems that the
nature of the commitments is not so much WTO-plus (going beyond those contained
in the WTO Agreements), but more of a confirmation that Russia’s energy sector has
to comply with WTO rules.62 Nevertheless, Russia has agreed to tie some of its
export duties on energy products. It has also committed itself to phase out several of
these duties over time.
With respect to export restrictions, Russia naturally confirmed that these would
not be justified under the WTO agreement.63 While some parties expressed concern
about licensing requirements connected to access to oil and gas pipelines, Russia
stated that there are no such requirements with respect to oil and natural gas, and that,
according to the Federal law on licensing of specific activities, there are no licensing
requirements for the following activities: (1) the operation of oil and gas production
facilities; (2) the sale of oil, gas and oil/gas processing products; (3) the processing
of oil, gas and oil/gas processing products thereof; (4) the transportation of oil, gas
and oil/gas processing products; (5) the storage of oil, gas and oil/gas processing
products; and (6) the activity of operating gas networks.64
As noted above, Russia has taken up some binding commitments on export duties
applied to energy goods, based on the HS Classification of Chapter 27.65 Regarding
export duties on crude oil, as well as some other oil products, Russia committed to a
59Protocol on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/L/839 and WT/MIN(11)/24,
17 December 2011; Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation,
WT/ACC/RUS/70, WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 November 2011.
60Milthorp and Christy (2011), p. 324; Marhold (2017), pp. 6–8.
61The Eurasian Economic Union was established in 2014 and is comprised of Russia, Kazakhstan,
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, see http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang¼en (last accessed on
27 May 2018).
62Milthorp and Christy (2011), p. 324; See also generally, Stewart and McDonough (2011); Global
Intelligence Alliance (2012).
63Milthorp and Christy (2011), p. 324.
64Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70,
WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 November 2011, para. 270 and Federal Law No. 128-FZ of 8 August 2001 “On
Licensing of Specific Types of Activity” (as last amended on 28 September 2010).
65See Russia’s Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods, Schedule CLXV, Part V,
p. 853 and 870; HS Convention: The Harmonised System Convention (Harmonised Commodity
Description and Coding System), 14 June 1983, 1503 U.N.T.S. 167, Chapter 27 Mineral fuels,
mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes.
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formula, which calculates the duties on the basis of the world market price of oil.66
For non-petroleum gases, the export duty will decrease to zero over the implemen-
tation period of the Accession Protocol (4 years).
With respect to State Trading Enterprises, Russia’s state-owned (51%) Gazprom
Group and other owners and operators of pipeline networks, were subject to much
debate in the accession process.67 Russia stated that it will notify Gazprom as an STE
in accordance with Article XVII upon its accession, but further stated that the
Gazprom Group is the only enterprise having special or exclusive privileges with
respect to exporting natural gas. Nevertheless, the question remains to what extent
Article XVII GATT allows STEs to charge different prices for its sales of a product
in different markets provided that such different prices are charged for commercial
reasons, to meet conditions of supply and demand in export markets. This matter is
relevant for the dual pricing debate.68 Although Russia has stated that it would
eliminate dual pricing on the production and distribution of natural gas to the
domestic industry, this issue should be kept in mind.
As for dual energy pricing itself, the EU (together with the US), as mentioned
above, was pushing for commitments by Russia, but was not very successful in this
respect.69 These Members stated that:
According to certain studies of the costs required for production and sustainability of the
production of natural gas, domestic regulated prices did not cover the full long-run marginal
cost of producing natural gas of Gazprom. They requested a confirmation from the Russian
Federation that gas suppliers would act on the basis of commercial considerations, based on
full recovery of costs and a reasonable profit.70
Russia however, used the argument that is in its right to exercise its sovereignty over
natural resources with respects to its subsurface resources, including natural gas.71
Moreover, Russia stressed that the practices were not very different from practices
maintained by many other Members, possibly having Saudi Arabia in mind. Also,
with regard to subsidies, Russia additionally firmly stated that it did not believe that
the governmental regulation of national monopoly prices constitutes a subsidy
within the sense of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(ASCM).72 However, this does not mean that other WTO Members may not
consider these as actionable or prohibited subsidies and challenge them in WTO
66Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70,
WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 November 2011, Annex 1.
67Milthorp and Christy (2011), p. 294.
68Milthorp and Christy (2011), p. 294.
69Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70,
WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 November 2011, paras 120–133.
70Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70,
WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 November 2011, para 122.
71Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70,
WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 November 2011, para 123.
72Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70,
WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 November 2011, para 696.
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dispute settlement. Moreover, in relation to concerns from Members about the
disparity between the price of gas sold to industrial consumers in the Russian
Federation and the world price of gas, the representative of the Russian Federation
stated:
[. . .] that gas export prices were not regulated and were established on the basis of supply
and demand in the importing country. He was of the view that there was no “world market
price” for gas, and noted that for gas shipped to Europe, costs of shipment and transport
reflected a substantial part of the landed price.73
It follows that regarding the issue of dual pricing, as touched upon above, negotia-
tion parties failed to obtain the full commitments they had hoped for, although some
commitments were made. First and foremost, Russia confirmed that producers and
distributors of natural gas would operate on the basis of normal commercial consid-
erations regarding their supplies to industrial users.74 Russia also stated it intended to
increase its prices for natural gas by 2030. This implies that the prices of natural gas
within Russia will be calculated on the basis of the same principles as those for the
rest of Europe, which will mitigate the difference between domestic and export
prices significantly. However, Russia will maintain dual pricing policies with respect
to domestic energy supplies to households and non-commercial users, under the
label of social policy.75
It should be mentioned in passing that the EU perceived Russia’s stance towards
dual pricing as disconcerting. As a result, in 2015, the European Commission
commenced an antitrust investigation into Gazprom’s business practices in Central
and Eastern Europe.76 The EU’s objections in these ongoing investigations are,
among others, addressed at what the EU labelled as ‘Gazprom’s alleged unfair
pricing policy’.77 On the basis of a comparison, the EU concluded that Gazprom is
charging unfair prices:
In order to assess whether individual price levels in a country are unfair, the different
Member State prices were compared to a number of different benchmarks, such as
Gazprom’s costs, prices in different geographic markets or market prices. On the basis of
this analysis, the Commission has come to the preliminary conclusion in its Statement of
Objections that the specific price formulae, as applied in Gazprom’s contracts with its
customers, have contributed to the unfairness of Gazprom’s prices: Gazprom’s specific
73Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70,
WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 November 2011, para 127.
74Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70,
WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 November 2011, para 132.
75Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70,
WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 November 2011, para 132.
76See European Commission, Factsheet, Antitrust: Commission send Statement of Objections to
Gazprom, Brussels, MEMO/15/4829, 22 April 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
15-4829_en.htm (last accessed 27 May 2018).
77European Commission, Factsheet, Antitrust: Commission send Statement of Objections to
Gazprom, Brussels, MEMO/15/4829, 22 April 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
MEMO-15-4829_en.htm (last accessed 27 May 2018).
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price formulae which link the price of gas to the price of oil products seem to have largely
favoured Gazprom over its customers.
The Commission’s preliminary conclusion, as outlined in the Statement of Objections, is that
Gazprom has charged unfair prices in five Central and Eastern European countries (Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland).78
Concerning price controls, Russia provided a list and services subject to them and
confirmed that they will be applied in a WTO consistent manner, especially with
regard to GATT Article III.9.79 The list includes natural gas, gas transportation,
nuclear fuel cycle products, electric power and heat generated by suppliers on the
wholesale market, electric energy network transmission services, transportation
services of crude oil and oil products through pipelines.80
Inevitably, transit of energy was an important issue. Prior to its accession, Russia
had raised the question as to whether or not GATT Article V would cover fixed
infrastructures such as gas pipelines. Its accession commitments on transit proved a
partial turnaround on this issue. With respect to transit fees, the country confirmed
that it would apply all its laws, regulations and other measures governing the transit
of goods, including energy in accordance with the obligations set out in Article V.81
However, with regard to access to pipelines and pipeline transport services, Russia
has not undertaken any commitments.82 Gazprom as an STE will furthermore
continue to be the sole exporter of natural gas.83 Moreover, gas is subject to an
export monopoly when the goods originate in Russia but are exported to the
Customs Union with Kazakhstan and Belarus.84 Regarding services, Russia under-
took some commitments with regards to market access in the energy sector in its
Services Schedule (mining, manufacturing and energy distribution).85 However,
these commitments are not particularly strong.
78European Commission, Factsheet, Antitrust: Commission send Statement of Objections to
Gazprom, Brussels, MEMO/15/4829, 22 April 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
MEMO-15-4829_en.htm (last accessed 27 May 2018).
79GATT Article III.9 and Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation,
WT/ACC/RUS/70, WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 November 2011, para 133.
80Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70,
WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 November 2011, Tables 7 and 8 on pages 407–411.
81Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70,
WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 November 2011, para 1161.
82Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70,
WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 November 2011, para 136.
83Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70,
WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 November 2011, para 271.
84Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation, WT/ACC/RUS/70,
WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 November 2011, para 1147 and Table 28.
85Mining under the UN Central Product Classification (CPC) 883: Manufacturing under CPC 8845
and energy distribution under CPC 887.
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In contrast to China, where a reference to the GATT in the goods schedule was
absent, Russia in its goods schedule included a Part V on export duties explicitly
referring to the GATT:
The Russian Federation undertakes not to increase export duties, or to reduce or to eliminate
them, in accordance with the following schedule, and not to reintroduce or increase them
beyond the levels indicated in this schedule, except in accordance with the provisions with
GATT 1994.86
This addition is crucial, as this reference would suffice for the applicability of the
GATT Article XX-exceptions to the goods listed in Part V. It is not unlikely that it is
due to the experience with the Chinese Accession Protocol that newly acceding
countries have been careful enough to include a reference to the GATT in their
schedules of concessions.
4.7 Kazakhstan (2015)
Kazakhstan is one of the WTO’s newest Members (it joined the Organization in
2015).87 It is the last in the string of major energy players to join the WTO. As with
Russia, a lot of Kazakhstan’s Energy Commitments are framed in the context of the
Eurasian Economic Union.
Regarding transit, Kazakhstan’s commitments on transit go further than Russia’s,
as it was explicitly agreed that transit related laws, regulations and other measures
governing the transit of goods (including energy) will be regulated in accordance
with GATT Article V.88
Furthermore, Kazakhstan made accession-specific commitments with respect to it
Government owned/regulated pipelines. Access to them is granted for foreign
investors producing crude oil and gas in Kazakhstan on a non-discriminatory
manner.89 Additionally, when applying measures to transportation through pipe-
lines, Kazakhstan undertook not to discriminate with respect to the origin of crude
oil and gas production and destination, or with respect to the application of tariffs
vis-à-vis domestic and foreign investors.90
86Russian Federation, Goods Schedule CLXV, Part V—Export Duties, WTMIN112A1-02
(22.08.2012) and Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation,
WT/ACC/RUS/70, WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 November 2011, paras 637–638; per analogy, Ukraine,
Vietnam and Kazakhstan have also included such reference in their commitments.
87Protocol on the Accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan, WT/L/957, 30 July 2015, Report of the
Working Party on the Accession of Kazakhstan, WT/ACC/KAZ/93, 23 June 2015.
88WTO, Overview of Kazakhstan’s Commitments, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_
e/kazakhannex_e.pdf (last accessed 27 May 2018).
89Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Kazakhstan, WT/ACC/KAZ/93, 23 June 2015,
paras 87, 162, 163.
90WTO, Overview of Kazakhstan’s Commitments, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_
e/kazakhannex_e.pdf (last accessed 27 May 2018).
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Kazakhstan also made commitments regarding Trade-Related Investment Mea-
sures (TRIMs) in the energy sector. It will eliminate all existing WTO-inconsistent
measures on local content provisions in the investments in the oil and gas sector by
1 January 2021.91
In contrast to Ecuador, that joined two decades earlier, we can see that issues
pertaining energy played an important role in Kazakhstan’s accession. This illus-
trates the different attitude towards energy as opposed to the time of the WTO’s
establishment in 1995.
5 Concluding Remarks on WTO Accession Protocols
and Energy
If we consider the commitments in the Accession Protocols above, what immedi-
ately catches the eye is the gradual development in energy discussions and commit-
ments in the accession of energy producing, exporting and transporting countries. At
first, as exemplified by Ecuador’s accession, these featured only as a minor issue.
However, from Oman’s accession onwards we see a steady rise in energy topics
placed on the agenda of the Working Party Reports. What is clear is that the WTO
accession process automatically sheds light on the energy sector in these countries;
acceding countries have to make sure that, at a minimum, these sectors are WTO
compliant.
What then, are the trends we can discern when looking at these accession
commitments? One development is that energy transit issues are increasingly
being discussed in the global trade forum, at least when it comes to acceding
members. While it is not clear whether GATT Article V applies to fixed energy
transmission structures of WTO Members that joined the organization in 1995, it is
clear that the Article applies to those that have made specific energy commitments on
with respect to GATT Article V in their accession protocols (i.e. Ukraine, Russia and
Kazakhstan). While these commitments may not always be full-fledged or
far-reaching, it does show that the WTO is a forum where energy transit issues are
discussed and negotiated actively. Perhaps the WTO is complementing or even
taking over from the Energy Charter Treaty in this respect, as energy discussions
under its auspices seem to have been dormant for quite a while.92
Another trend is that acceding countries are increasingly binding their export
duties (such as China and Russia) and that some new Members have specifically
bound export duties on energy goods (Russia in particular). This is a positive
development indicating that countries are shifting away from non-transparent pricing
91Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Kazakhstan, WT/ACC/KAZ/93, para 897.
92The most recent draft of the Energy Charter Treaty, ‘Transit Protocol’ Doc No: TT87 22/01/2010
was dated 22 October 2010; Marhold (2015), pp. 389–435.
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policies and are realizing that export duties, just as much as import duties, can be
subject to bargaining, and can be to the negotiating country’s advantage.
Connected to this are commitments with regard to dual pricing policies. While
commitments may not have been as firm as the EU and the US would have liked to
see, it is undoubtedly a positive development that the issue as such has at all been
discussed in the accession negotiations. Both Saudi Arabia and Russia have partially
committed to eliminating such practices, which may be a small victory, but is still
more positive than a complete absence of commitments in this sensitive area.
All in all, we can discern that with a greater number of major energy players
acceding to the WTO, these topics feature more prominently in accession negotia-
tions, resulting in gradual clarification of important issues such as transit, export
taxes and dual pricing policies.
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Gold and diamonds! Of all the substances on Earth, fewer emote such an emotional
response than do these two minerals. Gold, the symbol of wealth, power, and beauty
throughout history; diamonds, first prized for their usefulness and rarity became the
symbol of love and eternity in the mid-twentieth century. Coveted by cultures across
the globe as adornment, both gold and diamonds are industrially important as well.
The electronics and computer industries, in particular, are major users of each,
driving the trade in rough diamonds and raw gold from the mining towns to
manufacturing centres hundreds or thousands of miles, or half a world away.
The history of gold and diamonds,1 their usage, and—not surprisingly—their
legal status, however, differ significantly. Diamonds’ role in world trade has always
been minor. Although early traders did carry diamonds from their origin in India
along the Silk Road, and, by the fourteenth century to the cutting centres of Europe,
the stones themselves were always valued for their own sake—as production
materials or as gems. As diamonds were not found in quantity outside of India
until the nineteenth century, they were simply too rare to take on a major economic
or social role until that time.
Gold, on the other hand, has been not only worked and traded as a metal by the
earliest of human civilizations, much of its value has been—for all of recorded
history at least—intangible. Numerous cultures from all parts of the globe have
linked gold to religion, mysticism, and superstition. Equally important was the value
leant by gold’s uniformity, which allows it to have a recognized value in different
places and among societies: gold as currency.2
The legal status of these minerals follows their usage. While diamonds are
exclusively traded as products, or goods, and subject to the “normal” rules of
importation and exportation, gold’s various uses dictate a variety of possible appli-
cable treatments in international trade. As jewellery, gold can be a good, its import
and export subject to customs tariffs and quantitative restrictions; as a commodity,
its trade can be non-physical and regulated by the commodity exchanges; as a
currency, its trade can be highly restricted by financial supervisors and subjected
to prudential exceptions.
In the past, the trade in diamonds and gold has rarely been an object of interest as
a comparative matter. The recent and growing attention to human rights in supply
chains has made such a comparison of potentially great interest, however. This is
because while the trading rules applying to these two elements are so different, the
supply chains of both raw and cut or refined diamonds or gold are very similar from
the point of view of human rights abuse.
A literally vicious circle, the linkage between natural resource trading and violent
conflict was documented for diamonds in the late 1990s/early 2000s by the NGOs
1See generally Bernstein (2012); Kretschmer (2003).
2Or as a backing of currency to secure the value of the official tender in circulation.
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Global Witness and Partnership Africa-Canada.3 The publicity of the revelations
spurred industry attention as well as the attention of governments and the United
Nations. The result was a multi-stakeholder effort called the Kimberley Process,4
aimed at breaking the flow of war-funding by halting the trade in so-called “conflict
diamonds” (or, more vividly, “blood diamonds”). The Kimberley Process quickly
developed into a “scheme”—non-binding as a matter of international law, but
backed by national trading frameworks. It is certainly the most prominent program
for severing the connections between the trade in diamonds and the human rights
abuses of intrastate conflicts that exists today.
Despite implementation failures,5 the Kimberley Process continues to attract
attention because it is the tangible result of an effective campaign by
non-governmental organizations to put human rights on the international trade
agenda. The fact that there are numerous other resources the extraction of which is
of great concern to human rights observers, only some of which are also “conflict”
resources (the lapis lazuli of Afghanistan, for instance, which is a source of money
for IS troops there6), means that it is worth considering whether the Kimberly
Process Certification Scheme could—and should—serve as a model for deeper
integration of human rights considerations into the global trading system epitomized
by the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. Moreover, while similarly moti-
vated, there are significant aspects of current attempts to stop trade in conflict
diamonds and human rights-violative gold that are divergent. Just how these differ-
ences will affect the WTO-compatibility of the regulatory frameworks is something
this entry will also address.
I begin in Sect. 2 with a review of how conflict minerals became a concept and
how mineral supply chains gained the international community’s attention. In Sect. 3
I then set out the framework of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme as an
3Global Witness, A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan
Conflict (1998), text available at (last accessed 22 September 2017); Smillie I, Gberie L, and
Hazleton R (2000) The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone Diamonds & Human Security.
4See below Sect. 3.
5The Kimberley Process’ obvious and serious weaknesses in enforcement have been documented
by, among others, Global Witness itself, who withdrew from being a formal Observer to the
Process in 2011. Gooch C, Global Witness Leaves Kimberley Process, Calls for Diamond Trade
to be Held Accountable, 2 December 2011, available at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/
global-witness-leaves-kimberley-process-calls-diamond-trade-be-held-accountable/ (last accessed
22 September 2017). The NGO protested that the Process had proven itself “increasingly outdated”
by refusing “to evolve and address the clear links between diamonds, violence and tyranny.”Global
Witness Leaves Kimberley Process, Calls for Diamond Trade to be Held Accountable, Press
release, 2 December 2011, available at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/global-witness-
leaves-kimberley-process-calls-diamond-trade-be-held-accountable/ (last accessed
22 September 2017).
6Global Witness, War in the Treasury of the People: Afghanistan, Lapis Lazuli and the battle for
mineral wealth (2016), text available at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-min
erals/war-treasury-people-afghanistan-lapis-lazuli-and-battle-mineral-wealth/ (last accessed
23 April 2018).
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early response to the conflict minerals problem. The focus of Sect. 4 is on the
principles of WTO law that make regulation of supply chains legally problematic
for WTO Members. Section 5 then turns to gold, describing the processes underway
to eliminate “dirty” gold from the legitimate international supply chains. The
conclusions in Sect. 6 assess the likelihood of a “Kimberley Process for gold” and
suggests that the international community may be moving beyond worrying about
WTO rules when trying to address how most effectively to resolve human rights
violations in supply chains.
2 Conflict Minerals or Minerals from Conflict-Affected
Areas: From Regulating Products to Regulating Supply
Chains
Of the many tragic theatres over the past 50 years, few have measured up to those of
Western Africa in the 1990s. It was not just that an estimated 827,000 people were
killed and millions more forced to flee their homes that made these conflicts
shocking to the international community’s collective conscience—it was also the
brutality with which the attacks occurred. In Sierra Leone alone, an estimated 20,000
civilians were killed in the civil war, 7000 in January 1999 during a campaign known
as “Operation No Living Thing”—dying man by man, woman by woman, and child
by child—the lucky ones with guns, thousands of others with more rudimentary
tools.7
And for what? Ethnic violence and historical disgruntlements probably played a
role (the “grievance theory”), but that role may have been more one to motivate
would-be killers. The higher goals, it seems, were more mundane—for control over
natural resources (the “greed theory”).8
Significantly, the same natural resources that spurred conflict were used to finance
the conflict. An egregious example of the “resource curse,”9 the story of bringing the
idea of conflict minerals into the public eye had its historical roots in the
7The horrors of this campaign were captured on the award-winning documentary film “Cry
Freetown,” directed by Somura (2000), Cry Freetown, available at: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v¼NUCfAOBH3wo (last accessed 3 September 2017).
8The political science and economic literature on the causes of civil wars is huge. A good place to
begin is the economic analysis provided by Collier and Hoeffler in their 2004 article, Greed and
Grievance in Civil War. Collier and Hoeffler (2004), pp. 563–595.
9The “resource curse” is the label given to the observed phenomenon of failing to develop
economically despite—or indeed, because of—their abundance of natural resources. See Sachs J
and Warner A, “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth” NBER Working Paper
No. 5398, December 1995, text available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w5398 (last accessed
23 January 2018); Frankel J, The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of Diagnoses and Some
Prescriptions. HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP12-014, John F. Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University (2012).
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investigative efforts of non-governmental organizations into the civil wars of Angola
and Sierra Leone, and it is kept alive today by the reports coming out of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The basic plot is simple: (1) valuable resources—gemstones, minerals, and
lumber—are extracted from areas forcibly controlled by militarized groups or are
stolen from local populations under threat of violence; (2) the resources are sold onto
world markets—often by traders in the local markets or to smugglers who then place
them on the world market; and (3) the profits are used to purchase more weapons and
feed more fighters, who can therefore seize more resources.
The variations on this basic three-step process are innumerable, making general-
izations an only somewhat useful basis for developing legal responses to the
problems emanating from trade in conflict minerals. Whether the resources are
taken by rebel forces or governmental troops or even “just” organized criminals
may indicate the level at which laws to stop the trade need to be applied—are
national laws sufficient? Do we need international laws in place? Similarly, the
path the resources take to get to the world market may vary. Sometimes resources
enter the world market high up on the supply chain, with miners selling directly to
middlemen who are closely connected to foreign purchasers, while at other times
these resources pass through many more hands before reaching the international
companies who purchase large amounts of the mineral. Finally, the proceeds from
the sales might be going to purchase guns or food for fighters, but may also be
directed toward projects that have a more generalized effect on political opposition.
Thus, the state, for example, may profit from sales of resources and use the revenue
to maintain security forces that repress dissent.10
Given the contextual differences, it may not be surprising that on the regulatory
level there are variations in the way the resources have been approached. The only
thing that truly unifies the regulations is the underlying goal of stopping human
rights or environmental abuses that are connected to the resources. Yet, given the
plethora of human rights and environmental abuses that accompany the extraction,
trade, transport, and working of resources that are sourced from territories where
armed conflicts are on-going, the immediate goals may differ: stopping violations at
the stage of extraction, stopping abuses that accompany the sales or transport of the
minerals, or preventing the violation-tainted products from reaching consumers. In
each case, the mineral could be considered a “conflict mineral” in the general sense.
However, as a technical legal term, “conflict mineral” has no universally accepted
definition. While its use in policy discussions indeed suggests that a “conflict
mineral” is a metal or other natural element that directly or indirectly benefits
10E.g., Zimbabwe’s alleged use of a large portion of its national sales of diamonds from the
Marange mines for maintaining a state intelligence apparatus to control the population. See Global
Witness, Zimbabwe’s Vast Diamond Riches Exploited by Secretive Political and Military Elites,
Report Shows, Press Release, 11.9.2017, text available at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en-gb/
press-releases/zimbabwes-vast-diamond-riches-exploited-secretive-political-and-military-elites-
report-shows/ (last accessed 24 April 2017).
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armed groups (or other violence),11 there is no binding international legal instrument
setting this out with individual elements that can be interpreted and applied.12
The first conflict mineral to gain attention was diamonds. Accordingly, we turn
first to a description of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme before describ-
ing the current attempts to regulate other conflict minerals, including gold.
3 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (Kimberley Process or KPCS) was the
response of the diamond industry and governments to NGO revelations of the
financial connections between diamond trading and the internal armed conflicts
occurring in Western Africa in the 1990s.13 With unimaginable levels of brutality,
the civil wars in Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Ivory Coast,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone were particularly horrific in their targeting of civilian
populations. While the government soldiers of these nations were responsible for
numerous humanitarian atrocities and human rights abuses, it was the insurgent
groups’ use of soldiers and weapons paid for by the sales of diamonds (among other
natural resources) extracted or stolen from local miners that particularly motivated
the civil society campaign to address the role of diamond trading in civilians’
suffering.
3.1 The Kimberley Process
The effort was officially kicked-off by the South African government’s convening of
a May 2000 meeting of southern African leaders in the town where the first diamond
mine in Africa had been established: Kimberley in South Africa. Gathering the
support of the main players of the diamond industry (De Beers and the World
Diamond Council were heavily involved), governments of the other diamond pro-
ducing and purchasing states, and NGOs, the multi-stakeholder Kimberley Group
began a dialogue to address the question of how to prevent the civilian deaths and
maiming that were the hallmark of the conflicts in the region.




“Conflict resources” is a broader term (one which I have not found in legislation) and can include
plants, whether narcotics or medicinal, which are traded to support parties to an armed conflict.
Burnley (2011), p. 7.
13The Kimberley Process homepage has a history as well as relevant documents online, https://
www.kimberleyprocess.com/en (last accessed 25 January 2018).
86 K. Nadakavukaren Schefer
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
The United Nations enthusiastically embraced the efforts, raising the visibility of
the fight to halt trade in “conflict diamonds” by concluding a resolution titled, “The
role of diamonds in fuelling conflict: breaking the link between the illicit transaction
of rough diamonds and armed conflict as a contribution to prevention and settlement
of conflicts.”14
3.2 The Kimberley System
The answer was simple in theory—stop the international trade in diamonds which
may have been sold to finance insurgent groups and most of the human rights abuses
against civilians perpetrated upstream will stop. The Preamble of the KPCS Core
Document clearly reflects the connection of the two phenomena:
PARTICIPANTS,
RECOGNISING that the trade in conflict diamonds is a matter of serious international
concern, which can be directly linked to the fuelling of armed conflict, the activities of rebel
movements aimed at undermining or overthrowing legitimate governments, and the illicit
traffic in, and proliferation of, armaments, especially small arms and light weapons;
FURTHER RECOGNISING the devastating impact of conflicts fuelled by the trade
in conflict diamonds on the peace, safety and security of people in affected countries and the
systematic and gross human rights violations that have been perpetrated in such conflicts;15
In practice, however, it would be necessary to be able to do this without taking away
the economic benefits of the “legitimate trade” (i.e., non-conflict financing) in
diamonds. The answer settled upon to break the financial links between diamonds
and war was the creation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. This was to
require participants to create a means for identifying which diamonds had been
tainted by their funding of rebels and which had not—differentiating, that is, in KP
terminology, between “conflict diamonds” and other diamonds.
As the geology of diamonds (pure carbon) does not permit the identification of
single stones to a specific extraction site, the KP participants settled on a plan by
which individual shipments of uncut (“rough”) stones would be packaged in sealed
containers and officially marked by governmental entities to certify the stones’
legitimacy prior to export. Importing governments, too, would agree to permit the
importation of only those shipments of diamonds which were accompanied by an
14United Nations, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, ‘The role of diamonds in fuelling
conflict: breaking the link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict as a
contribution to prevention and settlement of conflicts,’ A/RES/55/56 (29 January 2001).
15Kimberley Process Certification System, Core Document, Preamble, text available at: https://
www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/system/files/documents/KPCS%20Core%20Document.pdf (last
accessed 2 October 2017).
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official certification declaring that the particular shipment was not one containing
conflict diamonds.
While each participant designs its own certificate, all official KP certifications
needed to contain certain information relevant to the sourcing of the diamonds to be
considered in conformity with the Kimberly Process. The mandatory elements to
appear on the certificate include: a unique number with the ISO Alpha 2 country
code; the issuing authority; the carat weight/mass of the stones contained; and their
value in U.S. dollars.16 The crux of the Kimberley Process’ reliability was the
participants’ mutual agreement to only trade with other participants. Ensuring that
any shipment of diamonds would only be import from and exported to the KPCS
partners meant that every shipment was certified from the original sale to the sale to
the final customer.
3.3 The Weaknesses
That, at least, is the theory. There are numerous weaknesses to the KPCS’s concep-
tion and operation. A main conceptual one is the narrow definition of “conflict
diamond,” which limits the focus of the certification requirement to trade in uncut
stones “used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at
undermining legitimate governments, as described in relevant United Nations Secu-
rity Council (UNSC) resolutions.”17 Thus, not only is the cutting and polishing
unsupervised by the Scheme, neither is the trade in rough diamonds from govern-
ment troops that may have violated the rights of labourers or civilians. In 2011, for
example, the KP Chairman issued a decision permitting trading in rough diamonds
from Zimbabwe’s Marange mines despite confirmed evidence of torture, forced
labour, and child labour perpetrated by governmental troops. As such abuses
would not make the diamonds from that mine “conflict” stones, their trade could
continue among participants.18 The same is true for trading by or from criminal
syndicates which thrive in territories with weak governance and consequently have
no intent of overthrowing those in power.
The main operational weakness is the KPCS’s reliance on the competence and
integrity of government officials responsible for certifying the shipments and
16Kimberley Process Certification System, Core Document, Annex I (A) and (B), text available at:
https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/system/files/documents/KPCS%20Core%20Document.pdf
(last accessed 2 October 2017).
17This limitation was present from the beginning. UNGA Resolution 55/56, promoting the original
Kimberley Process efforts, restricted the scope through its definition of the subject: trade in “conflict
diamonds.” It noted in the preambular language that it “Understand[s] conflict diamonds to be rough
diamonds which are used by rebel movements to finance their military activities, including attempts
to undermine or overthrow legitimate Governments,” A/RES/55/56.
18Several participants, including Canada, the European Union, and the United States, complained
about the abuses.
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controlling imports and exports. Section IV (“Internal Controls”) uses soft language
(“Each Participant should [. . .]”) to encourage Participants to establish internal
control mechanisms to enforce the Scheme.19 Oversight of the diamond companies
by independent auditors is similarly limited,20 being voluntary, leaving the Scheme’s
effectiveness particularly open to abuse by corrupt or even merely under-resourced
agents. Poor governance in the producing states is an ever-present problem that the
KPCS does nothing to address. With corruption and smuggling rampant, the
Scheme’s hope that certification will equal conflict-free stones is simply unrealistic.
Estimates by underground reports state that approximately 25% of the diamonds
sold on world markets are illegally sourced, with much higher numbers for certain
high-risk countries.21 A reported 80% of the diamond trade in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, for instance, is illegal.22 How can this be? Because the
movement of diamonds is still easy. The United Nations expert group on the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, noted the availability of illicit
goods trafficking not only across the country’s 9000 km of border (with nine
different neighbours), but on the lakes forming a significant portion of that border
(due to a lack of maritime forces) and via air, by landing on any of the country’s
largely uncontrolled airstrips—of which there are reported more than there are
roads.23 With limited resources for security or customs personnel, smugglers have
an easy time moving stones.
Moving stones across countries isn’t exactly the stuff of James Bond. ‘It’s very easy to cross
[international borders in Africa] without a Kimberley Process certificate. You can wear
them, hide them in a bag, put them in your boots,’ [the informant] explained. ‘And it’s easy
to get a fake certificate if you are moving a lot of stones. The price varies depending on
which country you want to say that they are from: from $100 for an Angola certificate to
$500 maximum for a South Africa one.’ [. . .] ‘If a buyer spends a million or more, I give him
the KP certificate for free.’24
19The 2013 amendments to the Core Document included the insertion of Annex IV, which contains
“additional requirements for establishing internal controls” to the existing provisions. Modification
to the Core Document of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Decision 1/2013 (in effect as
of 1 January 2015).
20Kimberley Process Certification System, Core Document, Section IV (“Principles of Industry
Self-Regulation”), text available at: https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/system/files/docu
ments/KPCS%20Core%20Document.pdf (last accessed 2 October 2017).
21Miklian J, “Let’s Deal!” A Conversation with a Diamond Smuggler, Words Without Borders,
Magazine, September 2013, text available at: http://www.wordswithoutborders.org/article/lets-
deal-a-conversation-with-a-diamond-smuggler (last accessed 3 September 2017).
22Id.
23See Letter Dated 15 July 2004 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to
the President of the Security Council, S/2004/551, paras. 26–47, (15 July 2004).
24Miklian J, “Let’s Deal!” A Conversation with a Diamond Smuggler, Words Without Borders,
Magazine, September 2013, text available at: http://www.wordswithoutborders.org/article/lets-
deal-a-conversation-with-a-diamond-smuggler (last accessed 3 September 2017).
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Thus, beyond dampening the trade and human rights discussion, the WTO waiver25
granted to the Kimberley Process participants achieves nothing in the way of
ensuring that human rights abuses are actually addressed.
3.4 Regulation of Conflict Gold
Once the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme was operating, attention turned to
the similar abuses taking place in the supply chains of other minerals. With the
computer/technological instruments industry the focus of much of the attention, it
was not long before other resources were found to be connected to the financing of
wars. The Democratic Republic of Congo’s civil war, in particular, was being waged
for but also by the profits of the sale of four minerals required for the production of
electronics: tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold. Conflict diamonds were no longer the
only “conflict mineral.”
3.5 US Law on Trade in Conflict Minerals
On the national level, a precise legal definition of “conflict mineral” is found in the
United States’ Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.26 This
2010 legislation’s main aim is to promote financial stability and consumer protec-
tion.27 It also, however, includes provisions to foster transparency in corporate
activities in the extractive sector of war-torn Africa. Section 1502 was conceived to
reduce the demand for minerals stemming from the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC). That provision instructs the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
require that any companies within its administrative scope investigate their supply
chains and, if they source from the DRC, that they explain why it is necessary to do
so. Considered burdensome by the affected industry, section 1502 limits the scope of
“conflict mineral” to the “3Ts” (tin, tantalum, and tungsten), gold, and minerals from
the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo and surrounding countries:
(4) Conflict mineral.--The term “conflict mineral” means--
(A) columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, gold, wolframite, or their derivatives; or
(B) any other mineral or its derivatives determined by the Secretary of State to be
financing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.28
25See below Sect. 4.
26Pub.L. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376–2223 (21 July 2010); for an explanation and analysis of the Act,
see Dorman et al. (2010).
27For an overview of the Act, see Skeel (2010).
28Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L. 111–203, Section 1502(e)
(4).
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Even though limited, the scope addresses the most visible abuses stemming from the
trade in minerals.
3.6 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply
Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk
Areas
Following soon after Dodd-Frank, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) began discussions on how to encourage multinational corpo-
rations to source ethically. Having learned from the critiques aimed at the KPCS, the
OECD’s angle on regulating the mineral trade’s links to human suffering shifted
from away from the point of the mineral’s entrance onto the world market toward a
holistic view of the entire supply chain. The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for
Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk
Areas29 (the OECD Guidance), takes a wide view of the problems associated with
the extraction of minerals and addresses a myriad of topics that have brought
disrepute to natural resource supply chains. Accordingly, while there is particular
mention of the African Great Lakes region, the Guidance is general in describing the
need for supply chain management in territories where armed conflict is occurring.
Most importantly, it extends the concern to areas where there may be no armed
conflict, but where the situation is otherwise “high-risk” for individuals located
there. The concept of “conflict-affected and high-risk area” defined in the Gold
Supplement is worth setting forth in full:
Conflict-affected and high-risk areas – Areas identified by the presence of armed conflict,
widespread violence, including violence generated by criminal networks, or other risks of
serious and widespread harm to people. Armed conflict may take a variety of forms, such as
a conflict of international or non-international character, which may involve two or more
states, or may consist of wars of liberation, or insurgencies, civil wars. High-risk areas are
those where there is a high risk of conflict or of widespread or serious abuses as defined in
paragraph 1 of Annex II of the Guidance. Such areas are often characterized by political
instability or repression, institutional weakness, insecurity, collapse of civil infrastructure,
widespread violence and violations of national or international law.30
Comparing this to the Kimberley Process definition of “conflict diamond,” the
Guidance is strikingly more suited to addressing the sufferings actually experienced
as a result of mineral extraction and trading. First, the Guidelines point out the
existence of armed violence against humans as only one problem. It also points to the
slavery, child labour, and sexual violence that surround the extraction and trade of
29OECD (2016) OECD due diligence guidance for responsible supply chains of minerals from
conflict-affected and high-risk areas.
30Id., p. 66.
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such resources. The document further mentions the risk of human rights violations
perpetuated by not only by armed non-state forces, but also the abuses carried out by
governmental and private security forces and by organized crime. It openly acknow-
ledges the existence of corruption and money laundering as a risk facing downstream
companies. The OECD Guidance’s approach refers not to trade in “conflict min-
erals” but to supply chains of “minerals” that are “from” conflict or high-risk areas.
This is a large step forward for those trying to address the problem, as it broadens the
scope significantly. Two of the most striking expansions in scope come from the
elimination of the focus on only the abuse relating to the unworked, or “raw,”
mineral and the recognition that the human rights abuses may arise in situations
that are not militarized.
While the OECD Guidance is a non-binding instrument, its influence is unques-
tionably great. Companies and organizations make frequent reference to the rules,
and they are seen to be representative of good corporate practice.31 The rules have
also become a model for national efforts to legislate for ethical supply chain
management, with a preeminent example of this being the recently concluded
European Union regulation, set forth next.
3.7 European Union Regulation on Trade in Minerals
and Metals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas
The European Union (EU) passed a Regulation in May 2017 (which is to come into
effect in 2021) that takes a hybrid approach to the supply chain regulation challenge.
It adopted the OECD Guidance approach in its efforts to legislate for supply chain
due diligence, addressing trade in minerals and metals from “conflict-affected and
high-risk areas.” As with the OECD Guidance, this latter term is defined broadly,
going much beyond the focus on abuses by insurrection groups in the extracting
process:
‘conflict-affected and high-risk areas’means areas in a state of armed conflict or fragile post-
conflict as well as areas witnessing weak or non-existent governance and security, such as
failed states, and widespread and systematic violations of international law, including human
rights abuses [. . .].32
However, like the United States, the European approach keeps the legislative focus
exclusively on the 3Ts and gold. The Regulation’s definitions state, in an exclusive
list:
31E.g., Responsible Jewellrey Council, https://www.responsiblejewellery.com/oecd-due-diligence-
guidance/ (last accessed 23 January 2018); London Bullion Market Association http://www.lbma.
org.uk/assets/LBMA%20Audit%20Guidance%20v%200.pdf (last accessed 23 January 2018).
32Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying
down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their
ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, OJ 2017, L 130/1, Article 2(f).
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‘minerals’ means the following, as listed in Part A of Annex I;
– ores and concentrates containing tin, tantalum or tungsten, and
– gold;
‘metals’ means metals containing or consisting of [the ‘minerals’], or as listed in Part B
of Annex I33;
No other minerals or resources (Annex I Part B lists the chemical compounds of tin,
tungsten, tantalum and gold—their oxides, hydroxides, carbides, and chlorates)
come within the scope of the Regulation explicitly, and the wording does not permit
the interpreting-in of any additional resources.
Perhaps more significantly, the EU Regulation specifically sets out its regulatory
aims to be stopping trade by security and militarized forces:
1. This Regulation establishes a Union system for supply chain due diligence (‘Union
system’) in order to curtail opportunities for armed groups and security forces to trade in
tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold. [. . .]34
The need for stopping this trade is undisputed, and the Regulation does encompass
the actions of governmental troops, which is important. Still, this wording falls far
short of ensuring that the supply chain is untainted by any human rights abuses or
even widespread governance and security failures. In fact, several of the criticisms
that have arisen in the context of diamond supply chain management are left
unaddressed by these newest legislative efforts.
Regardless of the operational problems of the different attempts to regulate the
diamond and gold supply chains, the motivation of disconnecting human rights
violations from the profitability of the trade in these elements is one that most states
and organizations can agree upon in theory. Just how far a state can go to achieve this
disconnection, though, is debatable. We turn, then, to the possible limits placed on
these efforts by the rules of the World Trade Organization treaties.
4 Regulation of Supply Chains and WTO Law
The weaknesses of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme that are so glaring
today were not so apparent when the Participants were drafting the Core Document.
At that time, the main concern raised was the Scheme’s consistency with the legal
rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Specifically, the participant-only
33Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying
down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their
ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, OJ 2017, L 130/1, Articles 2
(a), 2(b).
34Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying
down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their
ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, OJ 2017, L 130/1, Article 1.1.
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element of the KPCS put into question whether its implementation could expose
participants to trade sanctions.
The Core Document states:
Each Participant should:
[. . .]
(c) ensure that no shipment of rough diamonds is imported from or exported to a
non-Participant.35
At present, the 81 states that participate in the KPCS represent (according to the
KPCS website) 99.8% of world diamond trading.36 Even at the time of its conclusion
in 2003, all but one of the significant diamond trading states were participants (the
exception being Liberia, which joined in 2007).37 Nevertheless, this question of how
to ensure WTO compatibility became a crucial element of the negotiations.
As the WTO obligations existed prior to the Kimberley Process, it is not unrea-
sonable that the question arose as to the KPCS’s overall compatibility with the
governments’ international obligations. It is clear that since not all WTO Members
with diamond imports or exports were KPCS participants, any government that was
both a WTOMember and a KPCS participant (hereinafter WTO-KPCS government)
was in a position of being potentially brought before the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism by a WTO Member who was not a KPCS participant as allegedly
violating its WTO commitments.38
35Kimberley Process Certification System, Core Document, Section III (“Undertakings in respect of
the international trade in rough diamonds”), text available at: https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/
en/system/files/documents/KPCS%20Core%20Document.pdf (last accessed 2 October 2017).
36Kimberley Process Certification System, Core Document, text available at: https://www.
kimberleyprocess.com/en/participants (last accessed 4 September 2017).
37Only ten states have joined as KPCS participants subsequent to 2003: Bangladesh, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Liberia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Liberia, Mexico, New Zealand, Panama, Singapore,
Swaziland, and Turkey. See Kimberley Process Certification System, Core Document, text avail-
able at: https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/participants (last accessed 2 October 2017).
38This possibility is heightened by the fact that a WTO Member does not need to have actual
imports or exports of a product to bring a complaint based on another Member’s restrictions on
trade in that product. The Appellate Body of the WTO has confirmed that the potential for trade of a
certain product satisfies the requirements for launching a dispute settlement proceeding. Accepting
indirect as well as direct impacts on internal conditions of trade as targets of Members’ concern, the
WTO dispute settlement system is substantially relieved of limits on standing:
135. [. . .] we believe that a Member has broad discretion in deciding whether to bring a case
against another Member under the DSU. The language of Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994
and of Article 3.7 of the DSU suggests, furthermore, that a Member is expected to be largely
self-regulating in deciding whether any such action would be “fruitful.”
136. We are satisfied that the United States was justified in bringing its claims under the
GATT 1994 in this case. The United States is a producer of bananas, and a potential export
interest by the United States cannot be excluded. The internal market of the United States for
bananas could be affected by the EC banana regime, in particular, by the effects of that
regime on world supplies and world prices of bananas. We also agree with the Panel’s
statement that:
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4.1 WTO Principles
Securing the long-term liberalization of trade is the unifying aim of the rules of the
trading system. This liberalization is accomplished through two main principles: the
promotion of access to Members’markets and Members’ non-discrimination in their
treatment of comparable, or “like” products and services (and service suppliers).
While market access is a matter of ensuring that goods and services can cross
national borders as freely as possible, under the WTO treaties, non-discrimination
requires that each Member treat the goods and services of each other Member “no
less favourably than” it treats all other like products and services. It is clear from
even this basic level that the implementation of a program such as the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme could violate both of the WTO’s most fundamental
principles: first, the restriction on importation and exportation of conflict diamonds is
a limitation on market access (in the form of a quantitative restriction, prohibited by
Article XI GATT); the non-discrimination provision is also arguably violated by the
continued allowance of trade in non-conflict diamonds (Article XIII GATT limits
Members’ selective use of import and export restrictions of like products to quota
allocations based on historical trade shares).
Before describing the content of these two principles, it is important to be aware
of the potential sanctions that their violation can cause a WTO Member. The
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(DSU) is applicable to all WTO Members for any of their disputes with one another
arising out of the WTO agreements, including the GATT. Under the DSU, Members
who are found to be in violation of their WTO obligations may be required to “come
back into compliance” or face trade barriers. The latter may be composed, for
example, of increased tariffs or reduced quantitative allowances against the impor-
tation of particular goods to the complainant Member’s territory from the defendant
Member’s territory. Because the decision to impose sanctions in the face of
non-compliance cannot be blocked by the opposition of the defendant’s representa-
tive in the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB),39 the remedies system is considered to
be a particularly “strong” regime for international law.40 The “strength” comes from
both the one-sided nature of the sanction and the fact that the measure can have
practical and direct economic consequences rather than, for example, the intangible
... with the increased interdependence of the global economy, ... Members have a greater
stake in enforcing WTO rules than in the past since any deviation from the negotiated
balance of rights and obligations is more likely than ever to affect them, directly or
indirectly.[footnote]
European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (“EC-
Bananas III”), WT/DS27/AB/R, paras. 135–136 (9 September 1997) (quoting the panel reports of
the same case at para. 7.50).
39Negative consensus decisionmaking applies to decisions about sanctions: that is, unless all
members of the DSB refuse to accept the proposal to impose sanctions (including the member
proposing them in the first place), the decision will be deemed accepted. DSU Article 22.6.
40Feichtner (2009), p. 616.
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“shame” that comes from the government being set out as in violation with a WTO
regulation.
4.2 Market Access Restrictions
4.2.1 The Prohibition on Quantitative Restrictions
Article XI GATT takes a clear position against the use of trade restrictions focused
on the amount of a product allowed to enter or leave the market. There are exceptions
to the first paragraph’s “No prohibitions or restrictions” language, as paragraph
2 lists situations in which the Members may impose restrictions. These relate to
agricultural products and commodities, not to diamonds or gold, however.
4.2.2 Non-discrimination
The WTO also requires that Members treat other WTO Members’ products and
services with conditions of competition that are no less favourable than they do their
own or any other trading partners’ like products and services. Found in numerous
provisions throughout the WTO agreements, in the GATT, the most prominent
references are in Article I, with the cornerstone principle, Most-favoured nation
treatment (MFN, the principle of non-discrimination among WTO Members); Arti-
cle III, with the principle of National Treatment (the principle of non-discrimination
between a Member’s domestic traders and another Member’s traders); and Article
XIII, with the obligation of affording non-discriminatory treatment in the context of
quantitative restrictions (to ensure that any import or export prohibitions/limitations
they apply is applied to all trade in the like product).
4.2.3 Technical Barriers to Trade
Another group of market access restrictions the WTO addresses is that of technical
barriers to trade. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement)
sets out a framework for WTO Members to follow when imposing mandatory
technical regulations that could limit the trading of goods among or between
Members.
Under the TBT Agreement, an obligatory label requirement can be a “technical
regulation” and therefore subject to the rules of the Agreement. The TBT Agree-
ment’s Annex I defines the term:
1. Technical regulation
Document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and pro-
duction methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance
is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging,
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marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production
method.41
A governmental regulation that is characterized as a technical regulation is not in
itself a violation of the WTO, but it does require the WTO Member to attend to the
obligations of the Agreement, including that it be applied non-discriminatorily.
Article 2.1 TBT Agreement states:
2.1 Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products imported from the
territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to
like products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country.42
While the Appellate Body has said that GATT 1994-based definitions of “like
product” may differ across provisions, and thus, implicitly, across agreements, for
purposes of this entry, I presume that the TBT Agreement Article 2.1 likeness test
poses the same questions as the Article XIII GATT test does.
4.3 The WTO Conformity of Regulation of Supply Chains
4.3.1 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme poses several immediately recogniz-
able difficulties for WTO-KP. The newer regulations for minerals from conflict-
affected and high-risk territories are much less problematic currently, but could face
similar problems if developed into more binding instruments.
As set out above, according to the law of the World Trade Organization (specifi-
cally, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT), the limitation of
imports and exports of a “product”—in this case, rough diamonds,43 forms a
quantitative restriction on trade. Technically a quota of zero, a prohibition is
included within this term. The imposition of quantitative restrictions on either the
import or export of goods among WTO Members is generally illegal under
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XI. Paragraph 1 of Article XI
GATT states plainly:
“No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges [. . .] shall be
instituted [. . .] on the importation [. . .] or on the exportation” of any product from a Member
territory or to a Member territory.
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, banning trade in non-certified dia-
monds entirely, then, is clearly contrary to the idea of market access itself. It is, in
fact, the most potent restriction that exists and fits none of the carve outs found in
Article XI.44
41TBT Agreement, Annex I, 1.
42TBT Agreement, Article 2.1.
43Harmonized commodity numbers 7102.10, 7102.21 or 7102.31 refer to unworked diamonds.
44Pauwelyn (2003), p. 1183.
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That is not the only problem, however. The permission of trade among KP
partners but not with outsiders is also discriminatory. The first paragraph of Article
XIII GATT demands that any import or export prohibition that is applied by a WTO
Member be applied to all imports or exports of the “like product” from third
countries.45 The principle underlying Article XIII GATT is repeated in other forms
throughout the WTO texts, most prominently in Article I GATT’s statement of the
Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment obligation:
With respect to [. . .] all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation,
[. . .] any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any
product [. . .] shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product origi-
nating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.46
Any form of regulation, then, that would apply to a subset of WTO Members’
traders, could fall afoul of the rules on non-discrimination.
Finally, a labelling requirement such as the KPCS Core Document requires,
would clearly be a “technical regulation” as defined by the TBT Agreement. Thus,
any law based on obligatory labels for the importation or exportation of conflict
minerals would necessarily have to be non-discriminatory within the scope of the
TBT Agreement.
4.3.2 Potential Solutions to WTO Violations
The WTO Members were careful to maintain a degree of policy flexibility by
providing for explicit exceptions to the rules of the GATT. These include the
security exception of Article XXI GATT and the general exceptions of Article XX
GATT. Importantly, these exceptions apply to any GATT provision—market access
or non-discrimination—but also only to GATT provisions—and so cannot excuse a
measure that is a violation of the TBT Agreement.
A strong argument can be made that the specific reference to “conflict” minerals
could lend security exception coverage to measures implemented to prevent trade in
these minerals. The KPCS Core Document’s definition of “conflict diamond” with a
reference to the Security Council’s condemnation of the rebel movements financed
by such diamonds almost surely would have leant the Process coverage under GATT
Art. XXI(c), the security exception provision providing a general exception to WTO
Members to implement Security Council sanctions programs.47 Similarly, Article
XXI(b) could be invoked to justify a ban on conflict minerals based on their
contribution to the financing of arms.48
45See discussion below.
46While the idea of MFN would allow for different-but-equal treatment, clearly permitting trade
with one state and not with another is explicitly discriminatory.
47Pauwelyn (2003), pp. 1184–1185.
48Pauwelyn (2003), pp. 1185–1186.
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Some observers and WTO-KP governments felt that the general exceptions of
Article XX(a) (excepting measures necessary to protect public morals) or
(b) (measures necessary to protect human life or health) would suffice to relieve
KP participants of any liability under the trade agreements. Given the increasing
scope for WTO Members’ domestic policymaking decisions in recent Article XX
jurisprudence, the likelihood that either general exception would be accepted on the
merits for the minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas is arguably even
higher today. At the time of the Kimberley Process negotiations, however, the
Appellate Body had not yet addressed Article XX(a) GATT,49 and was less generous
with accepting Article XX(b) claims than they are currently.
More significantly, however, hopes that either provision would be a solution to
the conflict diamonds issue could be jeopardized by the questionable nature of using
the general exceptions to protect extraterritorial interests. The Appellate Body
clearly accepts that Members are granted broad discretion in defining their own
communities’ morality and the level of trade measures necessary to protect such
beliefs,50 as well as admitting that the interest in protecting human life and health is
so high as to permit the exception of trade measures that are not essential, but merely
helpful to achieve that goal.51 Yet, it has not stated that Members may use trade
measures to pursue the protection of foreign populations. Another topic on which
there exists a large literature, the permissibility of trade measures designed to protect
interests extraterritorially is still ambiguous.52 Unless the legality of trade measures
aimed to protect persons abroad is admitted as within the ambit of Article XX
GATT, the potential for liability of WTO-KP governments is left unchanged.
Another suggestion was to simply wait and see whether a WTO Member which
was not a KP participant would actually bring an Article XIII GATT case against a
WTO-KP government trading partner in the WTO. Implicit in this line of thought
was that any such claimant would be particularly poorly viewed by other members of
the international community. Since WTO disputes must be brought by a WTO
Member (there is no independent WTO enforcement mechanism beyond the Mem-
49The first Appellate Body report to interpret the public morals exception in Article XX(a) GATT
was the EC-Seals case. European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Mar-
keting of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R and WT/DS401/AB/R, paras. 5.194–5.203 (22 May
2014). This had been preceded by the US-Gambling case, interpreting the invocation of the public
morals exception in the GATS, Article XIV(a). See United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R, paras. 6.457–6.474 (10 November
2004); United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, paras. 293–299 (7 April 2005).
50EC-Seals, WT/DS401/AB/R at para. 5.199.
51Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R and
WT/DS169/AB/R, paras. 161–162 (11 December 2000); Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of
Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, paras. 179, 210 (3 December 2007).
52Offor and Walter (2017), p. 160. For a good overview of the numerous angles to this question, see
Bartels (2002). See also de Mestral (2014).
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bers themselves), this would be so unlikely as to diminish the potential for liability to
near zero. The reasonableness of this approach, however, did not assuage the
professed fears of the doubters in the KP.
The most controversial claim was that aiming at the human rights aspects of the
diamond trade. This posited that “conflict diamonds” and non-conflict diamonds
were not comparable (in the terminology of the WTO, not “like”) products, and
therefore that there was no MFN obligation on WTO members to treat them
equivalently. These voices argued that the fact that the KPCS’s trade restrictions
were limited to “conflict diamonds,” themselves defined to be diamonds that had
been used to finance rebel movements, meant that the trade in licit stones was an
entirely separate matter. The former could therefore be subject to regulations and
restrictions different from, and less advantageous than, those to which non-conflict
stones were.
This type of argument is referred to as a non-product related process and
production method, or “NPR PPM,” issue. By permitting otherwise identical prod-
ucts to be considered “not like” products for purposes of the WTO
non-discrimination obligations because of differences in their lifecycle, the accep-
tance or rejection of NPR PPMs would go to the heart of the WTO system’s
relationship with non-trade values such as human rights, labour standards, or
environmental protection. Abundantly written about53 and seemingly increasingly
accepted as legitimate policy tools, the NPR PPM question has been neither squarely
accepted nor rejected by WTO legal decision-makers as of yet. While advocates of
prioritizing non-trade values vehemently argue for NPR PPMs’ legitimacy as
distinguishing products,54 others firmly reject the idea that production (or end-of-
lifecycle) differences should be relevant for the products’ position on the market.
4.4 The Path Taken
The ultimate solution was found in the suggestion to request a waiver from the WTO
for WTO Members participating in the KP. The waiver, an instrument provided for
in Article IX.3 of the WTO Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO Agreement), is a decision taken by the Ministerial Conference (or General
Council) which grants a limited exemption from a particular obligation in order to
53The literature on PPMs is huge. An excellent overview of the multiple considerations at stake is
the 2002 article written by Steve Charnovitz. Charnovitz S, The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in
the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 Yale J. Int’l L. (2002), text available at: http://
digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjil/vol27/iss1/4 (last accessed 4 September 2017).
54See, e.g., Potts J, The Legality of PPMs under the GATT: Challenges and Opportunities for
Sustainable Trade Policy (IISD, 2008), text available at: http://www.iisd.org/library/legality-ppms-
under-gatt-challenges-and-opportunities-sustainable-trade-policy (last accessed 3 September 2017).
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pursue a particular goal recognized by the other WTO Members as being legiti-
mate.55 The text of the following paragraph describes the utilization of the waiver:
4. A decision by the Ministerial Conference granting a waiver shall state the exceptional
circumstances justifying the decision, the terms and conditions governing the application of
the waiver, and the date on which the waiver shall terminate. Any waiver granted for a period
of more than 1 year shall be reviewed by the Ministerial Conference not later than 1 year
after it is granted, and thereafter annually until the waiver terminates. In each review, the
Ministerial Conference shall examine whether the exceptional circumstances justifying the
waiver still exist and whether the terms and conditions attached to the waiver have been met.
The Ministerial Conference, on the basis of the annual review, may extend, modify or
terminate the waiver.56
As seen in the text, the waiver is a time-limited exemption and one tied to a particular
context—the Member receives a waiver for a particular time or until the situation
demanding the waiver changes, whichever comes first. If the situation develops, the
waiver conditions can be changed or ended entirely.
The Ministerial Conference granted a waiver for WTO-KP governments on
27 May 2003.57 The text recalls the “the trade in conflict diamonds is a matter of
serious international concern” and recognizes “the extraordinary humanitarian
nature of this issue,” as well as pointing out the Security Council’s support of the
KPCS. It then continues, stating in relevant part:
Considering that, in light of the foregoing, exceptional circumstances exist justifying a
waiver from paragraphs 1 of Article XIII, 1 of Article I, and 1 of Article XI of the GATT
1994 with respect to the trade in rough diamonds;
Decides as follows:
1. With respect to the measures taken by a Member listed in the Annex necessary to prohibit
the export of rough diamonds to non-Participants in the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme consistent with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, paragraphs 1 of
Article I; 1 of Article XI; and 1 of Article XIII of the GATT 1994 are waived as of
1 January 2003 until 31 December 2006.
2. With respect to the measures taken by a Member listed in the Annex necessary to prohibit
the import of rough diamonds from non-Participants in the Kimberley Process Certifica-
tion Scheme consistent with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, paragraphs 1 of
Article I; 1 of Article XI; and 1 of Article XIII of the GATT 1994 are waived as of
1 January 2003 until 31 December 2006.
3. This waiver also applies in respect of measures implementing the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme taken by any Member not listed in the Annex to this Decision that
desires to be covered by the present waiver and that notifies the Council for Trade in
Goods accordingly.
[. . .]
55See WTO Agreement, Article IX.3 (setting out the procedural steps required for the granting of a
waiver).
56WTO Agreement, Article IX.4 (emphasis supplied).
57Decision of 15 May 2003, WT/L/518 (27 May 2003).
All that Glitters: Conflict Diamonds, Dirty Gold and the WTO Legal. . . 101
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
Perhaps most importantly in terms of systemic analysis of human rights and trade,
the waiver was explicitly non-committal as to whether or not the Scheme was in fact
a violation of the WTO-KP’s WTO obligations:
Noting that this Decision does not prejudge the consistency of domestic measures taken
consistent with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme with provisions of the WTO
Agreement, including any relevant WTO exceptions, and that the waiver is granted for
reasons of legal certainty [. . .].58
The significance of this statement can hardly be overstated. For, although I continue
to consider the waiver a poor instrument for addressing the KPCS’s possible
incompatibility with WTO rules as a technical matter,59 the real problem is that
this waiver not only sidesteps the “is it or isn’t it” question, it implicitly answers the
subsequent question of “if the KPCS does violate the WTO rules, should WTO-KP
governments face possible trade retaliation if they would continue to pursue the
human rights goals of the KPCS?”
This goes much beyond a mild concern that “[. . .] the WTO continues to be shy of
integrating non-trade concerns into the international trading framework, and it is
structurally difficult for it to achieve such integration other than by extending
derogations.”60 The greater implication of this type of WTO-sanctioned “go
ahead” is not a problem of the WTO being “shy”—it is that the WTO is flexing
the dominance of trade flows over human rights protection. By refusing to address
the relative position of KPCS rules with WTO obligations, the waiver decision
suggests that human rights concerns will never achieve equal status with trade
rules in the trading system.
Here I find Catherine Mackinnon’s insights into dominance, difference, and
inequality, originally intended as a feminist legal theory, helpful in understanding
the trade and human rights dialogues. In particular, dominance, difference and
inequality can be brought into the analytical framework of viewing human rights
through the lens of trade law. “Inequality,” Mackinnon says, “comes first; differ-
ences come after.”61 The problem with this—for the subordinated one—is that
equality, though posed as neutral, principled, and objective, is defined by the
dominant paradigm. Thus, it requires all or everything which is not dominant to be
measured against the dominant to determine whether it can be considered equal—but
the comparison occurs against the framework established by the dominant paradigm
58Decision of 15 May 2003, WT/L/518 (27 May 2003).
59See Nadakavukaren Schefer (2005). Indeed, since writing that article, the KPCS waiver has been
extended twice (each for six more years), with the latest decision set to expire (or be up for renewal)
on 31 December 2018. See Extension of Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme for Rough Diamonds, WT/L/876 (14 December 2012). There seems, moreover, no
resolution of the diamond-conflict chain in many of the African countries where these links were
first detected. As a result, this “temporary” instrument for an “extraordinary” situation, appears
destined to continue indefinitely.
60Ankersmit L, Lawrence J, and Davies G, Diverging EU and WTO perspectives on extraterritorial
process regulation, 21 Minn. J. Int’l L. Online 14, 76 (2011–2012).
61Mackinnon (1987a), p. 7.
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as the norm. “To know if you are equal, you have to be equal to somebody who sets
the standard you compare yourself with.”62 Thus, to find equality, one has only two
choices, to be like the dominant class or to be in the inferior class as determined by
the dominant class.63 As such, one can never be equal, because any difference is
made relevant by, and therefore supports, the inequality.
Although the dominance/difference theory was never intended to be applied to
international trade relations, it can aid the analysis of the relationship between the
dominant framework of liberal trade and the subordinated (although professed equal)
interest of WTO Members in protecting human rights. Viewed from the theory of
dominance/difference, the KPCS waiver clearly indicates that human rights
concerns—even those of such extreme importance as the mutilation and killing of
civilian populations—remain subordinated to the goals of liberalized trade and
therefore need an exception from the rules which only the trade system Members
themselves can grant.
5 Regulating Dirty Gold: International Attempts to Rid
the Gold Supply Chains of Human Rights Abuses
The attempted regulation of gold supply chains is a relatively recent phenomenon.
The realization that gold mining often occurs under conditions in which the labor
rights of the miners are violated is not new, of course.64 Neither are the complaints of
environmental damage caused by the extraction process and the allegations by
indigenous peoples of violations of their cultural and property rights.65 Nevertheless,
the “conflict” element of the gold trade did not emerge fully onto the international
political (and security) stage until the mid-2000s, when the United Nations spoke out
on the linkage between the gold trade and weapons flows in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC). Already under sanction, the DRC’s failure to control illicit
financing of arms sales was sharply criticized by the experts reviewing the situation
on the ground. In a 2007 report, the Expert Group on—asserted:
62Mackinnon (1987b), p. 22.
63Mackinnon (1987c), p. 71.
64E.g., Wilson (1972); Hilson (2012), available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0305750X1200054X (last accessed 2 October 2017).
65Salomons (1995), text available at: https://ac.els-cdn.com/037567429400039E/1-s2.0-
037567429400039E-main.pdf?_tid¼a3fd64d0-a75c-11e7-81c8-00000aacb35d&
acdnat¼1506940379_feabcec28bde092f9cb7844f092730e4 (last accessed 2 October 2017); Har-
vard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, The Cost of Gold: Environmental, Health, and
Human Rights Consequences of Gold Mining in South Africa’s West and Central Rand (2016);
Centre for Environmental Rights, Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and the Violation of
Environmental Rights in Mpumalanga (May 2016), https://cer.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
Zero-Hour-May-2016.pdf (last accessed 2 October 2017).
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37. The Group can confirm that the most profitable financing source for armed groups
remains the exploitation, trade and transportation of natural resources. The tightly
intermingled economic interests of illegal armed groups with those of legitimate businesses
and of local populations do not allow a clear demarcation to be made between embargo
violators and legitimate actors. All supply chains from areas controlled by armed groups are
compromised.66
The report continued to point out the numerous sites of particularly heavy trade in
minerals, including gold, which formed a nearly uncontrollable financial source for
the purchase of weapons used in the fighting occurring in the country.67 Set amid a
civil war of equal brutality to the earlier insurrections in West Africa, the trade in
“conflict gold”—along with other conflict minerals such as tin, tungsten, and
coltran68—became an issue of international concern.
The international community response began with a broad focus on trying to rid
the market of all of these conflict minerals.69 Partly as a result of the wider scope and
multiple industries involved in the conflict minerals campaign, the approach taken
ultimately diverged significantly from the Kimberley Process’ methods.
In the beginning, however, the international community attacked the problem in
familiar ways. The United Nations Security Council imposed embargoes on the
export of natural resources from DRC and surrounding countries70 and NGOs such
as Global Witness engaged in campaigns to inform western publics and the indus-
tries using such minerals of the security and human rights issues.71 From the
beginning, however, the idea of “conflict minerals” encompassed more than simply
minerals from which the sales profits were benefitting rebel groups. Instead, the
focus was on minerals taken from territories in which there were armed conflicts
66Letter dated 16 July 2007 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to
the President of the Security Council, S/2007/423, para. 37 (18 July 2007).
67Letter dated 16 July 2007 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to
the President of the Security Council, S/2007/423, paras. 61–74 (18 July 2007).
68These are the minerals referred to as the “3Ts,” used heavily in the electronics industry (coltran is
tantalum ore).
69See Geenen S, African Artisanal Mining from the Inside Out: Norms and Power in Congo’s Gold




20Initiative%20for%20Artisanal%20Gold&f¼false (last accessed 7 September 2017).
70Security Council Resolution 1857, S/RES/1857 (2008); S/RES/2021 (2011); S/RES/2078 (2012);
S/RES/2136 (2014); S/RES/2198 (2015); S/RES/2277 (2016); S/RES/2293 (2016); S/RES/2360
(2017).
71Partnership Africa Canada, All that glitters is not gold (2014), text available at: https://
impacttransform.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/2014-May-All-That-Glitters-is-not-Gold-Dubai-
Congo-and-the-Illicit-Trade-of-Conflict-Minerals.pdf (last accessed 24 April 2018); Global Wit-
ness, River of gold (2016), text available at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-
minerals/river-of-gold-drc/ (last accessed 24 April 2018).
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occurring. The presumption was therefore that no matter who was benefitting from
the sale of such minerals, the sales were likely to be connected with abuses of human
rights. This presumption was not unfounded: miners and the small-scale business
people at every point along the local supply chain were exposed to brutality
(assaults, rape, and murder) and threats by not only insurrection fighters, but also
by DRC government forces and organized crime. Unlike the limited focus of the
Kimberley Process’s “conflict diamonds,” then, the conflict mineral issue was very
broad from the beginning.
By the second half of the 2000s, the UN embargos were evidently failing to even
substantially reduce the supply of Congolese minerals. The focus therefore shifted
away from trying to eliminate conflict mineral directly to trying to increase the
demand for certifiably non-conflict minerals. The advantage of this approach was
that it acknowledged the DRC’s limited governance capacity to address the com-
plexities of supervising and securing hundreds, if not thousands, of possible points
of illicit supply and placed the onus of implementation on those who were the
purchasers of the minerals—a smaller and more easily regulated group of players.
Corporate due diligence and supply chain management therefore became the key
catchwords of conflict mineral discussions.
Focusing on corporate conduct, in turn, meant that the emphasis of international
rules would shift away from the United Nations and toward states and—to the extent
states were unwilling to legislate domestically—to soft law instruments encouraging
responsible corporate behaviour.
The United States Congress was one of the first to issue binding rules, passing the
as the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.72 Under §1502, the Securities and Exchange
Commission was to require that all companies sourcing minerals from the DRC
report on their due diligence efforts to identify the source and supply chain controller
of their conflict mineral purchases from the DRC and surrounding countries, with the
main aim of enhancing the transparency of supply chains.73 Thus, while it encour-
aged purchasers to seek out conflict-free suppliers, there are no particular prohibi-
tions on buying such minerals as long as this is audited and reported. The uncertainty
surrounding the Dodd-Frank Act’s future status aside, its provisions reflect an
approach to regulating supply chains that seems appealing to states—other jurisdic-
tions have or are also developing or considering legislation to require transparency
from gold trading companies that source from conflict-affected or high-risk coun-
tries.74 By requiring transparency in purchasing and auditing due diligence efforts,
governments can balance calls for “doing something” against extraterritorial human
72The Dodd-Frank Act was mainly aiming to restore stability to the financial system by creating
new oversight agents, enhancing consumer protection rules, and increasing the transparency of
financial institutions’ activities.
73Dodd-Frank Act, § 1502(b).
74See Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (2017) Expert study on the Swiss gold sector:
final draft of 6 November 2017, pp. 108–136 (examining the gold supply chain regulations of
South Africa, Dubai, and India). See also discussion of Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations
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rights abuses with businesses’ fears of being held legally accountable for practices
over which they have little control (and perhaps even less appetite to police).
Soon after Dodd-Frank, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (“DDG”)
promoted internationally oriented rules fostering active corporate due diligence in
companies’ procurement of minerals that stem from geographic areas that are likely
to be tainted by illegal or human rights violation-fostering products. The DDG
composed a supplementary set of rules specifically for gold in 2012, and have
particularly addressed the questions of due diligence in relation to purchases of
artisanal gold. Examining these rules from the perspective of comparing them to the
KPCS and the WTO law implications, several things emerge as particularly
significant.
First, as set forth above, instead of defining its scope in terms of “conflict gold,”
the DDG Supplement on Gold addresses the supply-chain of gold from “conflict-
affected and high-risk areas.” The gold included in the scope, unlike the rough
diamond-only approach of the KPSC, may be refined—it mentions three sources of
gold that it includes: raw (“mined”); worked (“recyclable” or “grandfathered
stocks”); or “mixed” (from both mined and recyclable and/or grandfathered). By
moving beyond the mine, the DDG Supplement acknowledges that harm can arise at
any point along the supply chain.
Even more striking, however, is the much-expanded scope of the harms. Whereas
the KPCS’s extremely narrow definition of conflict diamonds could suggest that the
real concern with their trade lies in the potential of financing anti-governmental
insurrection, the DDG expresses a more victim-oriented view, looking to territories
“characterised by political instability or repression, institutional weakness, insecu-
rity, collapse of civil infrastructure, widespread violence and violations of national or
international law.”75
Clearly, this much-expanded view of the harm is more aligned to the lived reality
of dangers to individuals whom the measures are intended to help. By adopting an
experience-based approach (knowing of abuses by state actors, of criminal acts by
non-insurgents, and the mistreatment of individuals in situations where the rule of
law is weak), the approach is much more convincing as a Guidance document. On
the other hand, it makes the assignment to companies of protecting against the
presence of gold tainted by all such acts clearly something more resembling of an
ideological aim than a realistic target.
for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-
affected and high-risk areas, OJ 2017, L 130/1 above at III.
75OECD, OECD due diligence guidance for minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas 3d
ed., Supplement on gold (August 2016) (emphasis in original).
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Dream or target, the OECD Guidance promotes a five-step governance “frame-
work” for companies to adopt. While three of these steps relate to internal strategies
to identify and manage risks, the fourth and fifth steps call for “independent third-
party audits” and annual reporting of the due diligence efforts taken.76 Adding to the
2011 DDG’s generally applicable advice, the Supplement on Gold sets out a tailored
framework. Since gold is often traded in small quantities, the Guidance includes
support for the use of certified and sealed packages for shipments, of including the
right to conduct unannounced inspections in contracts, of identifying and discussing
the sources of gold with refiners, and keeping track of all payments made to
governments, agents, and security forces for each shipment.77
Most importantly, perhaps, the Supplement directs attention to the particular issue
of artisanal and small-scale gold miners (ASM). For the OECD, as well as the UN,
US, and EU, the prevalence of artisanal miners at the beginning of the conflict gold
supply chain increases the likelihood that the gold is tainted by violations of human
rights. Not only are the chances of an individual miner to protect him- or herself
against armed troops small in comparison to the ability of large mining companies
doing so, but there may be an active willingness on the part of individual miners to
profit from the existence of demand for their gold from insurgent groups, corrupt
officials, or organized crime networks.78 Thus, the majority approach to gold supply
chain management is to encourage a formalization of ASM sources and channel
purchasing toward the large or medium-sized mining companies.
5.1 Other Standards
The gold industry has its own initiatives to ensure conflict-free supply chains. The
most notable among these is the World Gold Council’s Conflict-Free Gold Stan-
dard.79 The Standard applies to mining companies themselves, and is self-described
as
76OECD, Recommendation of the Council on due diligence guidance for responsible supply chains
of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, 25 May 2011—C/MIN(2011)12/FINAL,
amended on 17 July 2012—C(2012)93, Annex I.
77OECD, Recommendation of the Council on due diligence guidance for responsible supply chains
of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, 25 May 2011—C/MIN(2011)12/FINAL,
amended on 17 July 2012—C(2012)93, Annex, Supplement on gold.
78OECD, Recommendation of the Council on due diligence guidance for responsible supply chains
of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, 25 May 2011—C/MIN(2011)12/FINAL,
amended on 17 July 2012—C(2012)93, Annex, at pp. 84–86. (unklar)
79World Gold Council, Conflict-Free Gold Standard (October 2012), available at the link on the
page http://www.gold.org/who-we-are/our-members/responsible-gold/conflict-free-gold-standard
(last accessed 8 September 2017).
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a mechanism by which gold producers can assess and provide assurance that their gold has
been extracted in a manner that does not cause, support or benefit unlawful armed conflict or
contribute to serious human rights abuses or breaches of international humanitarian law.80
Aiming to encourage companies to abide by local law, to refrain from bribery or
corrupt practices, to disclose payments made to government agents, and to restrain
security forces from violating human rights, the Standard goes even further toward
improving corporate responsibility than do the OECD Guidance documents upon
which the Standard also relies. Notably, it repeats the scepticism of the DDG
Supplement on Gold regarding sourcing from ASM.
Further standards in the industry include the London Bullion Market Associa-
tion’s Responsible Gold Guidance and its Good Delivery List. This set of rules
requires due diligence as set out in the OECD DDG in order for suppliers to remain
on the Association’s Good Delivery List. Tying the company’s efforts to ensure
responsible supply chain management to the traditional quality standard of gold bar
is a further push toward a de facto—although not de jure—firming up of the
principles behind making gold conflict-free.
As the implementation of the standards is mainly accomplished by publishing
reports to recount internal assessment processes, it is difficult for external observers
to accurately say whether or not the standards are “working.” Industry experts seem
convinced that these standards are changing the way business is done,81 however,
and certainly the awareness-raising effects of having such standards at all is a
positive step toward encouraging more sustainable supply chains. Still, there is
room for continued concern, particularly as news of failures in the oversight of
supply chains come to light.82 Moreover, the highly fragmented nature of the gold
supply chains—not only in the mining of gold by artisanal and small-scale diggers,
but also in the jewellery-making sector of countries such as India—leave the
extensive reporting requirements that are the centrepiece of the gold supply chain
initiatives open to being ignored by large segments of the industry.83
80World Gold Council, Conflict-Free Gold Standard (October 2012), available at the link on the
page http://www.gold.org/who-we-are/our-members/responsible-gold/conflict-free-gold-standard
(last accessed 8 September 2017).
81Personal discussion with manager of a large gold refiner on 13 January 2018 in Basel,
Switzerland.
82Dubai’s problems with fraud and smuggling are highlighted in a United Nations report. Final
report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2017/672/Rev.1)
published on August 16th 2017, available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m¼S/
2017/672/Rev.1.
83See Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (2017) Expert study on the Swiss gold sector:
final draft of 6 November 2017, p. 136 (discussing India’s informal and disperse gold jewelry
making sector as a possible hurdle to effective enforcement of industry standards).
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6 Conclusion
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme’s WTO compatibility is not in ques-
tion. For better or worse, the program to certify exports and imports of rough
diamonds as “conflict-free” is the subject of a waiver of WTO obligations for any
WTO Member that is a Kimberley Participant. Thus, in principle, the Scheme’s
discriminatory market access restrictions will be deemed legitimate for purposes of
the WTO rules for as long as the roughs are traded by rebel troops to fund their
egregious violations of civilians’ human rights. The legal questions specific to the
WTO system (are “blood diamonds” like non-blood diamonds? Would the general
exceptions of the GATT Agreement apply to the importing restrictions and discrim-
ination required by the Scheme’s Participant-only trading circle? Is the certification
requirement itself a technical regulation that falls afoul of the rules on use of
technical barriers to trade?) as well as the WTO system’s rules’ relation to inter-
national human rights and humanitarian law are avoided for a safe answer to whether
WTO Members may legally join the Kimberley Process Scheme.
Although significantly different from the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme’s approach to restricting trade in conflict diamonds, the current move to
regulate gold trade may end up similarly avoiding a WTO validity test. How the
broad base of conflict-free gold standards will fare under the WTO rules has not yet
been tested, and may never be tested. Yet, while its wider area of focus may seem to
suggest that it would have a more difficult time fitting within the confines of liberal
market access and strict non-discrimination, by focusing on the entire supply chain
rather than only on the exportation and importation of gold as a product, the
relevance of WTO rules becomes much more tenuous.
As they currently are, the target of the gold trading rules—the companies of the
gold industry—do not fall within the direct scope of WTO law. As WTO obligations
apply to governmental measures only, to the extent that due diligence “require-
ments” are suggestions for companies to follow for purposes of good relations with
the community or customers, the WTO rules have no real relevance for them.
However, where due diligence requirements become part of national law, the
same analysis must occur regarding market access and non-discrimination as was the
case with the KPCS. In terms of market access, the main relevant difference between
conflict diamonds and minerals from conflict areas is that the obligation to review
supply chains and submit an explanation for why the minerals are required for
production purposes is—under current formulations of the rules—not an obligation
to not trade. Rather, it is a transparency obligation: the company is to notify or report
on the existence of the trade, but is not prohibited from trading, even where the gold
is clearly tainted. True, the expected effect of the transparency requirement is that
there will be a drop in the demand for such gold, but it is not a restriction on the
supply. This, then, removes the clear violation of Article XI GATT from the
potential WTO claims.
The most such reporting would be is a non-tariff barrier. The next question to ask
is would it be subject to the rules of the TBT Agreement? As a mere reporting
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requirement, it would not appear to fall within the definition of “technical regula-
tion” set forth in the Agreement. However, if it were to be so categorized, given that
TBT rules apply without the availability of the general exceptions of Articles XX
and XXI GATT, the requirement that the regulation be non-discriminatory would
push WTO Members toward making such reporting requirements as broad as
possible—applying to all trade in gold, independent of source territory. Interestingly,
it would in this way be a potential boon to the interests of protecting human rights. It
would also, however, become much more burdensome for companies
purchasing gold.
The optimal regulation of supply chains, then, seems to be the one least likely to
violate the WTO rules. It is also, however, the one most burdensome on individual
companies who will bear the costs of diligently investigating their supply chains. As
a result, even where WTO obligations themselves can be managed to not actively
block human rights, it remains to be seen if there is the political will among traders to
bring the system far enough to help.
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Beyond Antagonism: Legal Protection
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1 Introduction
The natural resources sector has traditionally been, and continues to be, a key sector
for profitable projects of foreign investors and the economic development of States.
Studying investments in the natural resources sector is particularly important in view
of the implications and potential impact these investments may have upon a variety
of private and public interests, including the protection of the environment and
human rights.
It is appropriate to start this note by briefly defining natural resources (Sect. 2).
Two important notions need then to be discussed, namely permanent sovereignty
over natural resources (PSNR) and sustainable development, as both play a pivotal
role in elaborating a balanced regulation of foreign investment in the natural
resources sector (Sects. 3 and 4). This paves the way to a concise inquiry into
delicate questions related to the exercise of regulatory powers by States (Sect. 5).
Moving to the substantive law, the paper will finally focus on the protection of the
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environment, human rights and corporate responsibility, and good governance
(respectively, Sects. 6–8).1
2 Definition of Natural Resources
Common working definitions of ‘natural resources’ are quite straightforward, yet
rather vague. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD), for instance, “[n]atural resources are natural assets (raw materials)
occurring in nature that can be used for economic production or consumption”.2 In
the trade context, likewise, natural resources have been defined as “stocks of
materials that exist in the natural environment that are both scarce and economically
useful in production or consumption, either in their raw state or after a minimal
amount of processing”.3
Yet, natural resources are generic terms and as such difficult to define. Generic
terms relate to, or are descriptive of, a whole group or class. They are not “static” and
their meaning tend to evolve in time.4 Those using these terms in legal instruments,
most importantly international treaties, legislation and contracts, should be aware
that they are susceptible to a change in meaning and should accordingly accept the
related risks. As recently held by the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
where the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties necessarily having been
aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where the treaty has
been entered into for a very long period or is “of continuing duration”, the parties must be
presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms to have an evolving meaning.5
1On the settlement of disputes concerning investment in the natural resources sector, see Ortino and
Tabari (2016), p. 496.
2OECD, Glossary of Statistical Terms, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID¼1740.
3WTO (2010), p. 46. For a full discussion on the definition, see Rutten and Mwangi (2014), p. 51.
4See Namibia (South West Africa), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16, para 53. InUnited
States - Import Prohibition of certain Shrimps and Shrimps Products, WT/DS58/AB/R,
12 December 1998, para 130, the WTO Appellate Body, pointed out that the generic term ‘natural
resources’ in Article XX (g) GATT 1996 is “by definition, evolutionary”. As noted by Higgins R,
Declaration appended to Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment, 13 December
1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II), p. 1045, para 2, a generic term is a “known legal term, whose
content the parties expected would change through time”.
5Case Concerning the Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica
v. Nicaragua), Judgment, 13 July 2009, para 66. In para 70, the Court further pointed out that
generic terms “must be understood to have the meaning they bear on each occasion on which the
Treaty is to be applied, and not necessarily their original meaning”. In Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
(Greece/Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 3 at p. 32, para 77, the Court held that where a
term can be classified as generic “[t]he presumption arises that its meaning was intended to follow
the evolution of the law and to correspond with the meaning attached to the expression by the law in
force at any given time”.
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References to natural resources or foreign investment in the natural resources sector
remain rather uncommon in investment treaties. Investment treaties rarely contain a
definition of natural resources, as they normally apply to all sectors, with significant
exceptions such as the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)6 or the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol on Energy.7 Investment treaties occa-
sionally refer to the use of economic resources,8 the rights conferred with regard to
the cultivation, extraction and exploitation of natural resources,9 measures related to
the protection and conservation of (living or non-living exhaustible) natural
resources,10 or measures necessary to protect and conserve the environment, includ-
ing all living and non-living natural resources.11
Domestic legislation, on the contrary, often offers detailed definitions of natural
resources, which normally consist of rather comprehensive yet non-exhaustive lists
of various categories of natural resources. This is typically the case when legislation
specifically deals with natural resources. Article 3 of the Organic Law for Sustain-
able Use of Natural Resources, promulgated in Peru in 1997, is an interesting
example. It reads:
Natural resources are considered to be any component of nature, which can be used by
human beings to satisfy their needs and which has a current or potential value in the market,
such as:
superficial and subterranean waters;
the soil, subsoil and lands for their capacity for greater use: agricultural, livestock, forestry
and protection;
biological diversity: such as species of flora, fauna and microorganisms or protists; the
genetic resources, and the ecosystems that support life;
hydrocarbon, hydro-energetic, wind, solar, geothermal and similar resources;
the atmosphere and the radio spectrum;
minerals;
others considered as such.
6Concluded on 17 December 1994 and entered into force on 16 April 1998, at https://energycharter.
org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECTC-en.pdf.
7Concluded on 31 January 2003. Article 40 provides for the provisional application of the treaty
pending its entry into force, at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5477.
8See, for instance, the preamble of the BIT between Finland—Montenegro, in which the parties
agreed that a stable framework for investment will contribute to maximising the effective utilisation
of economic resources. The preamble of the model BIT elaborated and subsequently abandoned by
Norway recorded the desire of the contracting parties “to maximize effective and sustainable
utilization of economic resources.”
9See, for instance, SADC Model BIT Article 2.II.7.
10See, for instance, Article XVII of the BIT between Canada and Egypt BIT (1996), or Article
3 c. (iii) of the BIT between the United States and Uruguay.
11See, for instance, Article 16.1 (v) of the Indian Model BIT.
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The natural landscape, as long as it is an object of economic exploitation, is considered a
natural resource for the purposes of this Law.12
Indeed, a precise definition of natural resources facilitates the implementation of
the legislation, clarifies the relationship between investors and local authorities,
prevents having misplaced expectations, and directs domestic courts and investment
tribunals in qualifying investments for the purpose of the relevant legal instruments.
3 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR) is of key
importance for the regulation of foreign investment in the natural resources sector. In
Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda, the ICJ held that the principle of PSNR,
as expressed in General Assembly Resolutions 1803,13 320114 and 3281,15 is “a
principle of customary international law”.16 This finding seems to have found broad
support in literature, with several learned authors pointing out that PSNR first
emerged as soft law and then matured into customary international law.17 While
there is no harm in defining PSNR as a principle of customary international law, its
evolution from soft law into such a principle, and the issue of the existence of such a
principle before those resolutions, remain unclear.
It seems preferable to consider PSNR as part and parcel of the notion of
sovereignty, understood as “the territorial authority of a state over everything within
its territory includ[ing] sovereignty over the state’s natural resources”.18 The very
concept of sovereignty was introduced and developed in political theory in the
context of the power of the State over “everything within the State”.19
12Ley Orgánica Para el Aprovechamiento Sostenible de los Recursos Naturales, 25 June 1997, at
http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/cendocbib/con4_uibd.nsf/
94F1B8549C309A4005257B830064833E/$FILE/26821.pdf.
13Resolution 1803 (XVII), 14 December 1962.
14Resolution 3201 (S-VI), Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, 1 May 1974.
15Resolution 3281 (XXIX), Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 12 December 1974.
16Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 168, para 244. That PSNR does not apply—as held by the
Court—in the context of an international armed conflict remains questionable.
17Schrijver (1997); Hobe (2015), p. 1; Schrijver (2015), p. 15, esp. pp. 24–26; Tyagi (2015) p. 588.
18Jennings and Watts (1992), p. 384.
19Idem., p. 125; likewise Malanczuk (1997), p. 17, notes that “[t]he theory of sovereignty began as
an attempt to analyse the internal structure of a State. Political philosophers though that there must




From this perspective, PSNR is inherent in the exercise of sovereignty over a
portion of the globe, without any demonstration on the existence, nature or content
of any underlying right being necessary. As persuasively pointed out by Sornarajah,
the General Assembly resolutions mentioned above
[a]ssert[ed] a generally established proposition of international law. No State, developed or
developing, doubts the proposition that it has total control over all economic activities which
takes place within its boundaries. This is a self-evident principle of state sovereignty.20
It is particularly telling that Resolution 626 (VII) reiterated that “the right of peoples
freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources is inherent in their
sovereignty” (emphasis added).21 Likewise, Resolution 1803 (XVII) upheld “the
inalienable right of all States freely to dispose of their natural resources.” Neither
resolution introduced any development of international law or revealed any emerg-
ing or new right. Quite the contrary, both merely recognized a fundamental element
of the exercise of State sovereignty.22
It has been argued that, since PSNR developed in the era of decolonization, it
would be “inappropriate to invoke this concept in a case involving two African
countries”.23 The argument is inconsistent with the qualification of PSNR as a
customary principle as maintained by the ICJ, contradicts the well-established
understanding of sovereignty and ultimately misreads the significance of the proc-
lamation of PSNR in the post-colonial context.
The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly up to the proclamation of the
rights and duties of States within the attempt to establish a New International
Economic Order (NIEO) did not aim at rewriting the law completely, but rather at
invoking “one of the most powerful doctrines of international law”, namely the
sovereignty of States,24 in order to tackle the colonial legacy. The new States did not
need to assert their sovereignty over the natural resources, as this was inherent in
their being sovereign States.25 Their objective was to regain full control over the
natural resources in respect to which foreign investors had legally protected interests,
i.e. concessions.
20Sornarajah (2010), p. 83.
21Resolution 626 (VII), 21 December 1952. In China – Rare Earths, WT/DS331R, WT/DS332R
and WT/DS433R, 22 March 2014, para 7.270, the Panel described PSNR as “a corollary of
statehood”.
22In Crystallex International Corporation v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award,
16 April 2016, para 674, the Tribunal held that foreign investors have no “right” to a permit under
international law, because “a state would always maintain its freedom to deny a permit if it so
decides”.
23Judge ad hoc Kateca, dissenting opinion in Congo v. Uganda, above note 16, p. 378.
24Subedi (2016), p. 38.
25In this regard, it is worth noting that the preamble of the recent legislation on natural resources,
proclaimed that Tanzania “being a sovereign state has permanent sovereignty over all natural
wealth” (emphasis added), Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act 2017,
28 June 2017, at https://www.madini.go.tz/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Natural-Wealth-and-
Resources-Permanent-Sovereignty-Act-2017.pdf.
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The crux of the matter was not whether the new States possessed PSNR but how it
could be exercised.26 Accordingly, they put forward a number of calls for normative
change, the most important of which concerned the conditions for lawful expropri-
ation. The right to expropriate has never been disputed by developed or developing
States. What has been contentious for decades was the concrete exercise of this right,
and more precisely the applicable law and the determination of compensation in this
context.
The aim of the newly established States was to bring the issue of expropriation
under the reach of domestic law at the expense of international law. This was fully
articulated in Article 2(2)(c) of General Assembly resolution 3281.27 The newly
established States’ call, however, failed to muster the necessary support to bring
about a normative change. The resolution was persuasively considered as an expres-
sion of lexferenda in the Texaco arbitration.28
Other calls, having more political than legal content, accompanied the legal
discourse on PSNR. They included, most prominently, the promotion of the eco-
nomic and social advancement of all peoples and their standard of living, the
acceleration of the economic and social advancement of less developed countries,
the expansion of technical cooperation and transfer of knowledge, the diversification
of economic activities and the enhancement of the industrialization process.29 On the
economic level, the emphasis was on the distribution of the profits related to the
exploitation of natural resources, which “must be shared in proposition freely agreed
upon, in each case, between the investors and the recipient State, due care being
taken to ensure that there is no impairment, for any reason, of that State’s sovereignty
over its natural wealth and resources”.30
Later, PSNR was linked to and considered as “a basic component of the right to
self-determination”.31 The link was subsequently confirmed in common Article 1 of
the two UN International Covenants, according to which all peoples have the right of
self-determination and may freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic
co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law.32
26In this regard, Article 18.1 of the ECOWAS Protocol on Energy reads: “The Contracting Parties
recognize state sovereignty and sovereign rights over energy resources. They reaffirm that these
must be exercised in accordance with and subject to the rules of international law”.
27Note 15. As maintained by Bernie et al. (2009), p. 191, the resolutions “[w]ere primarily directed
at asserting the right to nazionalize or control foreign-owned resources and industries, free from
some of the older rules which protected foreign investments”.
28Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v. Libya, Award, 19 January 1977, 17 ILM 1978 1, para
88.
29See, for instance, General Assembly resolution 1515 (XV), 15 December 1960.
30Resolution 1803, note 13.
31Ibidem.
32International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, signed on 16 December 1966 and entered into force, respectively, on
23 March 1976 and 3 January 1976.
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A complete catalogue of the calls associated with the principle of PSNR was
eventually developed within the attempt to establish the NIEO.33
Regardless of the appropriateness to link PSNR to a well celebrated but still rather
obscure right such as self-determination, it must be emphasized that PSNR was not a
novelty insofar as it proclaimed the exercise of the rights related to the exploitation
of natural resources as being part and parcel of the very notion of sovereignty. The
legal added value of the principle of PSNR proclaimed by developing countries has
to be sought in the corollary attached to it, namely the claim to dispose of existing
contracts and other agreements on the basis of domestic law, rather than international
law.34 The claim found the firm opposition of developed countries and failed to
introduce the normative change it aspired to. In this regard, international law must be
seen as ‘a process of continuous interaction, of continuous demand and response, in
which the decision-makers of particular States unilaterally put forward claims of the
most diverse and conflicting character [. . . ] and in which other decision-makers [. . .
] weight and appraise these competing claims [. . . ], and ultimately accept or reject
them’.35
After decades of sharp division, in recent years the legal position of developed
and developing States on expropriation has eventually converged. Today, it is
generally accepted that the—never disputed—right to expropriate must satisfy four
basic conditions, which are found in virtually all investment treaties, including those
concluded between developing countries,36 and considered as being part of custom-
ary international law. According to Article 13(1) of the ECT, for instance, foreign
investments shall not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to a measure or
measures having an effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation, except
where such expropriation is: (a) for a purpose which is in the public interest;
(b) not discriminatory; (c) carried out under due process of law; and
(d) accompanied by the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation.37
33Wälde (1998), p. 771.
34As pointed out by Brownlie (1979), p. 263, “it is difficult to decide to what extent, if at all, the
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order of 1974 evidences any
specific development in customary international law. Probably it does not, since the right to
nationalize was not denied in the existing law and it was the conditions under which nationalization
occurred which were the object of persistent debate”.
35McDougal (1955), p. 354.
36See, for instance, Article 5 (1) of the BIT between Egypt and Vietnam.
37It is however, worthwhile noting that some States have brought expropriation back to the realm of
domestic law as most prominently South Africa. The South African Protection of Investment Act
(2015), at https://www.thedti.gov.za/gazzettes/39514.pdf, in particular, has pegged the protection
of property to Article 25 of the Constitution. Such developments, nonetheless, do not affect the
obligations of South Africa under the relevant investment treaties and customary international law.
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4 Sustainable Development
The other notion that deserves attention when dealing with foreign investment in the
natural resources sector is sustainable development. The notion of sustainable
development is “inherently complex”38 and difficult to qualify in strict legal terms.
It has its roots in environmental protection and has evolved through an intellectual
exercise aimed at expressing “[the] need to reconcile economic development with
the protection of the environment.”39
According to a minimalist view, sustainable development is a “label for a general
policy goal which may be adopted by states unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilater-
ally”40 and its main legal significance consists in assisting judges in establishing
priorities and accommodating conflicting norms (so-called interstitial normativity)41
as well as guiding and inspiring those involved in the adoption and implementation
of the relevant legal instruments.
Alternatively, sustainable development may be treated as an umbrella concept, or
a convenient way to synthesize several rules, principles and policy commitments.42
The normative content of sustainable development, therefore, must be determined by
putting together the normative contents of the relevant rules, principles and policy
commitments. This may change in time, due to the evolution of the underlying rules
or general principles, or the emergence and inclusion of new ones. This approach has
two main advantages. On the one hand, it anchors the normative content of sustain-
able development in the relevant underlying rules and principles and their evolution;
on the other hand, it provides a dynamic and coherent umbrella to all of them.
The International Law Association’s Committee on Sustainable Development,
while admitting “a continued and genuine reluctance to formalise a distinctive legal
status,”43 has identified seven principles that are instrumental in pursuing the
objective of sustainable development, namely:
1. the duty of States to ensure sustainable use of natural resources;
2. the principle of equity and the eradication of poverty;
3. the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities;
4. principle of the precautionary approach to human health, natural resources and ecosystems;
5. principle of public participation and access to information and justice;
6. the principle of good governance; and
7. the principle of integration and interrelationship, in particular in relation to human rights
and social, economic and environmental objectives.44
38Bernie et al. (2009), p. 54. Alternatively, sustainable development can be seen as a matrix, see
Barrel (2016), p. 3, at 4.
39Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7 para
141.
40Lowe (1999), p. 30.
41Idem, pp. 31–34.
42Sands (1995), p. 53.
43Final Report, Sofia Conference (2012), para 36.
44New Delhi Declaration on the Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Develop-
ment (2002), at www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/25.
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These principles, embodying both right and obligations, are reminiscent of those
included in the Brundtland Report, as follows: (a) reviving growth and changing its
quality; (b) meeting essential needs for jobs, food, energy, water and sanitation;
(c) ensuring a sustainable level of population; (d) conserving and enhancing the
resource base; (e) reorienting technology and managing risk; and (f) merging envi-
ronment and economics in decision-making.45 To a certain extent, they also repro-
duce some of the calls underpinning the NIEO.
The notion of sustainable development has found its way into the preamble of
several recent investment treaties and is expected to inform their interpretation and
application. One of the most sophisticated references to sustainable development can
be found in the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) betweenCanada andBurkina Faso, in
which the parties understood investment as “a form of sustainable development that
meets present needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs and that it is critical for the future development of national and global
economies as well as for the pursuit of national and global objectives for sustainable
development”. In another BIT, the parties recognized “the important contribution
investment can make to the sustainable development of the state parties, including
the reduction of poverty, increase of productive capacity, economic growth, the transfer
of technology, and the furtherance of human rights and human development”.46
The channelling of foreign investment towards sustainable development features
also at the domestic level. Article 5 of the Investment Law of Ethiopia, for instance,
provides quite a comprehensive set of investment objectives, which are designed to
realize the sustainable economic and social development of the country, and in
particular
to accelerate the country’s economic development;
to exploit and develop the immense natural resources of the country;
to develop the domestic market through the growth of production, productivity, and services;
to increase foreign exchange earnings (. . .);
to encourage balanced development and integrated economic activity among the region and
to strengthen the inter-sectoral linkage of the economy;
to enhance the role of the private sector in the acceleration of the country’s economic
development;
to enable foreign investment to play its role in the country’s economic development;
to create ample employment opportunities and to advance the transfer of technology (. . .).47
45As synthesized by Sands (2012), p. 9.
46BIT betweenMorocco andNigeria (not yet in force). In the same vein, the preamble of the COMESA
Investment Agreement (not yet in force), recognises that ‘direct investment is an important source of
finance for sustaining the pace of economic, industrial, infrastructure and technology development;
hence, the need to attract higher and sustainable level of direct investment flows in COMESA’.
47Likewise, Article 2 (d) (i) of the Namibian Investment Law (2016) aims at promoting sustainable
economic development and growth through the mobilization and attraction of domestic and foreign
investments that inter alia enhance “the economic development objectives of Namibia to build a
prosperous, industrialised society with adequate direct investment to, among other things,
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Still at the domestic level, the recent Act adopted by Tanzania offers an interesting
attempt to reassert the permanent sovereignty over all natural resources and to ensure
that natural resources are exploited for the greatest benefit and welfare of the
population.48 Expressly relying on General Assembly resolutions 1803 and 3281,
the Act declares four basic principles: (1) ownership and control over natural
resources is exercised by the government on behalf of the population; (2) any
arrangements related to the exploitation of natural resources concluded before or
after the entry into force of the Act is subject to approval by the National Assembly;
(3) for any such arrangement there must be a guaranteed return on investment to the
Tanzanian economy; and (4) earnings obtained from such arrangements must be
retained in Tanzanian banks and institutions. Reminiscent of the Calvo clause, the
Act also establishes the exclusive competence of domestic judicial bodies and other
organs to settle disputes related to the exploitation of natural resources.
With regard to principle (2), if the National Assembly believes that an arrangement
is partly or entirely prejudicial to the interests of the population of Tanzania “by reason
of unconscionable terms”; it directs the Government to renegotiate it. Unsuccessful
re-negotiation unavoidably entails the cessation of the effects of the arrangement
regarding the unconscionable terms. Importantly, the Tanzanian Act contains no
indication as to the settlement of disputes that may arise out of such a procedure.
The introduction of a preventive control over new arrangements by the National
Assembly over the relevant agreements can be seen as a welcome development. It
enhances public participation, public scrutiny, transparency and accountability. The
subsequent control over existing arrangements, on the contrary, remains problematic
on several accounts, including—for the purpose of this paper—possible breaches of
Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) potential retroactive effects49 and probable flow
of and claims of indirect expropriation with regard to covered investment. It is argued
that the Act under discussion should have been drafted more carefully and should have
included adequate normative precautions, most prominently procedural safeguards,
and the possibility of compensation and adequate judicial review. By opting for
unilateral measures based on the political assessment of a vague and largely subjective
notion such as “unconscionable terms”, Tanzania exposes itself to the risk of arbitral
proceedings being brought against it on the basis of the arbitral clauses contained in the
relevant treaties or contracts.50 The outcome of these proceedings may be more
encourage the creation of employment, wealth, technology transfer, capacity building, value
addition to natural resources and foreign currency generation”.
48The three main pieces of legislation were adopted on 28 June 2017: (a) Natural Wealth and
Resources (Permanent Sovereign) Act; (b) Natural Wealth and Resources Contract (Review and
Re-Negotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act; and (c) Written Law (Miscellaneous Amendment)
Act, all available at http://www.tcme.or.tz/resources/category/acts-and-regulations/P8.
49Interestingly, Section 12 of the Liberian Investment act (2010) expressly excludes any retroactive
effects, at http://www.moci.gov.lr/doc/TheInvestmentActof2010(1).pdf
50It has been reported that several foreign investors in the natural resources sector (including Acacia
Mining, AngloGold Ashanti and OreCorp) have started arbitral proceedings against Tanzania after
the adoption of the legislation.
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onerous for the State than an expropriation carried out in accordance with the relevant
legal requirements, or a negotiated agreement providing adequate compensation.
5 Regulatory Powers
Any inquiry into the legal protection of foreign investment, especially in the natural
resources sector, must start with the undisputed right of the host State to manage the
admission of foreign investment51 and to exercise its regulatory powers in this
context. The proclamation embodied in Article 2.2 of General Assembly Resolution
3281, that each State has the right “to regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investment within its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations
and in conformity with its national objectives and priorities”52 is uncontroversial.
Equally uncontroversial, from a different perspective, is that foreign investments
are subject to the jurisdiction of the host State and must comply with all relevant
rules and regulations. The inclusion of a provision reiterating such obligation in a
treaty, although not strictly speaking necessary, may reassure the State and assist
arbitral tribunals. In this sense, Article 12.1 (Compliance with Law of Host State) of
the Indian Model BIT reads:
Investors and their Investments shall be subject to and comply with the Law of the Host
State. This includes, but is not limited to, the following:
Law concerning payment of wages and minimum wages, employment of contract labour,
prohibition on child labour, special conditions of work, social security and benefit and
insurance schemes applicable to employees;
information sharing requirements of the Host State concerning the Investment in question
and the corporate history and practices of the Investment or Investor, for purposes of
decision making in relation to that Investment or for other purposes;
environmental Law applicable to the Investment and its business operations;
Law relating to conservation of natural resources;
Law relating to human rights;
Law of consumer protection and fair competition; and
relevant national and internationally accepted standards of corporate governance and
accounting practices.53
51Unless otherwise bound by treaties, legislation or contractual obligations, States remain free to
regulate the admission and establishment of foreign investment within their jurisdictions as a
sovereign prerogative, see Sacerdoti (2000), p. 105; Gómez-Palacio and Muchlinski (2008),
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Yet, the regulatory powers have to be exercised in accordance with the relevant
international and domestic legal provisions. As pointed out by an International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal, “while a sovereign
State possesses the inherent right to regulate its domestic affairs, the exercise of such
right is not unlimited and must have its boundaries”.54
Another Tribunal held that
[i]t is each State’s undeniable right and privilege to exercise its sovereign legislative power.
A State has the right to enact, modify or cancel a law at its own discretion. Save for the
existence of an agreement, in the form of a stabilisation clause or otherwise, there is nothing
objectionable about the amendment brought to the regulatory framework existing at the time
an investor made its investment. As a matter of fact, any businessman or investor knows that
laws will evolve over time. What is prohibited however is for a State to act unfairly,
unreasonably or inequitably in the exercise of its legislative power.55
To a significant extent, foreign investment law is precisely about fixing the limits
within which a State may exercise its regulatory powers, keeping in mind that “when
a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals, whether
natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to them the protection of the law and
assumes obligations concerning the treatment to be afforded them”.56 The crux of
the matter is indeed striking a balance between, on the one hand, the need to create a
stable and predictable legal framework to attract foreign investment through invest-
ment treaties, legislation and contracts, and, on the other hand, the need to preserve
the capacity of States to properly pursue their economic and social policies.
The undisputed right of every State to “freely exercise full permanent sover-
eignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources
and economic activities”57 must be exercised—throughout the entire life of the
investment, i.e. from admission to termination—in accordance with the relevant
domestic and international rules.
International treaties must be complied with in good faith as prescribed by the
pacta sunt servanda principle, which has expressly been recognized inter alia in
General Assembly Resolutions 1803 and 3281 (Chapter 1(j)).58 It is worth recalling
that States remain the masters of investment treaties, even though these treaties are
intended to benefit primarily foreign investors. The fact that in investor-State
disputes one of the parties is not a party to the treaty, furthermore, requires a
54ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. Hungary, ICSID ARB/03/16,
Award, 2 October 2006, para 423. TecnicasMedioambientalesTecmed, S.A. v.Mexico, ICSID ARB
(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003, para 119, “[t]he principle that the State’s exercise of its sovereign
powers within the framework of its police power may cause economic damage to those subject to its
powers as administrator without entitling them to any compensation whatsoever is undisputable”.
55Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, 11 September
2007, para 332.
56Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3, para
33.
57Article 2.1, General Assembly Resolution 3281, note 15.
58Respectively notes 13 and 15.
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“particular duty of caution” when interpreting these treaties,59 as well as adequate
protection of the acquired rights of investors in case of amendments.60
In addition to undertaking specific substantive or procedural obligations through
the conclusion of investment treaties, the adoption of legislation and the conclusion
of contracts, States may accept restrictions on their exercise of regulatory powers
vis-à-vis foreign investors. Conversely, they may take some precautions at the
normative level to safeguard their exercise of regulatory powers and minimize the
exposure to claims of alleged violations of investors’ rights.
From the first perspective, States may accept to abstain from exercising regula-
tory powers through so-called freezing and stabilization clauses. These clauses are
normally found in contracts, especially in contracts related to projects in the extrac-
tive industries in sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern and Southern Europe, and Central
Asia.61 They have often been criticized for unduly undermining the capacity of
States to meet their responsibilities with regard to the protection of collective
interests and to pursue effective tax and economic policies.62 Significantly, in
2016, Israel’s Supreme Court struck down a natural gas plan, due to a freezing
clause exempting foreign investors from regulatory changes in taxation, antitrust
limitations and export quotas for 10 years. The Court’s President explained that the
stabilization clause “was made in contrast to the general principle of administrative
law regarding the prohibition of shackling the authority’s ability to govern. The
government does not have the power to decide not to decide and not to act”.63
Occasionally, freezing clauses can also be found in BITs. Article 12(3) of the BIT
concluded in 1998 between Italy and Mozambique, for instance, reads:
Whenever, after the date when the investment has been made, a modification should take
place in laws, regulations, acts or measures of economic policies governing directly or
indirectly the investment, the same treatment shall apply upon request of the investor that
was applicable to it at the moment when the investment was agreed upon to be carried out.64
The clause neutralizes the exercise of subsequent regulatory powers to the extent
that such exercise is detrimental to covered investors. The provision is rather broad
59Berman F, diss. op. in Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v. Peru, ICSID ARB/03/
4, Annulment, 13 August 2007, para 9.
60Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, LP v Argentina, ICSID ARB/01/3, Award, 22 May
2007, para 337, the Tribunal pointed out that “States are of course free to amend the Treaty by
consenting to another text, but this would not affect rights acquired under the Treaty by investors or
other beneficiaries”.
61See, for instance, Shemberg A, “Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights,” May 27, 2009, at
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/9feb5b00488555eab8c4fa6a6515bb18/Stabilization%
2BPaper.pdf?MOD¼AJPERES. See also Sheppard and Crockett (2010), p. 333.
62See Human Rights Council, “Principles for responsible contracts,”May 25, 2011, A/HRC/17/31/
Add.3.
63See Reich A, Israel’s Foreign Investment Protection Regime in View of Developments in its
Energy Sector, European University Institute Working Paper LAW 2017/02, at http://cadmus.eui.
eu/bitstream/handle/1814/45005/LAW_2017_02.pdf?sequence¼1.
64Identical or similar clauses are contained in Italy’s BITs with Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bosnia, Cameroon, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Tanzania, Uganda, and Uzbekistan.
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as it applies generally to measures directly or indirectly governing investments.
Furthermore, unlike contracts, it provides all investors of the other contracting
party with an exemption from unfavourable laws, regulations, acts, or measures of
economic policies that are adopted by the host country.
From the second perspective, States are increasingly uncomfortable with the risk
that regulatory measures may violate or be perceived by arbitral tribunals as violat-
ing the rights of foreign investors, especially with regard to claims of indirect
expropriation.65 This type of expropriation, nowadays more frequent than direct
expropriation obtained through the transfer of title to property, results from covert or
incidental interference with the use of property, thereby depriving the owner, in
whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably expected economic benefit of
property.66 Drawing the line between non-compensable exercise of regulatory
powers and indirect expropriation, however, remains rather problematic.67 The
significant legal uncertainty which still surrounds the notion of indirect expropriation
unavoidably increases the exposure of States to claims of compensation.
With a view to reducing such exposure, States have developed several drafting
techniques to better safeguard their policy space. This can be obtained, for example,
by including general exceptions clauses in the investment treaty, which often
specifically address inter alia regulatory measures in the natural resources sector.68
6 Protection of the Environment
Striking a balance between the protection of foreign investment, on the one hand,
and protection of the environment, on the other hand, is a formidable challenge,
especially in the natural resources sector, due to the often enormous economic
65According to UNECA (2015), p. 9, “foreign investment is heavily protected, with little or no
responsibilities and obligations towards the host economy and the people, particularly in terms of
protecting land, social, cultural, and environmental rights. This form of neglect, or contempt, creates
a challenging environment for policymakers whose job is to address food security concerns and
safeguard land and human rights”, http://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/23035.
66See, for instance,Metalclad v.Mexico, ICSID ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, 30 August 2000, para 103.
In literature, see in particular: Christie (1962), p. 307; Dolzer (2003), p. 64; Reisman and Sloane
(2004), p. 115; Fortier and Drymer (2004), p. 293; Newcombe (2005), p. 1; OECD (2005);
Hoffmann (2008), p. 151; Montt (2009), pp. 231 ff.
67As noted by the Tribunal in Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, 3 September 2004,
para 200, “[t]he concept of indirect (or ‘de facto’, or ‘creeping’) expropriation is not clearly defined.
Indirect expropriation or nationalization is a measure that does not involve an overt taking, but that
effectively neutralized the enjoyment of the property”. In Saluka v. Czech Republic, Partial Award,
17 March 2006, para 263, the Tribunal conceded that “[i]nternational law has yet to draw a bright
and easily distinguishable line between non-compensable regulations on the one hand and, on the
other, measures that have the effect of depriving foreign investors of their investment and are thus
unlawful and compensable in international law”.
68See the survey conducted in K. Gordon, J. Pohl, Environmental Concerns in International




interests that is at stake, the pivotal role of the sector in the sustainable development
of the country, and the risk of adverse and possibly long-lasting effects on the
environment. Indeed, the relationship between foreign investment law and interna-
tional environmental law is complex and, in some regards, even ambiguous.69 Not
surprisingly, environmental rules and principles are increasingly frequent in invest-
ment arbitration.70 Yet, dispute settlement is only one—and arguably not the most
important—of the points of contact, interaction, and possibly friction, between
investment and environmental rules and principles.
Indeed, the challenge of finding a balance between the two is much wider and
multifaceted, as it includes the need (a) to optimize the exploitation of natural
resources; (b) to maximize its impact on economic growth; (c) to ensure the
responsible and sustainable exploitation of natural resources; (d) to prevent or
minimize damages to the environment; (e) to adopt remediation measures, if neces-
sary; and (f) to channel foreign investment towards clean projects. The challenge is
in the first place to design investment policies and adopt or negotiate legal instru-
ments (investment treaties, legislation and contracts) that properly incorporate the
rules and principles on protection of the environment. The challenge then continues
with the implementation of those policies and instruments throughout the life of
investment projects. In all the different phases of investment projects, the competent
agencies and authorities of the State must interact with foreign investors, in order to
create the conditions for the proper and effective execution of the project, to ensure
respect for all relevant legal instruments, and to intervene through the appropriate
regulatory or non-regulatory agencies, whenever necessary. Such interaction must
occur in a manner consistent with the rule of law and transparency, whereas the
investor must comply in good faith with all relevant obligations.
From the standpoint of States, the protection of the environment in the field of
foreign investment is pursued though several types of commitments, having a
general or specific character. States may include, either in the preamble or in the
substantive provisions of investment treaties, a general pledge to promote sustain-
able development or to optimize the use of natural resources, as in the case of Article
12 Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Investment
(Optimal use of natural resources), according to which “State Parties shall promote
the use of their natural resources in a sustainable and an environmentally friendly
manner”.71
Other investment treaties impose more specific obligations on the parties in
relation to the protection of the environment. This may take different forms. A
69See Vinuales (2009), p. 244.
70See, for instance, Vinuales (2015), p. 1517. For two recent cases, seeW.R. Clayton, W.R. Clayton,
D. Clayton, D. Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-
04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 17 March 2015 (with dissenting opinion of McRae); Pac
Rim Cayman LLC v. El Salvador, ICSID ARB/09/12, Award, 14 October 2016.
71See also the preamble of the ECT, in which contracting Parties recognized “the necessity for the
most efficient exploration, production, conversion, storage, transport, distribution and use of
energy”.
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typical provision prescribes that the parties shall not relax their rules and regulations,
presumably with a view to render their respective economies more attractive for
foreign investments. This is the case, for instance, in Article 12(2) of the 2012 United
States Model BIT, according to which
[t]he Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by weakening or
reducing the protections afforded in domestic environmental laws. Accordingly, each Party
‘shall’ ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from or offer to waive or otherwise
derogate from its environmental laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the protections
afforded in those laws, or fail to effectively enforce those laws through a sustained or
recurring course of action or inaction, as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisi-
tion, expansion, or retention of an investment in its territory.
A more stringent standard is based on the combination of the preservation of the
right of the parties to establish their own level of domestic environmental protection
and environmental development policies and priorities, combined with the commit-
ment to strive to ensure that their legislation provides for high levels of environ-
mental protection, and shall strive to continue improving this legislation.72
States might also commit themselves to strive to minimize, in an economically
efficient manner, harmful environmental impacts caused by investment, as well as to
take precautionary measures to prevent or minimize environmental impacts and to
recognize the so-called polluter pays principle. This is notably the case in Article
19 of the ECT, which has been followed in Article 19.1 of the ECOWAS Energy
Protocol.73
Also from the standpoint of the treaty obligations of States, a potentially quite
effective manner to minimize the risks of negative impacts of foreign investments on
the environment is performing a Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA). The SIA
exercise is intended “to assess how the investment provisions under negotiation
could affect economic, social, human right and environmental issues in [the concerned
countries] and to make recommendations to maximise the benefits of the agreement
and prevent or minimise potential negative impacts.”74 The SIA may then be
complemented by the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), to be performed
72See, for instance, Article VII (1) of the BIT concluded in 2009 between Belgium-Luxemburg
Economic Union and Colombia.
73Article 19.1 of the ECOWAS Energy Protocol reads: “Each Contracting Party shall strive to
minimize in an economically efficient manner harmful Environmental Impacts [. . .] taking proper
account of safety. In doing so, each Contracting Party shall act in a Cost-Effective manner. In its
policies and actions, each Contracting Party shall strive to take precautionary measures to prevent or
minimize environmental degradation. The Contracting Parties agree that the polluter in the Areas of
Contracting Parties, shall bear the cost of the avoidance, elimination, and clean-up of any pollution,
as well as the cost of any other consequences of such pollution, including trans-boundary pollution,
with due regard to the public interest and without distorting Investment in the Energy Cycle or
international trade”.
74European Commission, Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) in support of an Investment
Agreement between the European Union and the People’s Republic of China, Interim Report
(June 2017), at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/june/tradoc_155638.pdf.
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by foreign investors, and meant to ensure that specific investment projects are
environmentally sound (see below).
Treaties may also deal with the protection of the environment from the perspec-
tive of the exercise of regulatory powers. Some of these declare that the treaty does
not affect the right of the host State to adopt, maintain, or enforce any measures that
it considers appropriate to ensure that any investment activities in its territory are
undertaken in accordance with environmental law.75 Other treaties are drafted in the
form of exceptions, possibly using Article XX General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) as a model. Depending on the drafting of the relevant clause, the host
State can adopt the measures that are necessary,76 or it considers to be necessary,77
for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources, provided
that they are not applied in a manner that would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between investments or between investors, or amount to a disguised
restriction on international trade or investment. The self-judging or not self-judging
character of these provisions dictate the type of review arbitral tribunals may pass
over regulatory measures adopted by the host State.
Alternatively, States may agree that non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a
party, that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives—
such as public health, safety, and the environment—only in rare (i.e. exceptional)
circumstances constitute indirect expropriation.78 These clauses require arbitral
tribunals to show the highest level of deference to the measures adopted by the
host State.
From the standpoint of the investor, the obligation to protect and preserve the
environment is incumbent upon the foreign investor in the first place under the
domestic laws of several countries. According to Article 54 of the Foreign Invest-
ment Act of Cuba, for instance,
foreign investment shall be encouraged, authorized and will operate in the context of the
country’s sustainable development, which means that, throughout all its stages, special
attention will be given to the introduction of technology, the protection of the environment
and the rational use of natural resources.79
75See, for instance, Article VII (4) of the BIT between the Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union
and Colombia.
76Under Article 10 (1) of the Canadian Model BIT, for instance, “nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent a Party from adopting or enforcing measures necessary inter alia for the
conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources” (emphasis added).
77According to Article 16.1 of the Indian Model BIT, for instance, “nothing in this Treaty precludes
the Host State from taking actions or measures of general applicability which it considers necessary
with respect inter alia to protecting and conserving the environment including all living and
non-living natural resources” (emphasis added).
78See, for instance, the 2012 US Model BIT.
79For another examples, see Article 6 of the Indonesian Law Concerning Investment (2007);
Section 17 of the Myanmar’s Foreign Investment Law (2012); Article 7 of the Mongolian Law
On Investment (2013); Article 56 of Gambia’s Investment and Export Promotion Agency Act
(2010).
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An important tool at the disposal of States to minimize the negative impact of foreign
investment is the obligation of the foreign investor to perform an EIA or a Strategic
Environmental Assessment (SEA), defined respectively as “a national procedure for
evaluating the likely impact of a proposed activity on the environment,”80 and an
evaluation of the likely environmental, including health, effects, which comprises the
determination of the scope of an environmental report and its preparation, the carrying-out
of public participation and consultations, and the taking into account of the environmental
report and the results of the public participation and consultations in a plan or programme.81
Such an obligation may be prescribed in investment treaties, such as in Article 12
(1) of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act,82 in domestic legislation,83 or in contracts.
There is no need to emphasise the importance of conducting an Environmental
Impact Assessment in the natural resources sector84 and it comes as no surprise
that such an assessment is often at the heart of disputes on foreign investment in this
sector.85 What needs to be stressed is that, since fundamental and possibly long-term
decisions hinge on the assessment of the environmental impact of foreign invest-
ment, strict compliance with the rule of law and the highest level of transparency and
public participation must be ensured.
Furthermore, such an assessment is not confined to the initial authorization of the
investment project, but must be designed in terms of allowing a review, and if
necessary a correction of the initial assessment, should new evidence be available or
prior errors become evident. Needless to say, this may lead to the amendment or
even the withdrawal of the initial authorization, an issue that is to be dealt with the
80Article 1(vi), Convention on EIA in a Transboundary Context (1991), at www.unece.org/env/eia/
about/eia_text.html. In literature, see Gehring (2011), p. 149; Collins (2010), p. 4; VanDuzer et al.
(2013); Mayeda (2017), p. 131. In Emilio AgustínMaffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7,
Award, 13 November 2000, para. 67, the Tribunal pointed out that the “[e]nvironmental Impact
Assessment procedure is basic for the adequate protection of the environment and the application of
appropriate preventive measures. This is true, not only under Spanish and EEC law, but also
increasingly so under international law.”
81Article 2(6), UNECE Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention on
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (2003), at www.unece.org/env/eia/
about/sea_text.html.
82Article 12.1 reads: “[i]nvestors and investments shall conduct an environmental and social impact
assessment of the potential investment.”
83The large majority of States have adopted domestic legislation imposing Environmental Impact
Assessments. See, for instance, World Bank, Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations and
Strategic Environmental Assessment Requirements. Practices and Lessons Learned in East and
Southeast Asia, 2006, at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/
Resources/EIA&SEA-regional-review.pdf.
84See OECD Global Forum on International Investment, Environmental Impacts of Foreign Direct
Investment in the Mining Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa, at https://www.oecd.org/env/1819582.pdf.
85For two recent examples, see Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v. Oman, ICSID ARB/11/33, Award,
3 November 2015 and Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID ARB/09/12,
Award, 14 October 2016.
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greatest caution, the most rigorous adherence to the rule of law and an adequate level
of transparency and public participation.
Especially in the natural resources sector it is crucial to foresee the conditions and
modalities for remediation programs to mitigate possible detrimental effects upon
the environment that are caused by foreign investment. This is often provided for in
domestic legislation. An example is Article 29 of the Ecuadorian Investment Law
(1997), according to which
Los inversionistas extranjeros y nacionales, deberán conservar, preservar y restituir
completamente los daños causados al medio ambiente y los recursos naturales. El Estado
velará por el cumplimiento de esta disposición y en los casos pertinentes el Ministerio de
Comercio Exterior, Industrialización y Pesca, previo informe del Ministerio de Medio
Ambiente, podrá solicitar al COMEXI, prohibir total o parcialmente la operación de una
empresa que estuviere ocasionando daños al medio ambiente y depredación de los recursos
naturales.86
All the above normative tools contribute to ensuring that the foreign investment is
conducive to sustainable development and minimizes environmental risks and
detrimental effects of investment projects. States should carefully design and prop-
erly apply these tools within a stable and predictable legal framework. From this
perspective, Article 26 of Mozambique’s Investment Law 1993 can be seen as a
successful attempt to combine the relevant key principles and notions. It reads:
1. Investors, and subsequently their companies, shall, in the process of elaboration, imple-
mentation and operation of their investment projects, carry out and submit the relevant
studies and evaluations of the environmental impact and of any pollution and sanitation
concerns that may result from their activities and the damages and/or wastes of their
undertakings. Such studies and evaluations shall include any potential effects and/or
implications on forest, geological and hydrological resources, whether within their area
of concession or close to the peripheries of the areas in which the undertaking is being or
is to be implemented and operated.
2. It shall also be the responsibility of said investors and companies to undertake appropriate
measures for the prevention and minimisation of any negative environmental effects,
particularly those identified in the environmental impact studies referred to in paragraph
1 of this Article, and subject to observance of the rules and guidelines issued by the
competent authorities in this field, and in conformity with any legal provisions and any
terms specified in the licence granted for the operation of the activity.
3. Those activities with levels of pollution and contamination likely to alter and negatively
affect the environment or public health shall comply with restrictions established by law
and/or issued by competent authorities, as well as to any rules or international agreements
on such issues to which Mozambique has become a signatory.
86Ley de Promoción y Garantía de Inversiones (1997), at http://www.investmentpolicyhub.unctad.
org/InvestmentLaw/law/58. For another example, see Australia National Environment Protection
(Assessment of Site Contamination) Measures (1999), http://www.nepc.gov.au/nepms/assessment-
site-contamination.
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7 Human Rights and Corporate Responsibility
This paper does not attempt to discuss the panoply of human rights legal instruments
applicable in the field of investment in the natural resources sector.87 More modestly,
it offers some reflections on the protection of human rights in general, and from the
standpoint of the local population (and indigenous peoples specifically), and of
foreign investors, and of States.
With regard to the sources, a complex and heterogeneous web of instruments
belonging to different legal orders, and having a different legal nature, concur in the
protection of human rights in relation to investment in the natural resources sector. It
is worth recalling that most investment treaties are manifestly asymmetrical, as they
regulate the legal relationship between the host State and foreign investors, but
impose obligations only upon the former. Equally important, they can be considered
as a special category of human rights treaties, as they include a catalogue of pro-
visions aimed at protecting the rights of foreign investors, ranging from safeguards
on private property to fair and equitable treatment.88
Conversely, these treaties often completely disregard the human rights of other
stakeholders.89 Although references to the protection of human rights have found
their way into the preamble of some investment treaties,90 it remains that “few
international investment treaties contain meaningful references to human rights”.91
Article 14 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act on Investment is clearly one of the
most progressive provisions on the protection of human and labour rights contained
in investment treaties. It reads:
Investors or investments shall, in keeping with their best practice requirements relating to
their activities the size of their investments, strive to comply with on hygiene, security,
health and social welfare rule sin force in the host country.
87See Cotula (2012); Yilmaz-Vastardis and Van Ho (2015), p. 223; Francioni (2016), p. 66. In
general, see, amongst many: Weiler (2004), p. 429; Puvimanasinghe (2007); Dupuy et al. (2009);
De Schutter (2009), p. 137; Hirsch (2013), p. 85.
88Alvarez (1996–1997), p. 308, has described NAFTA’s investment chapter as a human rights treaty
for a special interest group.
89The UK House of Commons, Trade and Industry Committee, 3rd Report, 1998–1999, para 52, at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmtrdind/112/11201.htm, consid-
ered the superficial treatment reserved to environmental, social and human rights issues as one of
the main reasons for the failure to conclude a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, under the
auspices of the OECD.
90In the preamble of the BIT between Austria and Kosovo, for instance, the contracting parties
referred to the international obligations and commitments concerning the respect for human rights.
91Cotula L, Rethinking Investment Treaties to Advance Human Rights, IIED Briefing, September
2016, at http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17376IIED.pdf. See also Mann H, International Investment
Agreements, Business and Human Rights: Key Issues and Opportunities, OECD Global Forum,
27–28 March 2008, at http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40311282.pdf; Jacob M,
International Investment Agreements and Human Rights, INEF Research Paper Series Human
Rights, 03/2010, at http://www.humanrights-business.org/files/international_investment_agree
ments_and_human_rights.pdf; Dupuy et al. (2009), p. 45.
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Investors shall uphold human rights in the workplace and the community in which they are
located. Investors shall not undertake or cause to be undertaken, acts that breach such human
rights. Investors shall not manage or operate the investments in a manner that circumvent
human rights obligations, labour standards as well as regional environmental and social
obligations, to which the host State and /or home State are Parties.
Investors shall not by complicit with, or in assistance with others, including public author-
ities, violate human rights in time of peace or during socio-political upheavals.
Investors investments shall act in accordance with fundamental labour standards as stipu-
lated in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights of Work.
It remains that very few investment treaties incorporate substantive provisions on
human rights. Yet, these provisions fall outside the relevant arbitral clauses. Making
the rights included in those rights enforceable through arbitral proceedings would
mean a true paradigm shift in investment treaty practice which is theoretically not
impossible but rather unlikely to happen.92
As a result, the protection of human rights in the field of foreign investment
continues to be essentially a matter of human rights treaties, legislation and other,
often non-legally binding, instruments. For the purpose of this paper, a few consid-
erations on land rights (especially of indigenous peoples) are appropriate, due to
their importance in the natural resources sector.
With regard to land, the massive land acquisition for plantation agriculture in
Africa, Asia and Latin America, a phenomenon known as “land grabbing”, has
important repercussions on the life of the local community and often generates
serious tension.93 Yet, these developments “have not yet resulted in substantial shifts
in the nature, content and penetration of international law in land governance
arrangements, or in substantial development of land-related international law schol-
arship”.94 The most tangible outcome of the reflection on the phenomenon is the
non-binding 2012 Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of
Tenure.95
At the regional level, in 2014, the African Union, the African Development Bank
and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa jointly adopted the
Guiding Principles on Large Scale Land Based Investments in Africa.96 The princi-
ples are intended to contribute to the promotion of good governance and compliance
92Writing in Weiler (2004), p. 429, has proposed some draft articles that could be inserted in
investment treaties in order to recognize and make enforceable the investment-related human rights
of nationals of the host State. In line with the scope of application of most human rights treaties, it
may be argued that these remedies should not be confined to nationals of the host State but should
be generally available to those within its jurisdiction. At any rate, these remedies could be subjected
to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. Contracting parties could also include a fork-in-the-road
provision on the remedies offered under the investment treaty and under human rights treaties.
93See in general Jacur et al. (2015); see also above note 80.
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with human rights, the recognition and protection of customary land rights, and the
clear articulation of the rights and interests of all stakeholders in the relevant
legislation and contracts.
At the national level, several countries have adopted legislation aiming, inter alia,
at replacing legislation of the colonial era—redressing historical, social and eco-
nomic inequality and injustice97—and more fairly redistributing land, which occa-
sionally has caused controversy.98 In some cases, the legislation relates to land
reform and may affect the protection of foreign investors,99 while in other cases
the legislation relates to the protection of foreign investment, but contains important
caveats and safeguards on the acquisition of land by local population.100
When the land in question affects indigenous peoples, international rules on the
protection of indigenous peoples are furthermore applicable.101 The Convention No
169 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) on Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples deserves to be singled out for its importance in the natural resources sector,
even if it has been ratified by only 22 countries.102
The Convention prescribes, inter alia, to recognize the rights of ownership and
possession of indigenous peoples over the lands which they traditionally occupy
(Article 14), to safeguard the rights of indigenous peoples to the natural resources
pertaining to their lands, including the right of these peoples to participate in the use,
management and conservation of these resources (Article 15.1 and 15.2), and to
refrain from removing indigenous peoples from their lands, except where necessary
as an exceptional measure (Article 16.2 and 16.3). It remains to be seen to what
extent these provisions can be considered as reflecting customary international law.
In Grand River Enterprises et al. v. United States, the Respondent and Canada took
a clear stand against such a possibility. They argued that the Convention was not
97See, for instance, the South African Protection of Investment Act (2015), note 37.
98See, in particular, Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and others v. Zimbabwe, ICSID ARB/05/6,
Award, 22 April 2009.
99See, for instance, Indian Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act (2013), at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/
96426/113950/F1682977291/IND96426.pdf.
100See, for instance, the South African Protection of Investment Act, note 37.
101See Lenzerini (2014), p. 192.
102ILO Convention 1969 adopted on 27 June 1989, entered into force on 5 September 1991, at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C169. It is part of the domestic legal system of, and is
directly applicable in, almost all the countries that have ratified it. In many of these countries, and
especially in South America, the convention enjoys a higher rank than ordinary legislation or even
constitutional status. See also ILO, Application of Convention No. 169 by Domestic and Interna-
tional courts in Latin America – A Casebook, November 2009, at http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/
Resources/Publications/WCMS_123946/lang%2D%2Den/index.htm. See also the 2004 AkwéKon
Voluntary Guidelines, at https://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/akwe-brochure-en.pdf. At the
domestic level, see the Indigenous Investment Principles adopted by Indigenous Business
Australia (IBA), at http://www.iba.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/IB7158_IPP-brochure_FA4.pdf.
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intended to codify customary rules, nor had it developed at the relevant time into
customary rules.103
From the standpoint of foreign investors, the commitment and compliance with
human rights and labour standards by multinational enterprises (MNEs) has been the
subject of a hot debate for decades. After the failure to adopt a code of conduct on
MNEs under the auspices of the UN,104 the focus has shifted to non-binding
instruments. This exercise has produced a series of non-binding guidelines and
principles, most prominently the UN Human Rights Council Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights105 and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises.106
Yet, corporate social responsibility has become an increasingly important con-
cept. It can be defined as “how companies address the social, environmental and
economic impacts of their operations and so help to meet our sustainable develop-
ment goals.”107 The basic assumption behind the concept is that “recognizing
corporate responsibility [. . .] is an economically efficient means of allowing firms
to compete fairly in a global economy while enhancing social welfare and
conforming to standards of international law”.108
103Respondent’s Counter Memorial on the Merits, 22 December 2008, p. 139. See also Article 1128
Submission, 22 December 2008, pp. 2–4.
104See Muchlinski (2007), pp. 660 ff.
105See UN Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 16 June 2011, at http://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf. In literature, see, in
particular, Deva and Bilchitz (2013).
106At http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/guidelines. In literature, see, in particular, Ruggie J, Nelson T,
Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Normative Innovation and
Implementation Challenges, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Working Paper 66, May
2015, at https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/programs/cri/files/
workingpaper.66.oecd.pdf.
107UK Government, Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, at www.bis.gov.uk/policies/
business-sectors/green-economy/sustainable-development/corporate-responsibility. The European
Commission, COM(2001)366, 18 July 2001, at eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/
com2001_0366en01.pdf, has considered Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as “a concept
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and
in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.” The Swiss State Secretariat for
Economic Affairs has defined CSR as “the voluntary contribution of business to sustainable
development which takes into consideration the interests of stakeholders. It encompasses the
three dimensions of sustainable development; the economy, the environment and society”, at
www.seco.admin.ch/themen/00645/04008/index.html?lang¼en. In literature see in particular,
Bantekas (2004), p. 309; McCorquodale and Simons (2007), p. 598; De Schutter (2009), p. 137;
Muchlinski (2011), p. 30.
108Brief of J. Stieglitz as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, p. 24, at https://
harvardhumanrights.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/brief-of-joseph-e-stiglitz.pdf. For a comment of
the decision, see Boschiero (2014), p. 3.
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Express references to corporate social responsibility can be found in BITs,109
regional investment treaties,110 and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), such as the FTA
between Canada and Peru, according to which
[e]ach Party should encourage enterprises operating within its territory or subject to its
jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate internationally recognized standards of corporate
social responsibility in their internal policies, such as statements of principles that have
been endorsed or are supported by the Parties. These principles address issues such as
labour, the environment, human rights, community relations and anti-corruption. The Parties
therefore remind those enterprises of the importance of incorporating such corporate social
responsibility standards in their internal policies.111
Another interesting development from the perspective of enhancing the responsibil-
ity of foreign investors and redressing wrongful doings is the growing role of the
home State. Under Article 20 of the BIT between Morocco and Nigeria, for instance,
investors “shall be subject to civil actions for liability in the judicial process of their
home state for the acts or decisions made in relation to the investment where such
acts or decisions lead to significant damage, personal injuries or loss of life in the
host state”.112 The provision may have a considerable impact on domestic litigation
against investors—especially multinational companies—and help overcome juris-
dictional hurdles and most prominently the forum non conveniens doctrine.
8 Good Governance
The rules and principles contained in international treaties, customary international
law and domestic legislation applicable in the natural resources sector have greatly
contributed to the progressive development of the concept of good governance,
which “encompasses the role of public authorities in establishing the environment in
which economic operators function and in determining the distribution of benefits as
well as the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the rules”.113 The
principle of good governance is also an important component of the notion of
sustainable development.114
The three main pillars of the concept, namely the rule of law, public sector
management and controlling corruption, will briefly be mentioned in this paper. The
rule of law is a pervasive principle “of governance in which all persons, institutions
109See, for instance, Article 14 of the BIT between Canada and Mongolia.
110See, for instance, Article 16 of ECOWAS Supplementary Act on Investment.
111Article 810, at www.sice.oas.org/Trade/CAN_PER/CAN_PER_e/CAN_PER_text_e.
asp#Cha08Art01. For a provision specifically on anti-corruption see Article 13 the ECOWAS
Supplementary Act.
112Note 46.
113OECD, DAC Orientation on Participatory Development and Good Governance, OCDE/GD





and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that
are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which
are consistent with international human rights norms and standards”.115 It overlaps
with the concept of FET, but is much broader, more comprehensive and, importantly,
applies with regard to all stakeholders. Indeed, the rule of law affects every aspect of
the exercise of puissance publique by States at all levels of the administration, as well
as the conduct of private subjects, including foreign investors.
Public sector management is a multifaceted concept, which includes clear
national development planning, fiscal discipline and sustainable redistribution of
benefits, combined with enhanced transparency and public scrutiny. In the natural
resources sector, Ghana’s Petroleum Revenue Management Act, adopted in 2011
and amended in 2015, can be considered as a largely successful attempt to improve
the management of the sector and to optimize its economic impact.116 Perhaps more
importantly than in other sector, in the natural resources sector transparency, clear
and public procedures and policies on the allocation of contracts and licenses, as well
as on the collection, redistribution and spending of revenue are of paramount
importance. The Standards adopted in 2016 within the Extractive Industries Trans-
parency Initiative (EITI)117 are certainly a step in the right direction, together with
domestic legislation, such as the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initia-
tive Act 2007118 and the Liberian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act
2009.119 Transparency works both ways, as recognized in Article 14 of Cameroon’s
2002 Investment Charter, which requires both the private and the public sector to
observe international standards of transparency with regard to the production,
publication and dissemination of high-quality information.120
Finally, corruption in all its forms has often undermined the efficient exploitation of
natural resources and the positive impact investment may have on all stakeholders.
Natural resources related projects have often been a popular target for corruption
practices of multinational companies and political or military elites, despite the
existence of international treaties on the fight against corruption, such as the 1997
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions,121 or the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption.122
115UN Secretary General Report, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
conflict Societies, S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, para 8.
116At http://www.petrocom.gov.gh/assets/petroluem-revenue-management-act815-2011-.pdf. In
literature, see Amoako Tuffour and Ghannay (2016), p. 35.
117At https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/the_eiti_standard_2016_-_english_0.pdf. In liter-




121At http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf, 43 Parties. See also the
2009 OECD Recommendation, at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44176910.pdf.
122At http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.
pdf, 183 Parties.
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Corruption is also occasionally dealt with in investment treaties. Article 18.1 of
the ECOWAS Supplementary Act is quite an interesting example, since it imposes
certain obligations concerning corruption practices upon foreign investors, and in
case a violation of such an obligation is established by a domestic tribunal, it
deprives them of the right to institute arbitral proceedings. This is one of the still
rare cases in which a sanction for a violation of an obligation by the foreign investors
is built in an investment treaty.
9 Conclusion
Foreign investment law can be seen as a crossroads at which a variety of norms—
having a different nature (most prominently investment treaties, legislation and
contracts) and subject matter (ranging from standards of treatment of foreign inves-
tors to environmental rules and human rights)—meet, in a combined effort to legally
protect the private and public interests of the different stakeholders. This creates a
fertile ground for, on the one hand, tension and possibly conflict, and, on the other
hand, mutual support and cross-fertilization. This is even more evident in the natural
resources sector.
The search for “common or universal principles for resource management” has
proved inconclusive.123 Instead, a complex and heterogeneous web of different, and
not always legally binding, instruments concur to the creation of a stable and
predictable legal framework. Building such a framework is an incremental process
that concerns a variety of actors, having different interests, agendas and bargaining
powers. As any process of this kind, the trajectory is rarely regular and gaps and
shortcomings are difficult to fill and overcome, due to the reluctance of the actors
concerned to recalibrate the related legal instruments with a view to striking a better
balance.
There are nonetheless several encouraging developments, both at the interna-
tional and national level. In the background, the principle of PSNR and the concept
of sustainable development are firmly consolidated. They continue to influence and
inspire the progressive development of foreign investment law, and guide govern-
mental agencies, legislative bodies, domestic courts and arbitral tribunals, and
multinational companies.
An important step towards a more efficient and balanced legal framework on
foreign investment in general, and in the natural resources sector in particular, has
been the clarification and proper preservation of the right of States to exercise
regulatory powers, through apposite provisions that were inserted in the relevant
legal instruments, most prominently international treaties.
Furthermore, the protection of the environment and, to a lesser extent, of human
rights, has eventually found its way into foreign investment law. Several
123Weiss and Scherzer (2015), p. 56.
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developments have been significant in the natural resources sector, including social
and environmental impact assessments and corporate responsibility, as well as the
emergence of the concept of good governance. Yet, the advancement has been
fragmentary and irregular, and the available remedies for violations of the relevant
standards remain rather weak.
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1 Introduction
A wave of commercial investments in the natural resource sectors has rekindled
debates about the place of contracts in the interface between economic governance
and control over natural resources. Since the early 2000s, the boom and bust of
commodity cycles—and the increasing and then declining pace of investment in
the agriculture, mining, oil and gas sectors—have fostered lively discussions over
whether host countries received a fair share of economic benefits, over the distribu-
tion of those benefits within national economies, and over the social and environ-
mental impacts of commercial activities.
That foreign investment can play a role in the pursuit of sustainable develop-
ment is widely recognised, including by the policy instrument that underpins the
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internationally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).1 Job creation, the
generation of public revenues and improved access to markets and technology are
commonly cited vehicles through which investments could advance the SDGs. The
natural resource sectors provide sites of investment opportunity, including in many
low and middle-income countries. At the same time, large-scale natural resource
projects have often been accompanied by reports of social conflict and environ-
mental degradation. Many low and middle-income countries experience a stark
contrast between the hopes raised by their natural resource endowments and the
everyday reality of deprivation that many people face.2
Contracts have featured prominently in these trends and debates. While licence-
based regimes apply in some states and sectors, contracts often provide the legal
basis for the implementation of natural resource projects—even more so in low and
middle-income countries.3 In addition, contract renegotiations over the past 15 years
have been at the centre of many disputes between investors and states. This prom-
inent place of investor-state contracts has underpinned what some scholars have
called a “transactional view” of investment relations, whereby legal arrangements
are structured, at least in part, around a bargain between the investor and the state.4
However, the “transaction” involves complex constellations of both commercial
and non-commercial dimensions. In market-based economies, commercial viability
provides the foundation of any investment activity. Contracts and contract renego-
tiations can affect the balance of risks and returns in any investment, and ultimately
its profitability. At the same time, public policy issues are typically at stake—from
taxation to labour relations, land rights and environmental protection. Recognising
the non-commercial dimensions of natural resource contracts can shed new light on
established practice: contractual provisions to promote legal stability in investor-
state relations have come under scrutiny in the light of considerations, such as human
rights, which were rarely factored into conventional analyses.5
In addition, contractual developments “on the ground” have questioned tradi-
tional approaches that frame investment relations exclusively in terms of bilateral
arrangements between investors and states. The need for investors to establish
workable relations with local actors has fostered the negotiation of community-
investor agreements aimed at channelling benefits to the local economy.6 Many
companies have come to see these contractual arrangements as a strategy to promote
support for the business, while some indigenous movements and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) have appropriated the language of partnerships to advance
local claims to natural resources.7
1
“Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 70/1 of 25 September 2015, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1, e.g. para. 67.
2Ross (2015) and Venables (2016).
3See e.g. CCSI (2015), discussing the mining sector.
4Perrone (2017).
5Shemberg (2009).




Taken together, these evolutions have prompted renewed public reflection on
multiple aspects of natural resource contracts. Some early explorations focused on
specific clauses in investor-state contracts—such as stabilisation clauses,8 and envi-
ronmental provisions.9 Over time, the interrelatedness of contractual clauses and the
need to consider the role of local actors in investment contracting led to more holistic
approaches to understanding both the content of the contract, and its parties and
formation process.10 Significant developments have also occurred through the emer-
gence of authoritative international guidance, including principles for addressing
human rights issues in contracting processes,11 learning materials on how to imple-
ment the principles,12 and model contracts for natural resource projects.13
It is now clear that addressing the challenges associated with natural resource
contracts involves not only ensuring that governments are in a position to get a fair
deal in their negotiations with investors,14 but also reconsidering the fundamental
parameters on which contracting rests. Yet these deeper-level parameters are still
underexplored. Questions remain, for example, about legal arrangements to ensure
that states exercise sovereignty in the interest of their people; about how contracting
can operate in multi-layered resource ownership systems, including where socially
legitimate resource rights enjoy little recognition under national law; and about who
should have the right to manifest their consent, at which stage and under what
conditions, in the distribution of decision-making authority that underpins natural
resource contracting.
This chapter explores these questions, focusing on the extractive industries and
the agriculture sector.15 It first examines, based on positive law, the foundations of
natural resource contracts, focusing on the notions of sovereignty, ownership and
consent. This conceptual exploration highlights that, while consent underpins the
contract, the legal construction of (state) sovereignty and (resource) ownership sets
parameters for the expression of consent—namely, the actors whose consent is
required, the processes through which consent is formed and manifested, and the
8Amnesty International UK (2003, 2005), Cotula (2008), Shemberg (2009) and Johnson and
Volkov (2013).
9Tienhaara (2011).
10Cotula and Tienhaara (2013), Odumosu-Ayanu (2014) and Gathii and Odumosu-Ayanu (2015).
11Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, “Principles for Responsible Contracts:
Integrating the Management of Human Rights Risks into State-Investor Contract Negotiations –
Guidance for Negotiators”, 25 May 2011, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31/Add.3.
12See e.g. the training modules developed by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR) on the Principles for Responsible Contracts (www.ohchr.org/EN/
Issues/Business/Pages/trainingmodules.aspx). See also Götzmann and Holst Jensen (2014) and
Investment and Human Rights Project (2016).
13See e.g. the Model Mining Development Agreement released by the Mining Law Committee of
the International Bar Association (http://www.mmdaproject.org/).
14Kaul et al. (2009) and Sauvant (2017).
15Forestry, hydro and genetic resources are outside the scope of this study.
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bounds within which consent can lawfully operate. The chapter then distils some
practical implications for natural resource contracts, focusing on illustrative issues
relating both to the substantive and procedural dimensions of the investor-state
contract, and to reframing the contracting process around a wider range of resource
right holders and affected actors. The findings provide pointers for piecing together
the diverse and possibly conflicting commercial and non-commercial interests that
are at stake in natural resource contracts.
2 The Foundations of Natural Resource Contracts
In broad terms, natural resource contracts involve the allocation of resource explo-
ration and/or development rights to an investor, in exchange for considerations such
as revenues, employment or infrastructure development. That said there is tremen-
dous diversity in contractual practice. Contract formulations vary extensively, partly
reflecting diversity in the relevant sectors (e.g. agriculture, mining and petroleum)
and commodities (sugar cane, oil palm and rubber, for example). Diversity of
contractual formulations also reflects differences in applicable national law and in
the preferences of the contracting parties. The parties themselves vary, though in
many jurisdictions the state plays an important role in natural resource contracts.
In addition, there is variation in the role the contract plays in governing natural
resource investments: national law can establish a level-playing field for all invest-
ments sharing similar characteristics, and some states have moved towards
standardised licences and greater reliance on national law, rather than fully negoti-
ated contracts; but negotiated contracts are commonly used in many other countries,
particularly low and middle-income ones.16 In all cases, national and international
law shape the foundations upon which any natural resource contract rests. The
notions of sovereignty, ownership and consent are particularly important elements
of these foundations. The legal contours of those notions affect who has the legal
authority to enter into the contract, and through what process. They also affect the
terms that those with the authority to conclude the contract can or must agree to.
2.1 Sovereignty
Under international law, states have permanent sovereignty over the natural
resources located within their jurisdiction. This principle was enshrined in United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 of 1962,17 and as an application of the
16For trends in the mining sector, for example, see CCSI (2015).
17General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962.
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wider principle of territorial sovereignty, it reflects customary international law.18
The concept of sovereignty is susceptible of multiple legal constructions, and its
normative content has long formed the object of ambiguities and contestation.19
Among other things, there has been debate about the actors with which sovereignty
is vested. Inconsistent formulations, even within the same legal instrument, have
created interpretive challenges. Key parts of Resolution 1803 refer to undefined
“peoples and nations”,20 and international human rights instruments vest with
“peoples” the arguably related but distinct right to freely dispose of natural
resources.21
However, while human rights jurisprudence has consistently applied to peoples,
including groups within states, the human right to freely dispose of natural
resources,22 international treaties explicitly frame sovereignty over natural resources
as being the preserve of states.23 More generally, the “Westphalian” configuration of
international law has traditionally connected sovereignty to statehood.24 One way to
reconcile these complexities involves recognising that, at one level, sovereignty
ultimately resides in the peoples, as explicitly affirmed in numerous national con-
stitutions,25 and is constituted through peoples exercising their right to self-
determination; but that states provide the organisational structures through which
18Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Uganda), I.C.J. Reports (19 December 2005), para. 244.
19Koskenniemi (2005, 2017).
20General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, para. 1. However, the fourth
preambular paragraph refers to states.
21See e.g. common Article 1(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(New York, 16 December 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR], and of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (New York, 16 December 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR],
referring to “peoples”; and Article 21 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(Nairobi, 27 June 1981) [hereinafter ACHPR], referring to both “peoples” (e.g. Article 21(1)) and
“States Parties” (e.g. Article 21(4)). On this “peoples versus states” debate, see Duruigbo (2006),
Doyle (2015) and Gilbert and Bernaz (2015).
22E.g. The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and The Centre for Economic and Social
Rights v. Nigeria, 27 October 2001, Communication No. 155/96, African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, paras. 55–58; Centre for Minority Rights Development and Minority Rights
Group on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, 25 November 2009, Communication
276/03, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, paras. 252–268; African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. The Republic of Kenya, 26 May 2017, Judgment, African Court
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, paras. 191–201.
23E.g. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982),
Article 193; and United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992),
Article 3. It has been noted that General Assembly resolutions adopted after Resolution 1803 also
tend to refer to “states” or “countries”; see Dam-de Jong (2015).
24See e.g. UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, particularly the
principle of sovereign equality of states and related provisions.
25See e.g. 1991 Political Constitution of Colombia, Article 3; 1948 Constitution of the Italian
Republic (as amended), Article 1; 2010 Constitution of Kenya, Article 1; 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, Article II(1).
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sovereignty is held and exercised in international legal relations. The right to make
laws has long been recognised as a key attribute of sovereignty,26 and states have the
right to regulate natural resources within their jurisdiction—including the modalities
for allocating resource rights to commercial projects.
Contemporary international law configures state sovereignty as involving both
rights and duties. Some such rights and duties reflect concerns about relations that
transcend national boundaries, while others primarily regulate the relation between
each state and its people. International environmental norms provide examples of the
former. Article 3 of the Convention on Biological Diversity—a multilateral treaty
ratified by the overwhelming majority of states—places in states both “the sovereign
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies”,
and “the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction”.27
While this provision refers to a “responsibility” rather than a “duty”, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice has recognised that a “general obligation of States to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other
States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international
law relating to the environment”.28 Another explicit statement of both rights and
duties is contained in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: “States
have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their environ-
mental policies and in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine
environment”.29 In relation to investor-state disputes, arbitral tribunals have also
elaborated on the notion that the sovereign right to regulate meets “boundaries”
established by international obligations.30
This coexistence of both rights and duties in the contemporary framing of
sovereignty is at the centre of relations between states and their people. The range
of relevant relations is broad. Firstly, these relations link the state to the universality
of its citizens. Centralised resource control has often enabled kleptocratic capture of
natural wealth,31 in patterns that involve not only “grand” corruption at high political
26Bodin (1992/1593).
27See also the similarly worded Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environ-
ment (Stockholm, 16 June 1972); and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development (Rio de Janeiro, 12 August 1992), which refers to both “environmental and devel-
opmental policies”. The principle builds on earlier jurisprudence; see Trail Smelter Case (United
States v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A., 1905 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1938, 1941).
28Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), I.C.J. Reports (8 July
1996), para. 29.
29United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982), Article
193.
30See e.g. ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. The Republic of





levels but also more diffuse networks of rent-seeking and patronage.32 Therefore,
one relevant issue concerns the mechanisms whereby citizens can hold authorities to
account for the way they manage natural resources.33 Secondly, resource projects
can test relations between states and identifiable groups within the national polity,
who are holders of human rights (including the right to freely dispose of natural
resources, where applicable) and are affected by project implementation. Tensions in
these latter relations have found their way into growing human rights
jurisprudence.34
In these regards, General Assembly Resolution 1803 affirms that permanent
sovereignty over natural resources “must be exercised in the interest of [. . .] national
development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned”.35 Similar
provisions have featured in subsequent resolutions.36 On one level, this formulation
seems coextensive with the affirmation of sovereignty. Written at the time of
decolonisation, it signalled a shift away from natural resource policies that primarily
responded to the interests of the colonial power: in the post-colonial configuration,
national development and the wellbeing of the people in the newly independent state
would be the sole criteria for the exercise of sovereignty over natural resources.37 In
addition, features of this provision seem inscribed in a logic of deference to sover-
eign space: the notion of wellbeing is not defined, and—by virtue of their sover-
eignty—states are well placed to determine their national development priorities and
pursue the wellbeing-enhancing strategies that are most relevant to their contexts.
However, the plain language of a provision affirming that sovereignty must be
exercised in the interest of the wellbeing of the people signifies more than simply
deferring to the development priorities identified by states themselves. That lan-
guage affirms both a sovereign right (to ultimate authority over natural resources)
and a sovereign duty (to use that authority in the interest of the people). As
decolonisation via the exercise of peoples’ right to self-determination underpinned
the emergence of a more truly universal system of international law, and as the
notion of sovereignty was redeployed from a colonisation tool to a means for
emancipation,38 the solemn affirmation of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources placed people at centre-stage, and framed sovereignty as involving
ab initio both rights and duties that, in effect, put states at the service of their
people.39
32Bayart (1993) and Chabal and Daloz (1999).
33Gilbert and Bernaz (2015).
34Gilbert (2017) and Cotula (2017).
35General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, para. 1.
36Dam-de Jong (2015).
37However, Resolution 1803 also requires states to observe foreign investment agreements; see
para. 8 and Desta (2015). On the process that led to the formulation of Resolution 1803, see
Schrijver (1997).
38On the historical relationship between sovereignty and imperialism, see Anghie (2004).
39See also Dam-de Jong (2015), Violi (2015) and Gilbert and Bernaz (2015).
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The “people”, of course, is not a straightforward concept, whether philosophi-
cally or sociologically, given the conceptual complexities of political community
and the substantial differentiation of interests, values and aspirations that may exist
within that community. What constitutes the “well-being of the people” in any given
situation, what policy measures can enhance it most effectively, and how to navigate
the often inevitable distributive trade-offs can form the object of intense contesta-
tion.40 As a matter of legal principle, however, the framing of Resolution 1803
means that a state that deliberately acted against its own people would violate its
sovereign duties—even though, in practice, the undefined contours of those duties at
first did not establish clear parameters for reviewing the legality of state conduct.
Since the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 1803, extensive develop-
ments in international law have brought greater clarity on the rights and duties
associated with sovereignty over natural resources, providing more granular disag-
gregation of the relevant protected interests. Examples include the adoption of
numerous human rights treaties and the incremental consolidation of international
environmental norms. The relevance of these developments to the legal construction
of sovereignty is corroborated by the international instruments that most recently
reaffirmed the sovereignty of states over natural resources. For instance, Article 3 of
the Convention on Biological Diversity explicitly links sovereignty to the Charter of
the United Nations and to the “principles of international law”.41 The UN Charter
inscribes the promotion of human rights among the very objectives of the United
Nations42; and while there is debate about what was meant by “principles of
international law”, international norms requiring states to use natural resources
sustainably have been deemed to qualify.43
By calibrating the interplay of rights and duties, developments in international
human rights and environmental norms have reconfigured the parameters of sover-
eignty. Human rights norms illustrate this. Indeed, states cannot lawfully take
measures that breach their international human rights obligations. Further, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) requires
its states parties to advance the progressive realisation of the rights affirmed in the
Covenant “to the maximum of [their] available resources”, which would include
natural resources44; and the notion of “well-being of the people”, which states are to
realise in their exercising sovereignty, must arguably be interpreted in the light of
internationally recognised human rights, including economic, social and cultural
rights.45 In addition, the right to (internal) self-determination that international
40Koskenniemi (2011).
41See also the identical formulations in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment (Stockholm, 16 June 1972); and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 12 August 1992).
42Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco, 26 June 1945), Articles 1(3) and 55(c).
43Glowka et al. (1994).





instruments recognise to indigenous peoples points to a notion of “shared” sover-
eignty the exercise of which is disaggregated into multiple decision-making sites
within a single state.46
This brief examination of existing international law highlights that, in exercising
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, states have both rights and duties.
According to human rights norms, for example, states must: (1) in terms of process,
ensure respect for human rights throughout public decision making relevant to the
exercise of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and (2) in substantive
terms, ensure that public action upholds human rights, and take steps to maximise
the contribution of natural resource development to realising human rights. This
interplay of rights and duties has implications for natural resource contracts. The
duties set external bounds, because states cannot lawfully conclude (or sustain
private parties in concluding) contracts in ways that, in terms of content or process,
would violate their international obligations. To comply with their duty not to harm
the environment outside their jurisdiction, for example, states would have to ensure,
through contractual provisions or national legislation, that investors adopt (or do not
adopt) specified conducts that have a bearing on environmental impacts. The duties
also establish internal parameters—that is, they affect “from within” the very
purpose of the exercise of sovereign powers. For example, they require states to
ensure that natural resource contracting promotes the progressive realisation of
economic, social and cultural rights.
2.2 Ownership
While sovereignty refers to political organisation and is inherently centred on the
public sphere, issues of ownership are relevant to both privately and publicly held
rights to use, manage and transact valuable resources. Patterns in resource ownership
have a bearing on natural resource contracting. One reason is that, beyond the great
diversity of national law regimes, it is commonly recognised that a contracting party
cannot transfer rights that it does not hold.47 Put differently, who holds the resource
rights, and the substantive content of those rights, will affect the identity of the
contracting parties and the nature of the transaction. Unlike sovereignty, resource
ownership is primarily governed by national law, and as discussed the enactment of
national regulation is an attribute of sovereignty. As a result, legal arrangements can
vary significantly in different jurisdictions—more than is possible to do justice to in
the limited space available here. Further, while this section refers to ownership as a
46Indigenous Peoples’ Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Final Report of the Special
Rapporteur, Erica-Irene A. Daes, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30, 13 July 2004, paras. 30, 39–40,
56. See also Wiessner (2008) and Fox-Decent and Dahlman (2015).
47See the Latin maxims nemo dat quod non habet and nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest
quam ipse habet.
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shorthand, configurations of resource rights can be complex and multi-layered, and
they can encompass very diverse tenure set-ups.
In many jurisdictions, national law vests ownership of mineral and petroleum
resources with the state. Private (non-state) rights to subsoil resources do exist in
some countries. This includes arrangements that legally recognise customary or
indigenous rights to subsoil resources, which in some cases have paved the way to
joint ventures or partnership agreements between investors and indigenous groups—
for example in Canada and South Africa.48 In most countries, however, commercial
mining and petroleum projects primarily involve licences issued by the state, or
contracts with the state or a state-owned entity. Trends in land ownership present
greater diversity, and globally there is extensive experience with land-related con-
tracts awarded by non-state actors. In many low and middle-income countries,
however, states own a substantial part or even all of the land, or they otherwise
hold rights giving them substantial control over public lands that cannot formally
be owned or alienated. This trend partly reflects historical legacies, including in
the colonial period.49 Legal forms vary both within and between jurisdictions,
encompassing concepts such as trusteeship, domaine public de l’état, domaine
privé de l’état, and domaine foncier national, among others. But in general terms,
the state in these jurisdictions has the legal authority to allocate land on behalf of its
people, and land-based investments such as agribusiness ventures tend to involve
long-term leases or concessions granted by the state.
In these respects, natural resource contracting is connected to the realm of public
law, presenting specificities compared to purely private, commercial transactions.50
These public law dimensions flow not only from the role of states in managing
natural resources, but also from the fact that states perform that role for the benefit
of their people rather than as private owners—a circumstance that many national
constitutions and laws explicitly affirm,51 and that is meant to provide the basis for
relations of accountability between the authorities and the people in whose interest
those authorities are required to act.52 In many other countries, however, part or most
of the land is owned by actors located outside the sphere of government, ranging
from private landowners to traditional authorities. This situation affects contractual
48For examples of legal recognition of customary/indigenous mineral rights, see, in South Africa,
Alexkor Ltd v. Richtersveld Community and Others, Constitutional Court of South Africa (CCT19/
03) [2003] ZACC 18; and in Canada, the Nisga’a Final Agreement (British Columbia, 27 April
1999), Articles 3.19–3.20.
49See Cotula (2016) for a fuller discussion.
50Classifications in terms of public and private law resonate to varying degrees in different
jurisdictions. In some civil law countries, public-private law divides can have practical repercus-
sions, for example for the jurisdiction of ordinary and administrative courts; but these dimensions
do not operate in the same way in other countries, particularly in the common law tradition.
51See e.g. the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (as amended), Article 33(3); and
Nigeria’s Land Use Act 1978, Article 1. See more generally Gathii and Odumosu-Ayanu (2015).




arrangements: in jurisdictions where private land ownership is prevalent, land-based
investments often involve private-to-private transactions; and where traditional
authorities control a significant part of the land (in Ghana or Sierra Leone, for
example), many commercial land leases are signed with those authorities.53
Even where the land is owned by non-state actors, the state sometimes plays a role
in land contracts. First, eminent domain is widely considered an attribute of sover-
eignty, and national law typically empowers the government to compulsorily acquire
land for a public purpose provided that certain conditions are met. While activating
compulsory acquisition for commercial investments raises fundamental questions
about the contours of “public purpose”, some national laws expressly allow this,54
and in practice states have made extensive use of compulsory acquisition to allocate
rights to commercial projects. Second, where non-state actors, rather than government
authorities, allocate resource rights directly to investors, separate contractual arrange-
ments may govern relations between the investor and the state, covering issues such as
tax incentives or legal stability. As a result, the connections with the sphere of public
law are relevant to these situations as well. Contracts concluded by non-state actors
can themselves present public law dimensions: depending on applicable law, tradi-
tional authorities may owe legally defined responsibilities towards the landowning
community,55 and their historical socio-political evolution or contemporary legal
status may not be fully independent of the administrative apparatus of government.56
Ownership, under national law, of the resource at stake does not exhaust the full
spectrum of rights and claims relevant to natural resource contacting. A few exam-
ples illustrate this point. Firstly, state ownership of subsoil resources may coexist
with privately held rights to land and surface resources, which extractive industry
contracts can affect. Secondly, even where the land is itself owned or controlled by
the state, national law may protect rights to use and manage that land—for example,
based on occupation, indigenous or customary rights, or stated-issued land leases.
Depending on the context, these rights may be held by small-scale farmers, pasto-
ralists, fisherfolk, forest dwellers or local residents, for example—including groups
who qualify as indigenous peoples under international law. While in some national
legal systems these use and management rights can pave the way to direct land
transactions between right holders and external investors, in others local actors
cannot allocate commercial contracts to investors directly,57 or else the rights they
can allocate would fall short of commercial needs in terms of tenure security,
transferability or mortgageability,58 so the state plays a key role in the transaction.
53E.g. Boamah (2014).
54See e.g. Tanzania’s Village Land Act 1999, Section 4(2).
55E.g. Yeboah and Kakraba-Ampeh (2016), writing about Ghana.
56Mamdani (1996) and Ouédraogo (2006).
57See e.g. Knight (2010) and Tanner and Bicchieri (2014), writing on Mozambique’s land and
surface resource legislation.
58See World Bank (2013), which in relation to a commercial agriculture project in Senegal
suggested an elaborate scheme of leases and subleases to circumvent such limitations.
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Thirdly, small-scale farmers, pastoralists, fisherfolk, forest dwellers or local resi-
dents may claim resource rights that are perceived to be socially legitimate at the
local level but are not recognised or adequately protected by national law.
In all such situations, investment contracting can affect the claimed or legally
recognised resource rights of third-party actors. This circumstance creates specific
challenges compared to purely private contracts that transact resource rights between
two parties alone, and is often among the root causes of conflicts associated with
natural resource projects. International instruments provide guidance on how to
navigate these challenges. The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Gover-
nance of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security
(VGGT) are an international soft-law instrument endorsed in 2012 by the Committee
on World Food Security, which is the top United Nations body in food security
matters. In tying land and natural resources to food security and human rights, the
VGGT call on states and investors to respect all “legitimate tenure rights”, including
indigenous and customary tenure rights, and including socially legitimate rights that
are “not currently protected by law”.59 The VGGT provide guidance on handling
resource rights issues in investment processes, including through local consultation
and partnerships with local tenure right holders.60
International human rights instruments also have a bearing on this issue. The close
connections between resource rights and human rights are widely recognised.61
Examples of most obviously relevant human rights include the rights to property,
to housing, to food (where people depend on natural resources for their food security),
to enjoy one’s own culture (where traditional cultures are connected to land and
resources), to freely dispose of natural resources, and to self-determination, as well as
indigenous peoples’ rights to their ancestral territories—to name but a few interna-
tionally recognised human rights. That said, all human rights are interdependent and
interrelated, so the interface between resource rights and human rights encompasses
all internationally recognised human rights.62 Regional human rights courts have
consistently held that international law protects resource claims even if they are
customary in nature and not recognised as ownership under national law.63 Human
rights jurisprudence has also identified the limits of eminent domain, for example by
requiring, in relation to indigenous peoples, that states conduct environmental impact
assessments, promote benefit sharing and seek free, prior and informed consent.64
59Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in
the Context of National Food Security (11 May 2012), e.g. paras. 3.1, 3.2, 4.4, 5.3, 7.1 and section
12 [hereinafter VGGT]. The VGGT refer to land investments in general terms. In practice, however,
they have been primarily applied to the agriculture sector, in line with the institutional mandate of
the United Nations bodies that were involved in their development.
60VGGT, paras. 9.9, 12.6, 12.7 and 12.9.
61E.g. VGGT, paras. 1.1, 2.2, 3.2, 3B.1, 3B.4, 4.1, 4.3, 4.8, 4.9, 9.3, 12.4, 12.6, 12.8, 16.7, 16.9.
62VGGT, paras. 4.8.
63See for example the extensive jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the
human right to collective property, discussed in Cotula (2017).
64E.g. Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment, Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(28 November 2007), para. 134.
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The upshot is that diverse resource ownership patterns translate into different
combinations of public and private elements in natural resource contracting, and
considerable variation across sectors and jurisdictions. Privately held resource rights
can underpin contracts led by non-state actors, but in many jurisdictions natural
resource contracts involve the state or a state-owned entity. Even where the state
formally owns the relevant resource under national law, however, authorities are not
entirely free to transact resource rights. International instruments create spaces for
other resource right holders to have their voices heard in contracting, and—
depending on the jurisdiction—national law may establish comparable safeguards.
So while resource ownership can enable public authorities to play an important role
in contracting, this role coexists with a wider range of relevant resource right holders
and affected actors, and it is subject to both internal and external parameters—
because authorities must manage the resources in the interest of the people, and
because they must come to terms with resource rights protected under national or
international law.
2.3 Consent
While rules vary across jurisdictions, a contract is typically binding by virtue of the
consent manifested by the parties. In natural resource contracts, consent is connected
to issues of sovereignty and ownership. In relation to contracts between investors
and states, international arbitral tribunals have clarified that, in expressing its consent
to be bound by the contract, a state exercises its sovereignty.65 In addition, the right
to transact or alienate an asset is widely considered an attribute of ownership,66
although restrictions may apply including to publicly owned assets. Conversely, the
parameters of sovereignty and ownership limit the manifestation of consent. This is
not only because, as discussed, a contracting party cannot transfer resource rights it
does not hold. Wide-ranging legal obligations, including under international law,
have further knock-on effects on consent.
It is commonly accepted in contract law that external bounds delimit the realm of
the parties’ consent. In transnational commercial transactions, for example, it is
recognised that freedom of contract—that is, freedom to enter into a contract and
determine its content—is restricted by the application of “mandatory rules, whether
of national, international or supranational origins, which are applicable in accor-
dance with the relevant rules of private international law”.67 Over a long-term
historical trajectory, national laws in diverse areas such as rentals, labour and
65Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government of
the Libyan Arab Republic, 19 January 1977, 53 ILR 389, paras. 66–68.
66See e.g. Penner (1997).
67UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016, Article 1.4.
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consumer protection have reconfigured the classical notion of freedom of contract,68
and often extensive legal requirements shape what the contracting parties can
lawfully agree. Comparably, in natural resource contracts the sovereign duties of
states affect the range of commitments that states can lawfully consent to, and the
safeguards that states must establish for the manifestation of consent in contracts
between private parties.
Human rights obligations illustrate this point. Under international law, states have
a duty to respect human rights—that is, to refrain from infringing on those rights; as
well as a duty to protect human rights from interference by third parties, including
business entities in the context of natural resource investments.69 Failure to uphold
these duties in natural resource investments has been found to violate human rights
treaties.70 It is worth recalling that businesses, for their part, have the responsibility
to respect human rights—that is, “they should avoid infringing on the human rights
of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are
involved”.71 Therefore, expressions of consent for a natural resource contract
between a state and a business entity would engage, at the same time, the duties of
the state to respect and protect human rights, and the responsibility of businesses to
respect those rights. In this context, a state could not lawfully consent to contractual
provisions that are inconsistent with its duty to respect and protect human rights. In
addition, states must provide the regulatory framework to ensure that any contracts
between non-state actors respect human rights.
Besides setting external bounds for the manifestation of consent, the duty of states
to exercise sovereignty and manage publicly owned resources in the interest of their
people also establishes internal parameters that qualify consent from within. This
configuration outlines even more far-reaching qualifications to the classic principle of
freedom of contract. In private transactions, freedom of contract is mainly qualified
through the external boundaries established by mandatory rules, so in principle the
parties can autonomously determine their contracting objectives as long as legal
requirements are complied with. In contracts involving the exercise of sovereignty,
on the other hand, the manifestation of consent is inherently tied to the pursuit of
public policy goals advancing the interest of the people that public authorities
represent. For example, the duty of ICESCR states parties to progressively realise
68For a classic study, see Atiyah (1979).
69Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011,
Principle 1; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 24: State
Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the
Context of Business Activities, 10 August 2017, E/C.12/GC/24.
70E.g. The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and The Centre for Economic and Social
Rights v. Nigeria, 27 October 2001, Communication No. 155/96, African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, paras. 55–58.
71Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011,
Principle 11. If successful, the ongoing negotiation of a proposed treaty on transnational corpora-
tions and other business enterprises with respect to human rights could entail significant normative
shifts in this area.
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economic, social and cultural rights to the maximum of their available resources,
discussed above, requires those states to take steps to maximise the contribution that
natural resource development provides to the realisation of human rights.
This duty of states to act in the interest of the people also has implications for the
actors and processes involved in the formation and expression of consent. In investor-
state contracts, national law may establish channels for parliament and citizens to
influence public decisions underpinning the state’s consent. Process-related parame-
ters relevant to investor-state contracts are also established by international human
rights law, including via political rights such as the right to vote and freedom of
expression and association, and the rights of consultation and participation pertaining
to indigenous peoples. These parameters disqualify possible manipulations of the
framing delineated in General Assembly Resolution 1803, because public authorities
cannot claim to advance the “well-being of the people” on the basis of paternalistic
visions that take little account of the concerns and aspirations of those whose interests
they are meant to pursue.
Besides framing the formation and manifestation of a state’s consent in investor-
state contracts, the parameters of sovereignty and ownership—including the links
that connect resource rights to human rights—provide the normative basis for multi-
actor processes whereby the contract rests, at least in part, on the consent of relevant
resource right holders. In this context, the notion of consent has been deployed to
advance interests not associated with state sovereignty that, in legal terms, may—or
may not—involve formal resource ownership.
Free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is a case in point. It features prominently
in international instruments concerning indigenous peoples.72 While the specifics
vary depending on the instrument and the issue, the United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) calls on states to recognise the rights to
the land, territories and resources that indigenous peoples own, occupy, use or
possess73; and to consult indigenous peoples “in good faith” and “in order to obtain
their free, prior and informed consent” before adopting measures or approving
projects that may affect those peoples or their lands, territories or resources.74 The
International Labour Organisation’s Convention No. 169 contains broadly compa-
rable provisions.75 Further, the UNDRIP provides more stringent parameters of
consent for situations that involve relocating indigenous peoples.76
72Particularly the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 13 September
2007, G.A. Res. 61/295, Articles 19 and 32(2) [hereinafter UNDRIP]; and Convention No. 169 of
the International Labour Organisation Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries (Geneva, 27 June 1989), Article 6 [hereinafter ILO Convention 169].
73UNDRIP, Article 26.
74UNDRIP, Articles 19 and (using slightly different wording) 32(2).
75E.g. Articles 6 and 13–19 of ILO Convention 169. There are some significant differences, however.
For comparative analysis of the UNDRIP and ILO Convention 169, see Rombouts (2017).
76Article 10 of the UNDRIP provides: “Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their
lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the
indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where
possible, with the option of return.”
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The notion of FPIC has also been developed in international human rights
jurisprudence. In cases concerning commercial or development projects in the
ancestral territories of indigenous or tribal peoples, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights has cited the UNDRIP and/or Convention 169 to configure FPIC as
one element of the human right to collective property.77 Although some judgments
have referred more generally to the “right to consultation” rather than specifically
to FPIC,78 the Inter-American Court has clarified that consultation must be in
good faith and “with the aim of reaching an agreement or obtaining consent”.79
Further, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has deemed this duty to consult
indigenous peoples to be a general principle of international law, applicable
irrespective of any treaty obligations.80
These international norms have implications for natural resource contracts,
because FPIC can affect the contracting process, and because FPIC exercises may
themselves lead to partnership agreements.81 It must be noted that FPIC has been at
the centre of intense debates, partly owing to concerns that its application might
undermine the ability of states to award resource concessions they deem necessary
to promote national development. Different positions in these debates are reflected
in diverse interpretations of what FPIC means in practice, ranging from a full-
fledged “right to veto” (often advanced by indigenous movements and NGOs) to
bureaucratic or box-ticking consultation exercises (often in the perspectives of
governments and businesses, respectively).82 In terms of positive law, jurists have
noted that the duty to consult in good faith in order to obtain consent establishes
“more than a mere right to be informed and heard but less than the right of veto”83;
though as discussed the UNDRIP sets more stringent FPIC requirements for cases
involving relocation. Rather than undermining the exercise of sovereign powers,
FPIC seems consistent with a pluralist construction of sovereignty that rests on
both rights and duties and recognises spaces for decentralised exercise of public
authority.84
77Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (28 November
2007) para. 134. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights followed this jurispru-
dential approach in Centre for Minority Rights Development and Minority Rights Group on behalf
of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra, paras. 226–228.
78For example, Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Judgment, Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (27 June 2012), e.g. paras. 160, 163–167.
79Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Judgment, Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (27 June 2012), para. 185.
80Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Judgment, Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (27 June 2012), para. 164.
81Anaya (2013).
82Anaya and Puig (2016).
83Anaya and Puig (2016), p. 2. See also Rombouts (2017).
84See also Doyle (2015) and Fox-Decent and Dahlman (2015).
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3 From Concepts to Practice: Illustrative Issues
3.1 Investor-State Contracts
The configuration of the legal categories that underpin natural resource contracts—
sovereignty, ownership and consent—has important practical implications. Some
relate to the procedural and substantive dimensions of investor-state contracts.
Others concern reframing the contracting process around a wider range of actors,
including holders of legitimate tenure rights and people affected by project imple-
mentation. This section examines investor-state contracts, while the subsequent
section explores community-investor and multi-actor contracts. Due to space con-
straints, the aim is to illustrate the issues rather than to discuss them comprehensively
or in depth. Three examples illustrate implications for investor-state contracting
processes. They concern issues of transparency, parliamentary approval and local
consultation. The implications affect contractual practice, the wider governance
frameworks it fits in, or the interpretation of general norms as they apply to
contracting. Examples to illustrate content-related implications in investor-state
contracts include stabilisation clauses and third-party rights.
Starting with transparency issues, there have long been concerns that opacity in
contracting and non-disclosure of contracts create the breeding ground for corrup-
tion and deals that do not maximise the public interest.85 These concerns have
fuelled calls for transparency of contracts and contracting,86 where transparency is
considered a pre-condition for citizens to hold authorities to account for the way
they manage collective resources. Human right law affirms this connection
between transparency and political rights, with international jurisprudence having
linked public access to investor-state contracts to freedom of thought and expres-
sion.87 While empirical questions remain as to whether and how transparency
translates into accountability, and while opinion is often divided on how to
reconcile multiple commercial and non-commercial interests, there is substantial
support for the proposition that, compared to purely commercial transactions,
investor-state contracts should entail a different balance between transparency
and confidentiality.
This support is reflected, for example, in authoritative international guidance
providing for transparency and disclosure,88 national laws mandating contract
85Ayine et al. (2005) and Rosenblum and Maples (2009).
86Rosenblum and Maples (2009), stating that “citizens have a right a right to know” how the
government manages publicly owned resources (p. 15).
87Claude Reyes and Others v. Chile, Judgment, Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
19 September 2006.
88E.g. Principles for Responsible Contracts: Integrating the Management of Human Rights Risks
into State-Investor Contract Negotiations – Guidance for Negotiators, 25 May 2011, UN Doc.
A/HRC/17/31/Add.3, Principle 10. See also EITI (2016), Section 2.4(a).
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disclosure,89 and growing initiatives to facilitate public access to contracts.90 A
significant number of extractive industry contracts are now publicly available,
though many others are not and progress has been more limited in other sectors
including agribusiness.91 The public law dimensions involved in natural resource
contracting, and the fact that authorities must act in the interest of their people,
arguably strengthen the case for transparency and accountability,92 and for deepen-
ing the (still tentative) transition towards normalising disclosure.
The second process-related example concerns the place of parliamentary approval
in natural resource contracting. To ensure that states exercise their sovereignty and
(where relevant) resource ownership in the interest of the people, some national
constitutions establish safeguards for the expression of consent in investor-state
contracts. In some jurisdictions, the constitution requires parliamentary approval as
a condition for the state to perfect its consent.93 There are questions about the
difference these mechanisms can make in practice,94 and the relevance of these
requirements depends on the overall constitutional set up—particularly the nature of
the relationship between the executive and the legislature. Where requirements do
apply, complex legal issues can arise if the government concludes contracts without
parliamentary approval. With regard to treaties, under international law a state
cannot “invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty was expressed in
violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties
as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of
its internal law of fundamental importance”.95
An analogy may be drawn with contracts, and an argument may be made that
constitutional requirements for parliamentary approval are rules “of fundamental
importance” that an investor acting with due diligence should be aware of. However,
some investor-state arbitral tribunals have deemed contracts to have effect despite
the absence of the required parliamentary approval, holding that states were estopped
from challenging in the arbitration the validity of contracts they had until then treated
as valid.96 Such interpretations could undermine the effectiveness of constitutional
arrangements aimed at aligning a state’s manifestation of consent with pursuit of
public policy goals that connect natural resource development to enhancing the
“well-being of the people” (in the language of Resolution 1803). Giving effect to
89E.g. Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act 2009, Article 5.
90ResourceContracts.org and OpenLandContracts.org.
91Webb et al. (2017).
92Miranda (2007).
93See e.g. Article 181(5) of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, and Article 71 of the
2010 Constitution of the Republic of Kenya.
94Depending on the context, for example, the government may structurally enjoy the support of the
parliamentary majority, and members of parliament may lack the time and expertise needed to
perform this role effectively.
95Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna, 23 May 1969), Article 46(1).
96See e.g. Bankswitch Ghana Ltd. (Ghana) v. The Republic of Ghana, Award Save as to Costs,
11 April 2014, UNCITRAL, particularly paras. 11.71–11.97.
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the conceptual configuration of sovereignty, ownership and consent, outlined above,
may require a different balance between investment protection and procedural
propriety—expecting investors to identify any parliamentary approval requirements
as part of due diligence processes and to bear the consequences of fundamental
procedural defects.
The third process-related example concerns local consultation or FPIC require-
ments. These have implications for the structuring of contracting processes, for
instance with regard to the sequencing of key decisions and contractual instruments.
They also raise questions about the validity of contracts concluded in violation of
applicable consultation or FPIC requirements, and about the legal value of repre-
sentations government officials make during the negotiations. This latter point can
illustrate the issues. Government representations could involve assurances to the
investor that the land is free of encumbrances, or promises that the necessary permits
will be issued. Interpreting fair and equitable treatment provisions contained in many
international investment treaties, investor-state arbitral tribunals have considered
that government representations can create “legitimate expectations” on the part of
the investor, and that subsequent state conduct frustrating those expectations can
violate the investment treaty.97
One question is whether government representations made before consulting
affected resource right holders, and thus potentially in violation of applicable
consultation or FPIC requirements, can create legitimate expectations. As discussed,
international human rights instruments shape the parameters of state sovereignty and
resource ownership, and authorities cannot lawfully take measures that violate
human rights. Arbitral tribunals have held that the protection of human rights pro-
vides relevant context to frame the investor’s expectations.98 There is therefore a
compelling argument that investors’ expectations should not be considered legiti-
mate if, in making the representations, authorities breached their duty to respect and
protect human rights.99 Businesses have a responsibility to respect human rights,
including by conducting human rights due diligence,100 and this arguably requires
investors to ensure that their expectations are premised on respect for human rights.
With regard to the substantive content of contractual provisions, one issue is that
the investor-state contract involves a bilateral relationship between two parties but
the state has duties vis-à-vis third-party holders of (human, resource) rights. These
rights/duties limit what states can lawfully agree to when concluding the contract.101
This is partly reflected in the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
97International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. The United Mexican States, Award, 26 January 2006,
UNCITRAL, paragraph 147.
98Urbaser S.A. and Corsorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The
Argentine Republic, Award, 8 December 2016, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, paras. 622–624.
99Cotula (2016) and Cordes et al. (2017).
100Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 MarchPrinciples
11, 13 and 15.
101Leader (2006).
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Principle 9 affirms that “states should maintain adequate domestic policy space to
meet their human rights obligations” when negotiating investor-state contracts.102
This principle articulates, from a human rights perspective, the external parameters
of consent, by guiding states not to agree to provisions that would unduly restrict
their ability to advance human rights. In line with their non-binding nature, the
Guiding Principles frame this provision in non-mandatory terms. As discussed,
however, binding human rights law has reconfigured the legal contours of state
sovereignty and resource ownership, with implications for the bounds of consent. An
annex to the Guiding Principles contains Principles for Responsible Contracts that
provide more detailed guidance on specific contractual issues.103
Stabilisation clauses illustrate this point. Broadly speaking, these clauses aim to
shelter investments from adverse changes in law that could undermine the investors’
rights or returns. There is great diversity in formulations. Some clauses purport to
“freeze” applicable law to the norms in force at a specified time, excluding the
application of subsequent legislation. On the other hand, so-called economic equi-
librium clauses link adverse changes in law to requirements that the government
restore the contract’s economic equilibrium—for example, and depending on the
wording, via contract renegotiation or possibly payment of compensation. Hybrid
clauses combine freezing and economic equilibrium elements.104
Over the years, activists and jurists have raised concerns that a mechanical
application of stabilisation clauses could constrain the implementation of deserving
social, environmental or economic measures, including steps to realise human
rights.105 More stringent rules on community consultation, labour relations, health
and safety, and environmental protection—to name but a few potentially relevant
examples—could adversely affect investments and trigger the application of
stabilisation clauses. The concern is that states may have to exempt projects from
the new measures; or else that, if states must bear the costs those measures cause,
they may be discouraged from acting in the first place, particularly where public
finances are under strain.106 As a result, people affected by the social and environ-
mental impacts of natural resource investments could remain subject to obsolete
(“stabilised”) rules over often long contract durations.
The parameters of sovereignty, ownership and consent have a bearing on these
issues. As the sovereign right of states to enter into contracts is qualified by their duty
102Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011,
Principles 11, 13 and 15.
103Principles for Responsible Contracts: Integrating the Management of Human Rights Risks into
State-Investor Contract Negotiations – Guidance for Negotiators, 25 May 2011, UN Doc. A/HRC/
17/31/Add.3.
104Shemberg (2009) and Cameron (2010). More generally, see also Wälde and N’Di (1996) and
Johnson and Volkov (2013). On the different issues raised by the stabilisation clauses found
(arguably more rarely) in investment treaties, see Gazzini (2017).
105See e.g. Amnesty International UK (2003, 2005). On the environmental dimensions, see
Tienhaara (2006), Cotula (2008) and Viñuales (2012).
106Amnesty International UK (2005).
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to respect and protect human rights, any stabilisation commitments would need to be
drafted (or interpreted, if drafting was not explicit) as only covering issues that the
state can lawfully transact. Measures that states adopt to comply with their human
rights obligations would lie outside the scope of any stabilisation clauses.107 The
Principles for Responsible Contracts provide broadly consistent guidance with
regard to the drafting of stabilisation clauses. According to Principle 4:
Contractual stabilization clauses, if used, should be carefully drafted so that any protections
for investors against future changes in law do not interfere with the State’s bona fide efforts
to implement laws, regulations or policies, in a non-discriminatory manner, in order to meet
its human rights obligations.108
The commentary to this principle clarifies that areas such as “labour, health, safety,
the environment, or other legal measures that serve to meet the State’s human rights
obligations” should be excluded from the scope of freezing clauses, and that eco-
nomic equilibrium clauses should not contemplate financial repercussions for human
rights measures.109 To be clear, this guidance does not suggest that stabilisation
clauses formulated within such bounds would be desirable or well advised.110
Investors and states may have different interests, with investors typically favouring
stability, and states potentially being wary of arrangements that could affect their
ability to regulate over time. However, the point made here is about legally inscribed
limitations rather than judgments of policy opportunity: stabilisation clauses that
purport to limit the right and duty of a state to comply with its human rights
obligations would be at odds with international law; and a state’s sovereign right
lawfully to conclude contracts would not extend to clauses that conflict with interna-
tional obligations. Depending on the jurisdiction, additional doubts may arise about
the legality of stabilisation clauses—particularly those of the freezing kind—under
constitutional law.
Besides delimiting the external bounds of what a state can lawfully agree to, the
interplay of sovereignty, ownership and consent also influences the internal param-
eters of investment contracting. These parameters proceed from the duty of states to
ensure that natural resource development benefits their people, which in turn stems
from Resolution 1803 and the ICESCR, and—depending on the jurisdiction—from
any national legislation requiring authorities to manage resources in people’s inter-
est. Natural resource contracts often involve complex policy choices, and wide
political discretion, on how best to advance the public interest in diverse situations.
For example, some states may favour contractual clauses that promote business,
107Leader (2006) and Cotula (2008).
108Principles for Responsible Contracts: Integrating the Management of Human Rights Risks into
State-Investor Contract Negotiations – Guidance for Negotiators, 25 May 2011, UN Doc. A/HRC/
17/31/Add.3, Principle 4.
109Principles for Responsible Contracts: Integrating the Management of Human Rights Risks into
State-Investor Contract Negotiations – Guidance for Negotiators, 25 May 2011, UN Doc. A/HRC/
17/31/Add.3. Principles for Responsible Contracts, Key implications of Principle 4.
110See the wording “if used” in Principle 4.
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employment and/or training opportunities for local actors, or that require investors to
finance public infrastructure. At scale and depending on the circumstances, however,
these provisions might affect the fiscal take. Other states may prefer to maximise
public revenues instead, and use these revenues to sustain public services or promote
inclusive development without delegating these functions to private sector operators.
States can legitimately make different policy choices on such issues and trade-offs.
However, state conduct deliberately awarding commercial resource rights in the
absence of any reasonably commensurate benefits being generated and earmarked
to advancing human rights could come under scrutiny against the obligation of
ICESCR states parties to progressively realise economic, social and cultural rights
to the maximum of their available resources. There are also questions about legal
arrangements that could facilitate more active roles for the people in whose interest
authorities conclude the contract: insofar as any policy choices made involve
contractual provisions that benefit third parties, one issue is whether those third
parties can play any role in monitoring and enforcement. Examples of relevant
investor-state contract provisions include requirements for the investor to finance
local development funds, or to apply specified standards of compensation for land
acquisition. In these cases, third parties such as relevant resource right holders and
people affected by project implementation may benefit from contract compliance,
yet they are often outside of the investor-state negotiation and contract.
It is accepted that contracts can create rights for third parties, depending on their
circumstances and formulation.111 Some scholars have argued for harnessing the
“third party beneficiary principle”, as it applies in some jurisdictions, to enable third
parties to access legal remedies for investor-state contract provisions that create
rights for them.112 A pre-condition for this arrangement to work is that third parties
know about the relevant clauses, which compounds the case for transparency.
Applicable contract law has a bearing on third-party rights, and analytical work
remains to be done to assess how third-party rights might work in diverse national
legal frameworks. In more general terms, however, these exploratory reflections
illustrate how (re)configuring the conceptual foundations based on positive law has
wide-ranging practical implications for investor-state contracts and their governance
frameworks—strengthening the case for transparency and for taking parliamentary
approval requirements seriously; installing FPIC in contracting processes; restricting
the bounds of “legitimate expectations” and any stabilisation clauses; and develop-
ing arrangements to ensure natural resource development advances economic, social
and cultural rights.
111In relation to transnational commercial transactions, for example, Articles 5.2.1–5.2.6 of the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts cover third-party arrangements.
112Gathii (2014). See also OHCHR (2015).
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3.2 Community-Investor and Multi-Actor Contracts
The conceptual discussion highlighted that, under international law, the state repre-
sents its people and exercises sovereignty over natural resources. While in many
jurisdictions land is privately owned, national laws tend to vest ownership of subsoil
resources with the state for the benefit of the people. In many jurisdictions, the state
also owns or control part or all of the land. National law typically empowers
authorities to award commercial concessions. As a result, the state often plays an
important role in natural resource contracting, though the extent and nature of this
role vary across countries and sectors. This account emphasises the bilateral rela-
tionship between the investor and the state, with the investor being deemed to
advance commercial interests (while upholding their responsibility to respect
human rights), and the state to bear the public interest of its people (including
those most directly affected by the project, and citizens at large).
More pluralist accounts of political organisation point to the complexities affect-
ing the contours and operation of the state in real-life socio-political settings.
Political economy factors can create misalignments between state action and the
aspirations of the diverse constituencies the state is meant to represent. The distrib-
utive dimensions of natural resource investments compound these challenges: public
revenues may accrue to the national level and their use may advance the priorities of
those in power; while a disproportionate share of adverse impacts such as land
acquisition and environmental degradation are felt at the local level. In effect,
significant costs are borne by actors excluded from the investor-state contract.113
These actors may have limited ability to influence the state’s negotiating position.
Partly reflecting these structural issues, many resource projects have triggered
disputes between states and affected people. Human rights jurisprudence provides
several examples of litigation originating from the contested award of natural
resource concessions.114 Reconfiguring the procedural and substantive parameters
of the investor-state contract can go some way towards addressing these problems;
but the challenge does question the bilateral (investor-state) framing of natural
resource contracts.
Ultimately, investors need local support if their ventures are to thrive in the longer
term. Coupled with local actors’ advocacy for shifts in project approaches, this need
has underpinned growing experience with community-investor contracts—a practice
now documented in many countries from North and South America, Africa, Central
Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania.115 The terminology used to describe these agree-
ments varies (e.g. community development agreements, social responsibility agree-
ments, partnership agreements), as does their content. Some scholars have discerned
an ongoing transition from a narrow emphasis on social infrastructure (schools, health
facilities) to more comprehensive agreements also encompassing employment and
113Gathii (2014).
114For a discussion, see Cotula (2017).
115O’Faircheallaigh (2013), writing on the mining sector.
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training, revenue sharing or joint venture arrangements, and/or continued community
access to resources insofar not inconsistent with commercial activities.116 However,
research suggests that any such transition is not linear, and highlights the limitations
of contractual practices often characterised by weak and unspecific formulations.117
Further, empirical studies have documented shortcomings in the operationalisation
of seemingly promising partnership models, for example pointing to inadequate
consultation, limited effectiveness of board representation and/or lack of dividend
payments in agriculture-related community-investor joint ventures.118
A relation exists between community-investor agreements and the configuration
of sovereignty, ownership and consent. By aiming to ensure that people affected
by resource projects participate in decision making and in the socio-economic
benefits those projects generate, community-investor agreements offer one vehicle
for states to exercise sovereignty over natural resources in the interest of the people,
as required by General Assembly Resolution 1803, and ensure compliance with
human rights norms. Alternative or complementary models are available, such as
institutionalised vehicles for political participation, and legislation that uniformly
regulates the distribution of socio-economic benefits created by all relevant
investments.
In addition, community-investor agreements respond to resource ownership
patterns. Recognising all socially legitimate tenure rights, as called for by the
VGGT, provides local actors with a direct stake in contracting processes—because
resource transactions should inevitably engage the actors whose resources are
transacted. Where local groups own lands or resources, community-investor agree-
ments can provide the main source of the investor’s tenure rights, for instance in the
form of land lease or joint venture arrangements.119 For state-owned resources, local
resource use rights or claims can provide the basis for the negotiation of community-
investor agreements that, while not conferring commercial resource rights to inves-
tors directly, regulate other aspects of the relationship.
Multiple legal instruments sustain the relevance of community-investor agree-
ments even if local actors lack formal resource ownership rights. National law
may require investors to negotiate community-investor agreements as a condition
for the state to award commercial concessions. International soft-law instruments
such as the VGGT call for partnerships with affected resource right holders.120
And regional human rights institutions have emphasised benefit sharing when
interpreting the human right to collective property in connection with customary
rights to natural resources.121 While such national and international instruments
116O’Faircheallaigh (2013).
117Loutit et al. (2016).
118E.g. Majid Cooke et al. (2011), Lahiff et al. (2012) and Djiré et al. (2013).
119E.g. Boamah (2014), writing on Ghana’s agricultural sector.
120E.g. VGGT paras. 12.6, 12.9, 12.10, 12.14.
121E.g. Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment, Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(28 November 2007), para. 134. See also Morgera (2016).
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decouple community-investor agreements from outright resource ownership, evi-
dence suggests that ownership can give local actors real leverage. In Australia and
Canada, the more effective community-investor partnerships often seem tied to
developments in native title (Australia) and land claims (Canada).122
The links with the notion of consent are also apparent. By providing a
channel for local actors to express their consent to the project, the negotiation of a
community-investor agreement could constitute an element of FPIC processes. A
landmark report by the then UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples identified natural resource development by indigenous peoples themselves
as the first-best option; but should this option not be available owing to the
significant capital and know-how requirements, the report called for FPIC-based
partnership agreements between businesses and indigenous peoples.123 However, a
community-investor agreement does not, in itself, signal FPIC: depending on the
wording, local actors may be consenting to receiving certain benefits from a project
they oppose but cannot do anything about,124 and some community-investor agree-
ments were concluded after the project was initiated (against requirements for
consent to be prior).125
Community-investor agreements raise significant practical challenges. Three
deserve particular attention. The first concerns the notion of “community”. Contrac-
tual practice often uses this term (e.g. “community development agreement”) and
some national laws define it.126 However, the notion raises difficult legal and
philosophical questions, including about how to piece together multiple collective
and individual interests. Further, groups vary considerably: “communities” can refer
to an indigenous people, a number of indigenous peoples or groups within an
indigenous people; or it can describe local residents united by geographic proximity
and the impact of an investment who do not necessarily see the group as a stable
source of social identity. This diversity has legal implications, reflected for example
in the specific rights of indigenous peoples under international law.
In addition, social realities do not always fit legal categories: collective identities
may present fluid boundaries and evolve over time, and communities may host
divided opinions and social differentiation including based on wealth, gender,
age or ethnicity. Questions arise about the representativeness and accountability
of local leaders, and mechanisms for selecting community representatives vary
greatly—from mobilising traditional leaders to establishing new bodies such as
122O’Faircheallaigh (2010).
123Anaya (2013).
124Odumosu-Ayanu (2015). However, some agreements explicitly affirm that the community
supports the project (O’Faircheallaigh 2010).
125Gathii and Odumosu-Ayanu (2015).
126Examples include, in Mozambique, the Land Act 1997, Article 1(1) (defining “local commu-
nity”); and in the Philippines, the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act 1997, Article 3(h) (defining
“indigenous cultural communities”).
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elected committees, associations or cooperatives.127 Potential divides have also been
identified between the communities negotiating partnership agreements and the
lawyers advising them.128 Meaningful community-investor agreements rest on
addressing such difficult issues about “community” and its representation. This
may require significant investment in time and resources ahead of actual community
consultations or negotiations. These dimensions concern the realm of practice more
than law, but—in interrogating the nature of the actors expressing consent, and the
process for doing so—they do raise issues about the legal frameworks governing
social organisation and contracting processes.
The second set of challenges concerns the reality of developing community-
investor agreements in contexts that typically involve significant imbalances in
negotiating power.129 These are likely to depend on factors affecting communities
(such as social cohesion, strength of local organisations, quality of local leadership,
technical and financial resources) and external forces (e.g. investor corporate poli-
cies, time pressures), but local actors are often at a disadvantage.130 As a result,
community members may experience frustrations, divisions and stress, and they may
ultimately not obtain the terms they seek.131 As has been pointed out for relations
among states, the voluntarism inherent in the notion of consent belies the restricted
freedom of action that can exist “when choices are between lesser evils”, leading
critical commentators to draw a distinction between tactical consent and genuine
approval.132 Again, these considerations concern practical rather than doctrinal
issues, but they can entail legal reverberations. Communities may be exposed not
only to unfavourable and even exploitative arrangements, but also to legal risks and
possibly financial liabilities flowing from their being a party to the contract—
particularly in community-investor contracts that encompass commercial dimen-
sions, such as land leases or joint venture agreements.
These issues would require careful thinking through, especially where imbalances
in negotiating power or in available legal and technical support place the community
at a disadvantage. It is worth noting that, in relation to some other types of
contractual negotiations involving significant power asymmetries (e.g. labour or
consumer contracts), juridical configurations have historically tended to move
away from an exclusive reliance on consent as the foundation of the contract, with
regulation setting mandatory parameters that favour the weaker contracting party.
Recent “modern slavery” legislation has also restricted the relevance of consent
when determining if a person is held in slavery or required to perform compulsory




130O’Faircheallaigh (2013) and Szoke-Burke and Cordes (forthcoming).
131Szoke-Burke and Cordes (forthcoming).
132Salomon (2008), p. 42.
133See for example the United Kingdom’s Modern Slavery Act 2015, Sections 1(5) and 2(2).
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law can play in establishing the conditions for meaningful consent and possibly
minimum substantive standards for any community-investor agreements.
The third set of issues concerns the place of the community-investor agreement in
natural resource contracting, and particularly its relation to the investor-state con-
tract. These dimensions can affect the relevance and legal bite of any community-
investor agreement. In some cases, the community-investor and investor-state con-
tracts appear to be entirely separate agreements, without effective mechanisms
linking the two—an arrangement that can create problems during implementation.
At the other end of the spectrum lie tripartite contracts, or tripartite transactions
involving coordinated bundles of bilateral contracts, that bring together the govern-
ment, the investor and communities within a single, multi-party contractual frame-
work.134 Yet other approaches involve separate community-investor and investor-
state agreements, but link these agreements in procedural and/or substantive terms.
A few examples can illustrate the reverberations of these issues for the effec-
tiveness of contracts in addressing community-investor relations. The interface
between community-investor and investor-state contracts can affect sanctions
for investor non-compliance with the community-investor agreement—including
whether the state can terminate the investor-state contract for material breaches of
the community-investor agreement. Process-related questions concern the sequenc-
ing between the two contracts: concluding the investor-state agreement first could
limit options for the community-investor negotiation and undermine its usefulness
for FPIC, which requires prior consent; but it could also provide one avenue for
setting minimum parameters (e.g. on the terms of an outgrower scheme, were
relevant to an agribusiness venture) that might help communities in their negotia-
tion with the investor. Addressing these questions may require step-by-step
contracting—whereby an initial investor-state contract outlines key specifics but
keeps options open to enable FPIC and impact assessments; and a fuller investor-
state contract is informed by the outcomes of those local processes including any
community-investor agreements.
For all three sets of challenges, contractual and regulatory practice is yet to settle,
and legal scholarship is still in its infancy. The effectiveness of community-investor
agreements vis-à-vis other forms of regulation, including taxation-based benefit-
sharing arrangements governed by national legislation, is yet to be rigorously
assessed. Conceptually, however, trends towards multi-actor contracting align with
a configuration of sovereignty, ownership and consent that recognises the interplay
of both rights and duties in the construction of these legal categories.
134Odumosu-Ayanu (2014) and Gathii and Odumosu-Ayanu (2015).
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4 Conclusion
This study has explored how legal concepts can help to reframe contractual practice.
The investigation highlighted the role that, in a “Westphalian” system, states tend to
play as the organisational vehicles for holding and exercising sovereignty and, in
many jurisdictions, resource ownership. At the same time, international legal instru-
ments place people at the centre of concerns about sovereignty. The obligations that
these instruments create—including via strong connections between human and
resource rights—have redesigned the contours of state sovereignty. Depending on
the jurisdiction, national law may vest important resource rights with non-state
actors and set up arrangements to ensure that states manage publicly owned
resources in the interest of the people. This overall configuration establishes both
internal and external parameters for lawful state conduct, including the formation
and manifestation of state consent in natural resource contracting. It also underpins
more pluralist approaches whereby contracting rests, at least in part, on the consent
of a wider range of resource right holders and affected actors.
Focusing on illustrative issues, the study then distilled the practical implications
of this analysis. It found these implications to be wide-ranging—from the substan-
tive content of contracts to their parties and formation process. Some such implica-
tions affect the substantive or procedural dimensions of investor-state contracts, or
the framing and interpretation of the norms applicable to these contracts; while
others set the scene for multi-actor contracting that involves not only investors and
states but also actors affected by the investment. Each of these arenas has already
experienced developments in contractual practice, including shifts towards greater
contract transparency and growing experience with community-investor agreements;
but the conceptual configuration of sovereignty, ownership and consent provides a
more systemic foundation for addressing interrelated issues that have often been
handled in isolation.
These findings underpin forward-looking agendas for both research and action.
The still fluid nature of some areas of contractual practice, particularly in relation to
multi-actor contracting, creates opportunities for action to develop new approaches.
At the same time, difficult practical and conceptual questions remain—for example,
on the conditions that need to be in place, where negotiating power is very imbal-
anced, for consent to meaningfully provide the normative foundation of the contract.
Therefore, continuing analysis can helpfully inform the action, which could in turn
generate lessons for both contractual practice and research agendas. In taking
forward this work, the location of natural resource contracting at the interface
between national and international law; the combined operation of diverse sectoral
and cross-sectoral (e.g. human rights, environmental) norms; and the complex
relations between the normative and the experienced—all point to the value of
interdisciplinary approaches that cut across traditional boundaries between research
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“Fracking” is one of the methods used to extract unconventional natural gas and oil
from the underground. Unconventional natural gas includes shale gas, tight gas
sandstone, coal bed methane and methane hydrates. Until recently, such deposits
of gas were difficult and costly to extract. However, due to several circumstances the
exploration and exploitation of such gas deposits has become economically viable,
to the point where several states may turn from net gas importers to net gas exporters.
One of these circumstances was the rise in oil and gas prices in the early 2000s and
improvements to the extraction technique known as fracking.1
The “shale gas boom” has led to a significant increase in shale gas extraction
projects, and energy companies have invested significantly in several jurisdictions in
order to explore and extract deposits of natural gas that were previously considered
unattractive. At the same time, the fracking technique, has been associated with
environmental degradation in areas in which it is applied. It has been blamed for the
pollution of ground water and the disruption of the natural habitat of flora and fauna.
In response to these concerns, in at least one instance, a government that may have
previously welcomed investment in the sector has withdrawn a permit that had been
initially granted.2
Since, like other types of gas, shale gas is a natural resource that is deposited
within the territory of a state, its exploitation is subject to the principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources as articulated by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1962. That principle foresees that states are free to determine whether,
and if so, how, they wish to explore and exploit the natural resources located within
their territory. Where foreign investment is attracted in order to facilitate the
extraction of such natural resources, foreign commercial interests begin to interact
with domestic policy considerations of a public health or environmental protection
nature.
This contribution examines whether the domestic regulation of shale gas explo-
ration and exploitation by means of fracking simply presents another example of the
tensions that, by definition, exist between norms of international economic law
guaranteeing protection of the commercial interests of foreign investors and such
domestic norms, or whether the issue of fracking is of an altogether different nature.
In doing so, this contribution first examines the shale gas boom and the “fracking”
technique lying at its basis (Sect. 2). Subsequently, in the same section it explores the
ways in which several jurisdictions have regulated shale gas extraction techniques at
the national (and more local) level. In the next section, this contribution turns to an
analysis of the principle of the permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the
role it plays in respect of the extraction of unconventional natural gas (Sect. 3). By
1For further information on gas production, imports, exports, demands and prices see International
Energy Agency (2017).
2See Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2 (further
discussed in Sect. 4).
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examining the pending dispute between Lone Pine Inc. and Canada under
Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) the contribu-
tion aims to shed light on the relationship between domestic regulation of activities
associated with a high degree of risk and uncertainty and the rights of investors
engaged in providing such activities under international investment agreements
(Sect. 4). Thereafter the contribution examines in more detail the underlying ques-
tion of this article; whether the regulation of shale gas extraction simply presents
another example of the tension between norms of international economic law and
domestic regulatory autonomy, or whether it signals a deeper concern with the idea
that decisions by sovereigns negatively affecting foreign commercial interests could
be challenged before an international dispute settlement mechanism. In this regard,
the contribution considers recent discussions and efforts at both the national and the
multilateral level, not only to increase the regulatory autonomy of host states but also
to improve the current system of investor state dispute settlement (“ISDS”).
2 Shale Gas: Boom, Bust or Here to Stay?3
In simple terms, shale gas is natural gas which is trapped in fine-grained sedimentary
rocks. In order to release the gas, through a combination of horizontal drilling and
hydraulic fracturing,4 a mixture of water, sand and fracturing fluids is injected into
the ground under high pressure which then cracks the fractures open so that the gas
can flow.5 The technology is associated with environmental concerns and subject to
public opposition in several jurisdictions resulting in some cases in moratoria or bans
on national or local level.6 In others, such as in the United States, it has however led
to an industry revolution, creating jobs and economic and social prosperity in remote
and historically poor areas, and improved the energy supply security of the entire
country. However, public opposition is largely on the rise, not only in the jurisdic-
tions where land owners do not directly profit from the profits (as in the European
Union) but also in areas where said social and economic developments took place.7
In the European Union, shale gas extraction is said to have “no social license to
operate”, and public opposition has resulted in some Member States, such as
3This section of the paper is to a large extent based upon Geraets and Reins (2016); refer to this
article also for a detailed description of the technique, as well as the Production of shale gas
and associated environmental concerns.
4For an overview of the different hydraulic fracturing stages see for example FracFocus.
5For a more detailed description of the technology and its environmental considerations refer to
Middleton et al. (2017).
6For an overview and discussion refer to Fleming (2013).
7For a comparative analysis of amongst others the ownership system of mineral rights and its
impacts on public perception and participation in the United States and the United Kingdom please
refer to Whitton et al. (2017).
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Bulgaria8 and France9 imposing a ban on the exploration and extraction of hydro-
carbons using hydraulic fracturing. The state of play and regulatory regimes are
outlined in the following section.
2.1 Shale Gas Economics: State-of-Play
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, by 2040, shale gas is
expected to satisfy 30% of world natural gas production. Surprisingly, to date shale
gas so far is commercially extracted in only four countries, namely the United States,
Canada, China and Argentina.10 Estimates from 2013 identify the top ten countries
with estimated technically recoverable reserves to be China, Argentina, Algeria,
United States, Indonesia, Canada, Mexico, South Africa, Australia, Russia and
Brazil.11 Also some Member States of the European Union are carrying out explor-
atory drillings. To date, the United States is by far the biggest producer of shale
gas,12 has the longest history of extraction and is a driving force behind the
worldwide shale gas boom. According to recent EIA estimates, shale gas will
account for 70% of the total natural gas production by 2040. In 2015, it already
accounted for over 50% or 42 billion cubic feet per day.13 The United States is
currently ranked fourth among the top 10 countries with technically recoverable
shale gas resources.14 The resource changed the energy landscape in the United
States and turned it from a gas importer to a gas exporter. The commercial produc-
tion of shale gas in Canada started in 2008, accounting for 4.1 billion cubic feet per
day in 2015.15 According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration outlook, it
can reach 30% of the total natural gas production by 2040.16 Resources are located
mainly in northeast British Columbia (Montney formation), but also in other prov-
inces and territories.17 In the European Union, prospection and explorations are
underway in several EU Member States, even if the shale gas activity is not pursued
in a commercial manner yet in Europe. The European Commission’s Joint Research
8See also Goldthau and Sovacool (2016).
9Act 2011-835 of 13 July 2011 (Loi n 2011-835 du 13 juillet 2011 visant à interdire l’exploration
et l’exploitation des mines d’hydrocarbures liquides ou gazeux par fracturation hydraulique et à
abroger les permis exclusifs de recherches comportant des projets ayant recours à cette technique).
10U.S. Energy Information Administration (2016a), p. 21.
11U.S. Energy Information Administration (2013).
12U.S. Energy Information Administration (2016a), p. 21.
13Ibid.
14US Energy Information Administration (2013).
15For more information on the beginning of shale gas production and the environmental concerns in
Canada, refer to Rivard et al. (2014).
16U.S. Energy Information Administration (2016b).
17Government of Canada (2018b).
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Center initially estimated that the Union has around 16 trillion cubic meters of
technically recoverable resources.18 However, these estimates have had to be
corrected extensively over the years. Poland for example, had to correct the estimates
of recoverable resources from 5.300 bcm to between 346 and 768 bcm.19 The
political context could not be more diverse among the Member States. Despite the
corrections in estimates of recoverable resources and foreign drilling companies
abandoning extraction projects in Poland, for a long time, Poland took the lead
within the European Union promoting the shale gas exploitation process and becom-
ing a leading commercial supporter in the future.20 For this reason, Poland was often
considered a “test case for European shale gas development”which would determine
the further process in the EU.21 However, the test did not go the way it was intended,
not only because of the disappointing test drillings and corrections in estimates, but
also because of growing opposition at the local level.22
Although the shale gas boom showed signs of a slowdown in the aftermath of the
financial crisis, recent market reports suggest that the extraction of shale gas is still
considered a relevant means to secure a state’s energy supply.23 This explains
domestic regulation of shale gas extraction technology is worthy of consideration,
as well as the constraints imposed by international economic law on governments
seeking to impose such regulation.
2.2 Domestic Regulation of Shale Gas in the US, Canada
and the EU (and Its MS)
The domestic regulatory approaches of shale gas differ considerably between the
jurisdictions. This is not surprising, considering the different legal systems, consti-
tutional structure and more concretely, experiences with shale gas extraction so far.
In the United States, no federal regime regulates the extraction of unconventional
gas. As a consequence, the States, under delegated authority mostly, are usually the
locus for the implementation of legislation specifically on shale gas, but also on
conventional oil and gas exploration and production activities. The State legislation
in place, and the control exercised locally varies largely among the individual
States.24 Some states pre-empt most local regulation on oil and gas development.25
In addition, in the United States, regulation on a regional level, e.g., the regulation of
18European Commission.
19Polish Geological Institute (2012).
20For more information see Orlen (2010), pp. 44–55.
21Meißner and Naumenko (2011), p. 9.
22See also Goldthau and Sovacool (2016).
23Financial Times (2018).
24Sinding (2013).
25NY ECL § 23-0303(2).
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water ecosystem services used within the shale gas extraction process, falls under the
authority of the River Basin Commissions.26 These commissions are multi-
jurisdictional bodies with the power to adopt specific regulations applying to their
river basin. For example, the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC), was
created by legislation passed by Congress, and State level legislation passed in
Delaware, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania, and it has legal authority
over the Delaware River Basin and thus drilling operations in the Marcellus Shale
formation.27 As such, the Delaware River Basin Commission manages and regulates
all activities taking place within its jurisdiction. More precisely, the Commission has
the authority to regulate matters regarding water supply and conservation; water
quality and pollution control; flood protection, flow and drought management;
watershed management; project review, permitting and planning; regulation of
withdrawals as well as several other issues.28
In Canada the provinces have the primary regulatory power over onshore energy
resources, similar to that in the United States.29 However, on Federal level, the
Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) regulates the chemicals used in the
hydraulic fracturing process. Other applicable federal legislation is for example the
Fisheries Act, the Species at Risk Act and the Migratory Birds Convention Act.30
The ten provinces and three territories have enacted their own legislation for the
traction of oil and gas resources generally and some also for shale gas specifically.31
In addition, the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers has issued some
guiding principles32 and Seven Operating Practices33 for hydraulic fracturing. One
example of legislation adopted by a province, is Bill 18 entitled “An Act to limit oil
and gas activities”. This Bill, adopted by the Province of Quebec in 2011, was
ultimately challenged by an investor for allegedly violating its rights under
Chapter 11 of NAFTA (see Sect. 4, below).
In the European Union, shale gas is regulated on various levels as an interplay of
local, national and European legislation (which is transposed into national law).34 At
26DRBC (2018).
27See for further information on the involvement of water and river basin commissions in the shale
gas regulation process: ibid.
28DRBC (2009).
29See for a comparative analysis for the legal regimes in the United States and Canada: Carter and
Eaton (2016).
30Government of Canada (2018b).
31For an overview refer to Government of Canada (2018a).
32Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, as well as Beaudoin and Serry (2010).
33Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (2012).
34This is because “energy” and “environment” are included as a shared competence under Articles
4 (2)(e) and (i) TFEU Accordingly “the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt
legally binding acts in that area. The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent
that the Union has not exercised its competence. The Member States shall again exercise their
competence to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence” (Article
2(2) TFEU).
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the European level, besides a non-binding Recommendation outlining minimum
principles for the exploration and production of hydrocarbons,35 there is no specific
shale gas regulatory instrument. The regulation thus falls under general acts of
environmental and/or (conventional) energy law. In 2011, the European Parliament
released a study listing the 10 pieces of most relevant legislation applicable to shale
gas extraction activities,36 as well as a further 36 relevant EU Directives applicable
to the regulation associated with the activity, including legislation on water, protec-
tion of the environment, safety at work, radiation protection, waste and chemicals.37
Accordingly, the key pieces of legislation are the Mining Waste Directive,38 the
Ambient Air Quality Directive,39 the Seveso II Directive,40 the EIA Directive,41 the
REACH Regulation,42 the Habitats and Birds Directive creating the NATURA 2000
network,43 the Water Framework44 and the Groundwater Directive.45 In addition,
between 2011 and 2013, the different European institutions commissioned several
studies aimed at assessing both the general European regulatory system and the legal
frameworks in selected Member States.46 The main outcome of these studies was
that, in the Member States, shale gas is most often subject to the general regulatory
regime that is also applicable to conventional gas. Some member States, such as the
United Kingdom introduced several changes regarding shale gas within existing
legislation. There, key legislation and guidance are the Town and Country Planning
Act 1990, the Planning and Compensation Act 1991, the Environment Act 1995,
35Commission Recommendation from 22 January 2014 on minimum principles for the exploration
and production of hydrocarbons (such as shale gas) using high-volume hydraulic fracturing, OJ
[2014] L39/72 (“Recommendation”).
36Generally speaking, the entire European Union environmental acquis is applicable to shale gas
activities, see also: Tomescu.
37DG for Internal Policies European Parliament (2011), pp. 53–60.
38Directive 2006/21/EC on the management of waste from extractive industries and amending
Directive 2004/35/EC, [2006] OJ L 102/15.
39Directive 2008/50/EC of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe, [2008]
OJ L 152/1.
40Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving
dangerous substances, [2007] OJ L 10/13, as amended.
41Directive 2011/92/EU of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and
private projects on the environment, [2012] OJ L 26/1.
42Regulation No. 1907/2006 of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation,
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency,
amending certain Directives, [2006] OJ L 396/1.
43Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna
and flora, [1992] OJ L 206/7, as amended and Directive 2009/147/EC of 30 November 2009 on the
conservation of wild birds, [2010] OJ L 20/7.
44Directive 2000/60/EC of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the
field of water policy, [2000] OJ L 327/1.
45Directive 2006/118/EC on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration,
[2006] OJ L372/49.
46Such as Philippe and Partners (2011), Forster and Perks (2012) and Ballesteros et al. (2013).
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Petroleum Act 1998, the Energy Act 1976 and the Petroleum (Production) (Land-
ward Areas) Regulations 1995.47
The aforementioned sections illustrate that the regulation of shale gas and other
types of unconventional natural gas is largely a purely domestic, and sometimes
even, a sub-national affair. This explains the divergence in regulatory approaches
that have been adopted across different jurisdictions. Importantly, however, the right
of states to extract natural resources from the underground beneath their territory
follows from the explicit articulation at the international level that states (peoples and
nations) possess a right to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and
resources. The next section explores the tension between the domestic regulation
of shale gas extraction technologies and projects, and the rights of foreign investors
who have invested in them, from the perspective of the principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources.
3 Natural Resource Exploitation and International Law
Similar to other types of natural gas, shale gas is a natural resource that can be
extracted from the underground of the territory of a State. It is a type of “unconven-
tional” natural gas that is extracted by means of a technique that is regulated
differently across States as explained in the previous section. Under international
law, the answer to the questions as to whether to extract it, and if so how and by
whom, is governed by the concept of “permanent sovereignty over natural
resources” (“PSNR”). This section explores the concept in more detail and explains
the linkages between the idea of PSNR and the possibility for states to enable foreign
investors to investment in their territory so as to enable resource extraction. It
addresses the concept of investor-state dispute settlement and discusses how other,
more recent norms of international law, such as declarations on sustainable devel-
opment may signal a shift towards more (or renewed) regulatory autonomy of the
host state, mainly in respect of measures taken in the public interest.
3.1 UN General Assembly Declaration on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources (1962)
After the Second World War, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources emerged as a norm of international law.48 The principle “embodies the
47See DECC (2013), p. 14.
48Schrijver (2008); we refer to this contribution for an elaborate overview of the history of the
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.
182 L. Reins et al.
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
right of States and peoples to dispose freely of their natural resources”. In 1958, the
United Nations General Assembly decided to
establish a Commission composed of Afghanistan, Chile, Guatemala, the Netherlands, the
Philippines, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Arab Republic, and
the United States of America to conduct a full survey of the status of this basic constituent of
the right to self-determination, with recommendations, where necessary, for its strengthen-
ing, and further decides that, in the conduct of the full survey of the status of the permanent
sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural wealth and resources, due regard shall
be paid to the rights and duties of States under international law.49
The work of the Commission ultimately led to the adoption of the Declaration on
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources by the General Assembly in 1962.50
In eight paragraphs, the Declaration describes the way in which peoples and nations
can exercise their right to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and
resources. The first paragraph stipulates that this must be done “in the interest of
their national development and of the wellbeing of the people of the State
concerned”. The declaration also explicitly recognizes the fact that states endowed
with natural resources may require foreign capital for the exploration, development
and disposition of such resources. It provides that this should be done “in conformity
with the rules and conditions which the peoples and nations freely consider to be
necessary or desirable with regard to the authorization, restriction or prohibition of
such activities”. The third and fourth paragraph of the Declaration provide rules on
the treatment of foreign investors. For ease of reference, they are provided below in
full:
3. In cases where authorization is granted, the capital imported and the earnings on that
capital shall be governed by the terms thereof, by the national legislation in force, and by
international law. The profits derived must be shared in the proportions freely agreed upon,
in each case, between the investors and the recipient State, due care being taken to ensure
that there is no impairment, for any reason, of that State’s sovereignty over its natural wealth
and resources.
4. Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of
public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely
individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be
paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such
measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law. In any
case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction
of the State taking such measures shall be exhausted. However, upon agreement by
sovereign States and other parties concerned, settlement of the dispute should be made
through arbitration or international adjudication.
Paragraph 4 recognizes that “public utility, security, or the national interest” may
serve as grounds or reasons for the nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning of
49United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 1314 [XIII], “Recommendations concerning
international respect for the right of peoples and nations to self-determination”, 12 December 1958.
50United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 1803 [XVII], “Recommendations concerning
international respect for the right of peoples and nations to self-determination”, 14 December 1962.
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investments. It immediately adds, however, that where such nationalization, expro-
priation or requisitioning takes place, the (foreign) owner shall be paid “appropriate
compensation”. In case a dispute arises as to the amount or scope of the compensa-
tion, the “local remedies rule” applies. Nevertheless, the Declaration also foresees
the possibility of settling the dispute through arbitration or international adjudica-
tion. It has been observed that thereby the Declaration sought “to reconcile the
national standard proclaimed in the Calvo Doctrine advocated by the developing
countries with the international minimum standard supported by the industrialized
countries”.51
In respect of the relationship between foreign investment, host states and dispute
settlement, Paragraph 8 of the declaration further provides that:
8. Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by or between sovereign States shall be
observed in good faith; States and international organizations shall strictly and conscien-
tiously respect the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural wealth and resources
in accordance with the Charter and the principles set forth in the present resolution.
Thus, in sum, States may give authorization for the exploration and exploitation of
the natural resources located in their territory to foreign investors (companies) and
where they do so this shall be done under the rules of the national legislation in force
and under the rules of international law. In case of disputes between investor and
host-State the jurisdiction of the host-State shall be “exhausted” in principle, but “[u]
pon agreement by sovereign States and other parties concerned, settlement of the
dispute should be made through arbitration or international adjudication.” As has
been stated by Barral, “permanent sovereignty protects the freedom of the State to
choose its own path, regarding the exploration, exploitation and conservation of its
natural resources”52 It should however be noted that, because of the provisions
relating to investment protection, the name of the declaration has been criticized.
Indeed, Desta has argued that “it is a resolution as much about sovereignty over
natural resources as it is about protection of foreign investment” and that “[b]y
keeping the investment protection aspect of Resolution 1803 out of the title, the
drafters left us with a false sense that this is the beginning of the Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR) principle”.53 The question is however
whether more recent developments signal a trend towards a greater emphasis on the
sovereignty part, in that states are (re)-claiming their regulatory autonomy and are
reconsidering both the substantive norms of investment law as well as the procedural
aspects. These developments will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent
sections of this contribution.
51Schrijver (2008).
52Barral (2016), p. 3.
53Desta (2016), p. 128.
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3.2 Other Relevant Norms of International Law
Increasingly, the debate over natural resources has shifted back and forth between a
focus on the developmental and economic dimension and emphasis on the conser-
vation and rational use of natural wealth and resources, in particular in light of the
principle of sustainable development. In the UN Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment (“Stockholm Declaration”) of 1972, it was
proclaimed, in Principle 21, that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdic-
tion or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.
Twenty years later, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development added the
term “and developmental” between the terms “environmental [and developmental]
policies”, thereby placing the “exercise of resource sovereignty not only in an
environmental but also in a developmental context”.54 However, as Schrijver
observes “permanent sovereignty serves no longer solely as the source of every
State’s freedom to manage its natural resources, but also as the source of
corresponding international responsibilities requiring careful management and
imposing accountability on national as well as international levels, taking into
account international law on sustainable development including the interests of
future generations”.
In 2015, 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were set up, based on a
UN-Resolution “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Devel-
opment”.55 Goal 7 “Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern
energy for all” aims inter alia at increasing “substantially the share of renewable
energy in the global energy mix”, and enhancing “international cooperation to
facilitate access to clean energy research and technology, including renewable
energy, energy efficiency and advanced and cleaner fossil-fuel technology, and
promote investment in energy infrastructure and clean energy technology”.56
Such goals must be taken into account when assessing developments taking place
in the field of international economic law, where the interests of private operators
may come into conflict with those of States seeking to pursue other objectives, such
as those aimed at environmental protection or the sustainable management of natural
resources.
54Schrijver (2008).
55Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, United Nations, A/RES/70/1.
56Ibid., p. 19.
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4 Fracking and International Economic Law: More than
Just Another Example of the Tension Between Trade/
Investment Liberalization and Domestic Policy
Considerations?
Natural resource extraction is, as was explained in Sect. 3, largely an affair that is
regulated at the domestic level. The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources establishes that states remain free to decide whether they wish the
resources located in their territory to be extracted, and if so, under which conditions.
The sovereignty of states is constrained only and in as far as they have concluded
investment protection agreements—in the form of Bilateral Investment Treaties
(“BITs”) or Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”) with investment protection
chapters—with other states. These investment protection agreements provide the
possibility for investors to file a claim for compensation against a host state to the
extent that it considers its investment has been negatively affected by a regulatory
measure adopted by that host state.57 The system of investor-state dispute settlement
has become increasingly controversial and subject to discussion over the past
decade, mainly as a result of several high profile disputes in which investors
challenged governmental measures adopted on grounds of public health or environ-
mental protection considerations.
4.1 Lone Pine Resources v Canada
To date, the only dispute challenging a governmental measure relating to uncon-
ventional natural gas extraction (“fracking”) was the Lone Pine Resources Inc.
(“Lone Pine”) versus Canada arbitration under Chapter 11 of NAFTA. In March
2011, the Government of Quebec imposed a de facto moratorium on shale gas
exploration. Lone Pine filed a notice of intent to start arbitration proceedings in
November 2012, in which it informed Canada of its intention to “bring an arbitration
on behalf of its wholly owned subsidiary, Lone Pine Resources Canada Ltd., under
Article 1117 of the NAFTA for the arbitrary, capricious, and illegal revocation of the
Enterprise’s valuable right to mine for oil and gas under the st. Lawrence River by
57Rules generally protect investors against (in)direct expropriation, discrimination, and require host
states to accord “fair and equitable treatment” under a “minimum standard of treatment” provision.
The open character of some of these norms is often criticized as providing arbitral tribunals with too
much room for interpretation and the reform of investment protection chapters typically includes
efforts to more clearly define the content of such open norms.
186 L. Reins et al.
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
the Government of Quebec without due process, without compensation, and with no
cognizable public purpose.”58
4.1.1 Can Permits and Licenses Constitute an “Investment”
In its notice of intent, Lone Pine had argued that it had “expended millions of dollars
and considerable time and resources in Quebec to obtain the necessary permits and
approvals from the Government of Quebec to mine for oil and gas in the province of
Quebec, including beneath the St. Lawrence River”. Then, it argued, “[s]uddenly,
and without any prior consultation or notice, the Government of Quebec introduced
Bill 18 into the National Assembly on May 12, 2011 to suspend all exploration for
oil and gas in the province (except for the purposes of scientific studies onshore)”.
Moreover, according to Lone Pine, “Bill 18 also purported to revoke all permits
pertaining to oil and gas resources beneath the St. Lawrence River without a penny
of compensation”.59
One of the questions before the arbitral tribunal is whether the River Permit
constitutes an investment in the sense of NAFTA. Lone Pine argues that the permit
granted gives it “a real right of the nature of an innominate severance of the State’s
ownership”, and thereby an investment in the sense of Article 1101(1) of the
NAFTA.60 In its memorandum it had described the permit as follows:
187. Bill 18 terminated Lone Pine’s River Permit Rights by revoking “[a]ny mining right”
that had been issued “for the part of the St. Lawrence River west of longitude 6431'27" in
the NAD83 geodetic reference system or for the islands situated in that part of the river.”
188. The River Permit is a discrete asset and qualifies as an investment as defined by the
NAFTA: until they were revoked by Bill 18, the River Permit Rights were owned by the
Enterprise and therefore indirectly owned and controlled by Lone Pine. Accordingly, there is
a “legally significant connection” between Bill 18 and Lone Pine’s investment in Canada to
ground the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, as required by Article 1101(1).61
Article 1139 of NAFTA provides that the term investment encompasses:
(g): intangible property, acquired in the expectation or used for the purpose of economic
benefit or other business purposes; and
(h): interests arising from the commitment of capital or other resources in the territory of a
Party to economic activity in such territory. This definition of investment under the NAFTA
specifically includes interests that arise under “contracts involving the presence of the
58Lone Pine Resources Inc v Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under
Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (8 November 2012) www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1156.pdf.
59Lone Pine Resources Inc v Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under
Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (8 November 2012), para. 3, www.italaw.
com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1156.pdf.
60Lone Pine Resources Inc v Canada, Claimant’s Reply to the Submissions of the United States of
America and Mexico Pursuant to Article 1128 of the NAFTA (22 September 2017), para. 8.
61Lone Pine Resources Inc v Canada, Claimant’s Memorial (10 April 2015), paras. 187–188
(footnotes omitted).
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investor’s property in the territory of the Party, including turnkey or construction contracts,
or concessions”.
Lone Pine argues that the River Permit Rights satisfy both tests, whereas Canada has
argued that the River Permit Agreements “did not grant any right”. Moreover,
Canada has argued that there was no “interest that arose from the commitment of
capital because ‘no expenditures’ were made ‘to obtain its interests in the River
License, other than those made to acquire interests in the four Land Licenses’”.62
The claimant has argued inter alia that it was required to pay annual fees to Quebec
in order to maintain the permit, and that this in turn constituted a commitment of
capital.63
One of the predominant tests in international investment law to determine
whether an investment exists was developed in Salini. The test stipulates that what
is required is:
(1) a contribution of money or assets;
(2) a certain duration over which the project was to be implemented;
(3) an element of risk; and
(4) a contribution to the host state’s economy.
Although not undisputed, it does seem to be the prevailing test at the moment and
may provide guidance to the tribunal in Lone Pine.64
In another dispute involving concessions and permits relating to the extraction of
natural resources, the Pac Rim Cayman tribunal was faced with a claim that the
denial of environmental permits and exploitation concessions for a mining project
led to a de facto ban on metallic mining in El Salvador. The investor had “sole
ownership of certain Salvadoran mining companies that held rights conferred by
exploration licenses, authorizations and permits, including the right to a mining
exploitation concession in the area known as ‘El Dorado’.”65 El Salvador contended
in this regard that the investor had “acquired no right to any exploitation concession,
nor any legal or property rights to any deposits”.66 The tribunal rejected the
investor’s claims and found that it would not have satisfied the requirements for
an exploitation concession under the Salvadoran mining law.67 Although this issue is
somewhat different from the one at hand in the Lone Pine arbitration, it is interesting
to note that investment arbitration have not been unwilling to accord deference to
host states in certain recent cases. Whether this will influence the outcome in Lone
Pine remains to be seen.
62Lone Pine Resources Inc v Canada, Claimant’s Reply (Redacted) (22 July 2017), para. 256 (foot-
notes omitted).




66Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, Award, Para. 9.15.
67Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, Award, Para. 8.44.
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4.1.2 The Revocation of the River Permit as Expropriation?
Lone Pine further argued that Bill 18 revoked the River Permit and thereby
extinguished its ownership of the River Permit Rights in violation of Article 1110
(1) of NAFTA.68 According to Lone Pine, “[t]he River Permit Rights are a discrete
asset, capable of being the object of independent commercial transactions”.69 In
support of its argument, it stated that
Canada’s purported concerns for the St. Lawrence River are disingenuous. First, the
St. Lawrence River runs through highly industrialized areas of the St. Lawrence Valley
where the Quebec government continues to allow industrial and commercial development.
Second, if the revocation was genuinely motivated by concern for the St. Lawrence River,
the revocation would have also applied to the major tributaries which feed the
St. Lawrence.70
The Claimant also challenged the Quebec government for revoking the permits
under the St. Lawrence River, despite an environmental assessment of shale gas in
the Lowlands being underway. It stated that:
Environmental assessments are intended to improve the government’s understanding of
potential environmental effects of given activity and also propose prevention or mitigation
measures, with the aim of reducing or eliminating potential negative effects of a given
project. Environmental assessments would thus provide the Quebec government with key
information required to make appropriate legislative decisions about how to best regulate oil
and gas activity.71
This can be seen as a challenge to what may be seen as a “precautionary” approach
adopted by the Quebec government. In its reply to Canada’s response, Lone Pine
finally argues that:
[In] the midst of an ongoing evidence-based approach to building a comprehensive under-
standing to the potential issues and effects of oil and gas exploration and development which
would have properly equipped the government to make an informed decision on environ-
mental protection, the Government of Quebec deviated from that approach and its own
understanding of the scientific and environmental realities of hydrocarbon exploration, for a
purely political purpose unconnected with an objective assessment of the relevant facts and
science.72
The challenge facing the tribunal is therefore whether, under the current standard of
review, governments are required to follow an evidence- and science-based
approach to decision-making.
68Lone Pine Resources Inc v Canada, Claimant’s Memorial (10 April 2015), para. 227 (footnotes
omitted).
69Lone Pine Resources Inc v Canada, Claimant’s Memorial (10 April 2015), para. 236.
70Lone Pine Resources Inc v Canada, Claimant’s Memorial (10 April 2015), para. 259.
71Lone Pine Resources Inc v Canada, Claimant’s Memorial (10 April 2015), para. 270.
72Lone Pine Resources Inc v Canada, Claimant’s Reply (Redacted) (22 July 2017), para. 443.
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4.1.3 The Scope of the Minimum Standard of Treatment
A third critical issue in the Lone Pine Arbitration is what, under the minimum
standard of treatment under NAFTA, the concept of fair and equitable treatment
should constitute. This standard is included in Article 1105 of the NAFTA and
requires each Party to “accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment
in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security”. In the present dispute, Lone Pine argued, inter alia, that the
revocation of the River Permit constituted conduct that is “arbitrary, grossly unfair,
unjust or idiosyncratic” in violation of the prevailing legal standard.73 According to
the Claimant, ultimately, Bill 18 was “an effort, despite the existence of regulatory
means to protect the environment, to enact a political objective lacking scientific or
evidentiary basis”.74
4.1.4 Status of the Arbitration
The Lone Pine v Canada arbitration is currently still before the tribunal, which is
composed of president V.V. Veeder (Appointed by the Parties), arbitrators David
R. Haigh (Canada) (appointed by the Claimant) and Brigitte Stern (France)
(appointed by the Respondent). A hearing was held in Toronto from 2 to 13 October
2017, followed by an additional hearing on the merits in Montreal on 24 November
2017. It is unclear when the Tribunal will issue its award.75 The dispute raises a
number of questions, both in respect of whether an extraction license or permit can
constitute an investment capable of being (in)directly expropriated, as in respect of
the standards a governmental decision-making process must meet.
4.2 The Changing Tide for Investment Arbitration Involving
Natural Resources
Investment arbitrations, in which investors have challenged measures adopted by
central or local governmental decisions aimed at the protection of natural resources,
have resulted in increased attention to both the procedural and the substantive norms
of the system of ISDS. States, acting at their national level, as well as at the
international level, have taken action to safeguard their regulatory autonomy in
73Lone Pine Resources Inc v Canada, Claimant’s Memorial (10 April 2015), paras. 280–322.
74Lone Pine Resources Inc v Canada, Claimant’s Reply (Redacted) (22 July 2017), para. 567 and
preceding paras.
75ICSID, Case Details: Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. Canada (ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2),
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo¼UNCT/15/2 (last
accessed at 30 April 2018).
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light of the increase in investment arbitrations in the natural resources sector.
Although investment arbitration cases relating to the extracting industries and energy
production sectors in Canada—such as the Lone Pine arbitration—and the United
States have attracted significant attention and put the spotlight on the system of ISDS
as a dispute resolution mechanism, other states are equally forced by their domestic
constituencies to reconsider their approach. The subsequent sections address recent
developments that touch upon the relationship between international economic law
and the (domestic) sovereignty over natural resources and regulatory autonomy in
that regard. Viñuales has already articulated the “need to better integrate domestic
law and other norms of international law” such as environmental law.76
4.2.1 Domestic Legislation on Sovereignty over Natural Resources:
Tanzania
This section examines the domestic regulatory action in respect of natural resources
that has been taken in Tanzania, as well as the ISDS reform proposals that have been
put forward at the international level. African countries are endowed with significant
deposits of natural resources, such as minerals, oil, and gas.77 As a result, several
countries on the continent have been visited by foreign multinational companies
from the extractive industry wishing to bring the investment needed for the extrac-
tion of such resources. In response to governmental measures adopted by several
states, a number of these companies have initiated investor-state dispute settlement
proceedings against their host state in order to receive compensation (Table 1).
The 19 investment cases against African states relating to activities in the natural
resources industry represent almost a quarter (22.3%) of all investment arbitrations
against African states. This significant number explains the reason for the renewed
interested in ways to further safeguard the sovereignty over natural resources at the
domestic level. One example of such interest can be found in Tanzania, which, in
July 2017, adopted legislation that incorporated the principle of permanent sover-
eignty over natural resources explicitly in domestic legislation.78 Tanzania has
entered into Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) with 20 countries and 11 of
76Viñuales (2015), p. 12.
77Desta (2016), p. 118.
78Republic of Tanzania (2017), Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act, 2017.
Available at http://www.tcme.or.tz/resources/view/the-natural-wealth-and-resources-permanent-
sovereignty-act-2017; Republic of Tanzania (2017), Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts
(Review and Re-negotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act, 2017. Available at http://www.tcme.
or.tz/resources/view/the-natural-wealth-and-resources-contracts-review-and-re-negotiation-of-unc;
Republic of Tanzania (2017), Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2017. Available at
http://www.tcme.or.tz/resources/view/the-written-laws-miscellaneous-amendments-act-2017 (all
last accessed at 30 April 2018).
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these BITs are currently in force.79 Tanzania’s new Natural Wealth and Resources
(Permanent Sovereignty) Act refers explicitly to the UN’s Declaration on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources. The Act provides, inter alia, that:
Table 1 Investment disputes in the natural resource sector against African states
No. Host state Year Short case name Economic sector and subsector
1 Gambia 2017 APCL v. Gambia Mining and quarrying—support service
activities
2 Ethiopia 2017 ICL Europe
v. Ethiopia
Mining and quarrying
3 Lesotho 2016 Burmilla Trust and
others v. Lesotho
Mining and quarrying
4 Uganda 2015 Total E&P v. Uganda Mining and quarrying—extraction of
crude petroleum and natural gas
5 Burundi 2014 Interprétol v. Burundi Mining and quarrying—extraction of
crude petroleum and natural gas
6 Egypt 2014 Unión Fenosa Gas
v. Egypt
Mining and quarrying—support service
activities
7 Egypt 2012 Ampal-American and
others v. Egypt
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning
supply
8 Egypt 2012 Maiman and others
v. Egypt
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning
supply
9 Lesotho 2012 Swissbourgh and
others v. Lesotho
Mining and quarrying
10 Egypt 2012 Bahgat v. Egypt Mining and quarrying—mining of metal
ores—manufacture of basic metals
11 Zimbabwe 2010 Border Timers and
others v. Zimbabwe
Agriculture, forestry and fishing—forestry
and logging
12 Tanzania 2010 SCB v. Tanzania Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning
supply
13 Algeria 2009 Mærsk v. Algeria Mining and quarrying—extraction of
crude petroleum and natural gas
14 South Africa 2007 Foresti
v. South Africa
Mining and quarrying
15 Nigeria 2007 Shell v. Nigeria Mining and quarrying—extraction of
crude petroleum and natural gas
16 Egypt 2003 Joy Mining v. Egypt Mining and quarrying
17 Congo 2003 Miminco v. Congo Mining and quarrying—mining of metal
ores
18 Burundi 2001 Goetz v. Burundi (ii) Mining and quarrying—financial and
insurance activities
19 Burundi 1996 Goetz v. Burundi (i) Mining and quarrying
Source: authors’ own table compiled based on the UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub (updated
31 December 2017). Available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/
FilterByEconomicSector (last accessed at 30 April 2018)
79See UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, Bilateral Investment Treaties, available at http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/222 (last accessed at 30 April 2018).
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4.
(1) The People of the United Republic shall have permanent sovereignty over all natural
wealth and resources.
(2) The ownership and control over natural wealth and resources shall be exercised by, and
through the Government on behalf of the People and the United Republic.
(3) The First Schedule and the Second Schedule shall have effect in relation to assertion by
the People and the United Republic over permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and
resources.
Whereby the First Schedule to the act includes an integral copy of the UN GA
Declaration. As explained by Masamba, the Act indicates that permanent sover-
eignty entails:
• the need to obtain parliamentary approval before entering into natural resource agree-
ments aimed at exploration, exploitation, or acquisition;
• the requirement that the proceeds of such activities should ensure the interests of the
Tanzanian people;
• the requirement that the returns of such activities flow back into the local economy and
that the government obtains “an equitable share” of ventures;
• the possibility for parliament to review all agreements;
• the requirement that investors in the mining sector act as “active participants in the
growth of the Tanzanian economy”.80
Importantly, section 11 of the Tanzanian Permanent Sovereignty Act stipulates in
respect of ISDS proceedings that
11.
(1) Pursuant to Article 27 (1) of the Constitution, permanent sovereignty over natural wealth
and resources shall not be a subject of proceedings in any foreign court or tribunal.
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), disputes arising from extraction, exploitation or
acquisition and use of natural wealth and resources shall be adjudicated by judicial
bodies or other organs established in the United Republic and in accordance with laws of
Tanzania.
(3) For the purpose of implementation of subsection (2), judicial bodies or other bodies
established in the United Republic and application of laws of Tanzania shall be
acknowledged and incorporated in any arrangement or agreement.
Considering that Tanzania is a party to the aforementioned BITs, one could
question the value of including this provision in the act. As suggested by Masamba,
in order to effectuate this provision, “Tanzania could consider reviewing older
national laws and its BITs for coherence with the Permanent Sovereignty act”.81
From a commercial perspective, the Tanzanian Permanent Sovereignty Act has been
received with concern. In fact, some observers have even suggested that the act in
itself may constitute a breach of the legitimate expectations of foreign investors in
80Masamba (2017).
81Ibid.
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Tanzania.82 These responses indicate growing tension between governments that
legitimately seek to protect their regulatory autonomy and foreign investors who
seek to ensure that their interests arising from an investment are effectively and
adequately protected. It reflects the continuing need for the assessment of standards
of treatment that governments and states must accord to foreign investors. In this
regard the essential question is how the right of foreign investors not to be subject to
unfair or discriminatory treatment can be balanced and reconciled with the regula-
tory autonomy of host states, including their permanent sovereignty over natural
resources.
Whether foreign investors should have redress against such treatment outside the
domestic legal system of the state of investment is one of the crucial questions in
international economic law. Its importance becomes particularly evident in disputes
that relate to the permanent sovereignty over natural resources as the measures at
issue in these disputes often seek to achieve societal objectives that relate to the
preservation of such resources and their contribution to sustainable development of
the state in question. Similarly, they may be adopted by host states with the objective
of protecting the environment such as in the case of fracking. Where such measures
are adopted, they may turn back or overturn decisions taken by predecessor govern-
ments. That ISDS as a mechanism is under intense scrutiny is also reflected by the
approach taken by the current US administration. Indeed, in October 2017, United
States Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer openly criticized the basic
idea underpinning ISDS:
[. . .] I’ve had people come in and say, literally, to me, ‘oh but you can’t do this, you can’t
change ISDS. . . You can’t do that, because we wouldn’t have made the investment other-
wise.’ I’m thinking, ‘well then why is it a good policy of the United States government to
encourage investment in Mexico? My position is if the market makes that decision, then the
market should make that decision. It’s perfectly reasonable.’
The bottom line is business says ‘[w]e want to make decisions and have markets decide. But!
We would like to have political risk insurance paid for by the United States’ government.’
And to me that’s absurd. You either are in the market or you’re not in the market. [. . .]83
82Lexology, Allen & Overy—New laws create potential for arbitration claims against Tanzania,
5 September 2017. Lexology, Winston & Strawn LLP—Tanzania’s Legal Reform of the Natural
Resources Sector Threatens Extractive Industries, 1 August 2017. Lexology, Jones Day—Tanzania
Overhauls Mining Laws, Fines Investor US$190 Billion: Is Your Investment Protected?,
5 August 2017.
83USTR, Press Statement in Arlington, Virginia, 19 October 2017. Reported here https://
insidetrade.com/trade/his-own-words-lighthizer-lets-loose-business-hill-opposition-isds-sunset-
clause (last accessed 30 April 2018). See also, US House of Representatives, Committee on Ways
and Means—Hearing on U.S. Trade Policy Agenda, The Honorable Robert E. Lighthizer, 21 March
2018, p. 20; available at https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/
20180321FC-Transcript.pdf, pp. 20–21.
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4.3 International Developments: The EU’s MIC Proposal
and the CPTPP
Away from the domestic level of individual states, recent developments at the
international level also indicate a growing concern among states that current disci-
plines relating to the protection of foreign investment may impose undue constraints
upon national regulatory autonomy. After having been confronted with significant
public opposition to the concept of ISDS after the plans to include it in FTAs with the
US (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, “TTIP”) and Canada (Com-
prehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, “CETA”), the Commission, with the
support of Member States such as The Netherlands, started working on a proposal to
create a Multilateral Investment Court (“MIC”).84 Similarly, in the context of the
recently concluded Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (“CPTPP”), the contracting parties seem to have included provisions that
seek to strengthen their “right to regulate” in respect of, inter alia, governmental
measures aimed at environmental protection. This section addresses both develop-
ments in turn.
4.3.1 The EU’s ICS and MIC
The European Union is deeply involved in the international reform efforts of
investor state dispute settlement.85 Its position on ISDS has evolved gradually
over time. It is beyond the scope of this particular contribution to assess the changes
proposed in the EU’s Investor Court System (“ICS”) in detail, especially since this
has already been done extensively.86 It is important to note, however, that recently
the Commission’s objective of moving towards a Multilateral Investment Court
(“MIC”) seems to have gained traction. Although some trading partners, such as
Japan, have been somewhat reluctant to immediately except the Commission’s
proposals, others—such as Canada, Singapore, Vietnam, and, most recently,
Mexico—have welcomed the proposal and accepted it as part of the new agreements
they have concluded with the EU. This “coalition of the willing” or the “friends of
ICS” may ultimately grow to a “critical mass” of countries that seek to establish a
new, more institutionalized form of investor-state dispute settlement that replaces the
current system of ad hoc-arbitration. In this regard it will be crucial to see how the
US position in respect of ISDS will evolve. The statements by the current USTR
appear to reflect a much more fundamental criticism of the system, and one that is
based on the argument that the US should not cede sovereignty “in order to
84See, inter alia, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/brieven/2017/11/
17/fiche-bij-kamerbrief-over-informatievoorziening-nieuwe-commissievoorstellen/fiche-bij-
kamerbrief-over-informatievoorziening-nieuwe-commissievoorstellen.pdf (in Dutch), p. 2.
85Hoffmeister (2017).
86Reinisch (2017), p. 295.
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encourage people to outsource jobs”. It is unlikely that the reformed mechanism of
investor-state dispute settlement as articulated in the EU’s ICS, would suffice to
counter such fundamental criticism.
At the internal level of the EU, some questions remain to be answered. Indeed, the
Court of Justice of the European Union in respect of the EU-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement stated in Opinion 2/15 that “a regime, which removes disputes from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States, cannot be [. . .] established without
the Member States’ consent”.87 This has resulted in the European Commission
taking the approach of excluding investment protection chapters from FTAs, such
as is the case with the EU-Singapore FTA and will be likely be the case for the
EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement.88
4.3.2 The CPTPP
Similarly, in the recently concluded Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) an explicit provision is included that seeks to
protect host states’ right to regulate. Article 9.16 of the CPTPP indeed provides that:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or
enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to
ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental, health or other regulatory objectives.
Whether such a more explicit articulation of the right to adopt, maintain or enforce
measures otherwise inconsistent with the investment protection chapter of the
CPTPP is sufficient to address the concerns of the opponents of the system remains
to be seen. Moreover, one can justifiably raise the question whether this provision
would, nevertheless, prevent an investor from, seeking compensation for the dam-
ages that result from the adoption, maintenance, or enforcement of such a measure.
Indeed, this is precisely the point of investment arbitration; that governments may
adopt measures they deem in the public interest, as long as they provide for
appropriate compensation in case the interests of an investor are negatively affected
beyond what is acceptable under the standard of treatment provided for in the
relevant investment protection agreement.
These developments at the domestic and international levels indicate a growing
concern with the system of investment protection as it stands today. Such concern
becomes particularly evident when investment protection clashes with the applica-
tion of technologies aimed at the extraction of natural resources, which are seen as
carrying an uncertain amount of risk to human, animal, or plant life or health. That
the EU now appears to lead the movement towards the reform of ISDS at the
international level has been deemed “ironic, indeed hypocritical”.89 This
87ECJ, Opinion 2/15 of the Court, 16 May 2017, para. 282.
88Geraets and Reins (2016), p. 18.
89Desta (2016), p. 143.
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notwithstanding, the current climate seems to call for a reconsideration of the
prevailing status quo in respect of investment protection. Regardless of historical
positions, a calibration of investment protection mechanisms that guarantees gov-
ernments right to regulate, whilst providing for protection against the most blatant
violations of investors’ rights, seems to be a step forward.
5 Conclusion
This contribution has explored several recent developments in respect of interna-
tional investment law and its relation to the principle of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources by examining a dispute in which a host state’s regulatory autonomy
in respect of the controversial “fracking” technique was at issue. The Lone Pine
Resources v Canada investor state dispute settlement proceedings under Chapter 11
of NAFTA constitute the first challenge against a governmental measure that
affected the interests of a company involved in the exploration and exploitation of
unconventional natural gas. Although the dispute is by no means the first to deal with
a challenge by an investor in the natural resources extraction industry against
measures adopted for environmental purposes, it does represent a coming together
of two developments that have attracted significant public attention.
First, the “fracking” technology that was surrounded by scientific uncertainty as
to its long-term impact on the environment as well as with human health concerns.
Second, the emergence of public opposition against ISDS in Canada, the US and the
EU in light of the planned inclusion of an investment chapter in the Canada-EU
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the US-EU Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The dispute highlights the increas-
ing tension between regulatory autonomy of host states and investors’ rights for
compensation for. This tension has prompted governments globally to reconsider
their approach towards investor-state dispute settlement. At the national level,
examples such as that of Tanzania show that there is increased and renewed
emphasis on the permanent sovereignty, as including the regulatory autonomy to
determine under what conditions such resources may be extracted by foreign
investors. The Tanzanian example shows that resource endowed states seek to
safeguard their ability to regulate access to these resources. At the same time, the
increase in investor-state arbitration disputes against Western/developed states, such
as European states, as well as the US and Canada, has prompted them to assess
critically the elements of the traditional ISDS system that made it popular among
investors. This has not only resulted in proposals aimed at the reform of procedural
aspects of ISDS, such as those advanced by the EU in its proposal for a Multilateral
Investment Court (MIC), based on its Investor Court System (ICS), but also in a
reconsideration of certain substantive norms of investment protection and an
increased emphasis on the right to regulate as evidenced by the investment chapter
included in the CPTPP.
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This contribution has shown that criticism of the traditional ISDS system has been
fuelled by disputes against governmental regulation seeking to address the uncer-
tainty and high risk associated with some innovative techniques, such as the fracking
technique aimed at the extraction of unconventional natural gas. Although the Lone
Pine arbitration is by no means the only investment dispute in the natural resource
extraction sector, it does represent an instance of government regulation of a
technique associated with a high degree of uncertainty being challenged on the
basis that an investor claimed that its rights to an extraction permit were eradicated.
In this regard, the arbitral tribunal hearing the case will have to decide whether such
permits can constitute an investment and whether the regulatory act adopted by
Quebec revoked and nullified these permits, and thereby led to the expropriation of
the investment or the failure to comply with the minimum standard of treatment as
articulated under NAFTA. The outcome of this dispute will not only be relevant for
the parties involved, but will also provide further grounds for discussing both the
procedural and the substantive norms of investor-state dispute settlement. Moreover,
it will also shed light on the requirement on governments of host states to rely on
scientific evidence in their decision-making.
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1 A European Natural Resources Law: Consolidation or
Emergence of a (New) Field of Union Law/Policy?
Strictu sensu, a European natural resources law does not yet exist.1 Even if the
emergence of this legal field has already been subject to review in the past, the
specific backgrounds and debates upon which such considerations were built are no
longer up-to-date. In times of globalisation and an increased scarcity of resources,
especially inWestern industrialized nations as well as in the so-called “BRIC”-States
(Brasil, Russia, India and China), the question arises whether there is a need for a
general natural resources law, particularly with regard to deliberations such as safety,
sustainability and efficiency in the supply of raw materials, instead of the deep-
rooted North-South conflict or development aid.2
Against this background, the academic debate on natural resources at the
European level focuses on the establishment of a genuine European natural resources
law, and a corresponding European natural resources policy,3 rather than on a
thorough consideration of the existing commodity agreements4 or on the role of
the various legal disciplines relevant to this subject matter. Thus, a European natural
resources law is on the verge of emerging, yet at the same time consolidating. On the
one hand, the parameters and conditions for the creation of a natural resources law
have changed dramatically. Therefore, it no longer has to be built upon already
established and at times rigid legal structures. On the other hand, the novelties in the
primary law of the European Union (EU), as introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon,
have paved the way for the creation and consolidation of a European natural
resources law. Today, EU natural resources law does not merely constitute a field
of Union law that is rooted in environmental law and the respective environmental
standards and principles, but rather a hybrid between environmental and economic
law, which develops through many—yet overly regulated—fields of EU law. Recent
Communications of the Commission provide further evidence to this effect.5
1See critically Terhechte J P, In der Falle? Es droht eine Abschottung des Rechts – Europäische
Rechtsgebiete wie das Rohstoffrecht verlangen eine Neupositionierung der Wissenschaft. Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 December 2012, p. 6.
2See Kebschull (1974); see more recently, Stockmann et al. (2010), p. 219 ff. Garret N and
Piccinni A, Natural Resources and Conflict: A New Security Challenge for the European Union,
SIRPRI Policy Brief, June 2012, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/misc/SIPRIPB1206.
pdf (last accessed 30 April 2018).
3The term raw materials governance is further explained in Terhechte (2012a), p. 89 ff.; for the
definition of Energy Governance see Goldthau and Witte (2010).
4Pelikan (1990); Weberpals (1989); Habermayer (1985); Schraven (1982); Seitz (1975), p. 461 ff.;
Wenzel (1961); Adebahr (1975), p. 467 ff.; Friderichs et al. (1976), p. 226 ff.; Mason (1946).
5See European Commission, “Critical Raw Materials for the EU”—Report of the Ad-hoc Working
Group on Defining Critical Raw Materials, 2010; Risk & Policy Analysts Limited, Stockpiling of
Non-Energy Raw Materials—Final Report for DG Enterprise and Industry, 2012; Commission
Communication on the raw materials initiative—meeting our critical needs for growth and jobs in
Europe, COM (2008) 699 final; Commission Communication tackling the challenges in commodity
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Which consequences may be drawn from these findings for EU law? What does
the emergence of a new legal field, which escapes the well-established legal cate-
gories, say about the further development of European law and European integra-
tion? The Lisbon Treaty has provided an opportunity for the further consideration
and (hopefully) solution of these questions due to the many innovations it entails. In
particular, the changes brought about in the context of EU energy law (Art.
194 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; TFEU)6 and the common
commercial policy (CCP; Art. 206 TFEU)7 are significant for the development of an
EU natural resources law. Hitherto, the Lisbon Treaty has contributed to the con-
solidation of EU environmental law (Art. 191 ff. TFEU).8 The implications of such
consolidation for the creation of a European natural resources policy should not be
underestimated, especially in light of the fact that EU natural resources law is located
between economic and environmental law.
Subsequent to an analysis of the legal backgrounds for the creation of a European
natural resources law (Sect. 2), which includes the definition of the term natural
resources (Sect. 2.1), the commodity dependence of the EU on third states (Sect.
2.2), and current developments on the global raw material markets (Sect. 2.3) as well
as the legal means to regulate these markets (Sect. 2.4), an attempt will be made to
determine the essential features of the emerging European natural resources law
(Sect. 3). The focus will be on the normative requirements of EU law (Sect. 3.1), the
autonomy of a European natural resources law (Sect. 3.2) and ultimately, the
momentum the Lisbon Treaty has provided for its creation (Sect. 3.3). Afterwards,
the position of EU natural resources law in between the internal market rules as well
as European environmental policy will be further untangled (Sects. 4 and 4.1), its
objectives and principles determined (Sect. 4.2) and its linkage with and demarcation
from national (Sect. 4.3) as well as international law (Sect. 4.4) clarified. It is
obvious, that EU natural resources law requires a contextualization given its unique
character (Sect. 5). Accordingly, the influence of the EU raw materials initiative
(Sect. 5.1), the question regarding the components of a European natural resources
law (Sect. 5.2) and the aligned challenges for the study of European law (Sect. 5.3)
will be elaborated.
markets and on raw materials, COM (2011) 25 final; an overview of the different raw material
strategies employed by the G20 states may be found in Hilpert H G and Mildner S A, Fragmentation
or Cooperation in Global Resource Governance?, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Paper
No. 1, March 2013, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/
2013_RP01_hlp_mdn.pdf (last accessed 14 March 2018); see further Ruta M and Venables A,
International Trade in Natural Resources: Practice and Policy, CESifo Working Paper No. 3778,
2012, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Anthony_Venables/publication/234146815_Interna
tional_Trade_in_Natural_Resources_Practice_and_Policy/links/0046352cc64f7962b3000000/
International-Trade-in-Natural-Resources-Practice-and-Policy.pdf (last accessed 14 March 2018).
6See Kahl (2009), p. 601 ff.; Hobe (2009), p. 219 ff.; Ehricke and Hackländer (2008), p. 579 ff.;
Nettesheim (2010), p. 19 ff.
7Bungenberg and Herrmann (2011).
8See Epiney (2013), p. 98 ff.
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2 The EU in the Global Competition for Raw Materials
2.1 Raw Materials and Natural Resources Law
A uniform concept of raw materials exists in neither national nor European and
international law.9 The term is most commonly used in the context of resources or
natural resources. In English terminology, raw materials are referred to as natural
resources or commodities without the provision of a binding definition.10 The
different terms are to some extent used synonymously, yet the meaning of the
term resources is often understood to be broader than raw materials. In order to
create a truly European natural resources law, a comprehensive definition of this
term is necessary, since any new area of Union law will always be subject to debates
on the demarcation of competences between the Union and its Member States.11 The
broader the definition of the term raw materials or more generally resources in
European natural resources law is, the more likely it is that issues, with regard to the
exercise of the Union’s competence, it’s scope, as well as the possibility to take
regulatory action, arise.
The term natural resources is explicitly mentioned in Art. 191(1) TFEU, which
provides that the Union’s environmental policy shall contribute to the pursuit of a
“prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources.” Against this backdrop,
natural resources are perceived as elements of the environment such as soil, water,
air, flora and fauna, and especially mineral and energy resources.12 Accordingly, the
term resources in EU law is rather broad in nature, which makes it difficult to put a
stronger focus on certain key elements of this term. Particularly with regard to
certain principles, such as the EU’s waste management principles, as emphasised
in various communications and documents of the Union, it proves difficult to
manage these principles if they are interpreted in light of the rather broad definition
of resources.
The term raw materials, on the other hand, is predominantly used in the frame-
work of economic relations. Raw materials are classified as primary commodities
which may be found in nature and are usually subject to further processing (cf. Art.
56(1) Havana Charta 1948).13 Most certainly, the scope of the term raw materials
has widened throughout the years, e.g. through the differentiation between primary
and secondary commodities (the latter are extracted through recycling).14 Overall,
the term has a less political—especially environmental—connotation than
resources. At the same time, it is more tangible. Raw materials are mainly concerned
with the economic dimension of their exploitation, distribution, processing and
9With regard to public international law see Dederer (2012), p. 37 ff.; Weiß (2009), para. 2.
10See e.g. Sanden et al. (2012), p. 15 ff.
11Proelß (2012), p. 161 ff.
12Käller (2012), para. 12.
13Schorkopf (2008), p. 235; see also Weiß (2009), para. 2.
14Ibid.
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recycling. From this perspective, supply security constitutes an economic problem,
which may be mitigated through the adoption of legal measures typically used in
economic law. Yet, the EU Treaties do not allow for a one-sided pursuit of purely
economic goals in the framework of the EU’s natural resources law respectively
policy. For instance, Article 11 TFEU provides that “environmental protection
requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the
Union’s policies and activities.” Thus, while EU natural resources law is in its
core a field of law shaped by economic law, it still needs to have due regard to
requirements derived from the principle of environmental protection, as well as
sustainability.
2.2 The Commodity Dependence of the EU in a Global
Context
In many areas, the EU is dependent on the importation of commodities.15 The
pertinent analysis illustrates that this situation will not change any time soon. On
the contrary, the dependence on certain commodities will increase for decades to
come. This begs the question how a durable supply of these commodities to the EU
may be guaranteed. If one considers the key European industries, such as automotive
and mechanical engineering, it is apparent that prosperity in the EU—to the creation
of which the Union is obliged pursuant to Articles 2 and 3 TEU—is dependent on the
availability of commodities at reasonable prices.
The 2010 focus report on trade in natural resources by the World Trade Organi-
sation (WTO) further illustrates the dependence of the EU on commodity imports
from third states.16 The WTO-Report primarily relates to natural resources, but the
term is used essentially identical to the term raw materials.17 In 2008 the EU
(27) was on top of the list of leading commodity-importing nations with a share of
22.9% in imports of the worldwide exports of natural resources, followed by the US
and Japan. It is expected that the BRIC-States, such as China (already on fourth
place) and India (sixth place), will follow suit and outpace Japan and South Korea.
Brazil is already in 12th place. Overall, it demonstrates that the dependence on
natural resources of industrialised nations and states, which emulate the industrial
and economic model of the western states, is the biggest. Thus, it is clear that
especially these states will have to think carefully how they may attenuate such
15Compare with the analysis provided for by the European Commission, “Critical Raw Materials
for the EU”—Report of the Ad-hoc Working Group on Defining Critical Raw Materials, 2010,
p. 24; see also Terhechte (2012a), p. 83 ff.
16World Trade Organization, World Trade Report: Trade in Natural Resources, 2010.
17Cf. p. 46 of theWorld Trade Report 2010, which defines natural resources as “stocks of materials
that exist in the natural environment that are both scarce and economically useful in production or
consumption, either in their raw state or after a minimal amount of processing.” The requirement
economically useful underlines the parallelism to the term commodity used above.
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dependence and at the same time create structures to ensure the security of supplies.
The findings of the report are still accurate today as may be derived from the 2016
Report on Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).18 Among other things, it
analyses the export dependence of countries on natural resources. While within the
EU, most of its Member States only depend on the export of commodities of less
than 10%, which might also explain its need for raw materials, countries such as
Brasil (30–50%), Russia (more than 50%) and the US (20–30%) have a rather high
dependence on the export of their raw materials products. These questions are all the
more pressing if the abstract dependence on natural resources of the EU is assessed
in the context of the specific commodities the EU is dependent on and the countries
(or export nations) from which the EU obtains them on the global commodity
markets. The Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia hold the largest share in exports.
Among the 15 leading commodity-exporting countries are states such as the Russian
Federation, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Kuwait, Venezuela,
Algeria, Nigeria and Angola, which are confronted with various problems of
European and international law and whose relation to the EU is in some instances
quite tense. Therefore, the EU has employed economic embargos based on Article
215 TFEU against some of these states in the past (this applies e.g. to Russia and
Iran).19 Other states are on the verge of becoming a so-called failed state
(e.g. Nigeria) or exhibit strongly corrupt and authoritarian structures. Due to the
political instability of many commodity-exporting countries, the stability of supplies
to the EU will continuously be challenged. Consequently, the question of resource
security or the security of supply is becoming more and more a question of national
governance structures, the role of the rule of law, democracy as well as respect for
fundamental and human rights, the fight against corruption etc. These parameters
may further diversify if the role of European natural resources law is interpreted even
more extensively and the question of sustainability is taken into account.
2.3 Developments on the Global Commodity Market
The problem of the EU’s dependence on raw materials will not change in light of the
current and foreseeable developments on the global market for commodities, but
instead will become more precarious as time goes on. Next to an increased shortage
of supply through usage, the entry of further actors with rather different geostrategic
interests constitutes one of the main factors that has to be kept track of. In the face of
these developments, it is not surprising that restrictions of international trade in raw
materials are part of the day-to-day business.20 While the motives for such
18UNCTAD, Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade, 2016, p. 22.
19An in-depth overview is provided in Schneider and Terhechte (2014), para. 39 ff.
20See in detail Terhechte (2012a), p. 83 ff.
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restrictions may vary, the crucial question will always be how these restrictions may
be justified and legally classified under the existing legal framework for international
commodity markets. Last but not least, this also begs the question of whether,
through the increasing juridification of the international arena, important steps
have already been taken to better control and mitigate these conflicts through law
(e.g. arbitral tribunals etc.). While recent developments in the WTO indicate such
tendencies, it may likewise be observed that on the global level there is a growing
desire to not overly regulate certain aspects of international trade in raw materials but
rather employ informal mechanisms to control these markets.
If, in the context of the development of export prices for primary products, the
focus is placed on selected items such as energy, metals and food, a steady and
disproportionate increase in prices may be evidenced for the period from 2000 to
2010. This may be for different reasons: next to a rising demand of these products,
financial speculations and natural disasters may also push prices. It is clear that the
EU will have to continue to obtain raw materials on the global markets and hence,
will have to compete with other industrialised nations as well as the BRIC-states
(without the Russian Federation) in the surge for raw materials. Altogether, the
situation will become more complex in nature rather than simpler, irrespective of
whether this is due to new actors entering the market or the steady increase of
commodity prices (by virtue of higher demands). Given this initial situation, the
need for a concept of a European natural resources law becomes all the more
apparent. The price increase for energy-related raw materials (oil, gas and coal) is
rather worrying. The current situation in Ukraine is testament to the fact that resource
security or security of the supply of resources is not just concerned with economic
ratios but has become a question of policy-making and ultimately of war and peace.
This emphasises that a European natural resources law should also be open to legal
contents derived from the EU’s external (trade) policy and related questions.
2.4 The Legal Structure of the Global Commodity Market
The conclusions drawn above raise the issue of whether European and international
law are equipped to provide for adequate means of regulation and distribution to
better control commodity trading. Bearing in mind the continued importance of the
principle of sovereignty in international law—even though it should rather be
understood as limited sovereignty—there are no established principles yet, which
could potentially function as a global distribution constitution or statue. Obviously,
such a constitution could theoretically lead to further limitations in sovereignty-
based thinking.21 Therefore, the legal structure of the global commodity market is
derived from sectorial approaches as well as unilateral violations and their reparation
instead of general principles of international law. Nonetheless, WTO law already
21Dederer (2012), p. 37 ff.
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provides for a rather comprehensive approach to this matter, especially since a
number of raw material-related disputes have been brought before the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB).22 Next to WTO law, there are quite a few important
commodity agreements in place.23 In some sectors, these agreements are still highly
relevant and intend to create a kind of international raw materials authority. Whether
such undertakings will be successful in the long-term is highly debatable. The issue
of price inflation mentioned above shows that it is not just the result of an increased
demand for raw materials but especially of systematic speculation on the commodity
markets.
3 Requirements of European Union Law
Even after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the law of the European Union
does not, in principle, know or comprise a separate policy field termed raw mate-
rials. Yet, the Treaties contain many provisions, which function as a legal basis for
the creation of such a legal discipline. Therefore, as a first step, it is necessary to
place the subject of raw materials in the context of EU law. Based on this, the legal
foundations of a European natural resources law (Sect. 3.1), the question of whether
it indeed constitutes an independent field of European law (Sect. 3.2), and its relation
to other fields of Union law (Sect. 3.3) will be determined.
3.1 Legal Foundations
The EU has been founded—if it may be called that—as a commodity community and,
in many regards, continues to be one far beyond its founding days. While the
European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC) was primarily concerned with the
strategic relevant fields of coal and steel,24 the European Economic Community
(EEC) placed more importance on the management of certain commodity and
22The most prominent example constitutes the decision of the WTO’s Appellate Body in the dispute
with China regarding rare soil, see WTO, Panel Report, China-Measures Related to the Exportation
of Various Raw Materials (China—Raw Materials), WT/DS394R (USA), WT/DS395R (European
Communities) and WT/DS398R (Mexico); see also Paschke (2013), p. 97 ff.; more recently the
Appellate Body affirmed its conclusion, since China failed to remove some of the restrictions
already criticized in the previous proceedings before the WTO with respect to certain forms of rare
soil or earths, see WTO, Appellate Body Report, China—measures related to the exportation of rare
earths, tungsten, and molybdenum (China—Rare Earths), WT/DS431/AB/R (USA), WT/DS432/
AB/R (European Union), WT/DS433/AB/R (Japan); more general on WTO law and raw materials
see Cossy (2012), p. 281 ff.; Terhechte (2010), p. 61 ff.
23Weiß (2009); Schorkopf (2008), p. 233 ff.
24See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 18 April 1951, 261 UNTS
140, Art. 2.
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production markets in fundamental sectors—especially agriculture and fisheries.
Eventually, also, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) consti-
tutes in one way or another a type of commodity community, since the peaceful use
of nuclear energy is central to its mandate. Thus, the legal foundations for the genesis
of a genuine European natural resources law are manifold, even though an express
reference to raw materials or natural resources law is nowhere to be found in the
Treaties. At the same time, environmental perspectives shape EU law. Article 3(3) Treaty
on the European Union (TEU), for instance, obligates the Union to
work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth [. . .]
and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment.
Correspondingly, the EU’s environmental policy shall pursue a “prudent and
rational utilisation of natural resources” (Art. 191(1) TFEU). The protection of
the environment must in any case be respected in the context of an emerging
European natural resources law, even if it were designed beyond any considerations
of environmental law, since the protection of the environment constitutes a horizon-
tal objective of the EU. This means that it has to be respected in any decision the EU
wishes to take independent of whether it is directly part of the EU’s environmental
policy or belongs to a complete different policy field (Art. 11 TFEU). In light of the
above, European natural resources law could simply be seen as a branch of European
environmental law. Admittedly, such a narrow point of view is prone to critique and
problems. While European environmental law is primarily concerned with the
protection of the environment, European natural resources law is rather concerned
with the distribution of resources including the external political implications such
an approach might have.
3.2 Natural Resources Law as an Independent Field of Law?
At Union level, the creation and further development of an autonomous natural
resources law seems logical. Looking at the history of European integration, it
becomes apparent that the European Communities constituted largely commodity
communities.25 The ECSC was created for the sole purpose of jointly controlling the
coal and steel industries of its Member States. The European Community (EC), on
the other hand, may be labelled as an agricultural community, especially at the time
of its foundation, since the creation of a common agricultural policy (CAP) played
an important role—and still does today (cf. Art. 38 ff. TFEU). In the framework of
the EU’s environmental policy, sectors such as fishery, the regulation of the import
of raw materials as part of the common commercial policy as well as more generally
the EU’s objective to achieve a “prudent and rational utilisation of natural
resources” are relevant. Having a closer look at the European provisions shows
25Schorkopf (2011), para. 1.
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that Union law always aspires to establish a type of internal control over raw
materials, their exploitation and production before any external matters are regu-
lated. The global trade of commodities, the EU’s dependence on raw materials as
well as related legal issues are, however, not or only marginally reflected in the EU’s
existing regulatory framework.
Other legal cultures and legal orders are considerably more progressive. In US
Law, Natural Resources Law has always been an autonomous legal discipline.26
Besides, common law also does not know of a clear-cut separation or rather
shielding of different legal fields (public law—civil law—criminal law). For this
reason, Natural Resources Law constitutes a horizontal discipline, which is contin-
uously becoming more diverse (e.g. in Oil & Gas Law).27 Ultimately, it is located
between environmental, economic and private law. The European approach, how-
ever, should go beyond the approach of US law due to its geostrategic position.
While US law is built upon the tacit premises, that raw materials are (always)
available, the scarcity of raw materials is of primary concern in European natural
resources law. Therefore, it should be complemented with the relevant aspects of this
problem in the field of the EU’s common foreign policy, common commercial policy
and competition policy. In other words, it should adopt a sort of foreign distribution
perspective. Thus, EU natural resources law may also be understood as an evolution
of the German mining law.28
3.3 The Momentum of the Treaty of Lisbon
Even though Member States are well aware of the rather critical position of the EU
on the global commodity markets, the raw materials problem did not play an
important role in the reform efforts of the Lisbon Treaty.29 Nonetheless, it does
not mean that the Lisbon Treaty did not have an impact upon the creation of a
European natural resources law. On the contrary, the consolidation of a number of
rather important policy fields facilitated the possibility to identify coherent structures
and regulatory approaches upon which a European natural resources law can be
built. This may be underlined by three concrete examples: the consolidation of the
European energy policy by the Lisbon Treaty (Sect. 3.3.1),30 the strengthening of the
26See Fischman (2007), p. 721 ff.; MacDonnell and Bates (2010); Blanco and Razzaque (2011);
regarding the developments in US law see Terhechte (2012a), p. 91 f.
27See further Lowe (2009); Alramahi (2013).
28With regard to the role model function of German mining law in the context of legal research in
the field of raw materials see e.g. Kühne (2001), p. 370 f.
29On the Lisbon Treaty see Nowak (2011); Terhechte (2008a), p. 143 ff.; Hatje and Kindt (2008),
p. 1761 ff.; Streinz et al. (2010).
30See e.g. Kahl (2009), p. 601 ff.; Nettesheim (2010), p. 19 ff.
212 J. P. Terhechte
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
foreign policy profile of the Union (Sect. 3.3.2)31—especially in the field of the
common commercial policy (Sect. 3.3.3),32—and lastly, the (light) reforms intro-
duced in European environmental law (Sect. 3.3.4).33 It also allows for a determi-
nation of the centre of gravity of European natural resources law, which is located
between internal market and environmental law—yet, with a predominantly inter-
national perspective. Obviously, there are many aspects, which require an in-depth
analysis. Here, it may suffice to look at the connecting factors first, in order to get to
the bottom of one of the many different directions of research on a natural
resources law.
3.3.1 The Consolidation of the European Energy Policy
The Treaty of Lisbon has introduced an explicit legal basis for the EU’s energy
policy, namely Article 194 TFEU.34 Pursuant to the objectives set out in Article 194
(1) TFEU, European energy law primarily aims at ensuring the functioning of the
energy market, ensuring supply security of energy in the Union, the promotion of
energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable
forms of energy as well as the promotion of the interconnection of energy net-
works.35 Already, these objectives exhibit what may be termed the ability to
generalise. According to the communication of the European Commission, these
meta-strategic objectives—the distribution on the markets, the security of supply as
well as efficiency—are not only applicable in the context of the European energy
policy, but similarly in the EU’s natural resources policy. Yet, the achievement of the
thus defined objectives is limited by Article 194(2) TFEU, which leaves Member
States a lot of room for regulation with respect to their own energy policies and
objectives. These limitations are further qualified by Article 194(3) TFEU, which
requires unanimity if measures of a fiscal nature are enacted. Bearing in mind the
strategic importance of energy policy—be it on a national or supranational level—
such restrictions are rather unsurprising. Yet, they may further complicate the
creation of a coherent and effective Union policy on energy and negatively affect
31Eeckhout (2012), p. 57; Koutrakos (2013), p. 22 ff.; Thym (2008), p. 173 ff.; Fischer (2008),
p. 56 ff.
32Bungenberg and Herrmann (2011); Tietje (2009), p. 1 ff.
33Epiney (2013), p. 42.
34See in more detail Prontera (2017); Talus (2013); Delvaux (2013); Braun J. F, EU Energy Policy
under the Treaty of Lisbon Rules—Between a New Policy and Business as Usual, EPIN Working
Paper No. 31, February 2011, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/2011/02/EPIN%20WP31%
20Braun%20on%20EU%20Energy%20Policy%20under%20Lisbon.pdf (last accessed 15 March
2018), p. 1 ff.; Baumann and Turek (2008), p. 157 ff.; Ehricke and Hackländer (2008), p. 579 ff.;
Fischer (2009), p. 50 ff.; Hobe (2009), p. 219 ff.; on the European Constitution see Maichel (2005),
p. 55 ff.
35Nettesheim (2011a), para. 7.
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the emerging EU natural resources law, given the particular importance of energetic
raw materials for the Union.
3.3.2 The Strengthening of the Foreign Policy Profile of the Union
The realignment of the foreign policy profile of the EU in the context of its common
foreign and security policy (CFSP; Art. 23 ff. TEU), as well as the (new) concept of
EU natural resources law have to be recognised in the foreign distribution perspec-
tive of European natural resources law to the extent that such perspective is
implied.36 It will most likely become easier for the EU to act on the international
plane as regulator of commodity trade and as actor on the international markets in
general. Among other things, the legal personality of the EU has been explicitly
recognized and unitized in Article 47 TEU.37 From an institutional perspective, the
Lisbon Treaty has brought about many significant changes, such as the coupling of
the offices of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and
the vice-president of the European Commission.38 Thus, a coherent appearance from
an institutional point of view is guaranteed. Even beyond security-related aspects,
the CFSP contains further raw materials-related dimensions, such as the possibility
to use military interventions as a means to secure the supply of raw materials.39 The
binding nature of the objectives set out in Articles 21 and 23 TEU permit the
establishment of a direct connection to the common commercial policy (cf. Arts.
205 in conjunction with 207(1) TFEU). In other words, the CFSP and the CCP are
committed to achieve identical objectives, which makes a coherent external natural
resources policy possible in the first place.40 The aim of achieving identical objec-
tives as well as the institutional coupling of the Commission and the CFSP facilitate
the pursuit of a European raw materials diplomacy as well as the uniform treatment
of raw materials-related subjects in the framework of the CFSP as well the CCP.
3.3.3 The Extension of the Competences in the Common Commercial
Policy
The common commercial policy is an exclusive competence of the Union (Art. 3(e)
TFEU). Pursuant to Article 207(1) TFEU it comprises:
changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods
and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment,
the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to
protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies.
36Luzarraga (2008), p. 231 ff.; Herrmann (2008), p. 114 ff.
37See Terhechte (2012b), para. 3 ff.
38Martenczuk (2008), p. 941 ff.
39See Schmahl (2012), p. 213 ff.
40On this see Engbrink (2014).
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In light of the rather wide range of subjects covered by the CCP, it is evident that the
EU should also play a central role in the international trade with raw materials.
Without a doubt, raw materials may be classified as goods.41 The competences of the
EU in the CCP have been extended so far, that Member States feared that only the
EU is competent to represent their trade-related interests in the forum of the WTO.42
Although such a scenario is still a far cry away from materialising, it is in any case
self-evident that the EU would primarily conduct disputes over raw materials under
the auspices of the WTO. In turn, existing strategic partnerships of the Member
States relating to raw materials (e.g. Germany-Mongolia43) might no longer be in
conformity with the CCP and, therefore, require careful (re-)consideration.
3.3.4 The Development of EU Environmental Law
Finally, the changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon in the framework of EU
environmental law also need to be evaluated; though these should rather be seen as
minor corrections than fully-fledged changes.44 In the context of the horizontal
objectives of the EU, environmental policy has lost its unique character (ex Art.
6 Treaty Establishing the European Community; TEC) and has been reduced to a
normal policy field of Union law (see Art. 11 TFEU). Still, the horizontal objective
of the protection of the environment is closely related to and refined by the objective
of sustainable development.45 While a concrete definition of sustainability in Union
law still needs to be found, it is clear that it entails and unifies aspects such as
solidarity amongst the generations as well as ecological compatibility. In principle,
both aspects need to be respected with regard to exhaustible raw materials. While a
European natural resources law should purely focus on the import of energetic raw
materials, it is self-evident that environmental and sustainability aspects play a
pivotal role in its creation and the dogmatic shaping of its objectives and principles.
Albeit, the Lisbon Treaty most certainly did not have in mind the creation of a
primate of environmental principles.
41Schorkopf (2011), para. 6 ff.
42Bungenberg (2009), p. 206.
43Cf. Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Govern-
ment of Mongolia on cooperation in the fields of rawmaterials, industry and technology, 13 October
2011; see further Dahlmann and Mildner (2012); Dahlmann A and Mildner SA, Deutschlands
Rohstoffpartnerschaften: Modell mit Zukunftscharakter?. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Analysen und
Argumente No. 137, November 2013, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_36104-544-1-30.pdf?
131120143826 (last accessed 15.03.2018); Nowrot (2013); Wallenoeffer (2011), p. 132 ff.
44Vedder (2012), p. 11 ff.
45See Commission Communication on a thematic strategy on the sustainable use of natural
resources, COM (2005) 670 final; Calliess (1998), p. 559 ff.; Žvelc (2012), p. 174 ff.; More
generally on the term sustainability see Kahl (2008).
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4 Underlying Structures and Demarcation
A European natural resources law may take shape through demarcation and counter
terms. It is plain to see that the normative foundations of this field of law are to be
found in the provisions on the internal market as well as the European environmental
policy, because the Treaties recognise neither a separate natural resources policy nor
a clearly structured natural resources law (see Sect. 4.1 below). Closely related to
this is the question of which role national law plays in the framework of a European
natural resources law (Sect. 4.2) and which impulses may be derived and received
from international law (Sect. 4.3).
4.1 Natural Resources Law in Between the Internal Market
and Environmental Policy
European natural resources law is an inherently hybrid field of law, which has to fall
back on objectives, instruments and configurations of other fields of Union law in
order to determine and develop its own structure. Thereby, different priorities require
further attention. In particular, written EU law contains a lot of cross connections and
overlaps with European environmental law. The coupling of natural resources law
with environmental law is in some respects owed to their historical evolution.
Therefore, Article 191 TFEU consciously underlines this circumstance, even though
it is more concerned with the efficient use of natural resources than the security of
their supply.46 Nonetheless, recent developments show that the naturally perceived
connection between natural resources and environmental law results in a rather
narrow perspective on the matter. This runs the risk that the problems relating to
the (fair) distribution of raw materials on the global commodity markets and the
dependence of the EU on these raw materials are not sufficiently scrutinised.
Environmental law constitutes more a law of consequences than a law of distribu-
tion. Currently, and due to the dependence of the EU on imports of raw materials, it
seems as though the question of distribution is at the forefront.
This means that European natural resources law transcends environmental law in
many regards. Therefore, emphasis has to be put on European economic law,
including its external dimensions. Thereby, it is out of question that raw materials
constitute goods pursuant to Article 28 TFEU and are subject to the free movement
of goods within the Union.47 Similarly, EU customs law demonstrates many link-
ages with natural resources. Amongst others, it regulates the specific modalities of
their importation. However, EU customs law does not follow a certain logic specif-
ically relating to raw materials. The treatment of raw materials is determined based
46Nettesheim (2011b), para. 74 ff.
47Schorkopf (2011), para. 8.
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on different logics, which underlie the different areas of EU customs law.48 In light
of the dependence of the EU on certain raw materials, this thought should be subject
to further elaboration. Is it possible to simplify the import of raw materials, if
administrative customs procedures are made easier and more transparent and are
conducted in a raw materials-specificmanner? Though, it has to be born in mind that
the classification and underlying structures of raw materials are based upon the
Harmonised System (HS) of the World Customs Organization (WCO). A modifica-
tion might easily create a special system of the Union, which might be incompatible
with obligations and requirements derived from international law.
In the end, the CCP and European competition policy (as supplemented by the
EU’s energy policy) are at the centre of the discussions surrounding the security of
supply of the Union. In so far as the mechanisms for the distribution of raw materials
on the global commodities market are concerned, these legal fields contain the most
overlaps with the fundamental problem. While cartel and competition law (Art.
101 ff. TFEU) is there to ensure the free and fair distribution of raw materials within
the internal market and prospectively also on the global market,49 the CCP aims to
liberalise trade in the respective goods. Finally, the energy and environmental
policies of the Union determine the overall framework and the objectives to be
attained, which contributes to the sharpening of the EU’s natural resources law and
clarifies those areas in which Member States will continue to regulate themselves
(such as in the case of fiscal taxes).
4.2 The Objectives and Principles of a European Natural
Resources Law
To the extent that it is accepted that European natural resources law lies at the
interface between environmental and internal market law, the next step concerns the
question of which principles and objectives are to be attained with it. Keeping in
mind the closeness of natural resources law to economic and environmental law, it is
evident that one of the objectives constitutes the guarantee of the security of supply
of raw materials for the Union.50 Next to this, principles such as the sustainability of
supplies as well as the efficiency in the use or exploitation of raw materials need to
be respected.51 It is needless to say that all objectives set out in Articles 3 and
21 TEU are similarly imperative for the EU’s natural resources law. These objectives
48Ibid.
49See in detail with the example of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
Terhechte (2008c).
50Proedrou (2012); Frey (2013); see also the contributions in Peimani (2011); as well as Bahgat
(2006), p. 961 ff.
51See Commission Communication on a thematic strategy on the sustainable use of natural
resources, COM (2005) 670 final; Reimer and Tölle (2013), p. 591; see also Rehbinder (2012).
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may be implemented through the different Union policies. While the need to
guarantee security of supply is anchored in the CCP and competition law, sustain-
ability and efficiency questions are rather derived from environmental and energy
law. The respective instruments to achieve the set policy goals may be inferred from
the different policy fields, provided that the general objectives and principles of the
Union are still adhered to.
4.2.1 Security of Supply
One of the policy objectives of the EU’s energy policy is ensuring security of energy
supply in the Union pursuant to Article 194(1)(b) TFEU. While paragraph (a) of
Article 194(1) TFEU does pursue the functioning of the energy market, paragraph
(b) goes a step further by requiring sovereign action if and where the market does not
function.52 Accordingly, this already provides a useful indication for the potential
objective of ensuring security of raw materials supply. In the framework of Union
law the security of supply or rather its establishment does constitute a sovereign task.
This means that, in so far as the global and the Union raw materials market does not
guarantee the security of supply of raw materials, Member States and the EU
institutions are asked to create such security. The Union may base its actions on
instruments derived from its energy policy, but it may go beyond that by using
instruments which are derived from Article 21 TEU, the CCP (Art. 206 TFEU) or
European competition law.
4.2.2 Sustainability
Sustainability is especially important in the context of the Union’s environmental
policy pursuant to Article 191 TFEU. Apart from that, Article 3(3) TEU also requires
the EU to conduct its policies in light of the overall goal of sustainable development.
Thereby, the term sustainable development has to be read in the context of the
establishment of the internal market and does entail the attainment of economic as
well as social goals (such as balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly
competitive social market economy, full employment etc.). Therefore, sustainability
embodies a positive goal of European integration, even though the determination of
its exact content is not easy. It can be assumed, though, that it is predominantly
concerned with having oversight over future developments or generations. For
European natural resources law, this means that the global trade in commodities
and the use or exploitation of commodities should not be guided by the short-term
goal of maximising profits but instead by the long-term assessment of potential
consequences. The principles of security of supply and sustainability go hand in
hand, in the sense that both do not just apply to the present but indeed extend to the
52Hirsbrunner (2012), para. 16.
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future. Still, the consequences drawn from the principle of sustainability have not
played a role in the current practice of EU natural resources law. The EU institutions
have recognised this major deficit and are now making an effort to develop coun-
terstrategies.53 While not being a counterstrategy per se, but rather evidence of the
temporal relevance of sustainability, the EU has committed itself to the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), adopted by the United Nations in 2015, which aim to
end poverty, protect the planet and ensure prosperity.54 Having said that, it will most
certainly not become any easier for the EU to establish itself as a global player with
long-term strategic objectives on the global commodity market.
4.2.3 Efficiency
Efficiency is of particular importance in the context of European natural resources
law. Due to the fact that the term raw materials is divided into primary and
secondary raw materials, the subject of recycling has been upgraded and therefore,
requires the interpretation of Union law in light of efficiency. Initially, the term
efficiency relates to the most optimal use of raw materials. To the extent that
European natural resources law contributes to efficiency, its internal control has to
be taken account of. This means that European natural resources law is not only
concerned with the positioning and legal control of the global trade in raw materials,
but also the legal structure of the exploitation and recycling of raw materials within
the EU, which has to be organized in accordance with efficiency goals.
4.2.4 The General Objectives and Principles of Union Law
Next to the established objectives of security of supply, sustainability and efficiency
in the trade and exploitation of raw materials, European natural resources law has to
adapt to the fundamental values of the EU. This is the result of the interplay between
Articles 3 and 21 TEU and the respective preambles to the European Treaties, the
different strategic goals of the EU policies as well as the horizontal clauses contained
in the Treaties (Art. 9 ff. TFEU). In light of the manifold problems which have been
experienced in the global extraction of natural resources (examples: blood diamonds,
child labour, social imbalances, corruption etc.), it seems as though these ties to the
fundamental values of the Union are relevant in order to create a European natural
resources law which fully respects European constitutional law.
53Commission Communication, on a roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe, COM (2011)
571 final.
54See United Nations, General Assembly Resolution Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development, A/RES/70/1; on the commitment of the EU to these goals see Commis-
sion Communication on next steps for a sustainable European future European action for sustain-
ability, COM (2016) 739 final; Council Conclusions on a sustainable European future: The EU
response to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, No. 10370/17, 20 June 2017.
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4.3 European Natural Resources Law and National Law
A fundamental question in the creation of a European natural resources law consti-
tutes its demarcation from the law of the Member States. This question is all the more
pressing since, in recent years, many national initiatives have been adopted, whose
relation to EU law is unclear. In that respect, initiatives such as arranged resources
partnerships between Member States and third states55 or the proposal to create
strategic purchasing groups,56 which strengthen the demand position of companies,
have to be mentioned. Already these examples are testimony to the fact that national
violations in the field of natural resources may easily result in a fully-fledge
competence conflict between EU and national law. Given the strategic importance
of raw materials, not only for the European Union, but especially for the national
economies of the Member States, such competence questions will only gain in
importance. A clear demarcation of competences should therefore be one of the
major priorities of European natural resources law. Interestingly enough, many
competences, which are of utmost importance to the creation of a European natural
resource law, already belong to the exclusive competence of the Union. This is the
case with respect to the European customs policy, the CCP and partially the CAP.
4.4 European Natural Resources Law and International Law
In the wake of the internationalisation of European law, the relation of new policy
fields to international law is of major significance.57 Many questions, which arise
with respect to the global trade in commodities, concern their import and export and
are therefore questions of international law.58 At the centre of international law is the
idea that the sovereignty of states may be contained through natural resources. The
United Nations Resolution on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources of
1962 should be understood to that effect.59 Obviously, the resolution was adopted at
a time when post-colonial debates were at the centre of attention and is therefore in
many respects no longer authoritative today.60 Under the auspices of the CFSP and
the CCP the European natural resources law will have to attempt to prevent unilateral
violations by the Member States in order to enable a coherent representation of the
Union in the global competition for raw materials. Many doubts with respect to the
55For details see Nowrot (2013).
56Similar to the suggestions made by the former Germany minister for economic affairs Rainer
Brüderle; see critically Kamann (2012), p. 101 ff.
57For an example in European administrative law see Terhechte (2011), para. 53 ff.
58See Weiß (2009); Herdegen (2014), p. 1 ff.; Schorkopf (2008), p. 233 ff.
59United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, “Permanent
sovereignty over natural resources,” UN GA/Res. 1803 XVII (1962).
60Dederer (2012), S. 38 ff.
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legal status of the Union under international law have been solved and allow it to
take full account of the intergovernmental and supranational structures of EU law in
its external relations.
5 The Framework of the European Raw Materials
Initiative
European natural resources law has to be viewed in light of the current political
developments and the realities of the global commodity markets. The European
Commission recognised this years ago. Since the EU already possesses many legal
competences in the field of raw materials, it has called for the creation of an
autonomous natural resources policy to stay competitive in the global surge for
raw materials. Through the raw materials initiative, it has set up political and legal
strategies, which shall support the secure and sustainable supply of raw materials to
the EU from third states (see Sect. 5.1). Closely related is the question of which
elements European raw materials governance needs to exhibit (see Sect. 5.2) and
which challenges European law has to overcome in light of these developments
(Sect. 5.3).
5.1 The European Raw Materials Initiative
Within the scope of the raw materials initiative, the European Commission sets
various objectives.61 An objective of strategic importance constitutes the protection
of the access of the European Union to raw materials. Therefore, a fair and durable
supply of raw materials from the global markets needs to be secured.62 Apart from
that, the Commission is also of the view that the supply of raw materials should be
continued and optimized to guarantee a sustainable supply of the EU in the future.63
Lastly, also resource efficiency is considered to be one of the pillars of the raw
materials initiative, since a decrease in the demand for primary resources may be
guaranteed through higher material recovery rates.64 Thus, the topic of recycling is
of primary importance.65 While the creation of a European natural resources policy
61Commission Communication on the raw materials initiative—meeting our critical needs for
growth and jobs in Europe, COM (2008) 699 final.
62Ibid, p. 6.
63Ibid, p. 9.
64Ibid, p. 10; see also Orbie (2007), p. 297 ff.
65See Commission Communication, Closing the loop—An EU action plan for the Circular Econ-
omy, COM (2015) 614 final.
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is not explicitly spelled out in the Commission’s Europe 2020 strategy,66 it is
indicated and may be implied from its strong focus on sustainability.
Yet, the Commission is well aware of the fact that these objectives may not solely
be achieved through clever law making. Instead, the raw materials initiative counts
on a goal-orientated natural resources policy, which entails a European raw materials
diplomacy next to the exhaustion of the available legal tools.67 It is thus the
Commission, which for example envisages strategic partnerships and political dia-
logue to ensure the access to raw materials, especially critical raw materials
(CRMs).68 Through transparency efforts, the raw materials industries of developing
countries shall be supported. This applies to the investment climate in the respective
countries and the sustainable growing and harvesting of natural resources. In the
context of raw materials diplomacy, more attention has to be paid to knowledge
sharing with other international organisations (World Bank, Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative, International Monetary Fund, African Development Bank).
More recent examples of the Commission’s activities in this field constitute the
European Innovation Partnership (EIP) on raw materials,69 the Steel Action Plan70 as
well as the EU’s Strategy for Forest-based Industries.71
A closer look at the European raw materials initiative indicates that European law
has to play its role in the achievement of these objectives. Thus, it mentions the CCP
and competition law, which indicates that the EU will not only attempt to achieve its
objectives through diplomacy or through its development policy, but also through
legal means. Admittedly, such an approach would require the elimination of
66Commission Communication Europe 2020—A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive
growth, COM (2010) 2020.
67Commission Communication on the raw materials initiative—meeting our critical needs for
growth and jobs in Europe, COM (2008) 699 final, p. 6; With respect to the need of such approaches
see Goldthau (2010), p. 25 ff.; see more recently on this Commission Staff Working Document,
Report on Critical Raw Materials and the Circular Economy, SWD (2018) 36 final.
68The Commission regularly publishes a list of critical raw materials in order to reflect production
needs as well as market and technological developments based upon its own methodology. See third
list of CRMs Commission Communication on the 2017 list of Critical Raw Materials for the EU,
COM (2017) 490 final; European Commission, Methodology for establishing the EU list of EU
critical raw materials—Guidelines, 2017.
69The EIP is a platform for stakeholders (Member States, NGOs, industry, academia etc.) to receive
high-level guidance on innovative approaches to tackle the challenges related to raw materials. See
European Commission, The European Innovation Partnership (EIP) on Raw Materials, https://ec.
europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/eip-raw-materials/ (last updated 30 April 2018); European Com-
mission, Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) of the EIP, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-data
bases/eip-raw-materials/en/content/strategic-implementation-plan-sip-0#Read%20EIP%20docs
(last updated 30 April 2018).
70Commission Communication on an action plan for a competitive and sustainable steel industry in
Europe, COM (2013) 407 final.
71Commission Staff Working Document, A blueprint for the EU forest-based industries, SWD
(2013) 343 final; Commission Communication, A New EU Forest Strategy: For Forests And The
Forest-Based Sector, COM (2013) 659 final.
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discrepancies (e.g. privileged export subsidies) which still exist, so that the law
constitutes a credible source for the different fields of action.72
5.2 A European Raw Materials Governance
The formulation of a European raw materials initiative and the related policy-agenda
manifest that a truly European natural resources law should not only be looked at
from an internal market perspective, but that it forms part of an overall strategy.
Hence, the development of a European raw materials governance is the obvious
conclusion.73 Therefore, it will be important that new instruments and a coherent
application of the law create a legal structure upon which a successful governance
approach may be pursued. A step in the right direction would be the inclusion of the
creation of a European natural resources law in the Treaties, e.g. through the
inclusion of an objective to this effect, which is combined with a provision for the
autonomous regulation of the European raw materials or natural resources policy.
Only if the law remains transparent and provides for clear connecting factors, may it
be given its place within the raw materials governance.74
5.3 The Challenges for European Law
Both the European raw materials initiative and the question regarding the contour of
European raw materials governance depict that European law will have to
contextualise the traditional fields of Union law from a horizontal perspective.
This does not only entail the viewing of the law from a perspective of needs, but
also the role model effect of US law for the creation of new legal fields.75 Up until
now, European environmental law and its objectives and instruments have followed
the periodical developments in the USA.76 Similar tendencies may be observed in
European economic law, especially competition law.77 These are, however, just
rather general milestones. A European natural resources law has to be based upon
72Terhechte (2012a); Küblböck K, The EU Raw Materials Initiative—Scope and Critical Assess-
ment, Austrian Research Foundation for International Development, Briefing Paper
No. 8, September 2013, https://www.oefse.at/fileadmin/content/Downloads/Publikationen/
Briefingpaper/BP8_eu_raw_materials.pdf (last accessed 30 April 2018).
73Ibid.
74The EU’s attempts in the context of conflict minerals might serve as an example see further on
good governance with respect to conflict minerals Nowrot (2017).
75See also Terhechte (2011), para. 11.
76Ibid.
77With regard to the impact of US law on European competition law see Terhechte (2004), S. 192
ff.; Terhechte (2008b).
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national natural resources law to the extent that there are already national develop-
ments in that direction. Ergo a comparative analysis of the different national legal
orders is important to determine common structures and the distribution of compe-
tences. This is also true for the relation between EU law and international law, which
may further develop with regard to the global trade in commodities under the
auspices of the WTO and through the conclusion of raw materials agreements.
6 Conclusion
Currently, European natural resources law is developing as a new area of reference in
Union law. Thereby, it consciously bypasses traditional categories and may only
unfold through an interdisciplinary approach, which combines the perspectives of
the rule of law, politics, the economy and sustainability. Such an approach also
allows for a reasonable use of the term governance in legal studies, since natural
resources law is mainly concerned with the complex phenomenon of its logistics,
which often go beyond what may be simply regulated through law. The distribution
of raw materials in global competition often alternates between state control and the
free market.78
In light of the importance of raw materials for the European economy, the
example of the US natural resources law may provide it with various development
steps which need to be taken. Yet, the question of competence between the EU and
its Member States most certainly goes beyond the scope of regulation of US law.
There are compelling reasons to believe that the question of competence will become
even more important in the near future. Through the introduction of a competence
catalogue, the Lisbon Treaty has laid the foundations for the codification of a
European natural resources law.
For the moment, it seems as though European natural resources law is a project
driven by academia. Nonetheless, developments in the Member States, the structures
of EU law as well as legal practice speak a different language, namely that EU
primary law should provide for a clear structure for the regulation of natural
resources. Considering that European natural resources law constitutes in its most
fundamental structures (import and export of raw materials, customs treatment etc.)
an exclusive Union competence, it seems rather likely that it will be integrated into
the TFEU as an autonomous policy field next to environmental and energy policy.
Moreover, it should be integrated as a general objective in Article 3 TEU, to enshrine
the secure and sustainable supply of raw materials to the EU in the teleology of the
Union. This would overcome not only the uncertainties relating to the objectives
contained in Article 191 TFEU, but also the necessity of the Union to take action
based on the flexibility clause (Art. 352 TFEU). Apart from that, the many horizontal
connections European natural resources law has with the other internal market
78Schorkopf (2008), p. 235.
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policies also contributed to the perception that the creation of a separate legal field is
the logical consequence. Thus, it is the Member States as masters of the treaties who
are charged with the creation of the necessary legal structures to enable the Union to
stay competitive in the global surge for raw materials.
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1 Introduction
Illegal logging (that is, the harvesting of timber in contravention of the laws and
regulations of the country of harvest1) and the associated deforestation are a global
problem with significant negative economic, environmental and social impacts.2 In
economic terms illegal logging results in lost revenues and other foregone benefits.
The author is indebted to Valentina Grado (Professore Associato of International Law, University
of Naples ‘L’Orientale’) for her insightful comments on earlier drafts. This chapter is dedicated
to the memory of Professor Ulrich Beyerlin.
1In a broader sense, illegal logging covers a wide group of illegal activities, such as harvesting,
transport, processing and trade of timber, and evasion of fees and taxes related to these activities.
2Brack D (2007) Illegal Logging. Chatham House Briefing Paper, London, pp. 1–2.
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In environmental terms it is associated with climate change, desertification, soil
degradation, loss of biodiversity and forests. In social terms illegal logging can be
related to conflicts over land and resources, the disempowerment of local and
indigenous communities, corruption and armed conflicts. Moreover, illegal logging
activities also undermine the efforts of responsible operators, by making available
cheaper but illegal timber and timber products in the market place.3
Forests are often perceived as ‘private goods’. But the global benefits they
provide (i.e. sinks for carbon, habitat for biota, weather-regulating services) show
that they can also be properly regarded as ‘public goods’. Such public good character
has stimulated a significant ‘global interest’ in the sustainability of forest manage-
ment practice employed in forested countries. The international community has
therefore pursued several strategies to address illegal logging and deforestation4;
but to date these have often proved of only limited success. Whatever the merits of
these various strategies, throughout the period of their application in the 1990s and
2000s illegal logging and rapid deforestation persisted.5 At the current rate of loss, it
has been estimated that the tropical rainforest could disappear within 100 years.6 In
response to continued forest loss, around the turn of the millennium interest grew in
the possibility of (indirectly) addressing deforestation by focusing on trade in illegal
timber.7 It is under such a perspective that the European Union has been active for
over a decade and has taken a leading role in creating a market for legal timber.
The European Commission’s policy to fight illegal logging and associated trade
was defined back in 2003, with the Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade
(FLEGT) Action Plan.8 The latter has led in its turn to two key pieces of legislation
creating, respectively, voluntary and compulsory regimes for ensuring the legality of
the timber imported into the EU internal market. The first of these legislative
instruments, the FLEGT Regulation,9 was adopted in 2005. It allows for the control
3See extensively Pontecorvo (2011), pp. 17–39. Compare also Nellermann C (2012) Green Carbon,
Black Trade: Illegal Logging, Tax Fraud and Laundering in the World’s Tropical Forests. UNEP
and INTERPOL.
4See extensively Pontecorvo (2011), pp. 97–136; Pontecorvo (2013); Brack and Hayman (2001).
5See inter alia Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (2010) Global
Forest Resources Assessment 2010. Rome, pp. 15–17.
6See for example National Geographic, ‘Deforestation’, available at https://www.nationalgeographic.
com/environment/global-warming/deforestation/ (last accessed 6 August 2017).
7See Brown et al. (2008), pp. 5–6. Restricting imports to allow only timber that complies with
relevant laws of the country where it was harvested should, in principle, eliminate illegal harvests
driven by foreign demand and reduce the contribution of illegal logging to deforestation. Obviously,
deforestation could continue even if all logging were done legally; but eradicating illegality from
the sector would, at least, enhance the ability of governments to require sustainable practices.
8Commission Communication of 21 May 2003 on ‘Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and
Trade (FLEGT): Proposal for an EU Action Plan’ COM (2003) 251 final (hereinafter FLEGT
Action Plan (2003)).
9Council Regulation (EC) 2173/2005 of 20 December 2005 on the establishment of a FLEGT
licensing scheme for imports of timber in the European Community, OJ L 347/1 (2005) (hereinafter
FLEGT Regulation (2005)), adopted under article 133 TEC.
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of the entry of timber to the EU from countries concluding bilateral Voluntary
Partnership Agreements (VPAs) with the EU and it also enacts the so called
‘FLEGT licensing scheme’. The second legislative instrument, the EU Timber
Regulation (EUTR),10 was proposed by the Commission in October 2008 and
adopted by the EU Parliament and by the Council in October 2010. It is aimed at
preventing the introduction of illegally logged timber on the EU internal market, by
(a) prohibiting the placing for the first time on such a market of timber and timber
products harvested in violation of the legislation of the country of logging and
(b) requiring (inter alia) operators to conduct ‘due diligence’ to ensure that the
timber products which they trade in have a legal origin. The Timber Regulation has
become, as a matter of fact, the leading pillar in the execution of the EU FLEGT
Action Plan.
The EUTR entered into application on 3 March 2013, becoming applicable on all
EU Member States. The Regulation is a potentially powerful tool to help the EU to
exclude illegal timber from its market and to contribute to its broader objectives of
environmental protection and sustainable development.11 Taking into account that
the EU counts for about 40% of global forest product imports,12 it clearly has a
substantial potential to influence the global timber trade through domestic
legislation.13
In 2015 the EU Commission completed a review of the effectiveness of the EUTR
during its first 2 years of implementation and it also published a detailed report
showing both progress and the remaining challenges in this respect. Furthermore,
interesting development have been recently occurring also in the (national) enforce-
ment of the Regulation, with the first court cases on EUTR implementation being
examined by national courts in several EU Member countries. These court decisions
show that 4 years after its entry into application the EUTR’s regulatory system is
actually starting to take effect in practice.
10Regulation (EU) 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010
laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market, OJ L
295/23 (2010) (hereinafter Timber Regulation (2010)), adopted under article 192.1 TFEU.
11On this point see also Buckrell and Hoare (2011).
12According to FAO data, in 2008, 2009 and 2010 the EU accounted for, respectively, the 45%,
43% and 41% of global forest product imports (FAO, Forestry Trade Flows, FAOSTAT database,
available at http://faostat.fao.org/site/628/default.aspx). However, only 20% of timber imports
come from tropical countries, and this portion is declining rapidly because of the economic
downturn in Europe and increasing barriers to trade in tropical timber products (see UN Economic
Commission for Europe and FAO (2013) Forest Products Annual Market Review 2012–2013).
13However, it should be admitted that the EUTR’s value to the struggle against illegal logging
actually depends on its ability to withstand a (at the moment only hypothetical) challenge in the
World Trade Organization. To date, WTO Panels have never confronted a regulation quite like the
EUTR. Unlike previously litigated regulations, the EUTR (as we will see) seeks to limit trade on the
basis of foreign definitions of legality rather than imposing its own substantive requirements. On the
issue of the EUTR Regulation’s consistency with WTO law (which is behind the scope of this
study) see Geraets and Natens (2014), pp. 439–454; Fishman and Obidzinski (2014), pp. 265–274.
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In the light of the above, an analysis of the EU Timber Regulation seems to be
very timely. This chapter is aimed particularly at examining the original content,
scope and recent normative evolution of the EUTR’s regulatory system (par. 2), as
well as at investigating both its very effectiveness in the light of its actual imple-
mentation by EU member countries (par. 3) and its recent enforcement by EU
member countries’ national courts (par. 4). Such an analysis is also useful (rectius,
legally prodromal) to discuss on: first, the position of the Timber Regulation within
the whole EU anti-illegal logging policy framework; second, the role that EUTR
(as a unilateral EU trade regulatory measure) could possibly provide as a ‘model’ for
other EU legislative regimes equally trying to ensure that EU trade with other
countries may contribute to both sustainable development and the protection of
human rights; third, the significance of some (legally relevant) ‘signals’ emerging
from its recent national implementation case-law; and finally, the coherence of the
EU regime on forest governance—as a whole—with the EU values (i.e. sustainable
development and human rights) lastly recognised by the Lisbon Treaty as general
inspiring principles of its external action in general and of its external trade policy in
particular.
2 The EU Regime on Timber (and Timber Products) Trade
At the international level attention first turned to the problem of illegal logging in the
late 1990s, but early initiatives involved only limited binding commitments.14 One
of the more significant early efforts was the World Bank’s Forest Law Enforcement
and Governance (FLEG) Programme.15 Although FLEG conferences resulted in
action plans for curbing illegal logging, these were in fact mere ‘political statements
of intent’, which did not included implementing mechanisms.16 However, these
efforts did reflect the growing international focus on illegal logging.
14For example, the G8 Group released an Action Programme on Forests in 1998, which simply
obliged G8 members to reflect on their internal measures for combating illegal logging, make efforts
to improve transparency in the international trade and work to realize international pledges to
combat timber-related corruption: see G8 (1998) Report on the Implementation of the G8 Action
Programme on Forests: Annex B—G8 Action Programme on Forests. In 2002 the United States
announced a President’s Initiative against Illegal Logging, having the goal of assisting developing
countries to address illegal logging within their borders but not including any firm commitments:
see White House, President’s Initiative against Illegal Logging, 14 February 2002. On other
initiatives see Brown et al. (2008), pp. 6–8.
15Launched in 2001, FLEG was comprised of regional processes in which governments joined
together in making policy commitments to strengthen forest governance.
16See Brown et al. (2008), p. 8.
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2.1 The First Pillar: The FLEGT Action Plan (2003)
and the FLEGT Regulation (2005)
Building on this trend, on 21 May 2003 the EU Commission launched the Action
Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade, then endorsed by the
European Council of Ministers on November of the same year.17 Much like the
earlier FLEG Programme, the Action Plan promised support for governance reform;
but it also sought to create a market incentive to curb illegal logging, using a
licensing mechanism (based on bilateral partnership agreements with timber-
exporting countries) to promote trade in legal timber. More specifically, the
FLEGT Action Plan sets out the EU policy to fight illegal logging and associated
trade through a series of measures available to this extent to the EU and its Member
States. The Plan covers, in particular, both supply and demand side measures to
address illegal logging and it targets several key regions and countries (Central
Africa, Russia, Tropical South America and Southeast Asia), which together contain
nearly 60% of the world’s forest and supply a large proportion of internationally
traded timber. A key element of the FLEGT Action Plan is the voluntary licensing
scheme it establishes with a view to ensuring that only legally harvested timber is
imported into the EU from countries agreeing to take part in the scheme.18
The internal EU legal framework for this scheme (and for putting the whole
FLEGT Action Plan into effect) is the so-called FLEGT Regulation, adopted in
December 2005 and followed in 2008 by an implementing regulation.19 The FLEGT
Regulation allows indeed for the control of the entry of timber to the EU market from
countries concluding with the EU bilateral FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agree-
ments (VPAs).20 Once agreed, the VPAs will include commitments and action from
both parties to halt trade in illegal timber, notably with a ‘licensing scheme’21 to
verify the legality of timber exported to the EU.22 The VPAs also promote better
17As stated in the Commission’s communication establishing it, the ratio of the Action Plan is to
address “the growing problem of illegal logging and the related trade” which is named as one of the
Commission’s priorities.
18Brack (2005), pp. 33–37.
19Commission Regulation (EC) 1024/2008 of 17 October 2008 laying down detailed measures for
the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 2173/2005 on the establishment of a FLEGT
licensing scheme for imports of timber into the European Community, OJ L 277/23 (2008).
20FLEGT Regulation, art. 4.1.
21Exporting countries commit themselves in particular to establish national licensing schemes that
verify the legality of their shipments of timber and timber products to the EU.
22The concept underlying such a scheme is that by granting ‘FLEGT licenses’ solely for timber
whose legality could be verified, illegal timber from partner countries can be excluded from the
European market. In one respect the VPAs system is similar to another trade scheme in which the
EU is heavily involved: the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), seeking to eliminate
trade in ‘conflict diamonds’. In a similar way that VPAs use FLEGT licenses to certify timber
(as legal) and restrict trade between VPAs countries and the EU to certified timber, the KPCS
certifies rough diamonds (as ‘conflict free’) and restricts participants to trading only in such
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enforcement of forest law and promote an inclusive approach involving civil society
and the private sector.23 Once a VPAs is in place, all covered timber and timber
products exported from a partner country into the EU24 have to comply with the
licensing system. The FLEGT Regulation formed the basis for a series of prolonged
negotiations of bilateral voluntary partnership agreements with major timber pro-
ducing countries.25 These VPAs contain detailed rules on the regulation of logging,
the enforcement of legislation, the licensing of timber by the exporting VPA country
as well as on the monitoring and verification of the functioning in practice of the
system.26 If it can be ensured in this manner that the law is applied on paper and
enforced in practice throughout its territory, the exporting country can issue ‘FLEGT
licenses’ for shipment of timber destined to the EU market.27 The EU countries, in
their turn, in principle will accept the FLEGT licensed timber as proof of legality. A
functioning VPA relationship opens thus the EU doors for timber from exporting
countries.28
diamonds. However, it should be also recognized that there are at least two important differences
between the VPAs system and the KPCS. First, whereas the former regulates the timber trade only
between the EU and countries with which it has negotiated agreements, the KPCS prohibits
participants from trading rough diamonds with any country that does not meet the scheme’s
minimum requirements. Second, while these minimum requirements are all set forth by the
KPCS instrument, the FLEGT Regulation, on the other hand, provides a basic outline for VPAs
(requiring, for example, the establishment of a timber legality standard and certain institutional
structures) while most details are negotiated on an individual basis with partner countries.
23After the adoption of the FLEGT Regulation the European Commission has been given a mandate
from the Council of Ministers of the EU to conduct negotiations in view of concluding such FLEGT
VPAs. While the EU Commission is leading these negotiations, EU member States play a key role
in supporting the negotiations and implementation.
24Annex II of the FLEGT Regulation lists a number of categories of timber products that are to be
covered by all VPAs and their corresponding Harmonized System (HS) Tariff Classification
headings. Individual VPAs may cover additional timber and timber products.
25The first VPA to be signed was with the Ghana, followed by the Republic of Congo, Cameroon,
Indonesia, the Central African Republic and Liberia. Negotiations are ongoing with Côte d’Ivoire,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Guyana, Honduras, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand and
Vietnam.
26The loggers and other traders need to meet all applicable laws and regulations of the VPA country
that regulate origin and production process, subsequent processing, transport and trade activities.
The licensing authorities are to verify that the timber has been legally produced in accordance with
the applicable legislation.
27Indonesia was the first country in the world start issuing ‘FLEGT Licenses’ on the
15 November 2016.
28To date the VPA with Indonesia is, however, the only one that started operating (at the end
of 2016).
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2.2 The Second Pillar: The EU Timber Regulation (2010)
Few years after the adoption of the FLEGT Regulation, as it became clear that not all
major timber-producing countries were actually willing to conclude Voluntary
Partnership Agreements,29 existing EU instruments showed to be not very effective
in tackling illegal logging and trade. Therefore, the adoption of stronger measures to
this extent emerged as an urgent need. It was under these circumstances that on
20 October 2010 the Regulation 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the
Council (commonly named as ‘Timber Regulation’ and referred to by its acronym
EUTR) was adopted.30
2.2.1 The Regulatory Framework of the Timber Regulation
The Timber Regulation is as a matter of fact the second pillar the EU’s regulatory
framework on forest governance and, also, its most recent and significant addiction.
It aims, in general, to address the economic, social and environmental impacts of
illegal logging. For this reason, it lays down the obligations of operators who place
timber and timber products for the first time on the EU internal market.31
In particular, the Regulation counters the trade in illegally harvested timber and
timber products through three key obligations. First of all, it prohibits the introduc-
tion of such timber to the EU market. The prohibition is complemented in turn by
two sets of further obligations, imposed respectively on Member States and on
certain non-State actors that carry out timber-related economic activity in Europe,
that is ‘operators’ and ‘traders’. An ‘operator’ is defined in the Regulation’s Article
2 (c) as any natural or legal person who places timber or products thereof (for the first
time) on the European market.32 The same provision also defines ‘placing on the
market’ as the supply by any means, irrespective of the selling technique used, of
timber and timber products for the first time on the market. An ‘operator’ is to be
distinguished from a ‘trader’, who is any natural or legal person selling or buying
timber or timber products previously placed on the European market by operators.33
29As it was relatively easy to keep on putting illegally harvested timber on the EU market, the
conclusion of VPAs was not an urgent matter for these countries.
30Compare the Regulation’s Preamble, explicitly recognising that the scale and urgency of illegal
logging and related trade require “a complement to and strengthening of the system of VPAs”
(italics added).
31See Timber Regulation, art. 2 (a)–(b). Timber products covered by the Regulation are listed in the
Annex, with the corresponding HS Tariff Classification headings. For a comment, see Levashova
(2011) and among Italian scholars Di Stefano (2013).
32Timber Regulation, art. 2 (c).
33Timber Regulation, art. 2 (d). A Guidance Document, issued by the Commission in 2013,
contains more detailed definitions of terms used in the Timber Regulation: see EU Commission,
Guidance Document for the EU Timber Regulation September 2013 (hereinafter Commission’s
Guidance Document (2013) available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/forests/pdf/final%
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As to the prohibition established by the Regulation, it is the very core element of
its legislative framework. Article 4.1 prohibits the placing on the EU internal market
of ‘illegally harvested’ timber and products derived from such a timber. Hence, the
Regulation has in its essence significant extraterritorial effects, addressing issues and
concerns that took place outside the EU territory.34 Whether the timber is ‘legal’
depends indeed on whether it was harvested in accordance with the applicable
legislation in the country of harvest35 (even if it is not an EU country36). Specifically,
the prohibition under Article 4.1 applies (only) to timber and timber products
enumerated on a long list included into the Regulation’s Annex.37 Moreover,
according to Article 3 EUTR, two categories of timber are automatically considered
being legally harvested for the purpose of the Regulation. The first category includes
the timber embedded in timber products covered by VPAs (i.e. products originating
in a VPA partner country and listed in the VPA). If these products comply with the
requirements set out by the FLEGT Regulation and corresponding implementing
provisions, they shall be considered to have been legally harvested. The second
category consists of timber that is from species listed in Annex (A, B or C) to EU
Regulation n. 338/97 (so called Wildlife Regulation38) and which comply with that
Regulation and corresponding implementing provisions. Such timber shall also be
considered to have been legally harvested.39
20Guidance%20document.pdf (last accessed 9 September 2017). The Guidance Document was
updated by the Commission in February 2016: see Commission notice of 12 February 2016, C
(2016) 755 final (hereinafter Commission’s Guidance Document (2016)) available at http://ec.
europa.eu/environment/forests/pdf/eutr_guidance.zip (last accessed 9 September 2017).
34See Ankersmit et al. (2012), p. 59. It is important to consider that the Regulation does not prohibit
importing illegally harvested timber as such; therefore, it is not, strictly speaking, a border measure.
However, it is worth nothing that, contrary to the text of the Timber Regulation, the above-
mentioned Commission’s Guidance Document uses the term ‘importing’ instead of ‘placing on
the market’.
35See Timber Regulation, art. 2 (e)–(h). In this respect, according to art. 2 (g) the elements of the
(national) legislation to be taken into account include: (1) the rights to harvest timber within legally
gazetted boundaries, (2) due payments and duties, (3) environmental and forest legislation, (4) legal
rights of third parties concerning land use and land tenure, and (5) trade and custom formalities.
36This may pose questions as to the WTO-consistency of the Regulation. On this point see Geraets
and Natens (2014).
37As mentioned above, instead of imposing a blanket prohibition on all timber or timber products,
the EUTR adopt a selective approach, specifying in its Annex which types of timber and timber
products are subject to the regulation’s prohibition.
38Council Regulation (EC) 338/1997 of 9 December 1996 on the protection of species of wild fauna
and flora by regulating trade therein, OJ L 61/1 (1997).
39The exemption of this category of timber from the EUTR’s application has to be seen within the
broader context of wildlife protection and taking into account that the 1973 Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is uniformly
implemented by means of the Wildlife Regulation in all EU Member countries. While CITES
encompasses three appendices (each of which contains a list of species and regulates their trade), the
Wildlife Regulation contains four categories of species (listed in Annexes A–D). For species listed
in its Annex A or B (corresponding to all CITES Appendix I and II species, some Appendix III
species and some non-CITES species) the conditions for trade established by the Wildlife Regula-
tion are more restrictive than those set forth by CITES.
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To realise the prohibition established by its Article 4.1 the Regulation imposes, as
mentioned above, two distinct sets of obligations on: (a) EU Member States, and
(b) the actors (‘operators’ and ‘traders’) involved in timber-related economic activity
in Europe. As far as Member States are concerned, they are required by the
Regulation first of all to designate at least one ‘Competent authority’ to implement
its provisions.40 These authorities are charged in particular with checking whether
operators fulfil their (due diligence) obligations41; they are however also required to
cooperate with each other, with the EU Commission and with governmental author-
ities in non-EU countries42 to ensure compliance with the Regulation.43 Further-
more, Member States are required to report to the Commission on the application of
the EUTR every 2 years, so to enable reviews of its effectiveness in order to make
legislative adjustment if deemed necessary.44 Finally, they are also entitled to adopt
(their own) penalties in cases of violations of the Regulation’s provisions.
With respect to the obligations applying to non-State economic actors, as men-
tioned they are fashioned for two (well-distinct) groups: i.e. ‘operators’ and ‘traders’.
The latter are required—merely—to ensure that the timber and timber products they
deal in can be traced along the supply chain. Therefore, ‘traders’must (simply) retain
records, going back at least 5 years, of (1) the operators and (where applicable) other
traders that have supplied their inventories, and (2) of any traders whom they have
supplied timber or timber products to.45 ‘Operators’, on their side, face more
demanding requirements under Article 4 of the Regulation. The companies who
place timber products on the EU market for the first time must indeed exercise ‘due
diligence’,46 to ensure that they do not place illegally harvested timber or timber
products on such a market.47 The Regulation provides that it is in fact up to the
companies placing timber on the internal marketplace to verify that the timber from
non-VPAs countries is ‘legal’; and it establishes, in this respect, what is described as
40See Timber Regulation, art. 7, and art. 10–12.
41In this respect, art. 10.5 of the Timber Regulation specifies that where following the checks
shortcomings have been detected by the competent authorities, they “may issue a notice of remedial
actions to be taken by the operator”. The same provision also provides that “depending on the nature
of the shortcomings detected, Member States may take immediate measures, including inter alia: a)
seizure of timber and timber products; b) prohibition of marketing of timber and timber products”.
42Through information sharing and other means.
43Timber Regulation, art. 12.
44Timber Regulation, art. 20. A third (however only optional) obligation is established for Member
countries by art. 13, under which these States may choose to facilitate non-State actor compliance
with the Regulation by sharing information on illegal logging and by offering legal and other
assistance.
45Timber Regulation, art. 5. The same provision states that any competent authority may request
these information to traders and they must be prepared to provide it.
46Timber Regulation art. 4.2.
47The fact that due diligence is only required to ‘operators’ represents a concession by the
Regulation’s drafters, who recognised that the due diligence provisions might prove quite burden-
some to ‘traders’, and wished to avoid imposing on them unnecessary administrative costs (see in
this respect article 4.2 of EUTR, at recital 15).
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a ‘due diligence system’ that these ‘operators’ must implement. Regardless of
whether the ‘operator’ itself or a monitoring organisation48 develops the due dili-
gence system,49 such a system must comprise three (key) elements: (1) information
gathering, (2) risk assessment and (3) risk mitigation. As to the first element of the
due diligence system, the Regulation demands in particular that the company
collects verifiable data on the origin of the timber. To this respect, relevant infor-
mation that ‘operators’ must collect and retain includes the supply chain tracking
data,50 but extends to the country and location of harvest, the quantity and descrip-
tion of each product (as well as the names of the tree species represented) and the
documents or other information which demonstrate that all timber in the operator’s
inventory has complied with the relevant laws of the country in which it was
harvested.51 As to the second component of the due diligence system—the risk
assessment procedure—the Regulation establishes that, depending on the circum-
stances existing in the country, ‘operators’ must analyse and evaluate the likelihood
that the timber they introduce to the market was harvested illegally. In this respect,
the Regulation provides a list of specific risk assessment criteria to consider; but the
list in non-exhaustive and additional criteria may be considered if they help to
48The Regulation at its art. 8 provides for ‘Monitoring organisations’ (to be) recognised by the
European Commission. These organisations, which are private entities, are established to provide
EU ‘operators’ with operational due diligence systems. ‘Operators’ can thus develop their own
system of due diligence or use one developed by a monitoring organisation.
49The fact that in art. 4.3 the Regulation gives ‘operators’ the choice to either maintain and apply
their own due diligence system, or to use a due diligence system maintained by a recognized
‘monitoring organisation’ is (perhaps) another effort to lower the compliance costs. This flexibility
mechanism is especially important, because the Regulation does not specify which laws an
‘operator’ must be familiar with to ensure that timber and timber products were harvested legally;
it simply lists—as mentioned—the legislative areas that contain the particular laws that must be
adhered to. Moreover, monitoring organisations may be better positioned than ‘operators’ to follow
legal developments in multiple timber-exporting countries. The EUTR also provides in art. 8 the
criteria to be followed in granting recognition to monitoring organisations, sets out the requirements
they must follow and establishes a protocol by which competent authorities must audit monitoring
organisations and (where necessary) withdraw recognition. Further details on the process of
recognizing and withdrawing recognition from monitoring organisations are provided by the
clarifying Commission Regulation 363/2012 of 23 February 2012, OJ L115/12 (2012) (hereinafter
Commission Regulation 363/2012); while further direction as to the frequency and nature of the
audits that must be conducted of monitoring organisations (and as to the detailed rules concerning
the due diligence system) are provided by a second clarifying regulation, Commission Regulation
607/2012 of 6 July 2012, OJ L177/16 (2012) (hereinafter Commission Regulation 607/2012) on
which see also below.
50That is, name and address of the supplier to the operator and name and address of the trader to
whom the timber and timber products have been supplied.
51Timber Regulation, art. 6.1 (a). Similar to ‘traders’, ‘operators’ are under the obligation to keep
relevant information for 5 years and available to competent authorities upon request.
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determine the likelihood of illegal harvest.52 The final element of the due diligence
system is the risk mitigation procedure. Any risk identified at the risk assessment
stage that is not ‘negligible’53 must be mitigated by ‘operators’ by using measures
that are ‘adequate’ and ‘proportionate’.54 These measures could include requiring
additional information, third-party verification, or other actions.
‘Operators’ and ‘traders’ that violate their obligations under the Regulation are
subject to penalties. These may include fines, seizure of inventory and suspension of
the authorization to trade.55 The Regulation further specifies that penalties shall be
‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’56; the Regulation devolves however author-
ity to Member States to define their own penalties.57 Member States have indeed
wide discretion under the Regulation to choose both the form and the severity of the
penalties they will apply within their territory. Moreover, Member States must each
decide whether violations require a particular level of intent to warrant penalty. It is
obvious that penalty design may, in fact, strongly affect the level of risk that
operators are likely to embrace in choosing to deal in timber with a spectre of
illegality.58 The establishment of severe penalties by EU Member States would, in
turn, also provide a strong incentive for timber-exporting countries to negotiate
VPAs, to eliminate the uncertainty that operators face in deciding whether to deal
in their timber.
As to the scope of the Timber Regulation, it should be noted that if on the one
hand its provisions covers all companies that put timber on the EU market for the
first time (no matter whether they are transnational companies, small companies or
medium sized enterprises), on the other hand the scope of the Regulation is limited
however in other ways. Indeed, only certain types of timber and timber products are
52See Timber Regulation, art. 6.1 (b). The first group of criteria that must be considered is the
information collected at the information-gathering stage, which is specific to the timber or timber
product at issue. The second category of criteria concerns the context where the harvesting took
place. With respect to this context, the specific criteria for the risk assessment enumerated in art. 6.1
(b) are: (a) assurance of compliance with applicable legislation (which may include certification or
other third-party-verified schemes covering compliance with such legislation); (b) prevalence of
illegal harvesting of specific tree species; (c) prevalence of illegal harvesting (or practices) in the
country of harvest (and/or in the sub-national region where the timber was harvested), including
consideration of prevalence of armed conflicts; (d) presence of sanctions on timber trade by the UN
Security Council or the Council of the EU; and (e) complexity of the supply chain of the particular
timber or timber product at issue.
53‘Negligible’ is not defined in the Timber Regulation; but (as we will see) it does so the above
mentioned Guidance Document for the EUTR released by the Commission in September 2013 and
revised in February 2016.
54See Timber Regulation, art. 6.1 (c).
55See Timber Regulation, art. 19.
56See Timber Regulation, art. 19.2.
57See Timber Regulation, art. 19.
58The establishment by Member States of severe penalties, eventually combined with the possibility
that operators could be found liable for mere negligent violations (or—even—on the basis of strict
liability) could significantly chilly timber imports from sources with even a hint of illegality.
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covered by its provisions,59 while (too) many products made out of timber
(i.e. printed papers—such as books, magazines and newspapers, clothes hangers,
seats, tools and musical instruments) are exempted from the Regulation.60
As a whole, the regulatory framework established by the Timber Regulation is
clearly devoted to increase the proportion of legally harvested timber on the inter-
national market by incentivising timber-exporting countries to stop illegality with a
view to facilitating access to the (lucrative) European market. The crucial instrument
employed by the Timber Regulation to achieve this target (the prohibition on the
introduction for the first time of illegal timber to the EU internal market) is an
important rule lending itself to easy application. However, was it to stand alone, the
prohibition would admittedly only be of very limited utility. Unless indeed a court in
a timber-exporting country was to declare timber in a particular shipment (or timber
originating from a particular concession) to be illegal, it would be quite difficult for
European courts deciding disputes arising under the Timber Regulation to determine
the legal status of such timber. The latter courts are indeed not only quite unfamiliar
with foreign laws (those of the exporting countries) and probably (often) also unable
to read many of such laws in their original language, but also geographically far from
the relevant evidence. Moreover, as courts in developing countries (from which most
of internationally traded wood is harvested) only rarely weigh in on the legality of
harvested timber, European courts will not be able (either) to simply apply foreign
legal rulings. Hence, the EUTR’s provision on due diligence (which specify in what
manner illegality has to be determined) is—as a matter of fact—very crucial to
actualising the import prohibition. By enforcing the Regulation’s due diligence
provision, instead of relying on (quite unlikely) rulings by courts in timber-exporting
countries, the EU member States’ courts can make use (and in fact, as we will see,
they are recently actually starting making use) of other evidence in deciding whether
the timber entering the EU market has been legally harvested.
2.2.2 The Commission’s Delegated and Implementing Regulations
(2012)
The Timber Regulation also provides for the adoption of delegated and
implementing measures by the Commission aiming, respectively, at supplementing
the Regulation’s content and at ensuring its uniform implementation by Member
countries. Consequently, following consultation with relevant stakeholders, in
February and July 2012 the Commission adopted two acts of secondary legislation
59Such as, solid wood products, flooring, plywood, pulp and paper. As already mentioned, the
timber products covered by the Regulation are listed in its Annex, using the EU Customs code
nomenclature.
60On this point see, for instance, Drew C., Barker T. (2016) Analysis of potential European Union
Timber Regulation scope changes. WWF Report, illustrating that 67% (by value, and 20% by
volume) of products that contain or may contain wood do not fall under the scope of the Regulation.
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on the Regulation 995/2010, to complete its regulatory framework on specific issues
on which implementation guidance seemed to be necessary and useful.61
Particularly, on 23 February 2012, in the light of the power recognised under
EUTR’s Articles 6, 8 and 14 and in accordance with article 290 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),62 the Commission adopted the dele-
gated regulation 363/2012 establishing the (procedural) rules for its recognition and
withdrawal of recognition of national monitoring organisations. Moreover, in line
with EUTR’s Preamble (recital 29) and in order to ensure uniform condition for
implementation, on 6 July of the same year the Commission also adopted its
implementing regulation n. 607/2012. It includes detailed rules both on the fre-
quency and nature of the checks by Member States’ competent authorities on the
monitoring organisations (to verify that they comply with the requirement of the
Regulation) and on the risk assessment and risk mitigation measures which are part
of the ‘due diligence system’.63
With respect to the latter measures (the most relevant to our analysis), Article 2 of
the Commission’s implementing Regulation specifies that operators have to apply
the due diligence system “to each specific type of timber or timber product supplied
by a particular supplier within a period not exceeding 12 months, provided that the
tree species, the country or countries of harvest or, where applicable, the
sub-national region(s) and concession(s) of harvest remain unchanged”. Article
3 clarifies, in its turn, in which cases further information needs to be provided by
operators on (a) the full scientific name of tree species, (b) the sub-national region
where the timber was harvested and (c) the concession of harvest. Finally, Article
4 specifies the criteria that certification or other third-party verified schemes referred
to in the second paragraph of Article 6.1 (b) and in Article 6.1 (c) have to meet to be
taken into account in the risk assessment and risk mitigation procedures.
2.2.3 The Commission’s Guidance Document for the Timber Regulation
(2013, 2016)
During the consultation process for elaborating the Commission’s secondary acts on
Timber Regulation and after holding numerous bilateral meeting (with stakeholders,
61Under such a perspective, in March and April 2011 two stakeholder meetings were held in
particular to discuss different options and best practices for the recognition of monitoring organi-
sations. The two meetings were also an occasion to exchange views on best options for risk
assessment and risk mitigation procedures.
62See EUTR’s Preamble, at recital 28 (“The Commission should be empowered to adopt delegated
acts in accordance with article 290 of the TFEU concerning the procedures for the recognition and
withdrawal of recognition of monitoring organisations, concerning further relevant risk assessment
criteria that may be necessary to supplement those already provided for in this Regulation and
concerning the list of timber and timber products to which the Regulation applies”, italics added).
63On the implementing powers conferred in this respect on the Commission see the EUTR’s
Preamble, at recital 29.
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experts from Member States and members of the FLEGT Committee64), a common
view emerged that not all issues regarding the EU Timber Regulation could ade-
quately be addressed in the secondary legislation. This for a number of reasons, such
as (inter alia): (a) the limits in scope of the Commission’s implementing powers,
(b) the risk to restrict operators unnecessarily, by setting up a (too) rigid due
diligence system, (c) the risk to obviate their responsibility to adequately exercise
due diligence. Hence, it was agreed that a guidance document was necessary to
better address the outstanding issues related to the EUTR and its non-legislative acts
that had emerged as being in need for further clarification.
Consequently, the Guidance Document for the EU Timber Regulation65 was
published by the Commission in September 2013, after being discussed and elabo-
rated with the assistance of the FLEGT Committee.
The document contains a series of guidelines, clarifications and definitions on ten
issues included in as many chapters.66 They are preceded by an introduction
(illustrating the possible role and legal relevance of these guidelines for States and
operators) and are followed by two Annexes.67 The list of issues covered by the
Guidance document is considered by the Commission as ‘open’ to be eventually
revised (that is, to be further expanded and supplemented) in the light of the
experience made in the application of the Timber Regulation.68
64The FLEGT Committee includes officials of EU countries and works with the Commission
(article 11 FLEGT Regulation (2005)).
65Commission’s Guidance Document (2013).
66These are: (1) the definition of ‘placing on the market’ (relevant to art. 2 EUTR); (2) the definition
of ‘negligible risk’ (art. 6 (c) EUTR); (3) the clarification of ‘complexity in the supply chain’ (art.
6 (b) EUTR); (4) the clarification of the documents showing timber’s compliance with applicable
legislation of the exporting country (art. 2 (f)–(h) and art. 6.1 (a) EUTR); (5) the clarification of the
product scope of packaging materials (as referred to in art. 2 (a) EUTR and in its Annex), and of the
“waste” and “recovered” products (as referred to in recital 11 and in art. 12 EUTR); (6) the role of
third parties verified schemes in the process of risk assessment and risk mitigation (recital 9 of
Preamble and art. 6 EUTR, art. 4 Commission’s implementation regulation n. 607/2012); (7) the
regular evaluation of the due diligence system (art. 4 EUTR); (8) the concept of ‘composite
products’ (art. 6.1 EUTR), (9) the concept of ‘forest sector’ (art. 2 EUTR); (10) the treatment of
CITES and FLEGT-licensed timber (art. 3 EUTR).
67The two Annexes contain, respectively, an illustration of how the interpretation of ‘placing on the
market’ provided by the guidelines would apply in practice and examples of information on
‘composite products’ that operators are required to collect under the due diligence system.
68Consequently, in February 2016 (3 years after the EUTR’s entry into application on 3 March
2013) the Commission published, as mentioned, a revised version of the Guidance Document for
the EU Timber Regulation: see Commission’s Guidance Document (2016).
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As for the Guidance’s chapters most relevant to our analysis, the document
for instance defines important terms of the Timber Regulation (e.g. ‘placing
on the market’69 and ‘negligible risk’70), gives examples of cases in which
a company would be considered an ‘operator’71 and clarifies around the
documents showing timber’s compliance with applicable legislation,72 ‘complexity
69According to the definition provided for in this respect by chapter 4 of the Guidance, timber is
considered to be ‘placed on the market’ if it is (simultaneously) supplied: (a) “on the internal
market” (which means that “timber must be physically present in the EU, either harvested there or
imported and cleared by customs for free circulation. . .”), (b) “for the first time” (given that timber
products already placed on the EU market or derived from timber products already placed on such a
market are not covered by the Regulation) and (c) “in the course of a commercial activity” (that is,
“for the purpose of processing or for distribution to commercial or non-commercial consumers or
for use in the business of the operator itself”). Consequently, according to the Guidance ‘placing on
the market’ should be understood as occurring “when an operator first makes timber or timber
products available on the EU market for distribution or for use in the course of his commercial
activity”. Moreover, to enable clear, logical and consistent identification of the ‘operators’ involved
in the ‘placing’ on the EU internal market, the same chapter of the Guidance first recognises that “it
is necessary to define ‘operators’ according to how their timber is made available on such market”
(which vary depending on whether the timber is harvested inside or outside the EU); then provides
for three different definitions in this respect (1) for timber harvested within the EU, (2) for timber
harvested outside the EU, and (3) for timber or timber products imported to the EU. Finally, it
underlines that all ‘operators’ (whether EU or non-EU based) must comply with the prohibition on
placing illegally harvested timber on the market and the obligation to exercise due diligence.
Furthermore, in Annex I a series of examples outlining how the interpretation of ‘placing on the
market’ works in practice is included.
70Chapter 6 defines it as a finding that “no cause for concern can be discerned” following a full risk
assessment. Admittedly, in spite of the non-legally binding nature of the Commission’s guidelines,
courts might well find this definition very useful when interpreting the EUTR in the course of a
litigation. More in general, on the actual relevance of the Commission’s guidelines in recent case-
law on EUTR see amplius below.
71See for details Annex I to the Guidance Document (2013).
72Chapter 4 specifies that such documents must be collected “for the purpose of the risk assessment
and should not be viewed as a self-standing requirement”. It also provides that “the obligation to
obtain documents (or other information) should be interpreted broadly”, as different regulatory
regimes exist in different countries and not all of them require issuing specific documentation.
Therefore, according to the Guidance such obligation “should be read as including: ì) official
documents issued by competent authorities, ii) documents demonstrating contractual obligations,
iii) documents showing company policies, iv) codes of conducts; v) certificates issued by third party
verified schemes, etc. . . .”.
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of the supply chain’,73 ‘the role of third parties verified schemes’74 and ‘composite
products’.75
With respect to the scope and content of the revision made to the Guidance
Document in 2016 by the Commission in the light of the experience made in the first
3 years of application of the Regulation, the updated version presents some inter-
esting amendments and additions when compared to the previous 2013 edition. In
the revised text the main modified elements include, in particular: (1) the clarification
of the requirements for documents showing timber’s compliance with applicable
legislation,76 and (2) the treatment of CITES-unlisted timber products made of
CITES-listed species77; while the additions concern: (3) a new chapter on the
treatment of Agents,78 and (4) a new chapter on the treatment of Monitoring
organisations.79
As to particularly the issue of the requirements for the documents showing
timber’s compliance with the country of harvest’s legislation, the updated Commis-
sion’s Guidance provides for important details. It establishes first of all that, in order
to be able to exercise due diligence in accordance with Article 6.1 of EUTR
operators “must be able to evaluate the context and reliability of the documents
they collect [as well as] to show they understand the links between the different
information in the documents”. It also requires operators to assess these documents
“as a whole, with traceability throughout the supply chain” as well as to check
“whether the different documents are in line with each other. . ., what exactly each
document proves. . .and the reliability and validity of each document (meaning the
likelihood of it being falsified or issued unlawfully). . .”. Second, operators are (very
significantly) required “to take into account the risk of corruption specifically in
relation to the forestry sector. . .”; and, in cases where such a risk is not negligible,
according to the guidelines “even official documents issued by authorities cannot be
considered reliable” by operators. Furthermore, recognising that various sources
provide generally available information about the level of corruption in a country
73In EUTR art. 6 complexity of supply chain is explicitly listed among the risk assessment criteria
and it is therefore relevant to the risk assessment and risk mitigation part of the due diligence
exercise. The Guidance Document in its chapter 3 stresses that the timber tracking back to its place
of harvest may be more difficult if the supply chain is complex and that “failure to establish
necessary information at any point in the supply chain can increase the possibility of illegally
harvested timber entering the chain”. However, it also underlines that “it is not the length of the
supply chain that makes it difficult to identify the information requires by art. 6.1 (a)-(b) EUTR” and
that the complexity of the supply chain in fact “increases with the number of processors and
middlemen between the place of harvest and the operator. . . or when more than one species or
timber sources are used in the product”. The Guidance also includes a list of questions, which
operators might use in order to assess the complexity of the supply chain.
74See for details Guidance Document (2013) at Chapter 6.
75See Guidance Document (2013) at chapter 8.
76Cf. the revised Guidance document (2016), at chapter 4.
77Cf. the revised Guidance document (2016), at chapter 10 b.
78Revised Guidance document (2016), chapter 11.
79Revised Guidance document (2016), chapter 12.
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(e.g. the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index—CPI) and that
“a low CPI shows that further verification may be required (meaning that special
care is necessary when checking the documents as there might be a reason to doubt
their credibility). . .”, the Guidance Document stresses that “the higher the risk of
corruption in a specific case, the more it is necessary to get additional evidence to
mitigate the risk of illegal timber entering the EU market. . .”.80 Admittedly, these
elucidations significantly specify and ‘operationalize’ (the actual content of) the
‘risk-based’ due diligence obligation that EUTR establishes for the operators of the
timber sector interested in placing for the first time their timber on the EU internal
market.
Relevant clarification on EUTR’s provisions is also included in the (new) chapter
on the treatment of agents, when defining the possible role of these actors and their
position with respect to the obligations established by the Regulation’s Articles 2, 6
and 10. It is clarified indeed that in the timber industry the ‘agent’81 may act in the
behalf of the supplier or of the buyer and may be also based in a different country of
that of the importers; but that in all cases the contractual partners are the supplier and
the buyers, while the agent is (only) an intermediary. Moreover, taking into account
that some agents may be unable or unwilling to share certain detail of their contacts
or supply chain with the importer (often for commercial reasons), it is recognised
that in such cases importers may in fact be “prevented from accessing the basic
information necessary to exercise due diligence” as required for operators under the
EUTR. In relation to the operators’ due diligence requirements under EUTR, the
Guidance document clarifies however that these requirements “remain the same
regardless of whether or not they use an agent”; and that if an agent who provides
timber to an operator “is unable or unwilling to provide sufficient information for
that operator to exercise satisfactory due diligence, the operator should alter its
supply lines to be able to do so”. Furthermore, as to the responsibility of national
competent authorities under EUTR to carry out checks on operators, the document
stresses that such responsibility “is not affected by the involvement of an agent. . .
[and] the operator should still be checked by the competent authority of the country
in which the timber is placed on the market”. Finally, in case an operator is supplied
with timber via an agent based in a different country, the Commission’s document
clarifies that the competent authorities responsible on the operator “may wish to
cooperatewith the competent authority, or other authorities, in the country where the
agent is based, or elsewhere”.82
As regards finally the implementation of EUTR’s Article 8, Article 8 of the
Commission Regulation 363/2012 and Article 6 of the Commission Regulation
80See the revised Guidance document (2016), at chapter 4, p. 7 (italics added). Examples of such
additional evidence provided for by the Guidance document include: third-party-verified schemes,
independent or self-conducted audits or timber-tracking technologies (e.g., with genetic markers or
with stable isotopes).
81Defined as a representative working in the name of, and for the account of, a principal to a
contract.
82See the revised Guidance document (2016), at chapter 11, pp. 13–14 (italics added).
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607/2012, the (new) chapter 12 of the Commission’s Guidance provides details on
the use by operators of ‘due diligence certificates’ in third countries.83 The Guidance
significantly stresses indeed that “receiving such a certificate does not relieve an
operator to exercise due diligence as described under art. 6 EUTR” and that if a
monitoring organisation (or its non-EU sister company) issues such a certificate, it
“should specify that this does not relieve the operator of the due diligence obliga-
tion”. The above-mentioned certificate may however “be used as a part of a due
diligence system, similar to other documents that show compliance (e.g. legality
assurance system certificates). . .” and, in this case, the operator “should establish
precisely what the certificate certifies and the frequency of checks as part of their due
diligence”. Moreover, according to the Guidance Document the operator “should
also have a contact point at the company that performs the check” in case of further
questions or need to verify the certificates’ validity.84
Coming to the legal nature of the Commission’s Guidance Document, it is worth
mentioning that the same document’s Introduction explicitly indicates that the
Guidance does not have in itself a legally-binding effect, its (sole) purpose being
rather “to provide explanations on certain aspects of the EU Timber Regulation and
the two Commission non-legislative acts”. It also specifies that the document “does
not replace, add or amend anything to the provisions of the Regulation n. 995/2010,
the Commission Regulations n. 363/2012 and 607/2012, which constitute the legal
basis to be applied”.85 With respect to the possible role of the Guidance the
Introduction, after having clarified that the issues it addresses “should not be
considered is isolation as they, rather, must be used in conjunction with the legisla-
tion [they refers to]”, adds that the whole document can certainly “be a useful
reference material for everyone who will have to comply with the EUTR”, as it
provides important elucidations on parts of the legislative text that are or may be
difficult to understand. On the other hand, the document may also “serve to guide
national competent authorities and enforcement bodies in the process of implemen-
tation and enforcement of this legislative package”.86 A point, the latter, on which
we will come back when discussing on recent (first) national case-law on Timber
Regulation.
In the light of the above it is self-evident that, notwithstanding the non-legally
binding nature of the Commission’s Guidance Document, the clarifications and
details it provides for (to the provisions of EUTR’s legislative framework in general
83The issue arises from the fact that some operators have been presented with certificates issued by
non-EU sister companies of monitoring organisations and in some cases the operators (seem to)
have been informed that these certificates relieve them from the obligation to exercise due diligence;
but, the legislation does not explicitly address the treatment of such certificates.
84See the revised Guidance document (2016), at chapter 12, pp. 14–15 (italics added).
85Commission’s Guidance Document (2013), p. 1.
86Commission’s Guidance Document (2013), italics added. See also footnote 1 at p. 1 of the revised
Guidance document (2016) (stating however that “Nothing in this guidance document either
replaces or substitutes direct reference to the instruments described”, and reiterating also that
“only the European Court of Justice can make final judgments on the Regulation’s interpretation”).
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and to those of its due diligence system in particular) significantly specify, elucidate
and ‘operationalize’ the content of such framework. Consequently, in the light of the
Commission’s guidelines the EUTR’s regulatory framework seems to be better (and
possibly more uniformly) implementable and enforceable for—respectively—
operators and national competent authorities on the one hand and for national courts
on the other. This is particularly relevant, as far as our analysis is concerned, with
respect to the elucidation and detailing of the obligations of the due diligence system,
which are crucial as mentioned for the very effectiveness of the whole EUTR’s
legislative framework.
2.3 The Role of the Timber Regulation Within the EU’s
and International Anti-Illegal Logging Legislative
Framework and Its Possible Relevance for Other
Regulatory Regimes
Before discussing in next paragraph recent EUTR implementation practice as
emerging from its periodical evaluation made by the EU Commission in the light
of Member countries’ biennial reports, some brief remarks seem to be useful on the
role and importance of the Timber Regulation as a regulatory instrument. This both
within the EU’s and international anti-illegal logging legislative system and—also—
as a model for other regimes equally trying to promote sustainable development and
human rights protection in the EU trade with other countries.
The entry into application of the Timber Regulation in March 2013 completes, as
a matter of fact, the EU’s anti-illegal logging regulatory framework inaugurated by
the FLEGT Action Plan and further developed by the FLEGT Regulation with the
establishment of its first (voluntary) pillar, based—as mentioned—on the bilateral
VPAs mechanism. The introduction in such a framework, by the Timber Regulation,
of a second (binding) pillar based on a unilateral trade prohibition measure and—
above all—on a mandatory due diligence system for the operators placing timber
and timber products on the EU internal market, gives rise indeed to the most
comprehensive legislative efforts to combat illegal logging in the world.
The very relevance of the Timber Regulation within the EU legislative framework
on forest governance in general and in that against illegal logging in particular
emerges, first, from the fact that it reduces the proportion of illegally harvested
timber on the EU market (by incentivizing third States to stop illegality with a view
to access the EU market). In this way, EUTR contributes to overcome the limits of
effectiveness shown by the EU anti-illegal logging regime when only based on its
VPAs pillar.87 Secondly, by prohibiting the placing on the EU market for the first
time of illegal timber and imposing on non-State economic actors of the timber
87Given, as mentioned, the very limited interest of timber-exporting countries in entering into these
agreements in absence of an explicit prohibition to place ‘illegal timber’ on the EU internal market.
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sector a due diligence obligation the EUTR also creates an actual (though indirect)
positive incentive for timber-exporting countries to negotiate partnership agreements
with the EU in order to benefit (via the emission of the related ‘FLEGT license’) of
an automatic and ‘preferential’ access to the EU internal market for their timber. In
such a way, the EUTR not only complete the EU anti-illegal logging regulatory
system but it also contributes to the further development of such system, by creating
the factual condition for a strong interest of third (timber-exporting) countries in the
negotiation of VPAs with the EU.
Moreover, the EUTR’s normative package also adds a significant value to the
international framework on forest governance. This in terms of contribution it
provides both to the efforts to halt deforestation and forest degradation, conserve
biodiversity, reduce desertification and address climate change; and—also—to those
aimed at reducing the economic and social impacts of illegal logging. At the same
time, taking into account that—as already mentioned—the EU is a highly significant
market for trade in timber worldwide, its legislative framework aimed at preventing
the introduction of ‘illegally harvested’ timber to the EU internal market has a
(potentially) significant relevance also in terms of actual reduction of the global
scale of such a trade at the international level.
A further point of relevance of the Timber Regulation within the international
regulatory regime on forest governance arises from the fact that, as explicitly
recognized by the Regulation’s Preamble, in several timber-exporting countries
(above all those where national legislation against illegal logging is either not
adequate or not effectively implemented and enforced) trade in illegally harvested
timber can also indirectly fuel armed conflicts.88 Under such a perspective the EUTR
provides the EU with the opportunity to play a role not only in the promotion of
economic development in the countries exporting timber to the EU internal market
but also—indirectly—in the political stability and security of these countries.
As to the peculiar relevance of EUTR as a regulatory instrument, it relates to the
fact that the Timber Regulation is the first EU legislative instrument establishing due
diligence obligations on the operators of a specific economic sector. In other words,
EUTR is the first regulatory instrument that finally fosters a ‘good governance
model’ of harvesting in third (timber exporting) countries by making binding a
due diligence system on the timber trading companies interested in placing their
(timber) products on the EU internal market. Moreover, it is worth noting that the
88Above all in certain highly ‘fragile States’ (that is, politically unstable and economically back-
ward African countries—such as the Democratic Republic of Congo or the Central African
Republic), where illegal timber harvesting and the related trade are often a significant financing
instrument for armed groups (with or without the involvement of transnational organized crime
networks and, possibly, of terrorist groups): see Lawson S (2014) Illegal Logging in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Chatham House Energy, Environment and Resources Paper PP 2014/03,
Global Witness (2017) The EU’s Responsibility to Act on Conflict Timber. Briefing, June 2017
(available at https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/eus-responsibility-act-conflict-timber-new-
framework-action/ last accessed 3 September 2017), and Global Witness (2015) Blood Timber.
Report, July 2015 (available at: www.globalwitness.org/en-gb/campaigns/forests/bloodtimber/ last
accessed 3 September 2017).
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EUTR’s (sectorial) regulatory framework of forest governance is based on (and
turns around) a risk-basedmandatory system of due diligence, which—as a matter of
fact—anticipates and preludes to the adoption at the global level (by the United
Nations through their 2011 Guiding Principles on business and human rights89) of an
international standard of due diligence equally based on the risk of human rights
adverse impacts (though non-legally binding).
Last (but not least), as a sectorial binding instrument aimed at promoting envi-
ronmentally sustainable development, economic growth, social benefits, political
stability and therefore security in the countries exporting timber to the (highly
lucrative) EU internal market, the Timber Regulation can certainly be—even—a
significant and useful ‘regulatory model’ for other EU regimes that are equally aimed
at promoting these values through trade. The most significant parallel that may be
drawn in this respect is that with the case of conflict minerals, a sector where—as it is
well known—the EU is at present actively engaged in the development and imple-
mentation of a legislative framework aiming (via a due diligence obligation on
importers) both at preventing fueling conflicts and serious human rights violations
and at promoting sustainable economic development in mineral-rich countries.90
Further relevant fields where the EUTR legislative regime could play an ‘exemplary
role’ may be those of biofuels91 and palm oil.92
89United Nations (2011), ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (developed by the Special Represen-
tative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other
business enterprises and included in UNSRSG Final report to the Human Rights Council—A/HRC/
17/31). The UN Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles in its resolution 17/4 of
16 June 2011.
90Regulation (EU) 821/2017 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying
down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their
ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, OJ L 130/1 (2017). See for a
comment Grado (2019); van der Velde S (2017) The End of Conflict Minerals on the EU Market?
ASSER Policy Brief No 3 2017-01, Asser Institute, March 2017.
91Directive (EU) 1513/2015 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015
amending Directive (EC) 70/1998 relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending
Directive (EC) 28/2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 239/1
(2015).
92Regulation (EU) 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on
the provision of food information of food information to consumers, OJ L 304/18 (2011).
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3 EUTR Implementing Practice 5 Years After Its Entry into
Application: Where Do We Are?
The EU Timber Regulation entered into application on 3March 2013. Since then it is
legally binding on all EU Member States, which are consequently responsible for
laying down effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties and for enforcing its
provisions.93
In accordance with EUTR’s Article 20, in 2015 the Commission completed its
(first) review of the Regulation’s effectiveness during its first 2 years of
implementation.94 The outcomes of such review were included in an ad hoc report
released on 18 February 2016.95
The Commission’s report finds that, generally speaking, the EU is on track to
achieve its objectives to combat illegal logging and associated trade in illegal timber,
though (some specific) challenges remain. Among the positive trends actually visible
the Commission namely mentions the fact that EU operators are gradually taking
steps to ensure the legality of their suppliers and that there is more awareness of the
problem of illegal logging amongst EU consumers.96 Moreover, the Regulation
seems to have also encouraged producer countries to develop systems assessing
compliance with the requirements of the legislation. However, according to the
report more effort is needed from both Member States and the private sector, to
ensure effective and efficient application of the Regulation.97
More specifically, it emerges from the report that since 2014 there has been
significant progress in the implementation of Timber Regulation across the
EU. While indeed in July 2014 there were 18 non-compliant Member States, in
June 2015 the number was reduced to 4 (Greece, Hungary, Romania and Spain).
Moreover, against these persistent non-compliant Member States in 2015 the
93A table with information (as at 22 February 2017) on the state of implementation of the
Regulation by EU Member countries (showing whether and how they comply with their obliga-
tions) can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/forests/pdf/EUTR_implementation_score
board_22_02_17.pdf last accessed 15 September 2017. The table does not include, however, an
assessment whether the penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of the Regulation
laid down by the Member States are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
94The implementation review was made on the basis of Member States’ biennial reports and inputs
received through a public consultation and direct contacts with a broad range of stakeholders
(including private sector and civil society). The results of the consultation are publicly available
at the link http://ec.europe.eu/environment/forests/eutr_report.htm, where the individual Member
States’ implementation reports are also available. The latter reports cover however only the period
March 2013–March 2015 (while the progress recorded after March 2015 is not included).
95EU Commission, ‘EUTR Implementation Report’ of 18.2.2016, COM (2016) 74 final (equally
available at http://ec.europe.eu/environment/forests/eu-report.htm). According to EUTR’s art.
20, the results of the evaluation will be used by the Commission to further improve the implemen-
tation and application of the Regulation.
96EUTR Implementation Report, at p. 4.
97EUTR Implementation Report, at p. 12.
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Commission launched infringement procedures. Further infringement procedures
have been recently also opened against Slovak (April 2017) and Belgium
(October 2017).
4 Recent National EUTR Case Law: Signals of an
Emerging ‘Due Diligence Jurisprudence’?
Three years after it came into application, the Timber Regulation started showing its
‘teeth’ as to the actual enforcement of its provisions at the national level, with the
appearance in 2016 of the first court cases on the Regulation before the national
judges of the EU member countries. Several courts in EU member States98 have
indeed recently recognised99 that the due diligence obligation had not been ade-
quately implemented by operators100 importing timber or timber products from third
countries to the EU internal market.101 A brief overview of this case-law (and of
some relevant decisions adopted by national competent authorities) is useful not only
to highlight some interesting points that are starting to emerge from the evaluation by
national judges of both EUTR’s provisions and of its implementing legislation, but
also to identify possible trends arising from such recent case-law (and decisions).
Some interesting Swedish enforcement cases concern teak imports to the EU
internal market from Myanmar, a large timber-exporting country whose forest
legislation and harvesting practices have been often heavily criticised by NGOs.102
98I.e. Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, France and Great Britain.
99In cases brought before them by national timber-importing companies sanctioned by governmen-
tal competent authorities for violating EUTR’s provisions.
100As mentioned, according to EUTR and its implementing legislation and guidelines, the operators
should have ensured that the timber they trade in was logged in compliance with the legislation of
the country of harvest, should have provided extensive evidence of this (above all in countries of
harvesting prone to corruption) and should have adopted risk mitigation measures.
101Mainly, from Myanmar, Cameroon, Brazil and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
102In October 2016 the London based NGO Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), on the
basis of the findings and substantiated concerns emerged from its investigations on Myanmar’s teak
exports to the EU (see EIA (2016), Overdue Diligence. Teak export from Myanmar in breach of EU
rules, October 2016, available at https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/EIA-Overdue-
Diligence-FINAL.pdf), submitted legal complaints in five EU Member countries (Belgium, Den-
mark, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) on placements of Burmese teak from Myanmar into the
EU. These complaints regarded alleged insufficient due diligence process carried out by nine
operators under the EUTR. The EIA ascribed the lack of compliance to insufficient information
provided to the operators by the Myanmar Timber Enterprise (MTE). Moreover, in January 2017
EIA raised further substantiated concerns regarding also import of teak fromMyanmar by operators
in Belgium and the UK. Consequently to EIA’s complaints, the relevant competent national
authorities started investigating on the substantiated concerns raised by the EIA’s report on the
placement of teak from Myanmar into the EU. For instance, in March 2017 the Danish authorities
issued an injunction to all Danish operators importing from Myanmar; on 21 March 2017 the
German authorities issued an injunction to 11 companies known to have imported timber from
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First, on 5 October 2016 the Administrative Court of Jönköping confirmed the
decision by the Swedish competent Forest Agency (Skogsstyrelsen) to sanction a
timber-importing company (Almträ Nordic) for non-compliance with the due dili-
gence requirements under the EUTR when it imported teak from Myanmar.103 The
relevance of this first Swedish court case on EUTR arises from the fact that the
importer Almträ Nordic did possess a document (the so called ‘Green Folder’)
demonstrating that its timber complied with Myanmar’s forest legislation.104 How-
ever, despite formal possession of these papers, the Swedish Forest Authority was
not persuaded that the timber was actually ‘legally harvested’ in line with EUTR’s
provisions.105 Such distrust by the Forest Authority (and its consequent request to
Almträ Nordic of further evidence) was fully justified in fact by the many reports
showing that Myanmar exports huge amounts of illegally logged timber (possibly
with the ‘help’ of MTE’s employees)106; and it is also fully in line with the
Commission’s Guidance Document for the EUTR.107 Against the Court decision
no appeal was brought by Almträ Nordic, which rather announced it would stop its
(direct) import of timber from Myanmar. A second equally interesting Swedish case
on the enforcement of EUTR concerns a further recent initiative (March 2017) by the
Swedish competent Forest Agency. The latter first sent an injunction to a timber
Myanmar in recent years, informing them on the necessity to provide more detailed information on
the supply chain and proof. Furthermore, a search warrant was issued by the German Public
Prosecutor’s office in Kiel (for two shipyards in Rendsburg and Kiel, in order to aid investigation
into the use of teak fromMyanmar) while in April 2017 the same Prosecutor’s Office found that the
German shipyard Nobiskrug used illegally sourced teak in the construction of “Sailing Yatch A”. At
the time of writing, national competent authorities (or, as we will see, even courts) in the
Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, Germany and the UK have ruled that teak imports
from Myanmar are unable to comply with EUTR. Cases submitted by EIA to national competent
authorities are still pending in Italy and Spain. On 5 October 2017, the Italian competent authority
(Ministry of Agricultural, Food and Forestry Policies, Ministero delle politiche agricole, alimentari
e forestali MIPAAF) issued a guidance document specifically aimed at assisting operators and
control authorities in the proper interpretation of EUTR’s provisions—and particularly those of its
due diligence system—in relation to the import of timber from Myanmar (‘Guidelines for direct
import of wood from Myanmar’).
103Förvaltningsrätten Jönköping (Administrative Court Jönköping), case n. 2985-16, Almträ Nordic
AB v. Skogsstyrelsen) 5 October 2016.
104These folders are compiled by the company Myanmar Forest Products Merchants’ Federation
(MFPMF) and include the permits issued by the State-owned companyMyanmar Timber Enterprise
(MTE, the sole official seller of timber and timber products from the country) and other official
documents.
105Even if the areas where timber had been harvested were identified by the ‘Green Folder’, the
latter according to the Forest Authority did not include the (required) documentation clearly
tracking the timber supply chain (from MTE back to the forest of harvest).
106See e.g. EIA (2016).
107As mentioned, the Commission Document clearly explains (inter alia) that shortcomings in
national governance significantly undermine the actual reliability of the documents proving com-
pliance with applicable national legislation of the country of harvesting; and that it is therefore
necessary “to take into account” the level of corruption existing in each specific country (see
Guidance Document (2016), p. 7). These were precisely the circumstances existing in Myanmar.
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importing company (Retlog) to mitigate the risk for a Thai product containing
Burmese teak; then—due to the lack of improvement of its due diligence
system—the authority prohibited the company from importing teak from
Myanmar.108 What makes this case interesting is that, though the importer (even)
hired Bureau Veritas to visit MTE with a view to clarifying the origin of the imported
teak, this was still not sufficient to demonstrate that the timber was legally harvested
as the visit did not provide any further information on the production process.109 The
Swedish Agency therefore (rightly) interprets and applies the due diligence rules of
EUTR110 in a way that makes more difficult for companies importing timber from
countries with high level of corruption.111
It is worth mentioning that following the Swedish developments on timber (teak)
imports to the EU market from Myanmar, the Danish authorities on 17 March 2017
released in their turn a formal injunction against all Danish operators, ordering them
to stop introducing into the country’s market Myanmar’s teak.112 On the same day
the Myanmar Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation
(MONREC) reacted to these developments, by a statement recognising that their
current country system may be complex for external parties and may also present
challenges for operators to demonstrate the chain of custody required for due
diligence under the EU Timber Regulation. The Burmese authorities also stressed
to be committed to improving these systems and have been working on developing a
comprehensive Timber Legality Assurance System (MTLAS) that will meet
108The prohibition decision adopted by the authority (the first in Sweden under the EUTR) only
applies however to a specific teak Thai product (containing Burmese teak) imported by Retlog from
a specific Thai supplier. In other words, the decision only prohibits the company from placing on the
EU internal market the specific teak Thai product (also made by Burmese teak) from its specific
Thai supplier.
109Skogsaktuellt, Biltemas logistikföretag förbjuds att sälja teak från Burma, 22 March 2017,
(available at http://www.skogsaktuellt.se/artikel/53420/biltemas-logistikforetag-forbjuds-att-salja-
teak-fran-burma.html).
110Such interpretation is indeed totally in line with EUTR (unequivocal) prohibition to place illegal
timber on the EU internal market and the way the due diligence rules are formulated. Moreover, it
has to be kept in mind that the revised Commission’s Guidance Document clearly explains that the
higher the risk of corruption in a specific case, the more it is necessary to get additional evidence to
mitigate the risk of illegal timber entering the EU market; and it also mentions third-party schemes
as a means of obtaining such additional evidence (p. 7). According to the Forest Agency, Retlog
neither adequately implemented EUTR’s provisions nor was able (by the visit of Bureau Veritas to
MTE) to provide the required further evidence on the origin of the imported timber.
111Further prohibition decisions have been issued by the Swedish competent authority in May and
July 2017. The first against imports from Taiwan of Burmese teak (decision not appealed) while the
second against teak import directly fromMyanmar. Moreover, two Swedish operators have recently
voluntary stopped sourcing teak from Myanmar via Singapore and Vietnam. On these develop-
ments see Briefing Note for the Competent Authorities implementing the EU Timber Regulation,
June–July 2017, p. 1.
112See Mizzima, Denmark sanctions entire Myanmar teak industry, 16 March 2017 (available at
http://www.mizzima.com/business-domestic/denmark-sanctions-entire-myanmar-teak-industry).
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international best practice standards.113 Moreover, in August 2016 Myanmar
adopted a nationwide (temporary) logging moratorium that lasted till the end of
March 2017. In June 2017 Myanmar also published a draft Forest Law, reported to
include stricter penalties for—inter alia—illegal harvest of timber or misuse of
harvesting permits, including fines and imprisonment.114
Equally interesting are also the recent rulings on EUTR of two Dutch courts,
concerning timber imports (respectively) from Cameroon and from Brazil. In the
first court case, on 24 May 2017 the District Court Noord Holland, rejecting an
appeal by the importing company (Fibois VB Purmerend) against a previous deci-
sion by the Dutch competent authority (the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product
Safety Authority, Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit—NVWA),115 con-
firmed the decision of the authority to sanction the importer for not having collected
sufficient verifiable information.116 According to the Court, the company—in par-
ticular—did not identify the origin of the shipment of timber and its risk inventory
did not meet the requirements of the Timber Regulation. Moreover, as none of the
risk-limiting measures required by the situation in Cameroon was taken by the
importer Fibois, the Court agreed with the competent authority that the EUTR’s
due diligence requirements have not been fully met and, consequently, the authority
was allowed to sanction the importing company. Furthermore, in another more
recent court case the Amsterdam District Court (ruling on an appeal by Greenpeace
Netherlands against a previous decision of the Dutch competent authority NVWA)
on 4 July 2017 decided that NVWA failed to enforce the EUTR without a proper
reason in a number of cases where Dutch companies had imported timber from
Brazil without complying with the EUTR’s due diligence requirements.117
Greenpeace Netherlands had originally requested the Dutch authority to inspect
several companies importing timber from the Brazilian Amazon region and to
sanction those non-compliant with the EUTR’s due diligence system. Upon this
request, inspections were carried out and showed that, in fact, several Dutch
113See Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (MONREC), Statement of
progress in Timber Legality Assurance in Myanmar, 16 March 2017.
114Briefing Note for the Competent Authorities implementing the EU Timber Regulation, June–
July 2017, p. 4.
115According to the NVWA the timber importer Fibois did not comply with the EUTR rules when
introducing a shipment of Azobé timber from Cameroon on the Dutch market. It therefore adopted a
sanction measure whereby the operator would forfeit € 1,800 for each cubic meter of wood and/or
timber product placed on the EU market up to a maximum of € 90,000. Interestingly, the NVWA’s
reasoning is (correctly) grounded on the fact that, given the high level of corruption in Cameroon,
there is a high chance that the wood was not legally harvested and the company should have
consequently exercised more caution.
116B.V. X v de staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken, Rechtbank Noord-Holland 24-05-2017,
AWB—16 5358, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2017:4474 (available at https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/
inziendocument?id¼ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2017:4474).
117Stichting Greenpeace Nederland v de staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken, Rechtbank
Amsterdam 4-7-2017, AMS 15/5067, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2017:4926 (available at https://
uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id¼ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2017:4926).
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operators were non-compliant with the Timber Regulation. However, the request for
prosecution submitted by Greenpeace was rejected by the authority, which only
issued written warnings to non-compliant importers.118 As mentioned, such decision
of the authority was appealed by Greenpeace before the Amsterdam District Court,
which (correctly) found the Dutch enforcement policy unreasonable where it clas-
sified violations of EUTR’s Articles 4.2, 4.3 and 5 as minor issues resulting in
warnings only for first time offenders. Moreover, the Amsterdam Court recalled that
the Timber Regulation was adopted in October 2010 and entered into application in
March 2013, thereby allowing operators a significant amount of time to prepare for
complying with its obligations. Lastly, the Court set out that when companies violate
the law, the latter must be enforced and authorities can decide not to do so only in
special circumstances, which were lacking however in the case at issue. Conse-
quently, the decision of the Dutch authority not to prosecute importers
non-compliant with EUTR was considered insufficiently motivated and hence
rejected by the Court, which ordered the NVWA to take a new decision in
6 weeks.119
Besides the above mentioned Swedish and Dutch cases, similar court decisions
on EUTR have been adopted over the last months in other EU member countries. In
Germany, for instance, the administrative court of Cologne (Verwaltungsgericht
Köln) dismissed an action against a measure of confiscation of shipments of timber
(wengé wood) imported in Germany via Belgium from the Democratic Republic of
Congo120 which had been adopted in 2013 by the German competent authority.121 In
118NVWA refused to sanction the companies notably on the ground that the rules were still rather
new and it found therefore reasonable to provide operators with a further possibility to bring their
business operations in line with the new legal regime. As a matter of fact, a guidance document on
the enforcement policy under the Dutch nature protection legislation prescribed warnings to first
offenders: see NVWA, Specific Intervention Policy Nature Protection Legislation (Specifiek
interventiebeleid natuurwetgeving), IB02-SPEC08 natuur, version 2.1 of 16-07-2015.
119Under a further recent development, last 26 October 2017 the Dutch competent authority NVWA
has found other timber-importing companies (Boogaert Hout and one other unidentified timber
importer) to be in breach of the EUTR’s due diligence requirements, for placing Burmese teak on
EU internal market. The importer has now a 2-months grace period to comply with the EUTR’s
obligations otherwise it will be fined € 20,000 per cubic meter for any further non-compliant
Burmese teak it places on EU markets (see https://englishnvwa.nl/news/2017/10/26/preventive-
measure-issued-against-two-dutch-companies-for-breaching-the-rules-regarding-illegal-logging).
The case of Boogaert Hout was submitted to Dutch authorities by the NGO Environmental
Investigation Agency in October 2016. This NVWA decision follows similar outcomes by com-
petent national authorities in Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom,
where (as mentioned) similar cases were submitted by EIA (in the light of the finding of its
investigations being illustrated in its October 2016 report ‘Overdue diligence’). A further two
cases submitted by EIA, concerning the companies World Wood and Gold Teak Holdings, are still
being investigated by Dutch authorities (see: https://eia-international.org/major-dutch-timber-com
pany-found-breach-european-timber-regulation, last accessed 2 November 2017).
120Briefing Note for the Competent Authorities implementing the EU Timber Regulation, April–
May 2017, p. 1.
121German Federal Agency for Agriculture and Food (Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und
Ernährung, BLE).
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its ruling the German Court agreed with the competent authority’s findings that the
falsified supporting documents justified the confiscation. Furthermore, in Germany
after reports of illegal logging in Myanmar, the national competent authority also
carried out checks on companies importing teak from this country. On findings that
none of them complied with EUTR’s due diligence requirements, such authority
issued injunctions ordering the operators to take additional measures to endure that
the risk of illegality is reduced to a negligible level.122 Significantly in March 2017
the same authority also warned operators importing timber from Myanmar that the
EUTR due diligence obligation requires them to go beyond official documentation
and to trace timber back to not only the country but also the region of origin.
Operators were warned that, in the future, if they do not comply with the injunctions,
they might be imposed sanctions.
In France, the Tribunal of La Rochelle is investigating a number of companies
importing timber from the Democratic Republic of Congo, after Greenpeace France
filled a criminal complaint against them. Greenpeace claimed that companies were
violating EUTR obligations (i.e. the prohibition to import illegal timber and the
obligation to conduct due diligence).123 Finally, in the United Kingdom last
25 October 2017 at Westminster Magistrates Court a company (Angora 2011
Limited, trading as Lombok) was convicted (and fined £ 5000 plus costs) after
pleading guilty at the first hearing for failing to exercise the required due diligence
under EUTR when placing artisan sideboard on the markets imported on June 2016
from India.124
The above illustrated recent EUTR enforcement practice shows, first of all, that
all companies placing timber on the market for the first time fall under the scope of
the Timber Regulation, no matter whether they are transnational corporations,
medium or small sized companies. Moreover, the EUTR’s enforcement practice
made by EU member countries’ court rulings (but also, lato sensu, by national
competent authorities’ decisions) against those operators of the timber sector violat-
ing or not adequately complying with the Regulation’s requirements also shows that
EUTR is starting to take (actually) effect. Indeed, if until recently it seemed that EU
member States’ competent authorities were (sometimes) ‘not willing’ (and in other
122See http://www.ble.de/DE/Themen/Wald-Holz/Handel-Holz/handel-holz.node.html.
123This follows a previous case against illegal timber imports from the DRC, also brought by
Greenpeace France, which was closed by the public prosecutor: see Client Earth, EUTR News,
March–May 2017, p. 5.
124A previous breach of relevant EUTR provisions had earlier been identified by the British
competent authority and it led to a notice of remedial action being served on Lombok on
28 April 2015. This was followed by a warning letter dated 7 October 2015 when the company
failed to comply with notice. On October 2016, the authority’s officers visited Lombok’s central
London showroom and found the required due diligence checks had not been made for an artisan
sideboard for sale imported from India. See UK Government, Press Release: Company fined for
failure to check product was made from legally-harvested timber, 1 November 2017 (available at
http://www.gov.uk/government/news/company-fined-for-failure-to-check-product-was-made-
from-illegally-harvested-timber, last accessed 2 November 2017).
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cases ‘not fully able’) to start enforcing EUTR,125 the recent court decisions from
Sweden and the Netherlands and the rulings from some other EU national judges
show that the situation is starting significantly changing.
Overall, these cases can also actually help operators, competent authorities and
judges in other EU member countries to better understand, apply and enforce EUTR
in practice. At the same time, the court cases enforcing EUTR’s provisions signif-
icantly contribute (and they will increasingly do so in the future) to creating a body
of ‘due diligence jurisprudence’, able in its turn to (further) clarifying the details of
the obligations of due diligence for timber importers thereby operationalising
EUTR’s due diligence requirements. In this respect, the Commission’s Guidance
Document for the EUTR certainly contribute to provide for more clarity on impor-
tant practical aspects of the due diligence system.
Finally, it is clear that the way in which ‘due diligence’ is interpreted (and
enforced) within the EUTR regime could, also, be quite relevant to (and useful
for) other EU legislative regimes where due diligence obligations are imposed on EU
importers.
5 Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, the EU’s legislative framework on timber trade—based, on the one
hand, on the unilateral and binding EUTR’s regulatory pillar and, on the other, on the
bilateral and voluntary VPAs’ pillar—can play a relevant role in improving timber
governance in producing countries and, therefore, in contributing to the sustainable
(environmental, economic and social) development of both these countries and
(indirectly) of the EU itself.
Moreover, in fostering sustainable development and human rights in third coun-
tries through trade mechanisms (either binding or voluntary) establishing unilateral
or bilateral conditional access to the EU internal market for foreign timber and
timber products,126 the EU’s legal framework on timber governance is—also—in
line with the recent evolution experienced by EU external trade policy in the light of
the general objectives of its external action as established by Article 21 of the
TEU.127 That is, with the Lisbon Treaty’s call on the EU external action to take
environmental and human rights values ‘on board’.
125As the Dutch Greenpeace case shows, there was sometimes a sort of reluctance by national
authorities to apply the relevant EUTR’s provisions even in cases when operators were found not
being in compliance with the Regulation’s due diligence system.
126Cf. also, recently, Douma (2017), Douma and van der Velde (2016) and Geraets and
Natens (2015).
127See, inter alia, also for further bibliographical references Cremona (2017) and Vedder (2013).
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1 Introduction
In the coming decades, deep seabed mining beyond national jurisdiction may well
become a commercial reality.1 The mining industry is increasingly looking seawards
due to advances in subsea technology coupled with rising material consumption and
The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent the views
of the Scottish Government or the University of Glasgow.
1The analysis in this article of the status of the deep seabed mining regime and the extent of mining
activities is current as at 1 August 2018. All web links cited in this article are correct also as at
that date.
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anticipated scarcity of terrestrial mineral resources.2 In 2016, the Secretary-General
of the International Seabed Authority (“ISA”) predicted that the commercialisation
of deep seabed minerals beyond national jurisdiction is ‘well within reach’ and
‘attainable in the foreseeable future.’3 Since then, both interest and investment in
deep seabed mining has continued to grow amongst a range of actors.
In this context, this article will evaluate the international legal regime applicable
to deep seabed mining beyond national jurisdiction. Both this regime and the body
which governs it, the ISA, were established by the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 1982 (“UNCLOS” or the “Convention”).4 The overwhelming
majority of States are parties to UNCLOS. As of August 2018, UNCLOS has
168 States Parties, including the European Union.5 Much of the content of UNCLOS
is recognised as having the status of customary law, binding on all States irrespective
of whether or not they are parties to the Convention.6
Under UNCLOS, the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction (the “deep sea-
bed” or the “Area”) is defined negatively. All parts of the deep seabed which do not
otherwise fall within the national jurisdiction of coastal States form part of the Area.7
National jurisdiction of coastal States extends through a series of maritime zones.
Allowing for the vagrancies of geography and competing claims by littoral States,
travelling outwards from any given shoreline, one will generally encounter the
relevant coastal State’s territorial sea; contiguous zone; exclusive economic zone
(“EEZ”) and continental shelf.8 Depending on geomorphological and geological
factors, certain States are entitled to claim an extended continental shelf going
beyond 200 nautical miles (“nm”) from their coastline.9
2Fouquet and Lacroix (2014), pp. 3–5; see also Shukman D, ‘Deep Sea Mining “Gold Rush”Moves
Closer’, BBC News Online (London, 18 May 2013) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-
22546875>; Minter A, ‘Seafloor Gold Rush Could Have Alarming Impact’, The Japan Times
(Shanghai, 21 August 2016) <www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/08/21/commentary/world-com
mentary/seafloor-gold-rush-alarming-impact/#.W2sBQLllJaQ>.
3ISA Press Release, ‘Commercialization of Marine Minerals in Deep Seabed Well Within Reach,
International Seabed Authority Secretary-General States as He Introduces Annual Report’ (19 July
2016) SB/22/11.
4United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted and opened for signature 10 December
1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (English language version at 397), art
156 (establishment of the ISA). The ISA is an autonomous international organisation headquartered
in Jamaica.
5United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (“DOALOS”), ‘Chronological
List of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements’
(3 April 2018) <www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm>.
6Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 24; Boyle and Chinkin (2007), p. 380; Noyes (2014), pp. 52–56.
7UNCLOS, art 1(1): ‘“Area” means the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction’. Unless otherwise indicated, references in this article to the deep
seabed and the Area both refer to the “Area” as defined in UNCLOS, art 1(1).




From zone to zone, coastal States have differing obligations and rights. However,
one of the common denominators throughout all of these zones is that coastal States
have the exclusive right to authorise and regulate exploration and exploitation of
natural resources within their national jurisdiction.10 Beyond these zones—beyond
national jurisdiction—the position changes. This Area belongs to no one State.
Instead, it constitutes the ‘common heritage of mankind’.11 The ISA acts as the
custodian of the Area, regulating it and granting mining contracts to allow partici-
pants to explore for and exploit deep seabed mineral resources.12
To put the scope of the ISA’s remit into perspective, the deep seabed constitutes
almost three quarters of the entire global seabed. As the Area is defined negatively,
its exact size cannot be determined until the resolution of all coastal State claims to
extended continental shelves. The determination of these claims is an ongoing
process. However, the ‘best estimate’ of the surface area of the Area beyond national
jurisdiction is approximately 260 million square kilometres13 (or around 72% of the
total surface area of the oceans14).
As will be discussed below, many States, State institutions and private entities
have applied to the ISA to secure exploration rights over large swathes of the deep
seabed. Of the existing contractors, the following States or their nationals are
particularly active in deep seabed exploration beyond national jurisdiction: China,
Russia, South Korea, Japan, India, France, Germany and the UK. To date, China,
Russia and South Korea are the only States to hold exploration licences in relation to
all three types of mineral for which exploration is currently permitted (namely,
polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanganese
crusts).
Commercial interest in the resources of the deep seabed is increasing amongst a
variety of private actors. Key industry players such as Canadian mining giant,
Nautilus Minerals Inc., and US defence conglomerate, Lockheed Martin, are already
undertaking exploratory activities in the Area. Against this backdrop, this article will
consider the international legal framework which applies to deep seabed mining
activities. This article will address the following key questions: what types of
mineral resources are present in the deep seabed and come within the ambit of the
UNCLOS regime? By what means does the Convention’s deep seabed mining
regime operate: what are its fundamental principles and its licensing process? And,
10UNCLOS, arts 2(2), 56(1)(a), 77(1)–(2) and 81.
11UNCLOS, art 136.
12UNCLOS, arts 153, 157(1) and see also Annex III; the definition of deep seabed resources will be
discussed in this article below in Sect. 2.1, while the ISA’s licensing regime will be assessed in Sect.
3.2.
13Lodge (2014), p. 290.
14Eakins BW and Sharman GF, ‘Volumes of the World’s Oceans from ETOPO1’ (National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Geophysical Data Centre 2010) <www.ngdc.
noaa.gov/mgg/global/etopo1_ocean_volumes.html> (the surface area of the oceans is 361.9 mil-
lion square kilometres).
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finally, what types of mining activities are being undertaken in the deep seabed thus
far pursuant to the Convention?
In order to answer these questions, this article will proceed as follows. Section 2
will introduce the types of mineral resources which can be found in the Area. As
Sect. 2 will explain, the differing legal regimes applicable in the varying maritime
zones have considerable legal implications as to whether or not certain resources
(as defined in each zone) can be exploited with or without the permission of the
coastal State (in zones of national jurisdiction) or the Authority (in the Area), as the
case may be. Thereafter, Sect. 3 will offer an insight into the Convention’s deep
seabed mining regime and its key parameters, including the licensing process under
the regime and the extent to which actors are undertaking mining activities in the
Area at present. Finally, Sect. 4 will finish with concluding remarks on the status of
the deep seabed mining regime.
2 Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed
The deep seabed is home to an array of valuable mineral resources.15 As this section
will illustrate, mineral resources are present in various deep sea locations, including
volcanic ridges, rocky outposts and amongst the sediment of the ocean floor. By way
of contrast and comparison, Sect. 2.1 will begin by briefly clarifying the extent of
national jurisdiction and the legal definitions of natural resources within coastal State
maritime zones as compared to the Area. This is an important preliminary matter, as
it determines the scope of resource types which fall within the Convention’s deep
seabed mining regime. Once this is established, Sect. 2.2 will address the issue of
resource distribution in maritime zones, before explaining which types of resources
are most commonly found in the Area. Following this analysis, Sect. 2.3 will provide
dedicated focus on a category of deep seabed resource which is attracting current
commercial interest: rare earth elements.
2.1 A Comparison of Natural Resource Rights Within Coastal
State Maritime Zones and the Area
As noted above, the oceans can be divided into a series of maritime zones, each with
different legal implications; namely, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the EEZ,
15See e.g., International Seabed Authority, ‘Marine Mineral Resources’ (2003) <www.isa.org.jm/
files/documents/EN/Brochures/ENG6.pdf>; Hein J, ‘ISA Briefing Paper 02/12 – Prospects for Rare
Earth Elements from Marine Minerals’ (May 2012) <www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Pubs/
BP2.pdf>; Fouquet and Lacroix (2014), pp. 3–4.
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the continental shelf and the Area.16 Although the focus of this article is on the deep
seabed beyond national jurisdiction (i.e., the Area), this introductory Section will
briefly address the extent of national jurisdiction and the definitions of natural or
mineral resources within the various maritime zones in order to clarify the zones and
resource types which fall under the jurisdiction of coastal States or the ISA, as the
case may be.
Definitions of natural or mineral resources vary throughout the zones of national
jurisdiction and the Area. The form of a resource and the region within which it is
located has a decisive impact on the legal regime, which applies to it. Bederman cuts
across the sometimes confusing array of terminology with the following helpful
point:
If these zones sound mystifying (and they are to most international lawyers), keep one
simple point in mind. The closer to shore that a particular activity or resource is located, the
more likely it will come under the control, jurisdiction, or regulatory authority of the nearest
coastal state. Conversely, the farther one moves from shore, the more coastal state authority
decreases (. . .).17
Within the maritime zone closest to the shoreline—the territorial sea—the coastal
State possesses equivalent rights over all resources as it does on land.18 Seawards of
the territorial sea lie the overlapping contiguous zone and EEZ.19 In these zones,
coastal States retain rights over a broad range of resources. Within the EEZ, ‘natural
resources’ are defined as including both ‘living and non-living resources’ found
within the seabed and subsoil and in the water column above.20
Beyond the territorial sea and partially overlapping with the contiguous zone and
the EEZ is the continental shelf. The continental shelf comprises the seabed and
subsoil, which extends beyond the territorial sea and forms a ‘natural prolongation’
of the coastal State’s land mass beneath the sea.21 This submerged prolongation of
the coastal State’s land mass consists commonly of three distinct parts, each with
different resource implications. First, there is the continental shelf itself: an area of
thick sediment in relatively shallow waters.22 Second, there is the continental slope.
The slope is the point at which the shelf gives way to a steep descent. Thirdly and
16UNCLOS, arts 3 (territorial sea), 33 (contiguous zone), 57 (EEZ) and 76 (continental shelf), 1
(1) and Part XI (the Area).
17Bederman (2002), p. 169.
18UNCLOS, art 2(2); the territorial sea may extend up to a limit not exceeding 12 nm from a coastal
State’s baselines (art 3).
19The contiguous zone extends from the outer limit of the territorial sea up to a maximum of 24 nm
from the coastal State’s baselines (UNCLOS, art 33(2)). Partially overlapping with the contiguous
zone, the EEZ also extends from the outer edge of the territorial sea, but spans up to a maximum of
200 nm from the coastal State’s baselines (UNCLOS, arts 55, 57).
20UNCLOS, art 56(1)(a).
21UNCLOS, art 76(1); on the concept of ‘natural prolongation’, see also Symonds et al. (2000),
pp. 27–29; McDorman (2015), pp. 185–186.
22Pidwirny M, ‘Physiography of the Ocean Basins’ Fundamentals of Physical Geography (2nd edn,
2006) <www.physicalgeography.net/fundamentals/10p.html>.
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finally, there is the continental rise. The rise is the more gradual descent immediately
beyond the slope, which is formed by sediment cascading from the shelf and slope
above. Taken together, the shelf, the slope and the rise constitute the ‘continental
margin’.23
Subject to competing claims by littoral States, a coastal State possesses inherent
sovereign rights over its continental shelf up to 200 nm from its baselines.24 If
scientific and technical data confirms that the outer edge of a coastal State’s
continental margin extends beyond 200 nm from the State’s baselines, that State is
entitled to an ‘outer’ or ‘extended’ continental shelf (“ECS”).25 A State seeking to
exert an ECS must do so by way of submission to the UN Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf (“CLCS”).26
Within its continental shelf (including any ECS), a coastal State possesses
exclusive sovereign rights to explore and exploit its natural resources.27 Unlike in
the EEZ, where the coastal State has sovereignty over living and non-living natural
resources throughout the entire water column, in the continental shelf, the rights of
coastal States over natural resources are more narrowly defined.28 Within the
continental shelf, the definition of ‘natural resources’ extends to include only mineral
and other non-living resources located in the seabed and subsoil together with
bottom-dwelling sedentary species.29 The differing definitions of natural resources
in the EEZ and the continental shelf has most impact in any areas of ECS. Within the
ECS (i.e., beyond the 200 nm limit of the EEZ) only the more limited definition of
natural resources found in UNCLOS, Article 77(4) applies.
In further contrast, the definition of ‘resources’ in the Area is narrower again:
omitting the inclusion of living resources of any description, sedentary or other-
wise.30 In relation to deep seabed mining in the Area, the Convention defines
‘resources’ as ‘all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at
23UNCLOS, art 76(3).
24UNCLOS, art 76(1), (10), 77(3).
25UNCLOS, art 76(1). UNCLOS sets out a complex process for determining the outer edge of the
continental margin in Article 76(4)–(7). Article 76(5) allows the line of fixed points establishing the
outer limits of the ECS to extend up to whichever is further offshore of either: (1) 350 nm from the
coastal State’s baselines; or (2) 100 nm from the 2500 metre isobath (a line connecting the depth of
2500 m).
26UNCLOS, art 76(8); on the role of the CLCS, see Jensen (2014), p. 182. For analysis and critique
of the ECS claim process and its impact on the establishment of defined boundaries for the Area, see
Franckx (2010), p. 543.
27UNCLOS, arts 77(1)–(2) and 81; see also art 82 (pursuant to which a portion of any coastal State
revenues generated by exploitation of non-living ECS resources must be distributed equitably by
the ISA).
28Cf. UNCLOS, arts 56(1)(a) (EEZ) and 77(4) (continental shelf).
29UNCLOS, art 77(4). For analysis of the scope of sedentary species for the purposes of this
definition, see McDorman (2015), p. 186; Prescott (2000), p. 80.
30See UNCLOS, art 133(a).
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or beneath the sea-bed, including polymetallic nodules’.31 Once extracted from the
Area, such resources are referred to as ‘minerals’.32 Given that the UNCLOS deep
seabed mining regime does not apply to living resources, there is controversy as to
the extent to which marine genetic resources constitute part of the common heritage
of mankind.33 Therefore, in June 2015, the UN General Assembly voted to develop a
treaty to complement UNCLOS on the conservation and sustainable use of marine
biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction, on which work is now
underway.34
As this Section has demonstrated, both the location of a resource and its form are
factors, which determine the applicable legal regime. Resources present within the
zones of national jurisdiction, which are caught by the definitions of natural
resources within these zones fall within coastal State jurisdiction. To explore for
or exploit such natural resources, one must secure coastal State permission. Con-
versely, mineral resources within the Area, as defined in UNCLOS, Article 133, fall
within the ISA’s remit and can only be explored or exploited with ISA authorisation.
The remainder of this article will now focus on the mineral resources present
typically in the deep seabed (in the rest of Sect. 2) and the legal regime, which
governs these resources (Sect. 3).
2.2 Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed Beyond National
Jurisdiction
Now that Sect. 2.1 above has clarified the legal definition of resources in the Area
(as contrasted to equivalent definitions in the zones of national jurisdiction), this
31UNCLOS, art 133(a).
32UNCLOS, art 133(b). For the purposes of this article, the terms mineral resources, resources and
minerals will be referred to interchangeably to connote all non-living, solid, liquid or gaseous
mineral resources found on or recovered from the deep seabed.
33Consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this article. For analysis, see e.g., De La Fayette
(2009), p. 221; Matz-Lück (2010); Leary (2012), p. 375; Kirchner-Freis and Kirchner (2014);
Marciniak (2017).
34UNGA Res 69/292 (19 June 2015); see also Scovazzi (2015), p. 61. To that end, the General
Assembly (“GA”) established a Preparatory Committee (“PrepCom”) to make recommendations
on substantive elements of the draft treaty text. During 2016 and 2017, PrepCom held four sessions.
In July 2017, at its fourth session, PrepCom adopted a report to the GA proposing elements to be
considered in the development of a new treaty regulating marine biodiversity beyond national
jurisdiction (also known as “BBNJ”). PrepCom recommended also that the GA should convene an
intergovernmental conference to negotiate a treaty text regulating BBNJ; for an overview of the
PrepCom’s work and relevant documents see DOALOS webpage <www.un.org/depts/los/biodi
versity/prepcom.htm>. In accordance with PrepCom’s recommendations, the Intergovernmental
Conference on an international legally binding instrument under UNCLOS on the conservation and
sustainable use of BBNJ (the BBNJ Intergovernmental Conference) is due to hold its first session at
the UN headquarters in New York in September 2018.
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leads to the question as to which specific types of mineral resources can be found in
the deep seabed? The differing geological composition of the various maritime zones
has significant ramifications upon resultant resource distribution. A product of its
history, the continental shelf is rich in organic matter and sediment. Previously,
much of the land, which now forms the shelf, was above water. However, the shelf
was submerged due to rising water levels at the end of the glacial period. In contrast,
the deep seabed Area was forged from hardening lava, as the continents moved
apart.35 As the Area formed, most organic matter was extinguished by burning lava.
That is why much of the Area is constituted of heavy, rock-based material that sits
much deeper than the shelf.
Exploration and exploitation of the resources of the continental shelf is at a far
more advanced stage than comparable activities within the Area. Although conti-
nental margins vary in size and composition, they typically yield various non-living
resource types. Common shelf resource types include sand, gravel and placer
deposits of various minerals (such as gold, diamonds, ilmenite and tin) together
with industrial minerals such as phosphorites.36 Hydrocarbons, including natural gas
and petroleum, are often found on the continental shelf, and they may be present on
the slope and the rise.37 Due to the heavier, rock-based structure of much of the deep
ocean floor, the types of resources present diverges from those found on the
continental margin. Deep sea resource types are dominated by metallic minerals.
The vast majority of the deep ocean floor falls within the Area. However, due to
varying continental shelf attributes, some States possess swathes of deep ocean floor
within their inherent 200 nm continental shelf entitlement. As a result of this, mining
of the deep ocean floor is likely to commence soon within national jurisdiction of
certain territories such as the Cook Islands and Papua New Guinea.38 These mining
activities within deep waters of national jurisdiction will afford a barometer as to the
viability of deep seabed mining within the Area and in many respects may determine
the prospects for the deep seabed industry in the longer term.
As will be considered further in Sect. 3 below, the ISA maintains a licensing
regime for the exploration and exploitation of the Area’s mineral resources. Part of
the ISA’s regulatory role over deep seabed mining includes the power to progres-
sively develop a comprehensive Mining Code to regulate exploration and
35Plate tectonic theory explains that the continents moved apart through the process of seafloor
spreading; The British Geographer, ‘Plate Tectonic Theory’ The British Geographer Blog <http://
thebritishgeographer.weebly.com/plate-tectonic-theory.html>; see also Pinet (2003), p. 80.
36Prescott (2000), pp. 77–79; ISA ‘Marine Mineral Resources’ (n 15), pp. 1–2; Schröder (2014),
pp. 64–65.
37As Prescott notes, ‘continental slopes may offer better hydrocarbon prospects than the rises as
they receive more organic matter from the land (. . .). By comparison, the rises normally receive
comparatively low amounts of terrestrial organic matter’; Prescott (2000), pp. 75–76. See also ISA
‘Marine Mineral Resources’ (n 15) p. 1.
38For example, Nautilus Minerals has a contract with Papua New Guinea to commence sulphide
mining activities. If Nautilus’s Solwara 1 Project proceeds, it is due to be the world’s deepest
mining venture yet at depths of 1600 m.
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exploitation for all forms of resources in the Area. At present, this Mining Code
extends to cover exploration activities in respect of three particular types of metallic
minerals: polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanga-
nese crusts. These resources can be found throughout the Area, although they tend to
be clustered most heavily in particular locations, determined by the nature of their
formation.
The first of these resource types, polymetallic nodules, are potato-sized rock
deposits on the ocean floor, found typically at depths of between around 4000 and
5000 m.39 They contain manganese, iron and other metals, such as copper, nickel
and cobalt in varying concentrations. Nodules form through a process of accretion,
typically involving the gradual precipitation of dissolved metals onto a hard core,
such as a prehistoric shark’s tooth.40 The process of nodule formation is incredibly
slow, with increases in nodule diameter that can be measured in millimetres per
million years.41
Although nodules occur in various global locations, they are concentrated most
heavily in four particular regions.42 The largest of these, the Clarion-Clipperton
Fracture Zone (“CCZ”), is an area roughly the size of Europe, located west of
Mexico towards Hawaii. Two other nodule hotspots also within the Area can be
found in the Peru Basin and the central Indian Ocean. Finally, there is the Penrhyn
Basin: an area rich in nodules in the central western Pacific Ocean, predominantly
within the EEZ of the Cook Islands.43 The concentration of manganese nodules per
square metre of sea floor in each of these locations is 15 kg/m2, 10 kg/m2, 5 kg/m2
and 25 kg/m2 respectively, although in certain areas within the CCZ, nodule
concentration can be as dense as 75 kg/m2.44 Altogether, the volume of certain
metals found within deep seabed nodules, such as manganese, may exceed known
volumes of terrestrial reserves.45
In contrast to nodules, which lie on the deep sea floor, sulphides emanate most
commonly from hydrothermal vents on the mid-ocean ridge, where tectonic plates
39Glover and Smith (2003), p. 229; ISA ‘Marine Mineral Resources’ (n 15) 2; although note that
nodules can be found as deep as around 6500 m: Schröder (2014), p. 66.
40Glover and Smith (2003), p. 229; Schröder (2014), pp. 68–69.
41For example, Schröder cites a growth rate of ‘only about one to 3 millimetres per million years’ in
respect of certain types of polymetallic nodules: Schröder (2010), p. 146; see also Schröder (2014),
p. 68. Autun Purser, ecologist at the Helmholtz Centre for Polar andMarine Research, perhaps sums
up this slow process most vividly in his remark that such nodules are ‘half a millimetre thicker than
when Napoleon or Julius Caesar was walking around’; Milliken G, ‘Mining For Smartphone Metals
Could Kill Rare and Beautiful Deep Sea Creatures’ (Motherboard, 23 December 2016) 2 <https://
motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mining-for-smartphone-metals-could-kill-rare-and-beautiful-
deep-sea-creatures>.
42Schröder (2014), pp. 66–67.
43As this area is within the national jurisdiction of the Cook Islands, it falls to the Cook Islands to
regulate exploration and exploitation of the natural resources within it; on this, see also Sect. 2.1
above.
44Schröder (2014), pp. 66–67.
45Schröder (2014), p. 66.
The International Legal Regime Applicable to the Mineral Resources of. . . 269
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
meet. In these locations, volcanic activity produces distinctive chimneys (‘black
smokers’) spewing forth dark billowing clouds of mineral-rich seawater, which
accumulates, gradually on the ocean floor as sulphide deposits.46 Alternatively,
sulphides may also be present within iron-rich deep sea mud.47 Normally found at
depths of anywhere between 500 and 4000 m, sulphides typically comprise iron,
copper and zinc and may contain quantities of gold and silver.48 As with the other
categories of deep seabed mineral, the precise composition of sulphide deposits
varies depending on their location.49
The final type of mineral to which the UNCLOS deep seabed mining regime
extends currently is cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts, which form commonly on
seamounts, rocky outcrops and ridges in the sea floor and contain elements such as
manganese, iron, cobalt, nickel and lead. Typically found at depths of anywhere
between 600 to 7000 m (although most commonly at depths of around 4000 m and
above), these ‘pavement-like’ crusts form over many millions of years through a
process similar to the formation of polymetallic nodules.50 Cobalt crusts can be
found globally, but their highest volumes are within the Pacific Ocean, especially in
an area southwest of Japan known as the Prime Crust Zone (“PCZ”).51
These are the three types of mineral resources most commonly found in the Area.
However, as technology advances and scientific knowledge increases, other resource
types could be recoverable in the future. While recovery of hydrocarbons from the
Area is less likely, given the predominantly rock-based composition of the deep
ocean floor,52 there is some potential that resources, possibly including hydrocar-
bons, could straddle the boundary between the Area and the sediment-rich conti-
nental margin.53 Climate change and other environmental factors may also impact
the resources of the Area over time. Perhaps centuries from now, as continental
shelves erode, resource distribution in the area straddling the continental margin and
the Area will look very different from its present day composition.
Returning to the present day context, it remains an open race as to which of the
three deep seabed resources types currently regulated by the ISA may be first to be
exploited. Although nodules exploration has been ongoing for the longest dura-
tion,54 sulphides exploitation within deep sea waters in national jurisdiction may
46ISA ‘Marine Mineral Resources’ (n 15) 2; Schröder (2010), p. 148; Schröder (2014), p. 82.
47Glover and Smith (2003), pp. 231–232; Schröder (2010), p. 151; Schröder (2014), p. 91; one such
occurrence of metalliferous mud lies 2000 m deep in the Red Sea.
48Schröder (2010), p. 146; ISA ‘Marine Mineral Resources’ (n 15) p. 2.
49Schröder (2010), p. 148; Schröder (2014), p. 87.
50Glover and Smith (2003), p. 231; see also Schröder (2010), p. 148; Schröder (2014), p. 76; ISA,
‘Cobalt-Rich Crusts’ (March 2008) <www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Brochures/ENG9.pdf>.
51Schröder (2014), pp. 74–75.
52See, e.g., Tuerk (2014), p. 283 citing estimates that 97% of offshore hydrocarbons deposits are
within the maritime zones of national jurisdiction.
53See, e.g., Becker-Weinberg (2014), especially Ch 9 (concerning resources that lie between the
continental shelf and the Area).
54See discussion of this in Sect. 3.3 below.
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well commence before commercial activities begin in the Area.55 Irrespective of
which specific resource type is the first to be recovered from the Area, a category of
deep seabed resource, which is piquing current commercial interest is rare earth
elements (“REEs”). Notably, deep seabed minerals, such as the three types discussed
in this Section, may contain traces of REEs. These REEs are highly desirable
commodities, essential for use in various high-tech industries. Given that global
interest is increasing over potential sources of REEs within the deep seabed, Sect.
2.3 directly below will now turn to consider certain implications of deep seabed
mining for REEs.
2.3 Deep Seabed Mining for Rare Earth Elements
As noted in Sect. 2.2 above, seabed minerals often contain traces of REEs. These
elements are much sought after commodities: essential for use in the manufacturing
of green energy technology (such as solar panels, wind turbines and hybrid cars).
They are also indispensable in weapons manufacturing and in the electronics
industry for the production of high-tech gadgets such as smart phones, laptops and
flat-screen televisions.
Amidst increasing global calls for sustainable energy and the growing trend of
corporate divestment from fossil fuels, there is emerging awareness that elements
derived from deep seabed minerals could play a pivotal role in the process of
lowering carbon emissions. Indeed, this poses one of the key conundrums inherent
within deep seabed mining. Delivery of green energy requires sufficient raw mate-
rials to create the necessary technology. As terrestrial sources dwindle, does the
pursuit of sustainable, clean energy justify the potential environmental dangers
posed by extraction of these raw materials from the deep seabed?56 There may be
no easy answer to that question.
Within the past decade, China enjoyed a near total monopoly on worldwide
production of REEs. In 2009 and 2010, China was responsible for over 97% of
the global supply.57 However, to the shock of its trading partners, in 2010, China
imposed strict export limits on its domestically produced REEs. As a result of
China’s export restrictions, global demand far outstripped supply and the price of
55See discussion at n 38 above and accompanying text.
56On this ‘conundrum’, see, e.g., Shukman D, ‘Renewables’ Deep-sea Mining Conundrum’ BBC
News Online (London, 11 April 2017) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-39347620>;
Raworth S and Shukman D, ‘Deep Sea Mining’ (BBC1, News at 10, 11 April 2017); Carrington D,
‘Is Deep Sea Mining Vital for a Greener Future – Even if it Destroys Ecosystems?’ The Guardian
(London, 4 June 2017) <www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jun/04/is-deep-sea-mining-
vital-for-greener-future-even-if-it-means-destroying-precious-ecosystems>.
57US Department of the Interior and US Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2011
(2011) <http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/2011/mcs2011.pdf>.
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certain REEs spiked by as much as 3000%.58 Following successful challenge by the
EU, the US and Japan, the World Trade Organisation ordered China to relax its
export restrictions.59 As such, the price of REEs has stabilised.60 Nevertheless,
concerns about the security of the supply chain remain.61
In the context of these geopolitical uncertainties, investors are paying increasing
attention to the deep seabed as a potential source of REEs.62 As explored in Sect. 2.2
above, the composition of deep seabed minerals varies depending on factors such as
location and formation process. REEs have been discovered within various samples
of deep seabed minerals, including nodules, sulphides and crusts. For example,
REEs may be extracted as by-products in the mining of both nodules and sul-
phides,63 and cobalt crusts in particular may pose a promising source of REEs.64
In what may signal a tenable alternative to terrestrial extraction, recent discover-
ies highlight the wealth of accessible REEs on the deep seabed both within national
jurisdiction and within the Area. For example, sampling various areas of the ocean
floor, experts discovered numerous sites containing deep sea mud with high con-
centrations of REEs.65 Their estimates indicate that an area of only 1 square
kilometre in the Pacific Ocean has the potential to yield one-fifth of the current
annual world consumption of REEs.66 Another site measuring around 5 square
kilometres in the central North Pacific has the potential to satisfy nearly the entire
global annual consumption of REEs.67
As noted previously, certain States—including oceanic islands, such as the Cook
Islands—possess swathes of deep ocean floor within their inherent 200 nm conti-
nental shelf entitlement. The Cook Islands has discovered the presence of significant
quantities of REEs on the deep ocean floor within its EEZ. Experts estimate that the
58Rowlatt J, ‘Rare Earths: Neither Rare, Nor Earths’ BBC News Online (London, 23 March 2014)
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-26687605>.
59WTO, China: Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum –
Report of the Panel (26 March 2014) WT/DS431/R and Add.1/WT/DS432/R and Add.1/WT/
DS433/R and Add.1, adopted 29 August 2014; upheld by Appellate Body Reports: WTO, China:
Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum – Report of the
Appellate Body (7 August 2014) WT/DS431/AB/R/WT/DS432/AB/R/WT/DS433/AB/R.
60Rowlatt (n 58).
61Houses of Parliament, Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, ‘Deep-Sea Mining’
(POST note 508, September 2015) 2 <http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/
POST-PN-0508/POST-PN-0508.pdf>.
62Coles (2014), pp. 8–10.
63Hein et al. (2013), p. 51. See also Hein, ‘ISA Briefing’ (n 15) 1–2; Fouquet and Martel-Jantin
(2014), p. 63 et seq.
64In addition to the citations at n 63 directly above, see also ISA, ‘Cobalt-Rich Crusts’ (n 50) 2;
Schröder (2014), pp. 74–76 (which notes in particular that ‘in the southern area of the PCZ,
comparatively high elements of rare earth elements are found in crusts’).
65Kato et al. (2011), pp. 535, 535. Kato note that REE-rich mud appears to be concentrated mainly
in two regions: the eastern South Pacific and the central North Pacific (535).
66Kato et al. (2011), p. 535.
67Kato et al. (2011), p. 538.
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polymetallic nodules within the national jurisdiction of the Cook Islands, which
consist of a relatively high REE content as compared to other seabed nodules, have
‘significant resource potential’.68
Similarly, Japan has discovered high concentrations of REEs in deep sea mud
within its national jurisdiction. This discovery was made at depths of between 5600
and 5800 m near the island of Minami-Torishima, within Japan’s EEZ.69 Japan is
responsible for over half of global REE consumption for use in its environmental,
electronics and car industries.70 Following the discovery near Minami-Torishima,
Japanese scientists indicated that the contents of a single vessel mining in this area
could supply Japan with 60% of its annual REE requirements.71 Another discovery,
which evidences the REE potential of deep seabed resources, was made recently
within the Atlantic Ocean, on Tropic Seamount, an underwater mountain 270 nm
from Tenerife.72
Overall, the volume of REEs available from the deep seabed could potentially
exceed global land reserves.73 Deep seabed mining could be a viable means by
which to secure a reliable supply chain of REEs, insulated from potential geopolit-
ical ruptures. Moreover, some experts argue that mining the deep seabed for REEs
may pose environmental advantages as compared to terrestrial mining for these
metals. The process for removing REEs from the deep seabed could be less invasive
than equivalent land-based mining, impacting a significantly smaller footprint and
absent the toxic waste products, which are engendered by land-based mining.74 In
this context, global excitement is growing over potential deep seabed mining for
REEs in both national and international deep seabed areas.
68Hein et al. (2015), p. 97. See also Neate R, ‘Seabed Mining Could Earn Cook Islands “Tens of
Billions of Dollars”’ The Guardian (London, 5 August 2013) <www.theguardian.com/business/
2013/aug/05/seabed-mining-cook-islands-billions>.
69University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Engineering, ‘Discovery of Rare Earths Around
Minami-Torishima’ (Research News, 2 May 2013) <www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/focus/en/articles/a_
00145.html>.
70Evans-Pritchard A, ‘Japan Breaks China’s Stranglehold on Rare Metals with Sea-Mud Bonanza’
The Telegraph (London, 24 March 2013)<www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_
pritchard/9951299/Japan-breaks-Chinas-stranglehold-on-rare-metals-with-sea-mud-bonanza.
html>.
71Evans-Pritchard A (n 70).
72Tropic Seamount is rich in crusts containing REEs and other elements, which may be attractive
for use in green energy technology, such as tellurium: Shukman, ‘Renewables’ Deep-sea Mining
Conundrum’ (n 56).
73Kato et al. (2011), p. 538.
74Hein, ‘ISA Briefing’ (n 15), p. 3; Kato et al. (2011), p. 535; Coles (2014), p. 8.
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3 The UNCLOS Deep Seabed Mining Regime
As Sect. 2 above has established the main types of mineral resources, which can be
found in the Area and their perceived commercial, attractiveness, this section will
provide an overview of the UNCLOS deep seabed mining regime. Firstly, Sect. 3.1
will address the key parameters of the regime and its founding principles. Secondly,
Sect. 3.2 will consider the regime’s licensing process for exploration and exploita-
tion of deep seabed minerals. Finally, Sect. 3.3 will assess the extent to which actors
are already undertaking mining activities in the Area at present.
3.1 Key Aspects of the Deep Seabed Mining Regime
The existence of polymetallic nodules on the deep ocean floor was discovered by the
HMS Challenger expedition in the late 1800s.75 Notwithstanding this early discov-
ery, it was not until the middle of the twentieth century that the economic prospects
of deep seabed resources began to excite the international community. In the 1960s,
amidst the space race and growing competition to explore new frontiers, the hidden
riches of the deep began to seem enticingly close.76 During this era, increasing
interest in deep seabed resources led to a rift within the international community,
exposing a gulf between the views of developing States versus industrialist States.77
As a result of this, the deep seabed mining regime contained within the Convention
has an arduous negotiating history.78 Reflecting on the UNCLOS negotiating con-
ference (UNCLOS III), Koskenniemi and Lehto explain that ‘[t]he disagreement
which underlay the debate concerned the capacity of market liberalism v. socialism
to produce the general good. This was, of course, a disagreement which the Con-
ference could not discuss in the open.’79
Just as the deep seabed, itself bears the geological and geomorphical scars of its
evolution throughout the millennia, so too is the regime, which governs it,
pockmarked by its history and turbulent development. As leading commentary on
the law of the sea has remarked, ‘[n]o sketch can do its baroque architecture
justice.’80 The deep seabed mining regime is spread across various instruments.
75Murray and Renard (1891).
76See, e.g., Mero (1965); UNGA First Committee (22nd Session) ‘Speech by Arvid Pardo’
(1 November 1967, 3 p.m.) UN Doc A/C.1/PV.1516, 2.
77Higgins (1994), pp. 129–133; Koskenniemi and Lehto (1996), p. 537; Churchill and Lowe
(1999), pp. 224–226.
78For analysis of this, see Boyle and Chinkin (2007); see also Koskenniemi and Lehto (1996),
pp. 536–552; Churchill and Lowe (1999), pp. 224–229.
79Koskenniemi and Lehto (1996), p. 553.
80Churchill and Lowe (1999), p. 231, fn 25 (this comment relates to the pioneer investor scheme
within the regime which the UNCLOS III negotiations devised to appease existing deep seabed
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The main body of it is contained within Part XI of UNCLOS, together with Annex III
to the Convention (which sets out the licence application process and the conditions
for deep seabed mining). In practice, in order to ensure sufficient support for
UNCLOS amongst industrialised States, the regime as originally embodied in the
Convention required substantial modification. Therefore, in 1994, States adopted the
Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI of UNCLOS (“1994 Agreement”).81
Hailed as a ‘masterpiece of diplomatic ingenuity’, the 1994 Agreement elimi-
nated some of the more controversial aspects of the original UNCLOS scheme for
deep seabed mining, which were the source of long-running opposition to the regime
by industrialised States.82 In essence, the 1994 Agreement reduced certain regula-
tory aspects of the deep seabed mining regime and endeavoured to render it a more
‘market-orientated’ approach.83 Both Part XI of UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement
are to be interpreted and applied as if they constitute a single instrument. However,
in the event of discrepancy between them, the provisions of the 1994 Agreement are
decisive.84
Although UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement contain the legal framework, which
applies to the Area, they envisage a system whereby the ISA shall progressively
develop a comprehensive Mining Code to regulate exploration and exploitation for
all forms of resources in the Area. For that purpose, the regime endows the ISA with
broad powers to adopt any rules, regulations and procedures, which are necessary for
the conduct of mining activities in the Area.85
Key features of the overall system are as follows. The UNCLOS deep seabed
mining regime is underpinned by the principle that the Area’s mineral resources
investors; however, this comment by Churchill and Lowe is equally applicable to the UNCLOS
deep seabed mining regime as a whole).
81Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (adopted 28 July 1994, entered into force provisionally
16 November 1994 and definitively 28 July 1996) 1836 UNTS 3. For analysis of the 1994
Agreement and its impact, see Oxman (1994), p. 687; Brown (1995), p. 5 ff.; Sohn (1994),
p. 696. See also commentary by Nordquist et al. (2002), pp. 54–68.
82Koskenniemi and Lehto (1996), p. 549 (and see generally pp. 536–552). For further elaboration
on the evolution of the regime see also Churchill and Lowe (1999), pp. 224–229; Brown (2001), Ch
2; Holmila (2005), p. 187; Noyes (2012), pp. 459–460; Tuerk (2014), pp. 280–282; Fritz (2015),
pp. 450–452.
83See, e.g., the Preamble to the 1994 Agreement, which notes the ‘political and economic changes’
which occurred in the period between the adoption of the UNCLOS text in 1982 and the conclusion
of the 1994 Agreement, including the shift towards ‘market-orientated approaches’ within the
international community.
841994 Agreement, art 2(1).
85UNCLOS, arts 140(2), 145, 160(2) (f), 162(o), 165(2) (f), and Annex III, art 17; Annex to the
1994 Agreement, sections 1(1), (5) (f)–(g), (15). See also Harrison (2011a), pp. 122–123, 152 (for
analysis of the ISA’s far-reaching powers to progressively develop the Convention’s deep seabed
mining regime).
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constitute the common heritage of mankind.86 No State or entity can unilaterally
claim sovereignty over deep seabed mineral resources.87 Deep seabed mining in the
Area must be performed with the oversight and permission of the ISA and only ‘for
the benefit of mankind as a whole’.88 To this end, the deep seabed mining system
must take into account the interests of developing States and promote their effective
participation.89 One aspect of this is that the ISA must develop mechanisms to
guarantee equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from
the Area.90 Another significant element of the deep seabed regime is the protection
of the marine environment.91
The ISA plays a key role as the custodian of the deep seabed, with regulatory
control over deep seabed mining activities.92 The ISA is constituted by three
principal organs: the Assembly, in which all States Parties are represented; the
36-member Council elected by the Assembly, which constitutes the ISA’s executive
organ; and the Secretariat, which is responsible for the ISA’s administration.93
Importantly from a legal perspective, the ISA is assisted also by its Legal and
Technical Commission (“LTC”) which is an organ of the Council.94 As will be
discussed further in Sect. 3.2, the Authority has a mining arm, the Enterprise, but it is
not yet operational.95
As noted above, the ISA is entrusted with the progressive expansion of the
deep seabed mining regime through development of the Mining Code. Thus far,
the ISA has adopted three sets of regulations, which concern exploration activities
for three types of minerals (namely, polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides
86UNCLOS, art 136; the principle that the Area’s resources form the common heritage of mankind
is protected from amendment (see UNCLOS, art 311(6)).
87UNCLOS, art 137(1).
88UNCLOS, art 140(1); see also arts 153, 157(1) and Annex III.
89UNCLOS, arts 148, 152(2).
90UNCLOS, art 140(2), see also art 160(2)(f)(i).
91See, e.g., UNCLOS, arts 145, 147. For analysis of issues concerning environmental protection in
deep seabed mining see Redgwell (2006); Wolfrum (2014); Scovazzi (2014), p. 181; Jaeckel
(2015), p. 93.
92UNCLOS, art 137(2); see also arts 153 and 157(1) and Annex to the 1994 Agreement, section 1
(1). The ISA’s licensing process for deep seabed mineral exploration and exploitation will be
explored in Sect. 3.2, directly below.
93UNCLOS, arts 158(1), 159–162, 166.
94UNCLOS, arts 163, 165; the Council elects members to the LTC based on qualifications relevant
to deep seabed mining, including legal and technical expertise.
95UNCLOS, art 170; Annex to the 1994 Agreement, section 2.
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and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts96), together with some environmental
recommendations.97
Despite rising anticipation levels, the commercialisation of deep seabed mining
faces fundamental obstacles, especially in legal terms. One key challenge will be
completion of a suitable regulatory regime to govern the entire lifecycle of deep
seabed mining operations. A crucial aspect of this challenge is the need to develop a
regime for exploitation, which takes account of the understandable environmental
concerns posed by deep seabed extraction.98 Deep seabed mining faces considerable
opposition from a range of actors, including many NGOs. For example, the Deep
Sea Mining Campaign, which is an association of NGOs and concerned individuals
including Oxfam Australia and Mining Watch Canada, is calling for a moratorium
on all deep seabed mining in both international and national waters.99 Greenpeace
also decries the advance towards exploitation of deep seabed minerals, citing
concerns for the sensitive and unexplored ecosystems of the deep seabed.100
The ISA Secretary-General has recognised that this is a crucial test for the
industry, stating in 2013 that ‘[t]he challenge is to develop an exploitation regime,
including a fiscal framework, that fosters commercially viable exploitation and at the
same time benefits mankind as a whole.’101 In recognition of this challenge, the ISA
is currently developing an expanded Mining Code to regulate the forthcoming
exploitation phase. In July 2018, the ISA released the current version of the Draft
Exploitation Regulations.102 The ISA is working to finalise them by 2020, on the
96ISA, Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area (adopted
13 July 2000) ISBA/6/A/18 (updated 25 July 2013) ISBA/19/C/17 (“Nodules Regulations”); ISA,
Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area (adopted 7 May
2010) ISBA/16/A/12/Rev.1 (“Sulphides Regulations”); ISA, Regulations on Prospecting and
Exploration for Cobalt-Rich Ferromanganese Crusts in the Area (adopted 27 July 2012) ISBA/
18/A/11 (“Cobalt Regulations”).
97See, e.g., ISA LTC ‘Recommendations for the Guidance of Contractors for the Assessment of the
Possible Environmental Impacts arising from Exploration for Marine Minerals in the Area’
(1 March 2013) ISBA/19/LTC/8.
98For a scientific assessment of some of the environmental concerns posed by deep seabed mining,
see Sharma (2015), p. 204. For detailed legal consideration of the balance between commercial
mineral exploitation and protection of the Area’s marine environment, see Jaeckel (2017); see also
Gjerde (2012), p. 839.
99Deep Sea Mining Campaign <www.deepseaminingoutofourdepth.org/>.
100Greenpeace International, ‘Deep Sea Mining’ (Background, 20 March 2014) <www.
greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/oceans/marine-reserves/deep-sea-mining/>.
Greenpeace, alongside over 70 other NGOs, is part of the Deep Sea Conservation Coalition
(an umbrella movement seeking to protect and preserve deep sea ecosystems): Deep Sea Conser-
vation Coalition <www.savethehighseas.org/>.
101Odunton NI, ISA Secretary-General ‘Statement to the Twenty-Third Meeting of the States
Parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (10 June 2013).
102ISA LTC, ‘Draft Regulations on Exploitation of Mineral Resources in the Area’ (9 July 2018)
ISBA/24/LTC/WP.1/Rev.1 (Draft Exploitation Regulations).
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basis of extensive stakeholder consultation.103 Once extraction of mineral resources
commences, the ISA will oversee the redistribution of financial and other economic
benefits derived from the resources of the Area.104
3.2 The Licensing Process for Deep Seabed Mineral
Exploration and Exploitation
The licensing process for entities wishing to explore or exploit deep seabed minerals
is contained within the UNCLOS regime, as modified by the 1994 Agreement and
further developed by the ISA’s Mining Code to date.
Article 153 of UNCLOS contains the heart of the licensing system. Pursuant to
Article 153, activities in the Area may be carried out either by States Parties to the
Convention or by ‘state entities or natural or juridical persons which possess the
nationality of States Parties or are effectively controlled by them or their nationals,
when sponsored by such States’.105 This requirement of nationality or control is
echoed within all the ISA’s exploration regulations to date.106 Accordingly, if a
non-State entity wishes to secure a licence to explore for deep seabed resources, it
must obtain sponsorship from all States of which it is a national, and ‘[i]f another
State or its nationals exercises effective control, the sponsorship of that State is also
necessary.’107
103The ISA has been developing the Draft Exploitation Regulations by means of a process of
collaboration with interested stakeholders, including States, State entities, private corporations,
environmental groups and civil society. On the basis of stakeholder consultation, the LTC originally
released an initial working draft of regulations and standard contract terms concerning mineral
exploitation in the Area in July 2016; ISA LTC, ‘Report – Developing a Regulatory Framework for
Mineral Exploitation in the Area’ (July 2016) <www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Regs/
DraftExpl/Draft_ExplReg_SCT.pdf>. Since then, there have been two further iterations of the
draft (in August 2017 and April 2018) before the release of the current draft in July 2018; see ISA
Secretariat, ‘Draft Regulations on Exploitation of Mineral Resources in the Area’ (8 August 2017)
ISBA/23/LTC/CRP.3* and ISA LTC, ‘Draft Regulations on Exploitation of Mineral Resources in
the Area’ (30 April 2018) ISBA/24/LTC/WP.1.
104These benefits are to be shared equitably, on a non-discriminatory basis, through a mechanism
still to be devised by the ISA; UNCLOS, art 140(2). Although the ISA has yet to develop the rules
applicable to the equitable sharing of profits derived from deep seabed mining, in formulating such
rules, the ISA must take the interests and needs of developing States into particular consideration;
UNCLOS, art 160(2)(f)(i).
105UNCLOS, art 153(2)(b).
106Nodules Regulations, reg 9(b); Sulphides Regulations, reg 9(b); Cobalt Regulations, reg 9(b).
107Responsibility and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to
Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011) ITLOS Reports 2011, 10, para 77;




States Parties, and entities which have secured appropriate sponsorship, are
eligible to submit an application to the ISA to conduct exploration or exploitation
activities. They make their application by seeking ISA approval of a formal written
plan of work.108 The Council is responsible for approval of applications, and it may
do so upon LTC recommendation.109 Once the application is approved and signed, it
takes the form of a contract between the ISA and the contractor.110
A key aspect of the UNCLOS regime as originally envisaged was that it would be
a ‘parallel’ system.111 In accordance with this parallel system, States and State
sponsored entities would be permitted to explore for and exploit seabed resources
in tandem with the ISA’s mining arm, the Enterprise.112 To facilitate this process, the
Convention incorporates a system of ‘site banking’.113 Pursuant to this approach, a
contractor’s plan of work must identify a total area for exploration or exploitation
which is ‘sufficiently large and of sufficient estimated commercial value to allow two
mining operations’ and ‘indicate the coordinates dividing the area into two parts of
equal estimated commercial value’.114 On the basis of that information, the ISA must
designate one part of the submitted area as a ‘reserved area’.115
It was originally anticipated that mining activities in the reserved area would be
conducted ‘solely’ by ‘the Authority through the Enterprise or in association with
developing States.’116 However, in an effort to resolve one of the most intractable
issues, which was preventing UNCLOS from entering into force, the 1994 Agree-
ment suspended the role of the Enterprise indefinitely.117 In accordance with mod-
ifications enacted by the 1994 Agreement, the State or entity, which contributes a
particular area to the ISA as a reserved area, now has the right of first refusal to enter
into a joint venture agreement with the Enterprise for exploration and exploitation of
that reserved area.118 If the right of first refusal is not exercised, it is open for
108UNCLOS, art 153(3), Annex III, art 3.
109UNCLOS, arts 153(3), 165(2)(b) and Annex III, art 6; Annex to the 1994 Agreement, sections 1
(6), 3(11).
110UNCLOS, art 153(3) and Annex III, art 3(5); see also Annex to the 1994 Agreement, section 1(6)
(a)(i).
111See Nordquist et al. (2002), p. 297, et seq on the development and negotiation of the parallel
system in the context of the drafting of UNCLOS, art 153.
112UNCLOS, art 153(2).
113Nordquist et al. (2002), p. 297.
114UNCLOS, Annex III, art 8.
115See UNCLOS, Annex III, art 8 and Annex to the 1994 Agreement, section 1(10).
116UNCLOS, Annex III, art 8; see further Annex III, art 9. See also UNCLOS, Annex IV, which
contained the Statute of the Enterprise (much of which has been modified de facto by the 1994
Agreement).
117Section 2(1) of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement provides that ‘the Secretariat of the Authority
shall perform the functions of the Enterprise until it begins to operate independently of the
Secretariat’, while section 2(2) specifies the conditions that must be met for the Enterprise to
come into operation. As Yet, the Enterprise has not become operational.
118Annex to the 1994 Agreement, section 2(5).
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developing States and entities sponsored by them, including private actors, to apply
to explore and exploit the reserved area.119
Throughout the duration of deep seabed mining operations, the ISA possesses
broad powers to oversee the performance of the contract, including by monitoring
performance, inspecting installations and enforcing compliance with contractual
terms.120 Together with the pivotal role of the ISA in the mining process, in respect
of non-State entities, State sponsorship remains a crucial mechanism throughout the
life of mining operations and beyond.
The Seabed Disputes Chamber (the “Chamber”) of the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”) addressed the important role of the sponsoring State in
its Advisory Opinion of 2011.121 The key purpose of sponsorship is to ensure that
‘the obligations set out in the Convention, a treaty under international law which
binds only States Parties thereto, are complied with by entities that are subjects of
domestic legal systems.’122 The contract with the ISA is also instrumental to this
end. Due to the contractual relationship between the ISA and the contractor, the
contractor becomes directly bound to adhere to the Convention’s deep seabed
mining regime.123
Importantly, the sponsorship relationship also provides a direct means by which
to secure State responsibility on the part of the sponsoring State in respect of
activities by entities, which it sponsors. Pursuant to Article 139 of UNCLOS, States
Parties have the responsibility to ensure that any activities that they (or State-
sponsored entities) conduct in the Area are performed consistently with Part XI of
UNCLOS. In the event that a State Party fails to discharge this responsibility, it will
be held responsible at international law. A State Party will not be liable for damage
caused by an entity that it has sponsored only in the event that the State Party has
taken ‘all necessary and appropriate measures to secure effective compliance’ by the
sponsored entity.124 In order to satisfy this obligation, sponsoring States have the:
119UNCLOS, Annex III, art 9(4). In relation to sulphides and cobalt crusts exploration, the ISA
modified the site banking system further, permitting an applicant seeking permission to explore for
sulphides or cobalt-rich crusts to offer an equity interest in a joint venture arrangement to the
Enterprise instead of submitting a reserved area: Sulphides Regulations, regs 16, 19; Cobalt
Regulations, regs 16, 19.
120See, e.g.: UNCLOS, art 153(4)–(5), 157, 160, 162, 165; Annex III, art 18; Annex to the 1994
Agreement, section 1(1). The wide regulatory and enforcement powers of the ISA are reflected also
in the Mining Code; see, e.g., the standard clauses to mining contracts in the fourth annex of the
Nodules, Sulphides and Cobalt Regulations, at sections 10, 14, 21.
121ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n 107) para 74 (affirming that the ‘notion of “sponsorship” is a key
element in the system for the exploration and exploitation of the resources in the Area’).
122ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n 107) para 75; as the Chamber acknowledged, this end is also
achieved by virtue of the ISA’s regulations, which apply to all contractors.
123Karavias (2013), p. 124 (‘[t]he Standard Clauses [to the ISA contract], in turn, transpose the
content of the [UNCLOS] provisions regarding activities in the Area and of the [ISA] Regulations
into the contractual arrangement, thus providing a nexus between [UNCLOS] and the secondary
law enacted by the ISA and the contract for exploration.’); see also Harrison (2011a), p. 123.
124UNCLOS, art 139(2); see also UNCLOS, arts 138 and 153(4); and Annex III, art 4(4).
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[R]esponsibility to ensure, within their legal systems, that a contractor so sponsored shall
carry out activities in the Area in conformity with the terms of its contract and its obligations
under this Convention. A sponsoring State, however, shall not be liable for damage caused
by any failure of a contractor sponsored by it to comply with its obligations if that State Party
has adopted laws and regulations and taken administrative measures, which are, within the
framework of its legal system, reasonably appropriate for securing compliance by persons
under its jurisdiction.125
This obligation upon the State sponsor ‘to ensure’ compliance is a due diligence
obligation ‘to deploy adequate means, to exercise best possible efforts, to do the
utmost, to obtain this result’.126 In addition to this obligation ‘to ensure’, State
sponsors are subject to direct obligations, including duties to apply the precautionary
approach and best environmental practices.127 Consequently, State sponsorship
plays a vital function in obliging sponsoring States to adopt robust compliance
measures in respect of sponsored entities.
As noted in Sect. 3.1 above, once extraction of mineral resources commences, the
ISA will oversee the redistribution of financial and other economic benefits derived
from the resources of the Area. As the levels of fees and royalties that miners must
pay remains to be determined, together with the term of exploitation contracts, there
is significant uncertainty at present for contractors seeking to determine financing
arrangements for deep seabed mining ventures. However, as analysis in Sect. 3.3,
directly below, will demonstrate, notwithstanding the nascent nature of the current
regime, participation in the Area is increasing. Various States, State actors and
private entities are positioning themselves to take advantage of the perceived
opportunities afforded by extraction of deep seabed resources.
3.3 The Current Extent of Deep Seabed Mining Activities
Deep seabed mining activities in the Area have thus far been confined to the
exploration stage.128 Industry experts are cautious about the prospects for deep
seabed mining in light of the sheer costs involved in mineral extraction, together
with factors such as fluctuating metal prices.129 However, significant investment has
125UNCLOS, Annex III, art 4(4).
126ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n 107), para 110.
127ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n 107), para 122; see further Freestone (2011), p. 755; Harrison
(2011b), p. 517; Plakokefalos (2012), p. 134.
128On the parameters of the deep seabed and the definition of mineral resources within it, see Sect.
2.1 above.
129Sharma (2011), pp. 28–31; see also, e.g., Egan M, ‘Copper, Aluminium and Steel Collapse to
Crisis Levels’ CNN Money (New York, 9 December 2015) <http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/09/
investing/oil-prices-metals-crash-crisis-levels/>.
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been made by contractors in the Area, and there are signs that commercialisation of
the industry may be realised in the future.130
As of August 2018, the ISA has signed mining contracts with a total of twenty-
nine contractors for exploration in relation to the three regulated minerals types
(nodules, sulphides and cobalt crusts). These figures include a notable spike in the
number of applications and contracts granted in recent years. As recently as early
2011, only eight applications for exploration had been approved; by the end of 2015,
that figure had more than tripled.
Of the deep seabed licences agreed to date by the ISA, the most commonly
granted have been licences to explore for polymetallic nodules. The ISA has
approved seventeen such licences. All but one of the nodules licences are in respect
of areas of the seabed in the CCZ.131 The remaining nodules licence relates to an area
in the Central Indian Ocean Basin.
Of all the mining activities in the Area, those related to polymetallic nodules have
been ongoing for the longest period. Six contracts for nodules exploration were due
to expire in 2016 and one in 2017, having reached the end of their 15-year terms.
During its 21st Session in July 2015, the ISA adopted procedures and criteria for
extension of approved plans of work for exploration.132 Thereafter, during its 22nd
Session in July 2016, the ISA extended the first six contracts each for a period of
5-years, after which time the Council ‘invites the applicants to be ready to proceed to
exploitation’.133 During the ISA’s 23rd Session in August 2017, the ISA extended
the remaining contract, which was due to expire, for an additional 5-year period, on
similar terms.134 In practice, however, commercial production of nodules will not be
able to begin until the ISA has finalised appropriate regulations on exploitation: a
matter, which is ongoing.135
The ISA has granted seven licences for sulphides exploration. Of the seven
sulphides licences which the ISA has issued, four relate to areas in the Indian
130See, e.g., Latimer C, ‘Seabed Mining: Plunging into the Depths of a New Frontier’ Australian
Mining (Australia, 10 August 2011) <www.australianmining.com.au/features/seabed-mining-
plunging-into-the-depths-of-a-new-fr>; Shukman, ‘Deep Sea Mining “Gold Rush” Moves Closer’
(n 2); Goldenberg S, ‘Marine Mining: Underwater Gold Rush Sparks Fears of Ocean Catastrophe’
The Observer (London, 2 March 2014) <www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/02/under
water-gold-rush-marine-mining-fears-ocean-threat>; Minter A (n 2).
131For discussion of the CCZ, see n 42–44 and accompanying text.
132ISA Council, ‘Decision of the Council relating to the procedures and criteria for the extension of
an approved plan of work for exploration pursuant to section 1, paragraph 9, of the annex to the
Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of UNCLOS’ (24 July 2015) ISBA/21/C/19*.
133ISA Press Release, ‘Seabed Council Puts Forward Two Candidates for Election of Secretary-
General; Approves Six Exploration Contract Extensions; Begins LTC Election Debate’ (18 July
2016) SB/22/9; for the draft decisions by the Council to approve the extensions, see ISA Council
‘Draft Decisions’ (all dated 14 July 2016) ISBA/22/C/L.4–L.9.
134ISA Council, ‘Decision of the Council relating to an application by the Government of India for
extension of a contract for exploration for polymetallic nodules between the Government of India
and the Authority’ (10 August 2017) ISBA/23/C/15.
135See discussion in above at n 102–103 and accompanying text.
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Ocean (including areas on the Central Indian Ridge and the Southwest Indian
Ridge). The remaining three licences concern areas on the Mid-Atlantic Ridge on
the floor of the Atlantic Ocean.
The ISA has granted five licences for cobalt crusts exploration. Four of these
licences concern areas in the Western Pacific Ocean. The fifth licence relates to an
area on the Rio Grande Rise, which is located in the South Atlantic Ocean.
Various actors are conducting exploratory activities in the Area, including States,
State enterprises and private actors. Currently, the 29 existing contracts are held by
the following actors: 1 international consortium of States (exploring for nodules);136
4 States (holding 8 contracts between them to explore for a mixture of nodules,
sulphides and cobalt crusts);137 11 State enterprises, State institutions or State-
controlled corporations (holding 15 contracts in total to explore for nodules, sul-
phides or cobalt crusts);138 and 4 private corporations (holding 5 contracts between
them to explore for nodules).
All four of the private corporate contractors are exploring for polymetallic
nodules in the CCZ. The first of them is Tonga Mining Offshore Limited, a Tongan
national and wholly-owned subsidiary of Nautilus Minerals Inc. Shareholders in
Nautilus include various major natural resource and mining companies, such as MB
Resources, Metalloinvest, Anglo American and Teck Resources. The second ISA
corporate contractor is G-Tec Sea Minerals Resources NV, a Belgian national.
Thirdly, UK Seabed Resources Ltd (“UKSRL”), a UK national, holds two contracts
with the ISA. UKSRL is a subsidiary of US defence giant, Lockheed Martin. Finally,
the fourth private corporation to enter an ISA contract was Ocean Mineral Singapore
Pte Ltd (“OMS”). OMS is a Singaporean national, owned by fellow Singaporean:
Keppel Corporation, one of the world’s largest offshore and marine groups. Minority
shares in OMS are held by UKSRL and Lion City Capital Partners Pte Ltd, a
Singaporean private investment company.
Therefore, despite the uncertainties and risks inherent within deep seabed mining
endeavours, increasing exploratory activities—especially by private investors—
evidence that the industry may be moving towards commercialisation in the future.
136This contractor is Interoceanmetal Joint Organization (comprising Bulgaria, Cuba, the Czech
Republic, Poland, Russia and Slovakia).
137These four States are India, Poland, Russia and South Korea.
138These eleven entities possess nine nationalities between them, with Chinese entities holding four
contracts, French, German and Japanese entities holding two contracts each, and entities controlled
by Brazil, the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru and Russia holding one contract each.
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4 Conclusion
At the turn of this century, to some extent deep seabed mining in the Area seemed to
be ‘further off than ever before’.139 Interest in polymetallic nodules appeared to have
‘dwindled to the point where commercial exploitation of these resources [seemed], at
best, a remote possibility.’140 The tide may be turning. Although the challenges to
commercial operation remain significant, it could soon be both economically feasi-
ble and technologically viable to recover mineral resources from the Area.141
As this article explored in Sect. 2 above, the deep seabed beyond national
jurisdiction is home to a wealth of mineral resources, including various metallic
minerals such as polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich ferro-
manganese crusts. In particular, commercial interest has been piqued by discoveries
of rare earth minerals on the deep seabed, essential both for green energy technology
and to fuel ever-growing dependence on electronics and high-tech gadgets.
Within international law, a detailed legal framework for deep seabed mining
activities can be found within the Convention and associated instruments, including
the 1994 Agreement and the Mining Code. As considered in Sect. 3 above, this
regime enshrines the central role of the ISA as the regulator and overseer of deep
seabed exploration and exploitation activities. In accordance with the ISA’s licensing
process, commercial investment in deep seabed mining is growing amongst an array
of actors, including States, State entities and private investors. As the ISA continues
to grant more contracts and swathes of the seabed become earmarked for exploration
activities, there is now a tangible sense of momentum within the deep seabed mining
community.
At present, mining activities within the Area have been confined to the explora-
tion phase. As set out in this article, a critical factor in determining the future
feasibility of the industry will be the precise shape of the regulatory regime
governing extraction of deep seabed minerals beyond national jurisdiction.
UNCLOS and related instruments provide the basic legal framework applicable to
the Area, but the precise workings of the regime remain to be determined. In
practice, commercial exploitation of the deep seabed cannot begin until the ISA
has adopted regulations governing exploitation, a process which is ongoing and
likely to take some time. Regulations governing environmental aspects of mining
will also be vital. As the ISA works to implement these regulations and enhance the
Mining Code, through detailed consultation with stakeholders, this next phase will
be a fundamental step towards the long-term realisation of commercial activities
within the Area.
139Lodge (2002), p. 294.
140Ibid.
141ISA Press Release, ‘Commercialization of Marine Minerals’ (n 3); see also United Nations
Environment Programme, ‘Wealth in the Oceans: Deep Sea Mining on the Horizon?’ (Global
Environmental Alert Service, May 2014) available at <https://na.unep.net/geas/archive/pdfs/
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1 Introduction
In January 2018, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) released the
2019–2024 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing: Draft Proposed
Program. This document represents the presentation of a new strategy for the
exploration and exploitation of oil and natural gas on the continental shelf of Alaska
(with the possible exception of the North Aleutian Basin).1 Although the document
provides very relevant elements for an environmental framework of the activities
that may be developed in this maritime space, its main objective is to guarantee the
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energy autonomy of the United States in the short and medium term and to obtain a
leading position in this economic area.2
The alteration of the position of the United States of America3 regarding the use
of the continental shelf adjacent to Alaska for oil and natural gas exploration does
not appear to be consistent with the model of cooperation that has been developed
over the past two decades by the Arctic States, in particular through the Arctic
Council. The latest result of such international cooperation is the conclusion of the
negotiations on the draft Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in
the Central Arctic Ocean, on 30 November 2017 (signed at Ilulissat, 3 November
2018). The purpose of this international commitment is to prevent commercial
fishing permits from being issued for the Central Arctic Ocean until sufficient
scientific data on the species in this region have been collected and analysed and a
strategy for sustainable catches has been put in place.
It should be considered that interest in the Arctic is not restricted to the Arctic
coastal states. This has been demonstrated by the progressive development of an
integrated European Union policy for the Arctic (Joint Communication to the
European Parliament and the Council: An integrated European Union policy for
the Arctic4) and by the disclosure by China, on 26 January 2018, of a white paper
entitled China’s Arctic Policy.5
It should be noted that the territorial and maritime area described as ‘Arctic’ may
vary according to the natural criteria used for its definition, whether by the temper-
ature (the 10C isotherm), ecology (Arctic tree line) or geography (the Arctic Circle
2In this sense, in the 2019–2024 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing: Draft
Proposed Program, January 2018, https://www.boem.gov/NP-Draft-Proposed-Program-2019-2024
(last accessed 6 March 2018), p. 1, it is stated that “[t]he development of a new National OCS
Program at this time is a key aspect of the implementation of President Donald Trump’s America-
First Offshore Energy Strategy, as outlined in the President’s Executive Order (E.O.) 13795 (April
28, 20179, and Secretarial Order 3350 (May 1, 2017)”, being simultaneously emphasized that “[t]
his Draft Proposed Program (DPP) would make more than 98 percent of the OCS available to
consider for oil and gas leasing during the 2019-2024 period. Including at this stage nearly the entire
OCS for potential oil and gas discovery is consistent with advancing the goal of moving the United
States from simply aspiring for energy independence to attaining energy dominance”.
3About the national Arctic policy doctrines of the United States of America, the Russian Federation,
Canada and the European Union see Golitsyn (2014), pp. 470–480.
4Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: An integrated European Union
policy for the Arctic, prepared by the European Commission and the High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 27 April 2016 (JOIN (2016) 21 final). On the
evolution of the European Union’s position vis-à-vis the Arctic see Airoldi (2014).
5The white paper: China’s Arctic Policy, 26 January 2018, http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_
paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm (last accessed 6 March 2018), has the following
structure: I. The Arctic Situation and Recent Changes; II. China and the Arctic; III. China’s Policy
Goals and Basic Principles in the Arctic; IV. China’s Policies and Positions on Participating in
Arctic Affairs (1. Deepening the exploration and understanding of the Arctic; 2. Protecting the
eco-environment of the Arctic and addressing climate change; 3. Utilizing Arctic Resources in a
Lawful and Rational Manner; 4. Participating Actively in Arctic governance and international
cooperation; and 5. Promoting peace and stability in the Arctic).
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or areas north of 60N).6 When analysing the question of the use of natural resources
in the Arctic, the most appropriate approach for setting the boundaries of the Arctic
region seems to be the use of the criteria applied by the Arctic Council Participating
States, in particular for the elaboration of studies carried out by the Arctic Monitor-
ing and Assessment Programme (AMAP).7,8
The Arctic is inhabited by four million people, with indigenous communities
estimated at about one-tenth of the total population (the uncertainty being the result
of there not being specific date relative to the ethnic populations in the states
concerned). Indigenous populations are distributed among seven of the eight Arctic
States, with the exception of Iceland, the most important being the Saami, distributed
throughout Finland, Sweden, Norway and the Northwest of Russia, and the Inuit
(Iñupiat) in Alaska, the Inuit (Inuvialuit) in Canada,9 and the Inuit (Kalaallit) in
Greenland. Belonging to different ethnic groups, and distributed by diverse com-
munities with distinct characteristics,10 the livelihoods and survival of indigenous
populations are dependent on the methods of the traditional exploitation of natural
living resources, particularly the capture of marine mammals.11
Although the exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic is still, in many cases,
merely potential, the possibility of this happening in the near future is a consequence
of climate change. In 2004, in the study Impacts of a Warming Arctic12 it was stated
that, “[a]nnual average arctic temperature has increased at almost twice the rate as
that of the rest of the world over the past few decades, with some variations across
the region”, hence that there has been “[i]ncreasing precipitation, shorter and warmer
winters, and substantial decreases in snow cover and ice cover are among the
6On this matter see Rothwell (1996), pp. 23–25.
7The geographical coverage of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme covers areas
south of the Arctic Circle, “as far south as 51.1 degrees N (James Bay, Canada)” and “extends from
the High Arctic to the sub-Arctic areas of Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland and the
Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation”, See https://www.amap.no/
about/geographical-coverage (last accessed 6 March 2018).
8In this sense, Henriksen (2018), p. 593.
9On the specific legal regime applicable to the Inuvialuit see the Agreement between the Committee
for Original Peoples’ Entitlement, representing the Inuvialuit of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region,
and the Government of Canada dated June 5, 1984 (with subsequent amendments), reproduced in
The Western Arctic Claim. Inuvialuit Final Agreement as Amended, Inuvialuit Regional Corpora-
tion, See https://www.inuvialuitland.com/resources/Inuvialuit_Final_Agreement.pdf (last accessed
6 March 2018).
10About areas of heightened cultural significance see Huntington et al. (2013), pp. 101–115.
11In this sense, Larsen (2010), pp. 85–87, which states that “[t]he livelihoods of a significant
number of indigenous people—including also many non-indigenous residents—continue to depend
largely on harvesting and use of living terrestrial, marine, and freshwater resources. Many of these
resources are used as food and for clothing and other products, and make important contributions to
the cash economy of local households and communities” (p. 86). On the international legal regime
applicable to the indigenous peoples of the Arctic see Koivurova (2016), pp. 360–361.
12ACIA, Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, Cambridge University
Press, 2004, https://www.amap.no/documents/doc/impacts-of-a-warming-arctic-2004/786 (last
accessed 6 March 2018).
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projected changes that are very likely to persist for centuries”.13 These results were
corroborated by the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (2013), when it was stated that “[t]he Arctic region will warm more
rapidly than the global mean, and mean warming over land will be larger than over
the ocean (very high confidence)”,14 and also that “[t]he annual mean Arctic sea ice
extent decreased over the period 1979 to 2012 with a rate that was very likely in the
range 3.5 to 4.1% per decade (range of 0.45 to 0.51 million Km2 per decade), and
very likely in the range 9.4 to 13,6% per decade (range of 0.73 to 1.07 million Km2
per decade) for summer sea ice minimum (perennial sea ice)”.15
It should be noted that the consequences of climate change in the Arctic can be
appreciated in very different ways, according to the perspective adopted. The effects
of climate change are evaluated in a predominantly negative way when the ongoing
changes in the Arctic are considered according to an environmental perspective and
the maintenance of the traditional living conditions of indigenous populations. From
an opposite perspective, the reduction of the frozen areas and changes in the models
of economic use of spaces can be qualified as potentially positive when analysed
from a western anthropocentric perspective of the use of natural resources (very
different from the one that has been used traditionally by the indigenous communi-
ties living in the Arctic16).
Probably the most obvious and widespread facet of the potential positive conse-
quences of climate change in the Arctic has been the increased navigation routes in
the region, with the particular mention of four routes,17 viz. the Northern Sea Route,
the Northwest Passage,18,19 the Northeast Passage and the Central Arctic Ocean
Route. The existence of new Arctic routes may reduce the shipping distance between
destinations in Europe, Asia and North America, with decreases in days spent at sea
13ACIA, Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, Cambridge University
Press, 2004, https://www.amap.no/documents/doc/impacts-of-a-warming-arctic-2004/786 (last
accessed 6 March 2018), p. 10.
14
“Summary for Policymakers”, in Stocker et al. (2013), p. 20.
15
“Summary for Policymakers”, in Stocker et al. (2013), p. 9.
16On the issue see Cambou and Smis (2013) and Enyew (2017).
17A map with the various routes can be found in Sander et al. (2014), p. 37.
18About the Northwest and Northeast Passages see Golitsyn (2014), pp. 469–473; Scott and
Vanderzwaag (2015), p. 734, in respect of the jurisdictional tensions caused by the application of
the legal regime of the straits used for international navigation to the Russia’s Arctic straits and to
the Northwest Passage.
19In the study ACIA, Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, Cambridge
University Press, 2004, https://www.amap.no/documents/doc/impacts-of-a-warming-arctic-2004/
786 (last accessed 6 March 2018), p. 10, it is emphasized that “[s]easonal opening of the Northern
Sea Route is likely to make trans-arctic shipping during summer feasible within several decades.
Increasing ice movement in some channels of the Northwest Passage could initially make shipping
more difficult”.
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and fuel consumption, but they are not likely to result in a replacement of the
traditional maritime routes.20
The last decade has also witnessed an increase in tourism in the Arctic, consisting
of an increase in the number of tourists and the diversification of places that have
been visited for recreational purposes.21,22
2 The International Legal Regime of the Arctic and Its
Relevance to the Economic Use of Natural Resources
2.1 The International Legal Regime Applicable to the Arctic’s
Land and Maritime Spaces
Since frozen surfaces are a distinctive feature of the Arctic, it is important to make a
distinction between ice-covered land and waters that are temporarily or permanently
frozen, owing to the different regulations that are applied to them by international
law. The international legal regime of the various regions of the Arctic varies
depending on whether we are dealing with land covered by ice or frozen waters
that can be regulated by the international regimes of the various maritime spaces
provided for by the International Law of the Sea.
The legal regime of territorial sovereignty applies to terrestrial territories covered
by ice, which are considered to be exclusive, is incompatible with uses by third
States which are not authorized. For waters which are temporarily or permanently
frozen, different international legal regimes apply, and these vary according to
whether those waters are designated to be inland waters, territorial sea, contiguous
zone, exclusive economic zone or high seas.23 The outer limits of the maritime
20In this sense, Raspotnik and Rudloff (2012), pp. 6–7, argue that “the often positively potential of
the new maritime corridors does not only depend on the continuous melting of Arctic sea ice and the
mentioned reduction in sailing distances, but will be decisively influenced by economic parameters,
legal aspects and geopolitical/geostrategic considerations”.
21The main ports operating in the Arctic are: Churchill in Canada, Murmansk in Russia, and
Prudhoe Bay in the United States of America.
22On this question, see Maher et al. (2014), with an analysis of the cases of Alaska, Canada, Iceland,
Faroe Islands, Sweden, Finland and Russia; and Grimsrud (2017). Data on Arctic tourism can be
found at NOEP—National Ocean Economic Program, of the Middlebury Institute of International
Studies at Monterey—Center for the Blue Economy, http://www.oceaneconomics.org/arctic/tour
ism/tourData.aspx (last accessed 6 March 2018), with reference to Canada, Greenland, Sweden,
Finland, Iceland, Norway, United States of America, Russia, Denmark, and the Arctic Expedition
Cruise Operators (AECO).
23With regard to the United States of America the customary international law in force in this matter
applies, taking into consideration that the United States has not yet ratified the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. In this sense, Golitsyn (2014), p. 465, states that “it may be
assumed that, with the exception of the deep seabed mining, the United States considers all other
provisions of UNCLOS applicable to the Arctic Ocean as customary international law”. On the
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spaces subject to the sovereignty or jurisdiction of coastal states depends on the
baselines that have been fixed by the coastal States,24 and these cannot exceed the
limits authorized by the International Law of the Sea, namely 12 nautical miles to the
territorial sea, 24 nautical miles to the contiguous zone and 200 nautical miles to the
exclusive economic zone. The exercise of powers by the coastal State on the
continental shelf does not require a claim for up to 200 nautical miles, and the
possibility of its extension beyond the external limits depends on a submission to the
Commission on Limits of the Continental Shelf established by the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.25
The extent of the high seas and that of the Area is dependent on the outer limits of
the maritime spaces of the coastal states, namely the exclusive economic zone and
the continental shelf. The marine Arctic, including the Arctic ocean and adjacent
areas, such as the Bering Sea and the Barents Sea, is 14 million square kilometres in
extent, of which an estimated 2,800,000 square kilometres can be qualified as
high seas.
The land and maritime borders of the coastal States of the Arctic region are very
relevant with regard to the evaluation of the use of natural resources in the Arctic for
three reasons. Firstly, the exploitation of natural resources in the territory of States is
subject to the principle of territorial sovereignty. Secondly, coastal States have
sovereign powers to exploit the natural resources available in the maritime spaces
adjacent to their land territories that must be harmonized with the uses recognized to
third States, especially with regard to the freedom of navigation. And, thirdly,
international maritime spaces (the high seas) and internationalized maritime spaces
(the Area26) shall be determined according to the spaces subject to the sovereignty
and jurisdiction of the coastal States. In relation to these facts, the importance for the
Arctic States to negotiate and conclude bilateral agreements on the delimitation of
discussions concerning the ratification by the United States of America of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the compilation of documents entitled 21st Century Complete
Guide to the Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST). U. N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Commercial, Seabed Ocean Mining, Maritime Rights, and Military Implications, Progressive
Management Publications. At the ISAB—International Security Advisory Board, Report Arctic
Policy, September 21, 2016, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/262585.pdf (last
accessed 6 March 2018), p. 39, it is recommended that “the United States should make ratification
of UNCLOS an urgent national priority”, taking into account that “ratification will promote
American stability, security and presence in all oceanic contexts—particularly in the Arctic
region—and it will enable the United States to have a voice at UNCLOS tribunals on claims
asserted in the Arctic by Russia and others and in the future development of UNCLOS as an
institution”.
24On the issue see Golitsyn (2014), pp. 476–479, with reference to the position of the United States
of America on the subject; and Scovazzi (2016), pp. 172–177.
25On the issue see Rahbek-Clemmensen (2015); and Scott and Vanderzwaag (2015), pp. 732–734.
26According to Scott and Vanderzwaag (2015), pp. 733–734, “[w]hat areas of the deep seabed will
remain beyond national jurisdiction remains to be seen. A prevalent view among authors is that
once the outer continental shelves of the five Arctic coastal States are partitioned, only two
relatively small areas will lie beyond national jurisdiction”.
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their maritime borders can be understood and the maritime zones of potential conflict
between States of the region are almost non-existent.27
Other than the situation in Antarctica,28 which is an ice-covered land territory
with a specific international legal regime, the Arctic is not governed by particular
rules of international law, nor is it foreseeable that it will be in a near future.29
Indeed, in the: Ilulissat Declaration of 28 May 2008, the five coastal States of the
Arctic Ocean—Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation and the United
States of America—declared that they had adopted the International Law of the Sea
as the appropriate international legal framework for the management of issues such
as the “delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the
marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine
scientific research and other uses of the sea”. This position was reinforced by the
very relevant and expressive statement that, “[w]e therefore see no need to develop a
new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean”.30 The
European Union declared, on 27 April 2016, in the Joint Communication to the
European Parliament and the Council, entitled An integrated European policy for the
Arctic, and prepared by the European Commission and the High Representative of
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, that “the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides a framework for managing the Arctic Ocean,
including the peaceful settlement of disputes”.31 A similar position was adopted by
27In this sense, Scott and Vanderzwaag (2015), pp. 729–734, refer to the existence of four situations
of potential conflict: (1) the maritime boundary between Canada and the United States in the
Beaufort Sea; (2) the dispute between Canada and Denmark (Greenland) with respect to Hans
Island, an uninhabited islet, located in Nares Strait of the Kennedy Channel, with a dimension of
about 1 square kilometre; (3) the application of the regime of 200 nautical miles fisheries protection
zone to the Svalbard Archipelago under the Treaty of Spitsbergen; and (4) the possibility of
overlapping claims related to the of the outer limits of the continental shelves beyond 200 nautical
miles (Canada and the United States in the Beaufort Sea; Canada and Denmark/Greenland and
Russia in the Arctic Basin; and Norway (Svalbard) and Denmark/Greenland). A graphic represen-
tation of the maritime boundaries can be found in the maps available on the website of IBRU—
Centre for Borders Research, da Durham University: (1) Maritime Jurisdiction and Boundaries in
the Arctic Region Russian Claims https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/resources/arctic/ (last accessed
6 March 2018); and (2) Status of Arctic Waters Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from Shore, https://
www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/resources/arctic/ (last accessed 6 March 2018).
28On this issue see Mucci and Borgia (2014); Scott and Vanderzwaag (2015), pp. 738–745.
29On the international legal regime applicable to the Arctic see Vanderzwaag (2010), pp. 47–60. A
listing of the international legal regime applicable to the Arctic can be found in Sahu (2016),
pp. 83–95.
30Regarding the possibility of the Arctic being described as a semi-closed sea, for the purposes of
applying Part IX of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, Winkelmann (2017),
p. 886, states that “[n]either the five Arctic coastal States nor the Arctic Council have ever officially
referred to the Arctic Ocean as a semi-enclosed sea. Other States—including the remaining Arctic
Council Member States—would hardly adhere to such an assumption with its inherent exclusive-
ness. Thus, the question remains formally open. Many of the activities implemented by the Arctic
Council in the Arctic Ocean relate to tasks suggested in Art. 123”.
31Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: An integrated European Union
policy for the Arctic, prepared by the European Commission and the High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 27 April 2016 (JOIN (2016) 21 final), p. 14.
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China, which calls itself a “Near-Arctic State”, on 26 January 2018, in the China’s
Arctic Policy, by stating that, “States from outside the Arctic region do not have
territorial sovereignty in the Arctic, but they do have rights in respect of scientific
research, navigation, overflight, fishing, laying of submarine cables and pipelines in
the high seas and other relevant sea areas in the Arctic Ocean, and rights to resource
exploration and exploitation in the Area, pursuant to treaties such as UNCLOS and
general international law”.32
The international legal regime referred to above must be harmonized with the
international conventional regime applicable to the Spitsbergen archipelago or
Svalbard (in accordance with the Norwegian naming), concluded in Paris on the
9 February 1920.33 In accordance with Article 1, “the full and absolute sovereignty
of Norway over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen” was recognized, with the conse-
quence that “[s]hips and nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy
equally the rights of fishing and hunting in the territories specified in Article 1 and in
their territorial waters” (article 2). In accordance with Article 2, Norway “shall be
free to maintain, take or decree suitable measures to ensure the preservation and, if
necessary, the reconstitution of the fauna and flora of the said regions, and their
territorial waters”. Article 3 embodies the rights of States which are party to the
Treaty on Spitsbergen in particularly broad terms, by providing that “[t]he nationals
of all the High Contracting Parties shall have equal liberty of access and entry for any
reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of the territories specified in
Article 1; subject to the observance of local laws and regulations, they may carry on
there without any impediment all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial
operations on a footing of absolute equality”. The fundamental issue with regard
to the application of this conventional international regime at present is whether its
geographical scope covers only the territorial sea or must identically include mari-
time spaces, such as the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, the
concepts of which emerged only after its conclusion.34
While a consideration of issues related to the exploitation of natural resources,
especially the living natural resources, could take into account an ecosystem
approach, the political boundaries amongst the States of this region, whether land
or maritime, are still of decisive importance to this field of the uses of natural
resources.
32China’s Arctic Policy, I. The Arctic Situation and Recent Changes, 26 January 2018, http://
english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm (last accessed
6 March 2018).
33Treaty between Norway, The United States do America, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Great Britain and Ireland and the British overseas Dominions and Sweden concerning
Spitsbergen signed in Paris 9th February 1920, http://library.arcticportal.org/1909/1/The_Sval
bard_Treaty_9ssFy.pdf (last accessed 6 March 2018). Data on the Svalbard can be found in
Wang and Kristiansen (2017).
34According to Scott and Vanderzwaag (2015), p. 732, “Norway has somewhat defused the
controversy by allowing fishing access to various states within the FPZ [fisheries protection
zone], largely based on their historical fishing in the area”.
296 F. L. Bastos
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
2.2 The Arctic Council
Over the past two decades, through the Arctic Council, the five Arctic Ocean coastal
States, together with Finland, Iceland and Sweden, have been playing a decisive and
innovative role in the management of arctic affairs.35 The Arctic Council is
presented by its promoters as being “the leading intergovernmental forum promoting
cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, Arctic indigenous
communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular on
issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic”. In
these terms, by its not being an intergovernmental organization nor having been
given concrete powers of action, the implementation of the guidelines, assessments
and recommendations is the exclusive task of the participating Arctic States.
The Arctic Council was created by the Declaration on the Establishment of the
Arctic Council, dated 19 September 1996, signed in Ottawa, Canada, and based on
the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). On 21 January 2013, an
agreement was signed between the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the
Arctic Council Secretariat Director on the establishment of the Arctic Council
Secretariat in Tromso, Norway.36
The Ottawa Declaration was signed by representatives of the governments of the
eight States of the Arctic Region, which call themselves Arctic States: Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden and United States
of America. In accordance with para. 1 of the Ottawa Declaration, the Arctic Council
was “established as a high-level forum”. According to para. 1 (a) of the Ottawa
Declaration, the Arctic Council was established to: “provide a means for promoting
cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involve-
ment of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common
Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental
35In this sense, Brigham et al. (2016), p. 9, maintain that “[t]he Arctic Council is in many ways a
marvel. Perhaps the first true post-modern regional organization, representing a new kind of region-
building, it has not so much blazed a trail as invented and occupied a unique space in international
relations: one that has privileged cooperation and consensus to the point that it has withstood
broader political tensions between Russia and the West; has provided meaningful inclusion of
indigenous peoples and other non-state actors; and prioritized environmental protection using
scientific and traditional knowledges as its evidence base”. On the evolution of the Artic Council,
see Koivurova (2016), pp. 350–354, which states that “[c]urrently, the Arctic States have taken at
least some steps to counter the vast challenges ahead, by consolidating the Arctic Council as an
institution and choosing to prepare for the eventuality of climate-change Arctic through hard-law
instruments. Even if some have suggested stronger institutional responses to govern the ‘new
arctic’, Arctic states have chosen the path of consolidating existing regulatory frameworks and
negotiating new sectorial ones, also regarding the exploitation of natural resources” (p. 364).
36The authentic text, in English, of the Host Country Agreement between the Government of the
Kingdom of Norway and the Arctic Council Secretariat on the Legal Status of the Secretariat and
Privileges and Immunities of the Secretariat and its staff members can be found on the site of the
Arctic Council, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1655 (last accessed
6 March 2018).
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protection in the Arctic”. In a footnote to para. 1 (a) of the Ottawa Declaration, it is
expressly stipulated that “[t]he Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to
military security”. In the Joint Communiqué of the Governments of the Arctic
Countries on the Establishment of the Arctic Council it was further reaffirmed that
“[m]inisters viewed the establishment of this new intergovernmental forum as an
important milestone in their commitment to enhance cooperation in the circumpolar
North”.
The Arctic Council is composed of the States that signed the Ottawa Declaration
and Permanent Participants, whose number should be “at any time less than the
number of members”. Permanent Participants are: “Arctic organizations of indige-
nous peoples with a majority Arctic indigenous constituency, representing: (a) a
single indigenous people resident in more than one Arctic State; or (b) more than one
Arctic indigenous people resident in a single Arctic state”, pursuant to paragraph 2 of
the Ottawa Declaration. In January 2018, six organizations representing the Arctic
indigenous peoples have status as Permanent Participants: the Aleut International
Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Gwich’in Council International, the
Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the
North, and the Saami Council.
In accordance with para. 3 of the Ottawa Declaration, it is envisaged that there
may be observers in three categories: “non-Arctic states”,37 “inter-governmental and
inter-parliamentary organizations, global and regional”,38 as well as “non-govern-
mental organizations”.39 The granting of observer status involves taking into
37In January 2018, 13 Non-arctic States were approved as Observers to the Arctic Council: France
(2000); Germany (1998); Italy (2013); Japan (2013); Netherlands (1998); China (2013); Poland
(1998); India (2013); Republic of Korea (2013); Singapore (2013); Spain (2006); Switzerland
(2017); United Kingdom (1998). Regarding the states with observer status in the Arctic Council,
with reference to the aspiring Arctic Council Observer States (Turkey, Mongolia and Greece), see
ISAB—International Security Advisory Board, Report Arctic Policy, September 21, 2016, https://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/262585.pdf (last accessed 6 March 2018) pp. 11–17.
38In January 2018, 13 Intergovernmental and Inter-Parliamentary Organizations have an approved
observer status: ICES—International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (2017); IFRC—
International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies (2000); IUCN—International
Union for the Conservation of Nature (2000); Nordic Council of Ministers (1998); Nordic Envi-
ronment Finance Corporation (2004); NAMMCO—North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission
(2000); OSPAR Commission (2017); SCPAR—Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the
Arctic Region (1998); UN-ECE—United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (1998);
UNDP—United Nations Development Programme (1998); WMO—World Meteorological Orga-
nization (2017); e WNC—West Nordic Council (2017).
39In January 2018, 13 Non-governmental Organizations are approved Observers in the Arctic
Council: ACOPS—Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas (2000); AINA—Arctic Institute
of North America (2004); AWRH—Association of World Reindeer Herders (2000); CCU—
Circumpolar Conservation Union (2000); IASC—International Arctic Science Committee (1998);
IASSA—International Arctic Social Sciences Association (2000); IUCH—International Union for
Circumpolar Health (1998); IWGIA—International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (2002);
NGS—National Geographic Society (2017); NF—Northern Forum (1998); OCEANA (2017);
UArctic—University of the Arctic (2002); WWF—World Wide Fund (1998).
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consideration the following criteria: that they (1) “accept and support the objectives
of the Arctic Council defined in the Ottawa declaration”; (2) “recognize Arctic
States’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic”; (3) “recognize
that an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean including, notably, the
Law of the Sea, and that this framework provides a solid foundation for responsible
management of this ocean”; (4) “respect the values, interests, culture and traditions
of Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants”; (5) “have demonstrated a
political willingness as well as financial ability to contribute to the work of the
Permanent Participants and other Arctic indigenous peoples”; (6) “have demon-
strated their Arctic interests and expertise relevant to the work of the Arctic Coun-
cil”; and (7) “have demonstrated a concrete interest in and the ability to support the
work of the Arctic Council, including through partnerships with members states and
Permanent Participants bringing Arctic concerns to global decision-making
bodies”.40
The work of the Arctic Council is carried out by six Working Groups: (1) the
Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP) that “acts as a strengthening and
supporting mechanism to encourage national actions to reduce emissions and other
releases of pollutants”; (2) the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme
(AMAP) that “monitors the Arctic environment, ecosystems and human populations,
and provides scientific advice to support governments as they tackle pollution and
adverse effects of climate change”41; (3) the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna
Working Group (AFF) that “addresses the conservation of Arctic biodiversity,
working to ensure the sustainability of the Arctic’s living resources”; (4) the Emer-
gency, Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group (EPPR) that “works
to protect the Arctic environment from the threat or impact of an accidental release of
pollutants or radionuclides”; (5) the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment
Working Group (PAME) that “is the focal point of the Arctic Council’s activities
related to the protection and sustainable use of the Arctic marine environment”; and
(6) the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG)42 that “works to advance
40The criteria for admission of observers are set out in the Arctic Council Observer Manual, https://
oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/939 (last accessed 6 March 2018), adopted at the 2013
Kiruna Ministerial Meeting, with amendments introduced in October 2015 (Anchorage), and in
October 2016 (Portland).
41AMAP has produced a series of scientifically-based assessments of the pollution status of the
Arctic, such as: AMAP Assessment 2002: The Influence of Global Change on Contaminant
Pathways to, within, and from the Arctic; AMAP Assessment 2002: Persistent Organic Pollutants
in the Arctic; Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment; AMAP Assessment 2006: Acidifying
Pollutants, Arctic Haze, and Acidification in the Arctic; Assessment 2007: Oil and Gas Activities in
the Arctic—Effects and Potential Effects (volume 1 and volume 2); AMAP Assessment 2011:
Mercury in the Arctic; AMAP Assessment 2013: Arctic Ocean Acidification; AMAP Assessment
2015: Human Health in the Arctic; and AMAP Assessment 2015: Radioactivity in the Arctic.
42The SDWG works according to six broad thematic areas: (1) Arctic Human Health issues and the
wellbeing of people living in the Arctic; (2) Sustainable economic activities and increasing
community prosperity; (3) educational and cultural heritage, including indigenous languages;
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sustainable development in the Arctic and to improve the conditions of Arctic
communities as a whole”.43
The Arctic Council meets biannually,44 with “meetings of senior officials taking
place more frequently, to provide for liaison and co-ordination” (para. 4 of the
Ottawa Declaration). The decisions of the Arctic Council are taken “by consensus
of the Members” (para. 7 of the Ottawa Declaration), and “[t]he Arctic Council
should regularly review the priorities and financing of its programs and associated
structures” (para. 9 of the Ottawa Declaration). As a forum for intergovernmental
cooperation, the Arctic Council does not have a budget for the activities it promotes,
and its projects are funded by one or more Arctic States. The administrative budget is
funded in equal parts by the eight States participating in the Arctic Council.
In the Ilulissat Declaration, in 1998, the five Arctic Coastal States assumed “a
stewardship role in protecting” the Arctic Ocean as a “unique ecosystem”, but
simultaneously recognized the role that “other interested parties” could play. There
are three relevant examples of such extended cooperation.
Firstly, the three binding international commitments that were negotiated within
the framework of the Arctic Council: (1) the Agreement on Cooperation on Aero-
nautical and Maritime Search in the Arctic, signed at the Nuuk Ministerial meeting
of 2011 (Greenland), which entered into force in January 2013; (2) the Agreement on
Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic,
signed at the Kiruna Ministerial meeting in May 2013 (Sweden); and (3) the
Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation, signed in
Fairbanks on 11 May 2017 (Alaska).
Secondly, on 16 June 2015, the Arctic Five were involved in the creation of a
founding document providing the framework for future legal action in the Arctic
Ocean: the Declaration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas
(4) management of natural, including living, resources; (5) adaptation to climate change; and
(6) infrastructure development.
43The Arctic Council may also establish Task Forces and Expert Groups to carry out specific work.
In January 2018, during the Chairmanship of Finland (2017–2019), the Tasks Forces currently
operating are: the Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation (TFAMC), since 2015, and the Task
Force on Improved Connectivity in the Arctic (TFICA), since 2017. Between 2011 and 2013, an
Ecosystem-Based Management Expert Group developed four framework documents and a final
report, which include a policy commitment, a definition of ecosystem-based management in the
Arctic, a set of principles for ecosystem-based management in the Arctic, and a set of high-priority
activities for coordinating and improving the ecosystem-based management work of the Arctic
Council. At the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in Iqaluit (2015) an Expert Group in support of
implementation of the framework for action on Black Carbon and Methane was established in order
to assess the progress of the implementation of the Arctic Council Framework for Action on Black
Carbon and Methane periodically.
44Ten ministerial meetings of the Arctic Council took place between 1998 and 2017: (1) Iqaluit,
Canada, 17 and 18 September 1998; (2) Barrow, United States of America, 12 October 2000;
(3) Inari, Finland, 9 and 10 October 2002; (4) Reykjavik, Iceland, 24 November 2004;
(5) Salekhard, Russian Federation, 26 October 2006; (6) Tromso, Norway, 29 April 2009;
(7) Nuuk, Greenland, 12 May 2011; (8) Kiruna, Sweden, 15 May 2013; (9) Iqaluit, Canada,
24 and 25 April 2015; and (10) Fairbanks, United States of America, 11 May 2017.
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Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean (Oslo Declaration).45 The States signing the
Oslo Declaration have undertaken to authorize “commercial fishing” only to vessels
with their flag when “one or more regional or sub-regional fisheries management
organizations or arrangements that are or may be established to manage such fishing
in accordance with recognized international standards”. Although it contained only
political obligations, it was the basis for the negotiation and conclusion of a draft
Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean,
on 30 November 2017.
And, finally, the third example, the contributions they gave to the conclusion of
the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (or Polar Code), within
the framework of the International Maritime Organization. In accordance with its
preamble “the Code acknowledges that polar water operation may impose additional
demands on ships, their systems and operation beyond the existing requirements of
the International Conventional for the Safety of the Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as
modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto as amended by the 1997 Protocol,
and other relevant binding IMO instruments”. Pursuant to para. 4 (Structure of the
Code) of the Introduction the “Code consists of Introduction, parts I and II. The
Introduction contains mandatory provisions applicable to both parts I and II. Part I is
subdivided into part I-A, which contains mandatory provisions on safety measures,
and part I-B containing recommendations on safety. Part II is subdivided into part
II-A, which contains mandatory provisions on pollution prevention, and part I-B
containing recommendations on pollution prevention”.46
45On the Oslo Declaration, see Molennar (2015), which stresses that, p. 5, “the Arctic Five’s
pro-active and precautionary efforts and commitments, and implicit dismissal of a laissez-faire,
laissez-aller attitude”.
46According to para. 3 (Sources of hazards) of the Introduction, “the Polar Code considers hazards
which may lead to elevated levels of risk due to increased probability of occurrence, more severe
consequences, or both: 1) ice (. . .); 2) experiencing topside icing, with potential reduction of
stability and equipment functionality; 3) low temperature (. . .); 4) extended periods of darkness
or daylight (. . .); 5) high latitude, as it affects navigation systems, communication systems and the
quality of ice imagery information; 6) remoteness and possible lack of accurate and complete
hydrographic data and information, reduced availability or navigational aids and seamarks with
increased potential for groundings compounded by remoteness, limited readily deployable SAR
facilities, delays in emergency response and limited communications capability, with the potential
to affect incident response; 7) potential lack of ship crew experience in polar operations, with
potential for human error; 8) potential lack of suitable emergency response equipment (. . .); 9)
rapidly changing and severe weather conditions (. . .); and 10) the environment with respect to
sensitivity to harmful substances and other environmental impacts and its need for longer
restoration”.
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3 An Overview of the Economic Use of Natural Resources
in the Arctic
3.1 Introductory Elements
The economic use of natural resources in the Arctic, as a consequence of the
reduction of ice-covered areas, has been presented in recent years by the media as
a scramble carried out by a number of States, with particular emphasis on the States
of the region. This way of presenting the matter does not, however, adequately
reflect the reality in the light of the fact that the rules of international law applicable
to land and sea are clearly identified and are contrary to any attempt to appropriate
maritime areas that are not subject to the sovereignty or jurisdiction of coastal States.
In that sense, Article 89 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) provides expressly that, “[n]o State may validly purport to subject any
part of the high seas to its sovereignty”.
At the same time, it can be argued that the absence of a specific international legal
regime for the Arctic, based on principles similar to those of States in the Antarctic,
is an intentional option for coastal States and third States to maintain their freedom of
action necessary for the economic appropriation of the natural resources in the
region.47 The affirmation of the application of the International Law of the Sea to
the maritime spaces is highly significant to the extent that the existing international
legal regimes are almost entirely dedicated to the use of natural resources both on the
high seas, because the freedom of fishing is recognized to all States (article
87 (1) para. (e) UNCLOS), and also in areas subject to the jurisdiction of coastal
States, such as the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. This enshrines
the exclusivity of the sovereign rights of the coastal States to exploit their natural
resources, both living and non-living. In this sense, Article 56 (1) para. (a) UNCLOS
provides that, in its exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has “[s]overeign
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the
natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the
sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil”. In consonant terms, paragraph 1 article
77 of UNCLOS states that the “coastal State exercises over the continental shelf
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural
resources”.48
47In this sense, Dupuy and Viñuales (2015), p. 115, that “[t]he possibility of appropriation of Arctic
resources is governed by the basic international rules applicable to the exercise of sovereignty and
sovereign rights by States over land and maritime spaces”.
48In accordance with Article 77 (4) UNCLOS, the natural resources covered by the legal status of
the continental shelf “consist of the mineral and other non-living resources of the sea-bed and
subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms
which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the sea-bed or are unable to move
except in constant physical contact with the sea-bed or the subsoil”.
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It should be noted that the economic exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic
is currently heavily constrained by the rules of environmental law, both the domestic
laws of the Arctic States and also as a result of the application of the existing
international law in this field. There are 18 large marine ecosystems in the Arctic
region: viz. Faeroe Plateau, Iceland Shelf and Sea, Greenland Sea, Norwegian Sea,
Barents Sea, Kara Sea, Laptev Sea, East Siberian Sea, East Bering Sea, Aleutian
Islands, West Bering Sea, Northern Bering-Chukchi Seas, Central Arctic, Beaufort
Sea, Canadian High Arctic-North Greenland, Canadian Eastern Arctic-West Green-
land, Hudson Bay Complex and Labrador-Newfoundland.49 It is particularly signif-
icant that States have a “duty to take, or to co-operate (. . .) in taking, such measures
for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living
resources” (article 117 UNCLOS), and should cooperate “with each other in the
conservation and management of living resources in the areas of the high seas”, in
accordance with article 118 UNCLOS. The pursuit of economic exploitation in the
Arctic may also be subject to limits of action of a private origin, such as the ones
adopted by companies50 under corporate social responsibility, in order to ensure
scrupulous compliance with environmental obligations.51,52
The natural resources that can be economically exploited in the Arctic can be
divided into two categories, living natural resources and non-living natural
resources. The first category covers animal species with economic value, with
particular emphasis on fish. The second category includes non-renewable resources
such as oil, natural gas, minerals,53 and aggregates.54
In the last few decades, some animal species have ceased to be qualified as natural
resources and have come to be integrated into an autonomous classification as
49A synthesis on area, characteristics, fish/fisheries/ecosystem of the Arctic large marine ecosys-
tems can be found in Blomeyer et al. (2015), pp. 30–32. On areas of heightened ecological
importance see Skjoldal et al. (2013).
50It should be borne in mind that, as LARSEN (2010) points out, p. 94, “[b]ecause of the lack of
financial resources along with the cost of extraction, Northern resource development is largely
carried out by big corporations including multinational corporations”.
51On the issue Koivurova (2013); Koivurova (2016), pp. 360–367; Tiainen et al. (2015),
pp. 144–145.
52The position expressed in this domain in the China’s Arctic Policy, 26 January 2018, http://
english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm (last accessed
6 March 2018), is particularly significant when it is asserted that, “[t]he Arctic has abundant
resources, but a fragile ecosystem. China advocates protection and rational use of the region and
encourages its enterprises to engage in international cooperation on the exploration for and
utilization of Arctic resources by making the best use of their advantages in capital, technology
and domestic market”.
53An up-to-date overview of the exploration of Arctic mineral resources can be found in Boyd et al.
(2016); Lindholt (2017).
54The NOEP—National Ocean Economic Program, of the Middlebury Institute of International
Studies at Monterey—Center for the Blue Economy, http://www.oceaneconomics.org/arctic/
NaturalResources/ (last accessed 6 March 2018), divides the Arctic Natural Resources at: Fisheries
(Fisheries Data); and Arctic Extractives (Oil & Gas Data; Minerals Data; and Aggregates Data).
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environmental goods, endowed with specific international protection regimes. In the
Arctic this category is composed of marine mammals, with the particular exception
of their being allowed to be captured for consumption by the indigenous communi-
ties. To this end, the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, signed in Oslo
on 15 November 1973 by Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States of America, after establishing in Article I (1) that
“[t]he taking of polar bears shall be prohibited”, accepts that the catch may be
conducted “by local people using traditional methods in the exercise of their
traditional rights” (Article III (1) para. (d)), and also “wherever polar bears have or
might have been subject to taking by traditional means” (Article III (1) para. (e)).55
3.2 Fishing
Arctic fishery can be pursued in two types of maritime spaces: on the one hand, in
maritime spaces subject to the sovereignty and jurisdiction of coastal States, such as
inland waters, territorial seas and exclusive economic zones; and, on the other hand,
on the high seas. Regarding fishing in the high seas, the Arctic coastal States adopted
a set of provisional measures through the Declaration Concerning the Prevention of
Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean of 16 July 2015, in
accordance with which “[w]e will authorize our vessels to conduct commercial
fishing in the high seas only pursuant to one or more regional or subregional fisheries
management organizations or arrangements that are or may be established to manage
such fishing in accordance with recognized international standards”. The regulation
of catches in accordance with a sustainable fishing regime will be stepped up by the
entry into force of the draft Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries
in the Central Arctic Ocean, mentioned before, with the participation of the five
coastal States of the Arctic and also of China, Iceland, South Korea, Japan, and the
European Union. According to the information provided by the US Department of
State, on 30 November 2017, “[t]he Agreement will establish and operate a Joint
Program of Scientific Research and Monitoring with the aim of improving the
understanding of the ecosystem(s) of this area and, in particular, of determining
whether fish stocks might exist in this area that could be harvested on a sustainable
basis. The Agreement envisions the possibility that one or more additional regional
management organizations or arrangements may be established for this area in the
future”.56
55On the issue, Henriksen (2018), pp. 629–633; Potts (2010), pp. 73–76, to conclude that “[t]he
Arctic has several regimes that operate and overlap in the same marine space. Despite this
“patchwork quilt” approach a relatively healthy fisheries stock has been successfully maintained”
(p. 76).
56US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action: Meeting on High Seas Fisheries in the Central
Arctic Ocean, 28–30 November 2017: Chairman’s Statement, https://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/
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According to data from Fisheries Management and the Arctic in the Context of
Climate Change:
– “633 species, of which 63 are classified as mainly Arctic, 32 Arctic-boreal, 457 Boreal
and 81 as widely distributed. Of the 633 species, 80 (12,6%) are freshwater species, while
44 (6,9%) are found in both marine and fresh water, with 16 species mainly restricted to
Arctic waters” 57;
– “[t]he most important commercial fish species are North-east Arctic cod (Gadus
morhua), North east Arctic haddock (Melanogrammus eaglefinus), saithe (Pollachius
virens), redfish (Sebastes mentella and S. marinus), Greenland halibut (Reinhardtius
hippoglossoides), long rough dab (Hippoglossoides platessoides), wolffish (Anarhichas
lupus, A. minor and A. minor and A. denticulatus), European plaice (Pleuronectes
platessa), Barents Sea capelin (Mallotus villosus), Polar cod (Boreogadus saida) and
immature Norwegian spring-spawning herring (Clupea harengus)”58; and
– “real catches are apparently considerably greater than found in the official statistics for
FAO Statistical Area 18 (Arctic Sea). Reconstructed catches for the period from 1950 to
2006 indicate that total catches (950,000 t) are actually 75 times higher than the sum of
the catches reported for FAO Statistical Area 18, with most of the catches from the
Russian Arctic”.59
With regard to the same study,
[t]here is a general consensus that climate change will result in increased productivity in the
Arctic, and that with increasing temperature, there will be a “borealization” of the Arctic fish
community, with potential for some species to expand their distribution to the Arctic.
Among species with such potential are Polar cod, capelin and Greenland halibut,60
although there is a warning that
[t]he potential for increases in abundance and expansion vary from species to species, and
endemic fish species might suffer. This is limited by a set of constraints including environ-
mental and habitat preferences of species, as well as species adaptation capacity.61
opa/rls/276136.htm (last accessed 8 March 2018). On the issue of conservation of living marine
resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction see Henriksen (2018), pp. 624–628.
57Blomeyer et al. (2015), p. 32.
58Blomeyer et al. (2015), p. 35, which state that “[i]n addition to fish, there are 67 terrestrial
mammals, 35 marine mammals, 154 terrestrial and freshwater birds that breed in the Arctic,
45 marine birds that breed in the Arctic, 6 amphibians and approximately 5000 marine
invertebrates”.
59Blomeyer et al. (2015), p. 37. According to the synthesis available in NOEP—National Ocean
Economic Program, of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey—Center for
the Blue Economy, “[s]ince 2015, over 8 million metric tons have been harvested from Arctic
waters each year for commercial, artisanal, subsistence, and recreational uses, after declining from
its peak of 17 million tons in 1968” (Arctic Fisheries Data, organized by Daniel Pauly and Dirk
Zeller of the University of British Columbia, with detailed references to Arctic Country, Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ), Years Landed, Fishing Entity (Country), Fishing Sector, and Species, http://
www.oceaneconomics.org/arctic/fisheries/fisheriesData.aspx (last accessed 6 March 2018).
60Blomeyer et al. (2015), p. 14.
61Blomeyer et al. (2015), p. 98.
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3.3 Oil and Natural Gas
Oil exploitation began onshore in the 1920s and this was extended five decades later
to offshore exploration. Although in the presence of sparsely populated territories,
the decision-making in some states, particularly Canada, is long and time-consuming
because of the need to resolve issues related to the ownership of oil and gas deposits
owing to the different levels of administrative division involved, and the necessity to
take into account the participation of the traditional communities.62,63
In 2009, Philip Budzik of the Oil and Gas Division of the U.S. Energy Informa-
tion Administration, stated that, “[a]pproximately 61 large oil and natural gas fields
have been discovered within the Arctic Circle in Russia, Alaska, Canada’s North-
west Territories, and Norway. 15 of these large 61 large Arctic fields have not yet
gone into production: 11 are in Canada’s Northwest Territories, 2 in Russia, and 2 in
Arctic Alaska”.64
Economically profitable oil and natural gas exploration in the Arctic, according to
Budzik, must take into account the following constraints: (1) “[h]arsh winter weather
requires that the equipment be specially designed to withstand the frigid tempera-
tures”; (2) “[o]n Arctic lands, poor soil conditions can require additional site
preparation to prevent equipment and structures from sinking”; (3) “[t]he marshy
Arctic tundra can also preclude exploration activities during the warm months of the
year”; (4) “[i]n Arctic seas, the icepack can damage offshore facilities, while also
hindering the shipment of personnel, materials, equipment, and oil for long time
periods”; (5) “[l]ong supply lines from the world’s manufacturing centres require
equipment redundancy and a larger inventory of spare parts to insure reliability”;
(6) “[l]imited transportation access and long supply lines reduce the transportation
options and increase transportation costs”; and (7) “[h]igher wages and salaries are
required to induce personnel to work in the isolated and inhospitable Arctic”.65
In 2014, the Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic, made the
following synthesis on the oil and natural gas existing in the Arctic:
A decade ago, the Arctic accounted for about 25% of the world’s natural gas and 10% of oil
production. Yet most parts of the Arctic remain largely untapped. Those undiscovered
resources could amount to 90 billion barrels of oil, up to 50 trillion cubic metres of natural
gas and 44 billion barrels of natural liquids (NGLs), according to the U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS). That is about 13% of the world’s undiscovered, technically recoverable oil and up
to 30% of global gas reserves, and some 84% of it is offshore. Undiscovered natural gas is
likely to be three times more abundant than oil in the Arctic and is largely concentrated in
Russia66
62On the issue, Banks (2010), pp. 105–114.
63On the issue, Pelaudeix (2015), pp. 5–9.
64Budzik (2009), October 2009, http://www.akleg.gov/basis/get_documents.asp?session¼28&
docid¼741 (last accessed 6 March 2018), p. 4.
65Budzik (2009), October 2009, http://www.akleg.gov/basis/get_documents.asp?session¼28&
docid¼741 (last accessed 6 March 2018), p. 9.
66Luszczuk et al. (2014), p. 74.
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In 2017, the chapter of the study Economy of the North 2015, by Lars Lindholt and
Solveig Glomsrod, dedicated to the exploration of oil and natural gas in the Arctic in
a context of climate change,67 presented the following data on reserves, production68
and projections for future development:
– “The Arctic contains huge resources of oil and natural gas which amounts to 11 and
26 per cent, respectively, of the global undiscovered resources, i.e. excepted to be
worthwhile extraction from a business point of view”69;
– “Arctic Russia is a giant petroleum producer in Arctic and global context, with 95 per
cent of the total Arctic petroleum today (and 90 per cent of total Russian petroleum
production). Arctic Russia has as much as 70 per cent of total Arctic resources in terms of
undiscovered gas reserves, of which almost 90 per cent are found offshore”70;
– “Canada starts out with a steady growth in gas supply from low levels, almost matching
the production level of Alaska in the mid-2030’s, before production flattens out after
2040. Such a rapid development of Canada’s gas reserves probably depends on the
development of the much debated (and delayed) Mackenzie pipeline that can transport
gas form the North West Territories and south to Alberta oil sands and further. Lower gas
prices and indigenous rights have postponed the project several times”71;
– “Alaskan oil production today is mainly taking place on the North Slope, which covers
the Central Arctic state lands and adjacent waters of the Beaufort Sea. Notice that as
much as 28 per cent of the total arctic undiscovered oil resources are found in Alaska.
Over time, investment in new discoveries contributes to a rapidly rising production.
Alaskan future oil production increases steadily, and supply in 2050 is around 50 Mtoe
above the present level. Substantial future increase in Alaskan oil production first of all
requires that all onshore areas including the area of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
(ANWR) and the National Petroleum Reserve Alaska are accessible. Over 90 per cent of
the Alaskan undiscovered oil is found onshore on the North Slope as well as offshore in
adjacent areas in the Arctic Ocean closer to land than the Chukchi Sea”72;
– “Greenland has as much as 18 per cent of total Arctic undiscovered oil, but no reserves
have been proven (profitable and recoverable). However, Greenland has the longest lead
times and highest costs. Hence, production starts as late as from around 2035.”73
With regard to Alaska, the 2019–2024 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas
Leasing: Draft Proposed Program confirms that the areas available for the explora-
tion of oil and natural gas can be considerably extended. In that sense, it is stated
that,
[t]his Draft Proposed Program (DPP) would make more than 98 percent of the OCS [Outer
Continental Shelf] available for oil and gas leasing during the 2019-2024 period.
67
“Arctic petroleum extraction under climate policies”, in Lindholt and Glomsrod (2017).
68Data on the production of oil and natural gas in the Arctic can be found in the NOEP—National
Ocean Economic Program, of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey—
Center for the Blue Economy, http://www.oceaneconomics.org/arctic/extractive/extractSearch.
aspx?xtype¼petro (last accessed 6 March 2018) with reference to Countries, Minerals (Natural
Gas and Crude Oil), Regions e Production Year (from 1970 to 2016).
69Lindholt and Glomsrod (2017), p. 79.
70Lindholt and Glomsrod (2017), p. 80.
71Lindholt and Glomsrod (2017), p. 82.
72Lindholt and Glomsrod (2017), p. 83.
73Lindholt and Glomsrod (2017), p. 83.
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In terms of time, it is identically confirmed that,
[p]roduction from exploration and development in newly available OCS areas will likely not
occur for a decade or more, and then will continue for another 30 or 40 years or longer.74
4 Outlook of Natural Resources Law and the Arctic
The concrete future use of Arctic natural resources is primarily dependent on
extremely difficult geographic and climatic conditions even when one takes into
account their potential mitigation that may result from climate change.
Although the bulk of natural resources capable of economically relevant exploi-
tation, with particular emphasis on oil and natural gas, are located in areas subject to
the territorial sovereignty or maritime jurisdiction of the coastal States, the peculiar-
ities of the Arctic have led to the creation and functioning of a particularly innovative
governance regime. When one takes into consideration the fact that the Arctic
coastal states continue to act in accordance within the parameters of state sover-
eignty, the results of the cooperation amongst them must be highlighted with
particular attention given to the activities developed by the Arctic Council and the
conclusion of international environmental commitments. The originality of the
institutional structure of the Arctic Council should be noted particularly with regard
to the fact that it allows the participation of non-state entities, even though its
programmes of action are funded directly by the participating States.
Given the above, an adequate understanding of the matter of the economic use of
the natural resources that can be found in relation to the Arctic means that due
consideration should be given to six different aspects.
First, to be considered is the freedom of action that the Arctic coastal states intend
to continue to maintain in this area of the planet, especially with regard to the United
States and Russia, notably by not creating a conventional international legal regime
similar to that operating in the South Pole.
Secondly, the option for the use of the International Law of the Sea as the
international legal framework, explicitly affirmed in the Ilulissat Declaration and
subsequently reaffirmed by the European Union and China, allows their actions to
take place in the context of a consensual legal regime, particularly in relation to the
fixing of the respective areas of jurisdiction and the diverse uses of the sea.
Thirdly, the activities of the Arctic coastal States and third States, notably in the
fishing sector, should be assessed in accordance with a basic distinction among
maritime areas subject to the sovereignty and jurisdiction of coastal States, interna-
tional maritime spaces (the high seas), and internationalized maritime spaces (the
742019–2024 National OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Draft Proposal on the Size, Timing, and Location
of Sales, p. 1. At 100 US dollars per barrel, Alaska Arctic (Beaufort Sea and Chukchi Sea) could
account for a quarter of US oil production.
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Area), owing to the bilateral agreements that have been concluded for the delimita-
tion of its maritime borders.
Fourthly, instead of a scrambling for the existing natural resources, States with an
interest in their exploration, particularly for fishing on the high seas, have sought to
find mechanisms based on cooperation in terms of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea.
Fifthly, because of the extremely high investments required to pursue the exploi-
tation of mineral resources that can be found on the Arctic and the reduced number of
potential interested parties, the economic activities can be subjected to a demanding
environmental framework, notably according to the studies that have been developed
on these matters within the Arctic Council.
Sixthly, based on a precautionary approach, States interested in fishing in the
Arctic high seas have sought to create a legal framework for activities in this
international maritime space that takes into consideration the existing environmental
developments in area, especially by enshrining the principles developed and
established in the last two decades in the field of the international law of the marine
environment.
References
Airoldi A (2014) The European Union and the Arctic. Developments and perspectives 2010–2014.
Norden, Copenhagen
Banks N (2010) Oil and gas and mining development in the Arctic: legal issues. In: Loukacheva N
(ed) Polar law textbook. Norden, Copenhagen, pp 101–124
Blomeyer R, Stobberup K, Erzini K, Lam V, Pauly D, Raakjaer J (2015) Fisheries management and
the Arctic in the context of climate change. European Union Publications Office, Brussels
Boyd R, Bjerkgard T, Nordhal N, Schiellerup H (2016) Introduction. In: Mineral resources in the
Arctic. NGU - Geological Survey of Norway, Oslo, pp 8–14
Brigham L, Exner-Pirot H, Heininen L, Plouffe J (2016) The Arctic Council: twenty years of policy
shaping. In: Heininen L, Exner-Pirot H, Plouffe J (eds) Arctic yearbook 2016. Northern
Research Forum, Akureyri, pp 9–15
Budzik P (2009) Arctic oil and natural gas potential. U.S. Energy Information Administration—
Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting—Oil and Gas Division
Cambou D, Smis S (2013) Permanent Sovereignty over natural resources from a human rights
perspective: natural resources exploitation and indigenous peoples’ rights in the Arctic. Mich-
igan State Int Law Rev 22(1):347–376
Dupuy PM, Viñuales JE (2015) International environmental law. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge
Enyew EL (2017) Application of the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources for
indigenous peoples: assessment of current legal developments. Arctic Rev Law Polit 8
(1):222–245
Golitsyn V (2014) The legal regime of the Arctic. In: Attard DJ, Fitzmaurice M, Martínez Gutiérrez
NA (eds) The IMLI manual on international maritime law. Volume 1: the law of the sea. Oxford
University Press, Oxford, pp 462–483
Grimsrud K (2017) Tourism in the Arctic: economic impacts. In: Glomsrod S, Duhaime G,
Aslaksen I (eds) The economy of the North 2015. Statisk sentralbyra—Statistics Norway,
Oslo and Kongsvinger, pp 137–147
Natural Resources and the Arctic 309
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
Henriksen T (2018) Conservation of biodiversity and the Arctic region. In: Paiva Toledo A, Tassin
VJM (eds) Guide to the navigation of marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction. Editora
D’Plácido, Belo Horizonte, pp 593–644
Huntington H, Brattland C, Aleut International Association, Sami Council, Thurston D, Martin
Magne M (2013) Areas of heightened cultural significance. In: Identification of Arctic marine
areas of heightened ecological and cultural significance: Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment
(AMSA) IIc. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, pp 101–115
Koivurova T (2013) Resource exploitation in the Arctic: incorrect diagnosis, misinterpretations and
wrong solutions—how to avoid these? Baltic Rim Econ 2:7
Koivurova T (2016) Arctic resources: exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic from the
perspective of international law. In: Morgera E, Kulovesi K (eds) Research handbook on
international law and natural resources. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 349–365
Larsen JN (2010) Economics and business in the Arctic region. In: Loukacheva N (ed) Polar law
textbook. Norden, Copenhagen, pp 81–100
Lindholt L (2017) Box VI: mineral extraction in the Arctic. In: Glomsrod S, Duhaime G, Aslaksen I
(eds) The economy of the North 2015. Statisk sentralbyra—Statistics Norway, Oslo and
Kongsvinger, pp 86–87
Lindholt L, Glomsrod S (2017) Arctic petroleum extraction under climate policies. In: Glomsrod S,
Duhaime G, Aslaksen I (eds) The economy of the North 2015. Statisk sentralbyra—Statistics
Norway, Oslo and Kongsvinger, pp 79–85
Luszczuk M, Justus D, Thomas J, Klok C, Gerber F (2014) Developing oil and gas resources in
Arctic waters. In: Stepien A, Koivurova T, Kankaanpää P (eds) Strategic assessment of
development of the Arctic. Assessment conducted for the European Union. Arctic Centre,
University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, pp 71–85
Maher PT, Gelter H, Hillmer-Pegram K, Hovgaard G, Hull J, Jóhannesson GP, Anna Karlsdóttir A,
Rantala O, Pashevich A (2014) Arctic tourism: realities & possibilities. In: Heininen L, Exner-
Pirot H, Plouffe J (eds) Arctic yearbook 2014. Northern Research Forum, Akureyri, pp 290–306
Molennar EJ (2015) The Oslo Declaration on high seas fishing in the Central Arctic ocean. In:
Heininen L, Exner-Pirot H, Plouffe J (eds) Arctic yearbook 2015. Northern Research Forum,
Akureyri, pp 427–431
Mucci F, Borgia F (2014) The legal regime of the Antarctic. In: Attard DJ, Fitzmaurice M, Martínez
Gutiérrez NA (eds) The IMLI manual on international maritime law. Volume 1: the law of the
sea. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 484–508
Pelaudeix C (2015) Governance of Arctic offshore oil & gas activities: multilevel governance &
legal pluralism at stake. In: Heininen L, Exner-Pirot H, Plouffe J (eds) Arctic yearbook 2015.
Northern Research Forum, Akureyri, pp 214–233
Potts T (2010) Marine resources in the polar regions. In: Loukacheva N (ed) Polar law textbook.
Norden, Copenhagen, pp 65–79
Rahbek-Clemmensen J (2015) Carving up the Arctic: the continental shelf process between
international law and geopolitics. In: Heininen L, Exner-Pirot H, Plouffe J (eds) Arctic yearbook
2015. Northern Research Forum, Akureyri, pp 327–344
Raspotnik A, Rudloff B (2012) The EU as a shipping actor in the Arctic. Characteristics, interests
and perspectives. Working Paper FG 2, 2012/Nr. 4. SWP, Berlin
Rothwell DR (1996) The polar regions and the development of international law. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
Sahu MK (2016) Arctic legal system: a new sustainable development model. Russ Law J 4
(2):83–95
Sander G, Gille J, Stepien A, Koivurova T, Thomas J, Gascard JC, Justus D (2014) Changes in
Arctic maritime transport. In: Stepien A, Koivurova T, Kankaanpää P (eds) Strategic assessment
of development of the Arctic. Assessment conducted for the European Union. Arctic Centre,
University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, pp 35–53
Scott KN, Vanderzwaag DL (2015) Polar oceans and law of the sea. In: Rothwell DR, Oudeferink
AG, Scott KN, Stephens T (eds) The Oxford handbook of the law of the sea. Oxford University
Press, Oxford, pp 724–751
310 F. L. Bastos
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
Scovazzi T (2016) Sovereignty over land and sea in the Arctic area. Agenda Int 23(34):169–196
Skjoldal HR, Thurston D, Mosbech A, Christensen T, Gavrilo M, Andersen JM, Erisksen E, Falk K
(2013) Areas of heightened ecological significance. In: Identification of Arctic marine areas of
heightened ecological and cultural significance: Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA)
IIc. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, pp 3–100
Stocker TF, Qin D, Plattner GK, Tignor M, Allen SK, Boschung J, Nauels A, XIA Y, Bex V,
Midgley PM (eds) (2013) Climate change 2013: the physical science basis. Contribution of the
Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Tiainen H, Sairinen R, Sidorenko O (2015) Governance of sustainable mining in Arctic countries:
Finland, Sweden, Greenland & Russia. In: Heininen L, Exner-Pirot H, Plouffe J (eds) Arctic
yearbook 2015. Northern Research Forum, Akureyri, pp 132–157
Vanderzwaag DL (2010) Law of the Sea and Governance of Shipping in the Arctic and Antarctic.
In: Loukacheva N (ed) Polar law textbook. Norden, Copenhagen, pp 45–64
Wang JH, Kristiansen E (2017) Box IV: Svalbard—coal, tourism and research. In: Glomsrod S,
Duhaime G, Aslaksen I (eds) The economy of the North 2015. Statisk sentralbyra—Statistics
Norway, Oslo and Kongsvinger, pp 70–73
Winkelmann I (2017) Article 122. In: Proelss A (ed) United Nations Convention on the law of the
sea: a commentary. C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, Oxford/Baden-Baden, pp 881–886
Fernando Loureiro Bastos is Associate Professor of Public Law at the Faculty of Law, Univer-
sity of Lisbon (since 2005). Vice-President of the Institute for Juridical Cooperation, Faculty of
Law, University of Lisbon. Senior researcher of the Lisbon Centre for Research in Public Law,
Faculty of Law, University of Law. Director of Studies of the Portuguese Society of International
Law. Dean for Scientific and Pedagogic Affairs, Chairperson of the Scientific Council, and
Chairperson of the Scientific and Technical Council of the Centre for Research of Legislative
Reform of the Bissau Law Faculty, Guinea-Bissau (2007–2011). General coordinator of the study
for the collection and codification of the customary law in force in Guinea-Bissau (2008–2011).
Co-Agent and Counsel of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea, Case no 19: M/V “Virginia G” (2011–2014).
Natural Resources and the Arctic 311
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
Mining in Outer Space: Legal Aspects
Mahulena Hofmann and Federico Bergamasco
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
2 Legal Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
3 International Legal Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
3.1 Principle of Non-appropriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
3.2 The Environmental Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
3.3 Outer Space as “Province of All Mankind” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
4 National Legislation in Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
4.1 National Legislation and the Outer Space Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
4.2 The US Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
4.3 The Legislation of Luxembourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
1 Introduction
For several years, outer space has become the focus of projects planning exploration
and excavation of its precious natural resources. These projects are not primarily
concerned with minerals that could be used on Earth, but instead seek to exploit
matter that can be further processed in outer space for the purposes of promoting
scientific exploration, servicing space objects, enhancing living conditions in outer
space, or creating new space structures. The implementation of these projects
requires further thorough scientific research, accompanied by the detailed imagery
of potential mining sites, as well as the development of mining technologies that are
capable of working in zero-gravity.1 The progress in technologies which allows for
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landing on asteroids or comets, to mention the ESA’s project Rosetta as one
example,2 has shown that these plans are not science-fiction.
The appearance of many start-ups in this area signals that this sphere can also
offer a viable commercial model. While it is clear that time is needed to overcome
numerous technical problems before the first mineral is commercially excavated in
outer space, the output of the research and of the development of accompanying
technologies can be offered much earlier.
In several countries, intense private activities on space resources exploitation
and extraction have been developed. In the United States, Planetary Resources,
Inc., an asteroid mining company3 envisaged to transform asteroid water into rocket
fuel within a decade and eventually to harvest platinum-group metals from
space rocks.4 Deep Space Industries (DSI)5 intends to change the economics of
the space industry by providing the technical resources, capabilities and system
integration required to prospect for, harvest, process, manufacture and market
in-space resources. These resources, found on near Earth asteroids, are planned
to provide energy and supplies for the space economy. The company wants to
produce water, propellant and building materials to serve growing space markets.
For Japan, space resources development may be a promising industry in the
future6 as symbolised by the Hayabusa Project, where a spacecraft operated by the
Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency succeeded in landing on the surface of a
small near-Earth asteroid returning samples of the materials back to the Earth. The
Japanese private company Ispace, Inc.7 is a lunar exploration company with a vision
of extending the human presence into outer space. Its focus is on precious minerals
on the surface of the Moon and an estimated 6 billion tons of water ice at its poles.
The plans concentrate on producing fuel from the lunar water for fuel stations
established in space and on expanding the capacities of space transportation systems.
To achieve these aims, Ispace is developing micro-robotic technology for transpor-
tation service to and on the Moon.
There are reports stating that China is planning to exploit resources like titanium,
helium-3 and water from the far side of the Moon.8 Its Chang’e lunar exploration
program is an on-going robotic mission to the Moon based on the White Papers on
China’s Space Activities9 led by the China National Space Administration. There is
2ESA: Europe’s Comet Chaser, 1 December 2017, http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Sci
ence/Rosetta/Europe_s_comet_chaser (last accessed 1 December 2017).
3See https://www.planetaryresources.com/2011/01/planetary-resources-opens-doors/ (last accessed
20 December 2017).
4Wall M: Asteroid Mining May Be a Reality by 2025, 11 August 2015, https://www.space.com/
30213-asteroid-mining-planetary-resources-2025.html (last accessed 20 December 2017).
5See http://deepspaceindustries.com (last accessed 20 December 2017).
6Mizushima et al. (2017), p. 546.
7See http://ispace-inc.com/ (last accessed 20 December 2017).
8Goswami: N, China’s Unique Space Ambitions, The Diplomat, 3 August 2016, https://
thediplomat.com/2016/08/chinas-unique-space-ambitions/ (last accessed 20 December 2017).
9Shouping (2017), p. 20 et seqq.
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also information available that investments are being made in asteroid exploration.10
Intense space resources programs are pursued in the United Arab Emirates
and Luxembourg. After the Government of Luxembourg announced its “Space-
Resources.lu” initiative in February 2016, several companies decided to establish
their European subsidiaries in the country, including Planetary Resources and Deep
Space Industries.11 Furthermore, the Government of Luxembourg concluded bilat-
eral cooperation agreements with Portugal, United Arab Emirates Portugal, United
Arab Emirates, Japan and China aimed at the exchange of information and strength-
ening cooperation in the field of space activities.12
2 Legal Issues
These activities are not welcome everywhere. Surprisingly, the Russian Federation,
which in 2013 included space resources mining in its key political document in the
area of space activities approved by the President of the Federation called “The
Keystones of State Policy of Russian Federation in the Area of Space Activities for
the Period till 2030 and with a Further Perspective”13 turned into one of the most
active critics of these projects, especially in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS).14 Also, the official approach of Belgium, one of the
18 parties of the 1979 Moon Agreement (MA) remains more than reserved.15 The
proliferation of space resources projects boosted a passionate discussion also in the
academia. Whereas some authors already deliberate how to develop practicable rules
10Mizushima et al. (2017), p. 546.
11For instance, OHB Venture Capital GmbH, Munich, and LuxSpace SARL., Betzdorf, Luxem-
bourg (both subsidiaries of OHB SE) have established a company known as Blue Horizon SARL.,
or Rama, a private space company located in Luxembourg planning to commercialise space
resources in the solar system which is acquiring advanced technologies and intellectual property
from Russia, Europe and other space faring countries to help to build an advanced technology hub.
On 15 November 2017, US based Spire signed a cooperation agreement with the Government of
Luxembourg to open a European HQ in the Grand Duchy, www.spaceresources.public.lu (last
accessed 20 December 2017).
12With Japan on 27 November 2017, with UAE on 10 October 2017 and Portugal (2017), http://
www.spaceresources.public.lu/en.html (last accessed 20 December 2017).
13Document No. Pr-906, approved by the President of the Russian Federation on 19 April 2013.
14See e.g. Reviewing opportunities for achieving the Vienna Consensus on Space Security
encompassing several regulatory domains, Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation
in the 53rd Session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/2016/
CRP.15, 16 February 2016.
15See e.g. Contribution from Belgium to the discussion under UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee
on item “General exchange of views on potential legal models for activities in exploration,
exploitation and utilization of space resources” in the 56th Session of the Legal Subcommittee,
UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2017/CRP.19, 28 March 2017.
Mining in Outer Space: Legal Aspects 315
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
for the implementation of these programs,16 others explain the reasons for their lack
of consent with these activities.17
The positions towards space mining are divided in principle along three main
lines: are space resources projects compatible with the non-appropriation principle
of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST)? Are they respecting applicable environmen-
tal rules? Do they correspond to the “province of mankind” requirements?
3 International Legal Framework
3.1 Principle of Non-appropriation
The central international legal source of the law of outer space is the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty.18 It enjoys a very high recognition among States19 and is considered
by many scholars and practitioners to constitute customary international law.20 Its
Article II states that
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means.
For the opponents of space mining, this provision means that nothing in outer space
might be “appropriated” because, in their view, any extraction, whether by a State or
a non-governmental entity of any material from any celestial body necessarily
implies a kind of such “appropriation.”21 Furthermore, this thread of argumentation
is considered to be further supported by the existence of the later adopted and more
precise 1979 “Moon Agreement”22 that declares, in its Article 11(1), that the natural
resources of the celestial bodies constitute the “common heritage of mankind” and
prohibits, in its Article 11(3), that any “natural resources in place” shall become
property of any entity or person. As a later document compared to the Outer Space
Treaty, the Moon Agreement is considered by some to be “an expression of
16Mizushima et al. (2017), p. 543 et. seqq.; Frank (2017).
17E.g. Volynskaja (2016), 291 et. seqq.; De Man (2017); Hobe and De Man (2017).
18Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities in the Exploration and Exploitation of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 610 UNTS 205, entered into force on
10 October 1967.
19Status of International Agreements relating to activities in outer space as at 1 January 2017, UN
Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2017/CRP.7, 23 March 2017.
20On the legal character of the Outer Space Treaty see e.g. Hobe et al. (2009); Von der Dunk (2015).
21Volynskaja (2016), p. 296.
22Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1363
UNTS 3, entered into force on 11 July 1984.
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subsequent state practice” enabling clarification in the interpretation of the older
document.23
These arguments can be countered by referring to Article I (1) OST, which
guarantees the freedom of exploration and use of outer space. The purpose of
space mining activities is considered to be neither any “appropriation” of parts of
outer space nor of space resources in situ. Instead, the sole aim of any such activities
is their extraction, use and commercialisation, without any territorial demands or
titles as to the celestial bodies (or parts thereof) concerned.24 It should be stressed
that the Moon Agreement has been ratified by only 18 States,25 thus its limitations
concerning space activities resulting from the common heritage principle are binding
only upon its Parties and it cannot constitute international customary law. Further-
more, the Moon Agreement cannot be considered as subsequent State practice in the
sense of Article 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
either; quite to the contrary: there is even a Joint Statement of its States Parties dating
from 2008 and proclaiming that the common heritage of mankind principle does not
constitute an obstacle to space mining initiatives.26 Finally, this line of thought
points to the legal regime of the High Seas under the 1982 UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in particular to the regulation of fishing, allowing the
States Parties, in principle, to freely fish in the High Seas, as a relevant analogy.
3.2 The Environmental Perspective
The second debated issue is whether and how the entities planning to implement
space resources activities envisage to comply with the international legal environ-
mental requirements applicable in outer space. Similar to the non-appropriation
principle, these norms are few and very general.
23IISL Directorate of Studies, Background Paper, 2017, http://iislweb.org/docs/IISL_Space_Min
ing_Study.pdf (last accessed 20 December 2017), p. 9.
24Mizushima et al. (2017), p. 548.
25Status of International Agreements relating to activities in outer space as at 1 January 2017, UN
Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2017/CRP.7, 23 March 2017.
26Despite of the declaration which stipulates that this joint statement is based on experience of
States parties to the Agreement of the 1979 Moon Agreement and does not, in any manner,
constitute a joint position or an authoritative interpretation of the provisions of the mentioned
treaties or resolutions, Joint Statement on the benefits of adherence to the Agreement Governing the
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 1979 by States Parties to that
Agreement, UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2008/CRP.11, 2 April 2008.
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3.2.1 General Character of the Rules
The main reason for this situation is the fact that the central instrument of interna-
tional space law, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, was drafted in a period when few
States had space capabilities and the interest of the space community was mainly
dedicated to space science and exploration.27 Attention for environmental matters
was rather low and as a consequence there is one single provision, the second
sentence of Article IX OST, that abstractly discusses outer space environmental
protection.28 It requires that States shall pursue studies of outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their
harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth
resulting from the introduction of extra-terrestrial matter and, when necessary, shall
adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. While this second sentence addresses
directly the protection of the environment and specifically the forward and backward
contamination, the rest of the Article focuses on the interest of States Parties by
establishing different general principles: the principle of cooperation and mutual
assistance; the principle of due regard for the interests of other States Parties; and the
duty to undertake consultations with other States Parties in cases of expected harmful
interference. The part dedicated to environmental protection of the extra-terrestrial
environment, thus, appears to have only a marginal relevance in the larger context of
the Article.
In addition to the embedding of the environmental rule in the body of Article IX,
many commentators consider its lack of terminological precision as one of its major
shortcomings. This fact, quite common to all the space treaties,29 proves to be
particularly undermining to the potential role of Article IX for the adoption and
enforcement of environmental protection measures.
3.2.2 Applied to Space Mining
The first problem is connected with the vague contours of the term “celestial bodies”
as one of the objects of protection. Article IX OST classifies the extra-terrestrial
environment into three categories: outer space, the Moon and other celestial bodies.
While outer space and the Moon give rise only to limited doubts as to their
identification,30 the great variety of natural objects present in the solar system
makes the term “celestial body” potentially debatable. Currently, according to the
International Astronomical Union, known natural objects that can be found in the
solar system include the Sun, the planets, the Moon, the moons of other Planets,
27Hofmann (2010), p. 63.
28Gupta (2016), p. 24.
29Qizhi (1988), p. 125.
30It has to be recalled, however, that the legal delimitation between airspace and outer space is still
subject of debate. See De Oliveira Bittencourt Neto (2015).
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NEOs, asteroids, comets, dwarf planets, trans-Neptunian objects and Kuiper Belt
objects.31 In absence of any autonomous definition in the corpus juris spatialis, the
purpose and spirit of the Treaty would be better served by an expansive interpreta-
tion of “celestial body” to include all natural bodies within the solar system,
excluding only the Earth.32
The second problem is that the scope of application of the Article is restrictive
with regard to the kind of activities concerned. A literal interpretation of the second
paragraph limits the duty of States Parties to avoid harmful contamination only in the
pursuance of “studies of outer space” and “space exploration”. In the protection of
the space environment, thus, there is an apparent departure from the general scope of
application of the Outer Space Treaty—covering both the exploration and the use of
outer space—and a limitation of such protection to the first kind of activities. Since
the entry into force of the Treaty in 1967, technological developments have multi-
plied space activities that do not fall under the category of “studies” and “explora-
tion”. Not only direct exploitation activities such as space mining would be left
outside, but also traditional uses of outer space such as the operation of satellites for
telecommunications, Earth observation and satellite navigation.33
Third, the core element of the second paragraph is the concept of “harmful
contamination” and the related duty upon States Parties to avoid it. It is not
sufficiently precise, however, to identify which type of degradation of the outer
space environment is prohibited and to what extent.34 The presence of the term
“harmful” suggests at first that contamination is not per se prohibited and thus that
exploration activities are lawful even if to a limited degree contamination is
caused.35 It is not defined, however, what “harmful” means, i.e. the distinction
between legal and non-legal contamination remains obscure. Also the term “con-
tamination” lacks a definition. This seemingly leaves it open to cover both the
biological and non-biological kind, thus encompassing not only the classical notion
of “forward contamination” but also the release of chemical and radioactive con-
taminants.36 It is however open whether it would cover also environmental modifi-
cations of different kind, such as the alteration of the topography and geology of a
celestial body, or even its full consumption, which would be typical consequences of
upcoming large-scale human activities like space mining. It is also debatable why
there is a different terminology for the protection of the terrestrial environment.
31Lyall and Larsen (2009), p. 176.
32Tennen (2009–2010), p. 797. It would be debatable, however, whether a celestial body—such as a
small asteroid—artificially removed from its orbit and under human control would still be deemed
as a celestial body or whether it would fall within the category of “space object”.
33This would imply the lack of relevance of Article IX with regard to a growing issue such as orbital
space debris, or an aberrant interpretation such as its applicability only to the debris created by
scientific satellites.
34For a general overview of the various types of extra-terrestrial environment contamination see
Kramer (2014), p. 217.
35Lyall (2010), p. 57.
36Lyall (2010), p. 58.
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While the term “adverse change” has a much broader scope than “harmful contam-
ination” and is easier to be proven, the specification that it shall derive from the
“introduction of extra-terrestrial matter in the environment of the Earth” makes it
more circumstantiated and easier to enforce. The Article, therefore, seems to stress
more on the environmental protection of the Earth rather than of space and celestial
bodies.37
Fourth, the generic terms “appropriate measures” and “where necessary” do
not add any meaningful content to the obligation, confirming the high level of
abstractness of the provision. The remaining and prevalent part of Article IX,
focused on the protection of States Parties interests, suffers from a similar level
of ambiguity, by leaving terms like “guided” and “corresponding interest” without
further specification.
3.2.3 Environmental Protection According to the Moon Agreement
These problems are partially remediated by the 1979 Moon Agreement whose
Article 7(1) elaborates on the subject of environmental protection. It widens the
scope of Article IX’s second sentence OST by explicitly extending it also to the
“exploitation” phase of space activities and by stating the duty of States Parties to
“prevent the disruption of the existing balance of its environment.” Such disruption
can take place by the introduction of “adverse changes,” by its “harmful contami-
nation through the introduction of extra-environmental matter,” or “otherwise.”
Although the concept of “harmful contamination” remains undefined, it is beyond
doubt that these specifications give a more circumstantiated meaning to the provi-
sion. States Parties, furthermore, have the obligation to inform the UN Secretary
General about the measures undertaken to prevent the disruption of the existing
balance of the space environment. As stated before, however, the Moon Agreement
has a very limited practical application. As of 2017, only 18 States have ratified it38
and its relevance remains therefore mostly theoretical.
3.2.4 COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy
An additional instrument to be mentioned is the COSPAR Planetary Protection
Policy. COSPAR (Committee on Space Research) is a Scientific Committee of
ICSU (International Council for Science) established in 1958.39 Its objectives are
to promote on an international level scientific research in space and to provide a
forum for the discussion of problems that may affect scientific space research. One of
37Gupta (2016), p. 27.
38UNOOSA, Status of International Agreements relating to activities in outer space as at 1 January
2017, UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2017/CRP.7, 23 March 2017.
39See https://cosparhq.cnes.fr/ (last accessed 20 December 2017).
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its main tasks is advising the UN and other intergovernmental organisations on space
research matters or on the assessment of scientific issues in which space can play a
role. In 1964 COSPAR elaborated the Planetary Protection Policy, which has been
reformulated in 2002 and was lastly amended in 2011.40 It develops international
standards in the form of recommendations with the main purpose to avoid contam-
ination of planetary environments by biological contaminants or terrestrial microbes
that could compromise current or future scientific investigations, particularly those
searching for indigenous life. Despite its non-binding nature, the Policy has the
potential to be relevant for space mining, as it does not make any distinction as to the
purposes of the space mission. Additionally, in the Preamble it recognises itself as a
tool “to provide accepted guidelines to guide compliance with the wording of the
OST and other relevant international agreements,” making explicit reference to
Article IX OST.41 Its main limitations are the relatively narrow scope of application,
as it focuses exclusively on biological contamination and its recommendatory
nature, given that it would be still premature to consider it as an element of
international customary law.42 In its present formulation, therefore, the Planetary
Protection Policy is likely to have a limited impact on space mining. Its evolutionary
nature, however, suggests that it may be invested of a more prominent role in the
upcoming years.
In conclusion, the only universal rule on the protection of environment of outer
space, Article IX second sentence OST, stipulates that States “shall” avoid harmful
contamination and the intent of the drafters was allegedly to establish a legally
binding obligation. However, the ambiguity of the terms leaves much room for
discretion. As a consequence, its provisions seem to be too vague to be actually
enforceable in the practice.43 Therefore, it is difficult to require those States Parties
of the Outer Space Treaty planning to mine in outer space to respect more than these
general rules. It would be advisable, though, to invite these States Parties to accept
unilateral environmental obligations and to comply with the recommendatory rules
on debris mitigation.44
40See https://cosparhq.cnes.fr/sites/default/files/pppolicy.pdf (last accessed 20 December 2017).
41COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy 2011, Preamble, https://cosparhq.cnes.fr/sites/default/files/
pppolicy.pdf (last accessed 20 December 2017).
42Hofmann (2017).
43Apking (2005), p. 447.
44Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
endorsed by UNCOPUOS at its 50th session and contained in UN Doc. A/62/20, Annex,
p. 47, 2007.
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3.3 Outer Space as “Province of All Mankind”
Article I OST declares that the exploration and use of outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be “the province of all mankind.”45 This
provision is embedded between the rules stating that the exploration and use of outer
space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries and the
principle of freedom of exploration and use of outer space. The Cologne Commen-
tary on Space Law considers Article I as “one of the most important, but also of the
most disputed provisions of the entire Outer Space Treaty,”46 and it concludes that
the notion of “province of mankind” brings this lead provision of the Treaty “in line
with the legal regulation of human activities in other common spaces, such as
activities on the High Seas and the Deep-Sea Bed.”47
The “benefit” element of Article I OST has been further developed by the
recommendatory 1996 UN Space Benefits Declaration.48 After having repeated the
“province of mankind” in its Preamble, it stipulates that “States are free to determine
all aspects of their participation in international cooperation in the exploration and
use of outer space on equitable and mutually acceptable basis” (para. 2) and it
requires that “contractual terms in such cooperative ventures” are “fair and reason-
able” and in “full compliance with the legitimate rights and interests of the parties
concerned.”
At the treaty level, the 1979 Moon Agreement also reiterates the “province of
mankind” principle (Article 4), again in a close neighbourhood with the “benefit”
clause. However, the Moon, celestial bodies and their natural resources49 are
declared by Article 11 para. 1 to be “the common heritage of mankind” (CHM).
This principle finds its expression in particular in Article 11(5) which envisages an
establishment of an international regime to govern the exploitation of these resources
“as such exploitation is about to become feasible.” Here, the Cologne Commentary
refers to the fact that “there is no unique feature or specific meaning of the CHM in
all its manifestations.”While different interpretations may be put forward, the proper
meaning of the CHM can only be determined in the context of its use and for the
purpose of the future applicable regulatory regime.50 Furthermore, “the CHM does
45To compare, a comparison with the system of the International Telecommunication Union can be
useful: the Constitution of the ITU, BTS 24 (1996), declares (Article 44) radio frequencies and any
associated orbits, including the geo-stationary orbit “limited natural resources” which must be used
rationally, efficiently and economically, so that countries may have “equitable access” to those.
46Hobe et al. (2009), p. 27.
47Hobe et al. (2009), p. 27.
48Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the
Benefit and in the Interests of All States, taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing
Countries, adopted by General Assembly in its Resolution 51/122 of 13 December 1996, UN Doc.
A/RES/51/122.
49Through Article 1 of this Agreement, Moon means also other celestial bodies, as well as the orbits
around or other trajectories to or around these.
50Hobe et al. (2013), p. 395.
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not have any meaningful impact on the current exploration and use of the natural
resources on the Moon outside the future exploitation regime to be established.”51
“States Parties (to the Moon Agreement) are expected to make good faith efforts to
convene an international conference and to negotiate for the purpose of reaching an
agreement, but they would not be bound to reach an agreement on an international
regime,” thus the proposed international conference might even “reject the principle
CHM, or give a new and liberal scope to this principle.”52
The modification mechanisms of both treaties (Article XV resp. 17) or the
convening of an international conference as envisaged by Article 18 MA have not
yet been relied upon. Ten years after its entry into force, or any time after the
Agreement has been in force for 5 years, the issue of the revision of the Agreement
can be raised which can also include the question of the international regime to
govern the exploitation of natural space resources. In line with this rule, in 1994,
10 years after the entry into force of the Moon Agreement, the Resolution of the UN
General Assembly A/RES/49/34 of 30 January 1995 took note of the recommenda-
tion of the UNCOPUOS that the General Assembly, at its current session, in
considering whether to revise the Moon Agreement, should not take any action
(para. 42).
3.3.1 Moratorium on National Legislation?
In this particular situation, several scholars,53 but also of representatives of some
Member States of the UNCOPUOS, consider that there exists a moratorium on any
national legislation dealing with space resources activities,54 in other words “such
exploitation shall take place under the conditions laid down in the Outer Space
Treaty which are to be shaped in an appropriate international legal order multilater-
ally.”55 The arguments supporting this position can be traced back to the “province
of mankind” principle, but even more so to the international legal regime pertaining
to the Moon and other celestial bodies as established in the Moon Agreement based
on the principle of “an equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived
from those resources, whereby the interests of the developing countries, as well as
the efforts of those countries which have contributed to the exploration of celestial
bodies, shall be given special consideration” (Article 11(7)). The model usually
referred to with respect to any international regime of distribution of resources found
51Hobe et al. (2013), p. 397.
52Hobe et al. (2013), p. 397. “as we have seen in the case of the amended UNCLOS”.
53See e.g. Hobe and De Man (2017).
54So can be interpreted e.g. Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation in the 53rd Session
of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/2016/CRP.15,
16 February 2016.
55Results of the IISL Background Paper, p. 45, 2017, http://iislweb.org/docs/IISL_Space_Mining_
Study.pdf (last accessed 20 December 2017).
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on celestial bodies is a structure based on the regulations on deep seabed mining
provided for in Part XI of the afore-mentioned 1982 UNCLOS56 and its
complementing 1994 Agreement relating to the implementation of this Part XI.57
Without any doubt, a multilateral regime would be the best option for developing
activities related with space resources because it would avoid many uncertainties and
fears and could unify or at least harmonise the application of national legislations
regulating its authorisation and supervision. However, the requirement of the Moon
Agreement to adopt a corresponding multilateral regime has been already substan-
tially qualified by its parties;58 moreover, it is clear that the Agreement is binding
only upon those States which ratify it and cannot be considered—as shown above—
to have developed any customary law effect.
But even provided that there would be an international cooperative regime
governing space resources activities, there is no compelling indication, neither in
international nor in European law, as to the point in time when such regime was to be
finalised and adopted. As an example, supporting this assessment are the 1986 UN
Principles Related to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space.59 The Pream-
ble of the Principles refers to the 12 years which were needed to adopt the document.
During this time, not only did actual Earth observation quite intensively take place,
but also the US 1984 Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act60 was adopted
which, to our knowledge, did not provoke any harsh reaction from other States.
Moreover, the position that no national legislation might be adopted before a
multilateral document was agreed upon is difficult to accept also for formal grounds.
No one would seriously contest the fact that the States are sovereign in the frame-
work of their jurisdiction and free in adopting legal acts as long as they do not
contravene international and in case of the members of the European Union,
European Union law. In this context, reference can be made to the 1923 Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) Lotus case where the PCIJ stated that in absence
of an explicit prohibition given by international law, States may exercise their
jurisdiction.61 Therefore, it seems justified to conclude that, first, the envisaged
56UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3.
57The 1994 Agreement established an International Seabed Authority (Article 1) as a body
responsible for concluding the contracts with the investors, and an Enterprise (Article 2) entering
into joint ventures with the contractors, Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, OJ 1994 L 215/10.
58Joint Statement on the benefits of adherence to the Agreement Governing the Activities States on
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 1979 by States Parties to this Agreement, UN Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/2008/CRP.11, 2 April 2008.
59Adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution—Principles relating to remote sensing of the
Earth from space, UNGA Res. 41/65, UN Doc. A/RES/41/65 of 3 December 1986.
60Public Law 98-365, 98th Congress, H.R. 5155, 17 July 1984, 98 Stat. 451.
61The S.S Lotus Case (France v. Turkey), P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 10, p. 4 (1927), see (with critical
remarks) Bogdandy, Rau (2006), Lotus, The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International
Law, June 2006, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e162?prd¼EPIL (last accessed 16 February 2018).
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future space resources extraction and commercialisation activities, as long as they
respect the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, do not violate currently applicable
international law and that, consequently, States are entitled to legislate on their space
activities, including space resources activities.
The question as to the existence of a moratorium imposed on the activities
pursued in outer space can be looked at also from the perspective of State practice.
In addition to the US 1984 Land Remote-Sensing Act, other examples of domestic
legal steps preceding the developments of the international rules can be given. The
2016 Outer Space Act of Denmark defined outer space as the area located more than
100 km about sea level,62 Article 18 of the 1991 Constitution of Bulgaria even
declares that the State shall exercise “sovereign rights” with respect to geostationary
orbital positions allocated to it,63 despite of the fact that the question of definition
and delimitation of outer space has been on the programme of UNCOPUOS for
many years and has not yet been resolved by any binding document.
3.3.2 Content of the Multilateral Regime
A further question concerns the expectations connected with the content of an
envisaged multilateral regime. It is questionable whether the model of the 1994
Agreement establishing institutions responsible for concluding contracts with inves-
tors for the purpose of deep seabed mining is the best way to follow. Until now, only
a very limited number of such contracts have been concluded and there are good
reasons to question whether the existing complicated and expensive structure is an
attractive pattern to be followed, especially for developing countries.
To compare, the regime adopted by the UN Remote Sensing Principles can be
described as a cooperative regime based on commercial principles. According to
their Preamble, the aim of the principles is “strengthening of international cooper-
ation in this field,” by carrying out these activities “for the benefit and in the interests
of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic. . .” and other development
and taking in “particular consideration the needs of the developing countries”
(Principle II). However, the participation in remote sensing activities is based on
“equitable” and “mutually acceptable terms” (Principle V). Also, the access of
sensed States to primary data, processed data and analysed information concerning
their territory should be accorded “on reasonable cost terms” (Principle XII).
A similar approach is followed by the multi-stakeholder Hague Space Resources
Working Group which published, in September 2017, the “Draft Building Blocks for
the Development of an International Legal Framework on Space Resources
62Outer Space Act, Denmark, Act no. 409 of 11 May 2016.
63Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, prom. SG 56/13 July 1991 as amended.
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Activities.”64 In this document, this international group stressed that a future inter-
national framework should create an enabling environment for space resource
activities that takes into account all interests and benefits all countries and human-
kind. This framework, addressed to States and international organisations, must be
consistent with international law, should promote consistency and predictability
among domestic frameworks of States and internal frameworks of intergovernmental
organisations and prevent disputes arising out of space resources activities (Building
Block (BB) 4).
According to the Hague Group, the envisaged international framework should
enable the unrestricted search for space resources; the attribution of priority rights to
operators to search and/or recover space resources in situ for a maximum period of
time within a maximum area upon registration in an international registry; and
provide for the international recognition of such priority rights (BB 6). According
to its BB 10, States and international organisations authorising space resources
activities should be permitted to establish safety zones to assure safety and to
avoid any harmful interference with space resources activity. In relation to potential
disputes, the international framework “should encourage recourse by States, inter-
governmental organisations and operators to the amiable resolution of disputes, for
example by developing procedures for consultation or promoting the 2011 Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to
Outer Space Activities” (BB 18).
This document should, in the formulation of The Hague Building Blocks, serve as
a basis for negotiations on an intentional framework and recommendations on an
implementation strategy. It will be interesting to see to what extent these pragmatic
rules will influence the present discussions in the UNCOPUOS, especially in its
Legal Sub-Committee in the framework of the item “General Exchange of views on
potential legal models for activities in exploration, exploitation and utilization of
space resources.”65
4 National Legislation in Force
4.1 National Legislation and the Outer Space Treaty
Article VI OST prescribes that the activities of non-governmental entities in outer
space shall require authorisation and continuing supervision by the appropriate State
Party to the Treaty. This requirement has been fulfilled by the States Parties by many
64The Hague Working Group Draft Building Blocks on Space Resources Activities 2017, http://
law.leiden.edu/organisation/publiclaw/iiasl/working-group/the-hague-space-resources-gover
nance-working-group.html (last accessed 20 December 2017).
65See e.g. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN Doc. A/72/20, 60th
Session—7–16 June, 2017.
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quite diverse mechanisms: some of them authorise national space activities on an
informal basis; others have used legislation adopted for other than space purposes.
The majority of space faring countries, however, decided to adopt—at least as
regards activities of certain intensity—specific legislation which defines the sub-
stantive conditions for obtaining the authorisation, the procedure to be followed, as
well as eventual sanctions for violating its provisions. These legal rules are not
fulfilling any mere self-purpose as the “appropriate State Party” shall bear interna-
tional responsibility for national activities in outer space, that is for assuring that
national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set up in the OST
(Article VI).
In view of the planned intensity of space resources activities, first the US and later
Luxembourg decided to adopt specific legislation which would enable them to define
the conditions for authorisation of space mining activities and to create a transparent
procedure for obtaining the licenses.
4.2 The US Legislation66
The 2015 US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act67 made the US the
first country to have adopted a national regulatory framework for space mining
activities, a step which, in the terms of the working paper of the Russian Federation
to the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UNCOPUOS amounted to
being a “manifestation of total disrespect for the international law order.”68
Title IV of the Act (short title: “Space Resources Exploration and Utilization Act
of 2015”, Sec. 401) specifically authorises citizens of the United States (hereinafter
US citizens) “to possess, own, transport, use and sell the asteroid resource or space
resource” they obtain “in accordance with applicable law, including the international
obligations of the United States” (§ 51303). The Act defines a “space resource” as an
“abiotic resource in situ in outer space” including minerals and water (§ 51301(2))
and an “asteroid resource” is a “space resource found on or within a single asteroid”
(§ 51301(1)).
The aim of Title IV is to “facilitate commercial exploration for and commercial
recovery of space resources by United States citizens” (§ 51302). According to the
legislation, three conditions have to be fulfilled in order to benefit from the rights
guaranteed by the Act. First, the entity involved in space resources activities must be
a US citizen. According to Title 51 of the US Code entitled National and
66This part is partly based on Leterre, Providing a Legal Framework for Sustainable Space Mining
Activities, Master Thesis, University of Luxembourg, 2017, https://wwwen.uni.lu/recherche/fdef/
satellite_communications_and_space_law/publications (last accessed 20 December 2017).
67US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, 129 STAT. 704.
68Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation in the 53rd Session of the Scientific and
Technical Subcommittee, UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/2016/CRP.15, 16 February 2016.
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Commercial Space Programs,69 US citizens are natural persons with US citizenship
and legal entities directly submitted to US law. Further, if they are entities “orga-
nized or existing under the laws of a foreign country,” they are eligible to benefit
from the applicability of the Act provided that a “controlling interest”70 of the entity
is held by US citizens (natural or legal persons).
Second, in addition to the citizenship requirement, space mining companies must
obtain an authorisation by the US authorities (§ 51302). As a preliminary measure,
Title IV has required the US President to submit to Congress a report determining a
specific process of authorisation of commercial exploitation of space resources as the
existing procedures were not applicable to space mining activities. The White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy report (its Appendix) of 4 April 201671
categorically confirmed that “no person that is subject to the jurisdiction and control
of the United States may, directly or through any subsidiary or affiliate, conduct
missions in outer space without authorization.” As there is no specific authority
competent to authorise space resources activities which would require a parliamen-
tary act, the US Government decided to use, as a temporary solution—the “Federal
Aviation Administration’s (FAA) payload review process” to issue mission
authorisations.72 This procedure is based on interagency cooperation, especially
with the Department of State and limited to procedural aspects of mission authori-
sation.73 The first application on this temporary legal basis was raised in 2016 by the
US company Moon Express, Inc. and an authorisation for the specific mission
awarded accordingly.74
Third, Section 403 of the Act contains a Disclaimer of Extraterritorial Sover-
eignty. It clearly states, that by the enactment of this Act, the United States “does not
thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the
ownership of, any celestial body.” This provision corresponds to the high value
attached to the international obligations of the US. Such obligations are mentioned
four times: as a criterion for the legality of commercial recovery of space resources
(§ 51302 a 2), as a limit for the freedom of US citizens to engage in commercial
69National and Commercial Space Programs, 51 U.S.C. § 50902 (1996) (US), https://www.law.
cornell.edu/uscode/text/51/50902 (last accessed 20 December 2017).
70An interest of 41% is presumed sufficient; see Aeronautics and Space, 14 CFR 401.5, https://
www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/401.5 (last accessed 20 December 2017).
71Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), Report on On-orbit Authority, as Required by
the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (Public Law 114-90) (2016), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/csla_report_4-4-16_final.pdf
(last accessed 20 December 2017).
72Masson-Zwaan and Palkowicz (2017), pp. 11–12.
73Gabrynowicz, Title IV of the 2015 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act,
27 March 2017, http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/lsc/2017/symp-05.pdf (last
accessed 20 December 2017).
74Gabrynowicz, Title IV of the 2015 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act,
27 March 2017, http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/lsc/2017/symp-05.pdf (last
accessed 20 December 2017).
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recovery of space resources free from harmful interference (§ 51302 a 3), as an
explanation for the need to appoint an authority responsible for authorisation and
supervision of space resources activities (§ 51302 b 1) and finally, as a criterion for
the legality of the legal title to the resources obtained in outer space (§ 51303). While
one can only speculate about the reasons to include these criteria in the Act, it is
incontestable that international law is part of the US national legal order; for the
potential user of the legislation who is or might not be aware of the Outer Space
Treaty or the Liability Convention this reminder might be, however, useful.
4.3 The Legislation of Luxembourg
The 2017 Law on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources of Luxembourg75
was inspired by the US model of implementing Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty.
Until the entering into force of this legislation, the amended 1991 Law on Electronic
Media76 was the only basis for authorising space activities in Luxembourg, albeit
restricted to the authorisation of “satellite systems” and therefore hardly capable to
deal with activities connected to space resources extraction.
With the announcement of Luxembourg’s intent to explore the potential use of
space resources, the legislative work started. Based on the conclusions of the Study
on Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Space Resources Utilization of the University of
Luxembourg,77 the Draft legislation was submitted to the Parliament by the Minister
of Economy on 15 November 2016 and was later revised as a result of the Opinion of
the Conseil d’État of 7 April 2017. On 27 July 2017, the law was adopted and
entered into force on 2 August 2017.
The legislation deals generally with “space resources” without making a
distinction between space and asteroid resources. In contrast to the US legislation,
this central notion is not closely defined in the body of the law; according to
the Explanatory Statement, there are abiotic resources that can be found in situ
in outer space and that can be extracted. According to Article 2(4), this Law
shall not apply to satellite communication, orbital positions or the use of frequency
bands.
75Loi du 20 juillet 2017 sur l’exploration et l’utilisation des ressources de l’espace (Mémorial a, no
674 du 28 juillet 2017).
76Law of Electronic Media of 27 July 1991, Luxembourg, http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/
archives/2010/0241/a241.pdf (last accessed 20 December 2017).
77Hofmann, Prüm, Von Der Dunk, Tronchetti (2016) Study on Legal and Regulatory Aspects of
Space Resources Utilisation in Luxembourg, not published.
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Article 1 of the Law declares that “space resources are capable of being appro-
priated.” The reasoning by the legislator is based, inter alia, on an analogy with the
rules governing the High Seas.78 Contrary to §5130 of the US law, the provision on
the persons, both natural and legal, possibly entitled to benefit from the application
of the Law, is more general and in particular not limited to the citizens of Luxem-
bourg—even legal entities owned in full by non-Luxembourg citizens or fully
controlled by legal entities domiciled outside Luxembourg are entitled to benefit
from the Law as long as they are themselves registered in Luxembourg. The
condition “in accordance with international law” which originally was part of the
corresponding provision in the Draft Law was moved into the part dealing with
authorisation following the recommendation made in the above-mentioned Opinion
of the Conseil d’État of 7 April 2017, which explained that “international law has by
its nature a hierarchical value above the internal law, without any need of precision.”
Furthermore, “international law mentioned in the Draft would not have any direct
effect for the citizens and would bind Luxembourg only.”79 Today, Article 2(2) of
the Law states that an authorised operator may only “carry out the activity” in space
resources area “in accordance with the conditions of authorization and the interna-
tional obligations of Luxembourg.”
The remainder of the Law deals with the authorisation procedure with which
it is necessary to comply in order to perform activities in this area. No person
can explore or use space resources without holding an authorisation from the
minister or ministers in charge of the economy and space activities (Article 2) on a
personal and non-assignable basis (Article 5). The authorisation shall be granted for
a specific “mission” (Article 3) performed for commercial purposes. The crucial
conditions for obtaining an authorisation are as follows. The applicant must be either
a public company limited by shares (société anonyme), a corporate partnership
limited by shares (société en commandite par actions), a private limited company
(société à responsabilité limitée) of Luxembourg law or a European Company
(société européenne) having its registered office in Luxembourg (Article 4).
The shareholders of the operator may be Luxembourg or foreign, natural or legal
persons.80
The operator to be authorised must have its central administration and the
registered office in Luxembourg (Article 7 para 1). It must have a robust scheme
of financial, technical and statutory procedures and arrangements through which the
mission is planned and implemented (Article 7 para 2). At least two persons must be
responsible for the management of the operator, both of which must possess
adequate professional experience (Article 9).
78See Luxembourg law on the exploration and use of space resources entered into force, Arendt
Publication: Newsflash, 2 August 2017, http://www.arendt.com/publications/pages/luxembourg-
law-exploration-use-space-resources-into-force.aspx (last accessed 13 February 2018).
79Opinion of the Conseil d’État, Luxembourg of 7 April 2017, p. 9.
80Luxembourg law on the exploration and use of space resources entered into force, Arendt
Publication: Newsflash, 2 August 2017.
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The application must be accompanied by all useful information for the assess-
ment thereof and the emission program (Article 6). For example, the identity of the
shareholders or members with a qualified holding of at least 10% of the capital or the
voting rights in the operator or, in the absence of such holdings, the identity of the
twenty largest shareholders or members must be disclosed pursuant to Article 8(1). If
the “suitability” of those shareholders or members to ensure a “sound and prudent
operation” which criteria are defined in Article 8(2), is not satisfactory, the autho-
risation “shall be refused” according to Article 8(2).
The application for the authorisation must be accompanied by a risk assessment
of the mission (Article 10 para. 1) and the authorisation shall be conditional upon the
existence of financial bases that are appropriate to the risk associated with the
mission (Article 10 para. 2). The authorisation may be accompanied by additional
conditions which can determine the activities to be carried on or outside the territory
of Luxembourg, or the modalities for the supervision of the mission (Article 12).
For each application, a fee shall be set by the Ministers which shall range from
5000 to EUR 500,000 depending on the complexity of the application (Article 13).
Implementing Article VI OST, Article 15 declares that the ministers in charge of the
economy and space activities are “in charge of the continuing supervision of the
missions for which an authorization has been granted.”
Article 16 of the Law deals with the “responsibility for damage.”81 According to
this provision, the operator is fully responsible for any damage caused at the
occasion of the mission, including all preparatory works and duties. The granting
of an authorisation for a mission does not dispense from the need to obtain other
approvals or authorisations, e.g. any business license or the necessary frequencies
assignment.
If the conditions of the authorisation are no longer met, or the operator does not
make use of the authorisation within 36 months after it being granted, it can be
withdrawn (Article 14). The violation of the Law entails criminal law consequences
ranging from a monetary fine to a term of imprisonment (Article 18).
5 Conclusion
Space resources activities have a potential to boost existing space activities and
enable further long-time projects, including the long-stay of human beings in outer
space. This positive momentum should be taken into account when discussing their
future international regime.
In relation to the appropriation of space resources, the Outer Space Treaty is very
general and does not formulate any respective prohibition; the more detailed Moon
81
“L’exploitant qui a obtenu un agrément pour une mission est pleinement responsable des
dommages causés à l’occasion de la mission, y inclus à l’occasion de tous travaux et devoirs de
préparation.”
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Agreement is not binding more than its 18 States Parties. Consequently, for the
States who are not party of the Moon Agreement, space resources activities are not
per se violating international law.
The Outer Space Treaty is also very general in relation to the environmental
obligations the States have to comply with when authorising the activities of
non-governmental entities. Despite this fact and in order to ensure the sustainability
of their own activities, the space actors should be invited to adopt unilateral
environmental obligations and to comply with the recommendatory Space Debris
Mitigation Guidelines.
As the Moon Agreement does not represent any customary rule of international
law, it is, therefore, not capable to impose a moratorium on space resources activities
or on the adoption of domestic space resources legislation on other States than its
own Parties, provided that these activities or legislative acts are in compliance with
international law. The “province of all mankind” principle of the Outer Space Treaty
does not prescribe any specific regime of distributing the space assets, provided that
space activities are carried out for the benefit of and in the interests of all countries
and the UN Remote Sensing Principles show that an international cooperative
regime based on commercial principles could be one of the alternatives how the
future regime could be drafted.
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1 Introduction
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) came into being on May 29, 2014. The
members of the union are the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and
the Kyrgyz Republic. Energy dialogue forms an important part of this union, as two
out of five members of the EAEU—Russia and Kazakhstan possess significant
supplies of global energy resources. Meanwhile, the rest of the members—Belarus,
Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic are largely dependent on energy imports and this
has resulted in the economic union with different aspirations for trade in energy.1
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Currently, the parties aim to conclude the formation of the common energy market
by 2025, however there are a number of hurdles blocking the successful achievement
of this goal.
This article gives context about the common energy market of the EAEU and
elaborates on the obstacles for energy integration in the EAEU. It argues that
formation of common energy market is being hindered through the lack of trust
between the members, monopolization of the energy sectors, non-coordination of
national energy policies, lack of fair competition in the energy market and depen-
dence on a single source of energy, mainly fossil fuel in overall energy mix.
The article is organized as follows: The first section describes how energy
integration is handled in the regional trade agreements in the world, second section
gives context about the Eurasian Economic Union, third section analyzes the energy
trade within the Eurasian Economic Union, common energy market, energy transit in
the region and energy commitments of the EAEU members in the World Trade
Organization. The last section describes the blockages on the way of formation of
common energy market.
2 Energy in Regional Trade Agreements
Energy can be classified both as goods and services. As goods, energy includes all
forms, such as oil, gas, electricity, coal, wood, renewables like atomic energy, solar,
wind and hydro-energy, as well as biofuels. Energy as a service, on the other hand,
covers everything from extraction of energy until delivery to final consumers. This
entire process encompasses distribution, transportation, exploration, development,
transmission, generation, production, extraction, marketing, consumption and man-
agement of the energy.2 It should be noted that multilateral trade agreements of
World Trade Organization (WTO) do not contain provisions specifically on energy,
as during the Uruguay round, the founding members did not feel the necessity to
include energy as a specific sector in the WTO agreements. It was generally believed
that common multilateral trade rules of WTO would be enough to regulate trade in
energy.3 Therefore, in WTO, the only rules concerning specifically the energy were
on transit and transportation, which were included in the GATT (General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade) and further developed in the Trade Facilitation Agreement.
Nonetheless, focus on trade in energy has been gradually increasing in the
multilateral trade negotiations. It can be clearly seen that acceding countries to the
WTO are more frequently requested to commit to the energy liberalization.4 How-
ever, energy issues are more and more tackled in the regional trade agreements
2WTO Council for Trade Special Session, USA proposal on energy services S/CSS/W/24,
18 December 2000.
3Cottier et al. (2011), p. 211.
4VanGrasstek (2013), p. 137.
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(RTA) platform than the WTO.5 Yet, still only a few RTAs in the world contain
provisions specifically dedicated to the liberalization of energy goods and services.
One reason behind this is that energy resources are gathered asymmetrically among
the RTA partners and therefore, liberalization of trade in energy goods and services
result to benefit one side more than another. Thus, most RTAs are usually limited
with provisions on promotion of the use of sustainable energy and renewables, as
well as energy efficiency and security.6 These provisions are most of the times
intertwined with the provisions on advancing climate change mitigation measures
and energy efficiency.
One of the few RTAs which regulate trade in energy is NAFTA—North-Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement, which has specific chapter called “Energy and basic
petrochemicals” in its founding treaty. Here the parties affirm their desire to liber-
alize the energy trade gradually. The provisions in this chapter apply to both energy
goods, as well as services associated with such goods. The parties undertake not to
apply quantitative restrictions, minimum or maximum price restrictions, as well as
export taxes on energy and basic petrochemicals with some exceptions.7 However,
even NAFTA’s energy trade liberalization is very limited in its application, as the
treaty reaffirms prohibition of foreign ownership in Mexico’s oil and gas sector.8
This was dominated by Mexico’s policy at the time and can be a clear example how
RTAs comprised of members with diverse energy policies can be an obstacle for the
liberalization of trade in energy.
ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) and Mercosur also have
policies on energy integration. Though, initially energy were not included in the
founding treaties of these two RTAs, the subsequent documents have covered
issues such as renewables, interconnection of power grids and energy efficiency.
In Mercosur, energy integration is administered through the Memorandum of
Understanding on Electricity Exchange and Integration,9 Memorandum of Under-
standing on Gas Exchanges and Gas Integration among Mercosur Member States,10
5Leal-Arcas et al. (2016), p. 5.
6Energy issues are also tackled within international energy organizations which tire to unify and
coordinate energy policies of their member states on different aspects, such as transit policies,
stabilization of energy prices in world market, promotion of use of renewable energy, mitigation of
effects of energy on climate change. Among these multilateral platforms we can name Energy
Charter, Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries, International Renewable Energy Agency,
International Energy Agency, as well as forums of environmental organizations dealing with
multilateral energy regulation.
7NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement: a guide to customs procedures (1994),
Washington, DC: Dept. of the Treasury, U.S. Customs Service: Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O.
8Leal-Arcas et al. (2014), p. 33.
9Memorandum of Understanding on Electricity Exchange and Electrical Integration in
MERCOSUR MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC No. 10, 23 July 1998.
10Memorandum of Understanding on Gas Exchanges and Gas Integration among Mercosur Mem-
ber States MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC No. 10/99, 7 December 1999.
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Framework Agreement on Regional Energy Complementation,11 as well as Action
Plan for Cooperation in Biofuels.12 ASEAN’s energy integration is aimed at
connecting the energy grids of the region. It has adopted four energy plans to
interconnect the region. The last one—“Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation
2016 - 2025: Enhancing Energy Connectivity and Market Integration to Achieve
Energy Security, Accessibility, Affordability and Sustainability for All” aims to
connect power grids and facilitate multilateral electricity trade, interconnect gas
pipelines in the region, increase the share of renewables, facilitate clean coal
technologies, cooperate in the nuclear energy sector, increase energy efficiency
and conservation.13
However, the model for the rest of the world in liberalization of energy trade has
been European Union. EU has achieved major milestones in this regard. Even the
first steps towards the formation of the EU was taken with the establishment of
European Coal and Steel Community and European Atomic Energy Community.
Thus, common market for coal and nuclear energy was already formed in the 1950s.
The legal basis of the functioning of the common energy market is Article 194 of
the Treaty on Functioning of European Union.14 Currently, EU has built quite
well-functioned common energy market and has moved from national market to
integrated internal energy market due to the adopted three energy packages to
achieve this aim. Between 1996–2009, interconnection of energy systems of mem-
ber countries were increased, rules on competition and unbundling were developed,
retail market was liberalized, Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators was
established to assist national regulators, electricity cross-border trade was improved
and many other steps were taken.15 In 2015, EU adopted Energy Union Framework
Strategy16 and in November 2016, it adopted the document “Clean Energy for all
Europeans”.17 The latter akes energy integration into a further level by developing
rules for energy union, promotion of the use of renewables and security of supply,
which is a major policy issue for the EU. Indeed, nowadays, the other RTAs,
including the EAEU look for and learn from EU in taking steps for the formation
11MERCOSUR Framework Agreement on Regional Energy Complementation, 9 December 2005.
12MERCOSUR Action Plan for Cooperation in Biofuels MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC No. 49/07,
17 December 2007.
13ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation 2016–2025 is the fourth action plan. The
previous action plans covered the period 1999–2004, 2004–2009 and 2010–2015.
14Other relevant provisions are: Article 122 on security of supply, Articles 170–172 on energy
networks, Articles 216–218 on external energy policy, as well as Article 114 on internal energy
market. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp. 47–390.
15Serena (2014), pp. 14–15.
16Communication from the European Commission: a framework strategy for a resilient energy
union with a forward-looking climate change policy, COM (2015) 080 final, 25 February 2015.
17Communication from the European Commission: clean energy for all Europeans, COM (2016)
860 final, 30 November 2016.
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of common energy market, as EU’s achievement in interconnection of national
energy policies are worth commending.18
3 Eurasian Economic Union: Context
EAEU is a regional integration union inspired after the EU. The idea behind this
union was first introduced by Kazakhstani president Nazarbayev in 1994 and it was
actively lobbied by the Russian Federation. But this suggestion did not become a
reality at that time mostly because of the political circumstances, as timing and
conditions were not ripe for this initiative. In the meantime, several attempts were
made to integrate post-Soviet countries into one union, but most of these attempts
were not durable and failed.
The biggest step towards integration came with the conclusion of bilateral and
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) free trade agreements between the
countries in the region which created conditions for the free movement of goods in
the post-Soviet space. CIS free trade agreement was updated based on the WTO
provisions and socio-economic needs in 2011. This agreement served as a founda-
tion for further integration attempts. The road towards the establishment of the
EAEU was intensified since 2007. Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus became the
signatories to the Treaty on the Establishment of the Customs Union.19 The Customs
Union was launched in 2010. Single economic space was launched in 2012 and the
Eurasian Economic Commission was delegated powers for administration of further
integration policy.20 The Treaty on the Establishment of Eurasian Economic Union
(hereinafter EAEU Treaty) was signed on May 29, 2014 and came into force a year
later.21 Soon Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic officially joined the membership of
the EAEU.22
It should be noted that formation of the EU has been a great learning process for
other regional blocks, including the EAEU. The latter has been looking to and
learning from the achievements of the EU. Therefore, not surprisingly, institutions
of the EAEU are fairly similar to the EU. However these similarities remain purely
structural, as in substance there are important differences in decision-making
18Qlazyev et al. (2013), p. 10.
19Treaty on the Establishment of the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan
(6 October 2007).
20Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Commission, 18 November 2011, https://docs.eaeunion.org/ru-
ru (last accessed 30 October 2016).
21Treaty on the Establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union, 29 May 2014, https://docs.
eaeunion.org/en-us (last accessed 30 October 2016).
22Armenia signed the EAEU treaty on October 10, 2014 and Kyrgyz Republic signed it on
December 23, 2014.
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process, enforcement and judicial powers.23 The EAEU has four tiers of governance
and the fifth tier – financial regulatory body is supposed to be established by 2025.
Supreme Eurasian Economic Council is the first tier of the governance, which is led
by the presidents of the member states. It sets the course of policy for the EAEU. The
second main body is the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council, which is led by prime
ministers. It supervises proper implementation of the EAEU Treaty and tasks third
tier and executive body of the EAEU – Eurasian Economic Commission with
relevant work. The Commission develops proposals for integration and lays ground
for effective functioning of the EAEU. Lastly, the judicial matters are handled with
the EAEU court, located in Minsk.
Another difference is that, unlike the EU, the EAEU considers itself purely
economic organization. The founding treaty of the EAEU emphasizes that the
EAEU is an international organization for regional economic integration. Indeed,
in comparison with the EU, the EAEU does not have an integrated common foreign
policy or as a matter of fact, common policy on security, justice, human rights and
social matters. Nonetheless, major motivation behind the establishment of the EAEU
seem quite political. First and foremost, aspiration of the Russian Federation to unite
the post-Soviet countries in its orbit in a prototype of the Soviet Union is obvious.
The union has also been actively searching for enlargement of its membership,
which also serves as a tool to expand the sphere of influence of Russia, a segment
of larger foreign policy of Russia. There are other factors such as provision of
geopolitical security for Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic, as well as, support for
the preservation of governing regimes in all the countries in the EAEU by Russia.
The EAEU’s policy of enlargement has been ongoing in several directions.24
Creation of “Great Eurasia”—common economic space extending to the whole
Eurasia—is a part of the policy which necessitates closer ties with the EU. However,
the EU has been reluctant on any kind of cooperation with the EAEU, even more so
after the annexation of the Crimea by Russia and events in Ukraine.25
On the Asian front, the integration has been quite successful. A first FTA of the
EAEU was signed with Vietnam and entered into force in 2016. There are at least
three dozen of other countries exploring the possibility of deepening their economic
ties with the EAEU. Among these Asian countries, special attention deserves China,
which has an important impact in the region, especially in the Central Asia. The
EAEU and China already concluded a trade deal to integrate EAEU projects into the
“Silk Road Economic Belt” initiative of China. This trade deal serves for strength-
ening of “The EAEU – China partnership”.26
23Suleymenov T, Denejniy vopros: pochemu Evraziyskomu soyuzu ne nujna yedinaya valyuta
(Money problem: why Eurasian Union does not need common currency). RBK, 17 June 2016,
http://www.rbc.ru/opinions/economics/17/06/2016/5763dfff9a794704a8e9d0f3 (last accessed
12 October 2016).
24Trudnosti sopryajeniya (Challenges for integration). Respublika, 17 February 2016, http://www.
eurasiancommission.org/ru/nae/news/Pages/17-02-2016-1.aspx (last accessed 12 October 2016).
25Yeliseyev (2015), p. 7.
26Kommentariy: Putin pozval Yevropu v Bolshuyu Yevraziyu (Commentary: Putin invited Europe
to the Great Eurasia). DW, 17 June 2016, http://dw.com/p/1J8tk (last accessed 2 July 2016).
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4 Energy in the Eurasian Economic Union
4.1 Energy Policies of the EAEU Members
Two out of the five members of the EAEU—Russia and Kazakhstan possess
significant global energy resources. Russia accounts for the most of the trade in
energy in the EAEU. It is the world’s largest crude oil producer, the second largest
natural gas producer, the top producer of electric power, world’s third exporter of
coal, as well as the nuclear energy producing country. However, energy trade of
Russia with the EAEU countries are not large, as the EAEU and the CIS are not the
biggest export markets for Russia. In fact, the main Russian export markets for
energy resources are the EU and Asian countries. The EU and Russia are somewhat
inter-dependent in this energy relationship. The EU has been importing almost one
third of its energy from Russia, while Russia has been exporting more than half of its
energy to the European markets.27
Energy accounts for the 40% of the budget revenues for Russian Federation,
therefore trade in energy is an important revenue source for this country.28 As such,
any fluctuations of prices in energy market affects the economy a great deal and
makes Russia vulnerable to external shocks. Indeed, this was clearly seen during the
downfall of oil prices in 2014 and onwards, which resulted in devaluation of the
Russian currency, budget cuts and loss of the significant government revenues.29
Though not as a large producer as Russia, Kazakhstan’s energy resources are also
significant in terms of the region where it is located. To be precise, among the post-
Soviet Union countries, Kazakhstan is the second largest producer of energy
resources, after Russia.30 In the world, Kazakhstan ranks among the top 20 oil
producing countries. Kazakhstan is also the world’s top country for production of
uranium, as well as it is the top coal producer among the Central Asian countries.
However, being land-locked country, it is dependent on its neighbors for the transit
of its energy resources. Currently, Kazakhstan is using routes via Russia, the
Caspian Sea and China to transport its energy resources. On the other hand,
Kazakhstan also acts as a transit country for transportation of Turkmenistan’s gas
to China.
It should be noted that both Russia and Kazakhstan have state monopolization
in the energy sector. In case of Kazakhstan, it is “Kazmunaygaz”, which is the
state-trading agency of Kazakhstan that controls the energy sector. It is the sole
government agency for the development, extraction, refinery and transportation of
hydrocarbon resources.31 Ministry of Energy of Kazakhstan—central executive
27Aalto (2008), p. 7.
28Jaffe and Manning (2001), p. 133.
29Grushevenko (2015) The effects of lower oil prices in Russia. National Bureau of Asian Research
briefs, http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id¼561 (last accessed 10 January 2018).
30Yesdauletova (2009), p. 38.
31See more at http://www.kmg.kz/eng/ (last accessed 29 October 2017).
Trade in Energy: The Case of the Eurasian Economic Union 343
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
body for energy policy—has delegated to “Kazmunaygaz” regulation of the plan-
ning, project building, construction of the oil and gas transport infrastructure,
transportation via oil and gas pipelines, subsequent storage and use of oil and gas
infrastructure.
The same applies to Russia. “Gazprom” is the Russian sole monopoly company
for gas extraction, development, transportation and sale. In the field of oil, the
situation is different, as there are multiple companies such as “Rosneft”, “Transneft”,
“Gazprom-neft”, “Lukoyl”, “Tatneft” and etc. Among them two companies are
distinguished. “Transneft” is the monopoly in Russia for transportation of oil.
“Lukoyl” is responsible for exploration, extraction, refinery and sale of oil and gas
fields in Russia and abroad, including Kazakhstan as well.
Other members of the EAEU are largely dependent on the import of energy
resources. For instance, Armenia’s energy sector depends on Russia. In fact, Russian
subsidiary company “Gazprom Armenia” controls 100% of the gas supply and sale
to Armenia. Armenia also possesses nuclear energy, as its Metsamor nuclear plant
provides significant amount of electricity for the domestic use. But the plant itself
poses huge ecological risk to the country, as well as to its neighbors. In fact, this
plant has been cited as the most dangerous nuclear facility in the world by “National
Geographic”, as it had outlived its normal 30 years life span for more than a decade
now.32
The Kyrgyz Republic owns vast hydrocarbon resources and generates half of the
electricity for its needs by hydrocarbon power. The share of hydropower on general
electrical mix has been around 90% making the country dependent on single energy
source.33 The Kyrgyz Republic possesses limited amount of gas, however due to the
geographical difficulties of extraction and exploration, it imports gas from Uzbek-
istan.34 Its gas sector belongs completely to the Russian companies now. In 2013,
during a severe shortage of energy, the Kyrgyz Republic has sold entire gas sector to
the Russian “Gazprom” for just 1 USD in exchange for the forgiveness of its former
gas debts.35
Among these countries, Belarus is of special attention, because it serves as an
important route for the transit of the Russian energy. 97% of energy imports to
Belarus come from Russia and more than 80% of the Belarusian energy use is
dependent on Russia.36 Belarus imports Russian oil at subsidized prices and then
re-exports this oil at global market prices, which generates an important revenue
source for Belarus. In exchange for this subsidized prices, Belarus has become a
32Lavelle and Garthwaite (2011) Is Armenia’s nuclear plant the world’s most dangerous? National
Geographic, https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2011/04/110412-most-dangerous-
nuclear-plant-armenia/ (last accessed 29 October 2017).
33Aminjonov (2016), p. 6.
34Aminjonov (2016), p 7.
35Russia’s Gazprom buys KyrgyzGaz State Co. for 1 USD. Ferghana International Information
Agency, 31 July 2013, http://enews.fergananews.com/news.php?id¼2677&print¼1 (last accessed
27 December 2017).
36Balmaceda (2006), p. 6.
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close ally of Russia and actively participates in implementation of foreign policy of
the latter. The relationship of these two countries are peculiar. From time to time,
Russia provides economic baits to Belarus in the form of forgiving of debts. For
instance, in 1996 the two countries signed an agreement, where Russia let go of
Belarusian debt for gas in exchange for the lease of military telecommunication
objects.37 Though Belarus receives the most subsidized gas prices within the CIS
region, it has been demanding even lower prices for gas.38 In this regard, Belarus has
numerously called for the revision of the EAEU treaty and acceleration of the work
for the formation of the common energy market.39
4.2 Energy in WTO Commitments of EAEU Members
Energy commitments of the EAEU members in the WTO accession packages
considerably differ in their scope of liberalization. The Russian Federation has
tried to limit any commitment in the energy sector by scheduling only services
incidental to mining, services incidental to energy distribution and related scientific
and technical consulting work.40 Even when scheduled, the scope of these commit-
ments is very narrow. For instance, services incidental to mining cover only consul-
tancy services. Related scientific and technical consulting work, which encompasses
geological, geophysical and other research services, subsurface surveying, excludes
the field work from the scope of the commitment. The Russian Federation also
scheduled specific limitation to production sharing agreements. These types of
agreements are signed between the government and energy extracting companies.
Based on these limitations, the Russian Federation grants priority status to its
juridical persons as suppliers, contractors, carriers in the production sharing agree-
ments. Moreover, Russia introduces nationality requirement, by specifying that 80%
of the employees on such contracts should be Russian nationals.
Kazakhstan’s schedule of services is more liberal compared to Russia. For
instance, if Russia only committed to consultancy services regarding services inci-
dental to mining, Kazakhstan took a deeper liberalization and opened up this sector
to foreign participation. The only limitation is that juridical persons have to be in the
37Balmaceda (2006), p. 8.
38Currently Belarus pays 132 USD for thousand cubic meters of gas. The country demands lower
prices for gas because the world prices have gone down, Russia refuses to do so. From 2016,
Belarus started to pay 73 USD for thousand cubic meters of gas. As retaliation, Russia decreased the
export of the oil to Belarus which resulted in the loss of export duty revenues to Belarus. The trade
war between the countries on the gas prices is still ongoing.
39‘Lukashenko prizval “provesti revisiyu” doqovora o Evrazes’ (Lukashenko called for the “revi-
sion” of the EAEU treaty). Ria novosti, 28 October 2016, https://ria.ru/economy/20161028/
1480193958.html (last accessed 6 November 2016).
40WTO Russian Federation Schedule of Specific Commitments: GATS/SC/149 5, November 2012.
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form of a juridical person of Kazakhstan.41 However, services incidental to energy
distribution still cover only consultancy services. Unlike Russia, Kazakhstan took
full commitment in related scientific and technical consulting work.
The Kyrgyz Republic has a fairly liberal services schedule. It has fully liberalized
most of its energy related services, such as services incidental to mining, engineering
services, pipeline transport. Services incidental to energy distribution is partly
liberalized.
Armenia has no energy commitments and Belarus is not a member of the
WTO yet.
4.3 Transit of Energy
Transit of energy is also significant for this region. In this regard, relationship of the
EAEU members to the Energy Charter Treaty is quite interesting. The Energy
Charter Treaty is unique, because it provides protection for investment, tackles
transit issues in detail and provides for dispute settlement for energy transit. Specif-
ically, under the Energy Charter Treaty, there are obligations for the contracting
parties to ensure the smooth and non-interrupted transit of energy flows and create
non-discriminatory environment by providing national/most-favored treatment, as
well as protection against non-commercial risks. Out of all EAEU members, only
two—Russia and Belarus signed the Energy Charter Treaty. Russia accepted provi-
sional application of it until the ratification.42 However, in 2009 Russia refused to
ratify it and formally gave the notice of it to the Secretariat and stopped the
ratification process as a whole. Belarus is applying the Treaty provisionally pending
ratification.
The move of Russia to pull out of Energy Charter clearly shows that the country
was not willing to take full commitment in the transit of energy and be bound with
the dispute settlement for such matters. As Russia is a transit country for the
Central Asian energy resources, this step could have been taken with the motiva-
tion to control the transit, as well as to have the advantage of influence over these
countries. Also, by taking this step, Russia might have aimed to limit potential
impact of future investment disputes in its energy sector. This specifically applies
to Yukos, whose shareholders arbitrated against Russia’s expropriation of the
company.43
41WTO Kazakhstan Schedule of Specific Commitments: WT/ACC/KAZ/93/Add 2, 23 June 2015.
42Pominova I (2014) Risks and benefits for the Russian Federation to participate in the Energy
Charter: comprehensive analysis. Energy Charter Secretariat Knowledge Center http://www.
energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Occasional/Russia_and_the_ECT_en.pdf (last
accessed 09 September 2017), p. 1.
43Russia’s withdrawal from Energy Charter Treaty. http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/
publications/22691/russias-withdrawal-from-the-energy-charter-treaty (last accessed 31 October 2017).
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4.4 Common EAEU Energy Market
Since two major energy producing countries are among the membership of the
EAEU, not surprisingly energy is one of the driving forces for the integration. As
common energy market meant that EAEU members would have equal rights as the
local companies to access Russian energy resources, it has been a considerable
motivation for Belarus, the Kyrgyz Republic and Armenia in their decision to join
the EAEU. Once a common energy market is formed within the EAEU, it will be the
largest economic benefit for these countries.
The Eurasian Economic Union Treaty has special chapter XX on energy which is
even further elaborated on Annexes N21, 22 and 23. The Treaty discerns the
common oil and petroleum products market, common gas market and common
electricity energy market.44 These annexes to the EAEU treaty elaborates the
coverage of the common energy markets. The EAEU Treaty specifies the deadlines
by which these markets have to be operational. These are 1 July 2019 for the
common electricity market and 1 January 2025 for the other energy markets.45 It
is noted in the EAEU Treaty that an international treaty with the EAEUmembers had
to be concluded before the launch of these markets, as well as action plans and
concepts papers should be developed in advance.
4.4.1 Common Gas Market
Annex No22 of the EAEU treaty is devoted to the issues such as cooperation,
market access, natural monopolies, pricing policy for common gas market. The
main principle is that import and export duties are not being applied for the intra-
EAEU trade.46 This was a concession sought by Belarus, and later by Armenia
and the Kyrgyz Republic. Besides that, the annex has provisions on harmonization
and approximation of the legislation, as well as on environmental safety.47 The
main pre-condition for the formation of the common gas market is the economic
44Treaty on the Establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union: Article 81, 83 and 84, 29 May
2014), www.docs.eaeunion.org (last accessed 2 November 2017).
45Treaty on the Establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union: Article 104, 29 May 2014, www.
docs.eaeunion.org (last accessed 2 November 2017).
46Annex 22 to the EAEU Treaty, Protocol on Rules for the access to the services of natural
monopolies in the sphere of transportation of gas through gas transporting systems, as well as
price formation and tariff policy, Article: 3.1, 29 May 2014, www.docs.eaeunion.org (last accessed
2 November 2016).
47Annex 22 to the EAEU Treaty, Protocol on Rules for the access to the services of natural
monopolies in the sphere of transportation of gas through gas transporting systems, as well as
price formation and tariff policy, Article: 3.4–3.5, 29 May 2014, www.docs.eaeunion.org (last
accessed 2 November 2016).
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profitability. In other words, the EAEU members should have such market prices
that it should be economically beneficial to sell gas to the EAEU members.48 The
EAEU itself does not regulate volume, price and tariff, leaving this to the authority
of national governments.49 Thus, energy producing countries—Russia and Kazakh-
stan still maintain their sovereignty over these issues. The economic benefit
pre-condition also gives a chance for this countries to move away from the common
market commitment if they find it non-profitable.
On 31 May 2016, concept of the formation of the common gas market was
adopted.50 According to this concept, formation of the common gas market is
conditioned upon the development of the internal gas markets of the members.
The concept ensures that internal needs in the gas of the member are answered
with the resources of the given member or other members and in some cases even the
third countries.51 However, the price formation and other commercial/technical
conditions of the transportation of the gas are determined with the bilateral agree-
ments. Also, in case of threats to economic and energy security of a member, it has a
right to adopt relevant regulative steps, which means that it can limit application of
common energy market in such cases.52
The common gas market is envisaged to be formed in several stages. The first
stage covers the period until 2020, when the legislation is to be harmonized, access
to information is provided, norms and standards for gas are unified, formation of
indicative balance of gas of the union and adoption of the rules for the auctions on
the gas are completed. The second stage covers period up to 2021 when one or more
auctions on gas are operational in the EAEU territory, members have access without
barriers to the auctions located in the territory of other members and they have
access to the gas transportation systems of each-other. The third and final stage
covers the period up to 2025 when the agreement on common market for gas enters
into force, the supply of gas through bilateral agreements or auctions are ensured
freely and the members adopt the price for gas which is equally beneficial to all the
members.
48Annex 22 to the EAEU Treaty, Protocol on Rules for the access to the services of natural
monopolies in the sphere of transportation of gas through gas transporting systems, as well as
price formation and tariff policy, Article: 5, 29 May 2014, www.docs.eaeunion.org (last accessed
2 November 2016).
49Annex 22 to the EAEU Treaty, Protocol on Rules for the access to the services of natural
monopolies in the sphere of transportation of gas through gas transporting systems, as well as
price formation and tariff policy, Article: 7, 29 May 2014, www.docs.eaeunion.org (last accessed
2 November 2016).
50Decision N7, dated 31 May 2016 of the Eurasian Economic Council on the concept of the
formation of common gas market of the EAEU.
51Decision N7, dated 31 May 2016 of the Eurasian Economic Council on the concept of the
formation of common gas market of the EAEU, Article 3.
52Decision N7, dated 31 May 2016 of the Eurasian Economic Council on the concept of the
formation of common gas market of the EAEU.
348 S. Verdiyeva
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
4.4.2 Common Oil and Petroleum Products Market
Annex 23 of the EAEU Treaty regulates common oil and petroleum products
market.53 Again, tariffs for the transportation services of oil and petroleum products
are in the hands of national authorities.54
The concept of formation of common oil and petroleum products market
was adopted on May 31, 2016.55 Major principles reflected in the document are
ensuring competition in the energy market with the exclusion of the services
of natural monopolies for the transportation of oil and petroleum products; remov-
ing administrative, technical and other principles in the common market;
non-discriminatory access of the members to common oil and petroleum products
market; ensuring commercial and transport infrastructure of common oil and
petroleum products market; prioritizing supply of needs of EAEU members in oil
and petroleum products; non-application of quantitative restrictions in mutual
trade; harmonization of legislation for technical and commercial infrastructure of
common market; unification of norms and standards for oil and petroleum prod-
ucts; ensuring favorable conditions for attraction of investments and ensuring
ecological safety.56
Again, as the case was with the common market of gas, mutual trade of the
members in the common market can be realized through either bilateral agreements,
or through auctions. The oil and petroleum products price formation is realized
through market prices, excluding services of the natural monopolies for transpor-
tation of oil and petroleum products, where prices are formed by national author-
ities.57 Thus, profitability of selling gas to the member states are ensured. The
following principles are further applied: (1) tariffs are formed based on national
legislation; (2) tariffs for legal persons cannot be higher than the tariffs determined
for the legal persons through the territory of which oil and petroleum products are
transported; (3) members are not obliged to offer lower tariffs than the tariffs
determined for legal persons through territory of which oil and petroleum products
are transported.58
53Annex 23 to the EAEU Treaty, Protocol on Rules for organization, governance, functioning and
development of common oil and petroleum products market, 29 May 2014, www.docs.eaeunion.
org (last accessed 2 November 2016).
54Annex 23 to the EAEU Treaty, Protocol on Rules for organization, governance, functioning and
development of common oil and petroleum products market, Article 7, 29 May 2014, www.docs.
eaeunion.org (last accessed 2 November 2016).
55Decision N8, dated 31 May 2016 of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council on the adoption of
the Concept of common EAEU oil and petroleum products market.
56Decision N8, dated 31 May 2016 of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council on the adoption of
the Concept of common EAEU oil and petroleum products market, Article 4.
57Decision N8, dated 31 May 2016 of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council on the adoption of
the Concept of common EAEU oil and petroleum products market, Article 4.
58Decision N8, dated 31 May 2016 of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council on the adoption of
the Concept of common EAEU oil and petroleum products market, Article 9.
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Similarly to the common gas market, the common oil and petroleum products
market is also formed in three stages. The first stage covering 2016–2017 envisaged
adoption of the program of formation of such market, the second stage covering
2018–2023 envisages realization of actions included in the program and the last
stage covering 2024 envisages conclusion and adoption of international agreement
on common oil and petroleum products between the members.59
4.4.3 Common Electricity Energy Market
In 2015, the EAEU adopted the concept for the formation of the common electricity
market.60 Belarus agreed to the concept with a special opinion stating that common
electricity market will not be fully operational until the common gas market is
formed. The concept determines several main tasks for the common electricity
market, such as development and increase of the efficiency of the market mecha-
nisms for mutual trade in electricity energy, increasing transparency of the price
formation, creating conditions for the access without barriers to the services of
natural monopolies on electricity energy (as long as technical conditions technical
capabilities make it possible and with the condition that these services will be as a
priority used for the internal needs in the transmission of interstate energy), creating
conditions for the access of the producers and consumers of the electricity energy to
the electricity energy market of the members (with pre-condition of taking into
account the national interests), increasing opportunities for the mutual trade in
electricity energy, decreasing the increase rate of the prices of electricity energy
for final consumers and creating favorable conditions for the investment in electricity
energy objects.61
According to the concept, common electricity market is to be created based on the
parallel functioning electricity systems of the members. Thus mutual trade is to be
handled both through the bilateral agreements, as well as through the centralized
auctions. The price formation for the bilateral agreements and the centralized
auctions will be different. While prices for electricity energy will be determined
within the bilateral agreements, in auctions the prices will be formed based on the
algorithms of the common electricity market regulations.62 A special program for the
formation of common electricity market was developed by the EAEU Commission,
but the document is still pending for the adoption by the Supreme Eurasian Eco-
nomic Council.
59Decision N8, dated 31 May 2016 of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council on the adoption of
the Concept of common EAEU oil and petroleum products market, Article 10.
60Decision N12, dated 8 May 2015 of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council on the adoption of
the Concept of common EAEU electricity market.
61Decision N12, dated 8 May 2015 of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council on the adoption of
the Concept of common EAEU electricity market, Article 2.
62Decision N12, dated 8 May 2015 of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council on the adoption of
the Concept of common EAEU electricity market, Article 9.
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5 What Is Blocking Energy Integration Within the EAEU?
Though EAEU has been advocating a union of strong economic ties which steadily
moves towards the creation of the common energy market, there are certain blockages
on the way to achieve this goal. These blockages are both political and economic.
The most important obstacle on the way to deeper energy integration within the
EAEU is the lack of trust of the members to each-other, and especially to the hub of
this union—the Russian Federation. This stems mainly from the Russian policy of
using energy as a foreign diplomacy tool, showcased in many instances in Ukraine,
Georgia or the Baltic states.63 Many of the countries in the region are dependent on
energy import from Russia or in the case of Kazakhstan, on the transit of energy
through Russia. So, potential disrupt of the supply of the energy, as well as potential
prevention of the transit of energy could be quite burdensome for these countries.
Another factor to take into consideration for the mistrust among the members is that
they do not want the EAEU to turn into the disguised Soviet Union and the history
repeating itself. The threat of the loss of sovereignty is therefore an important factor
that make members cautious to trust the EAEU and the Russian Federation.
Secondly, energy markets of the member countries lack accountability and
transparency. Though the EAEU promises more transparency for the energy admin-
istration, the current practice is far from that. One clear example for this is the
famous “Yukos” case where Russia forcibly broke down and acquired assets of the
largest energy company at the time in Russia—“Yukos” worth of billions of dollars.
Though international courts such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the
European Court of Human Rights, Arbitration Institute of Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce ruled the unlawfulness of this expropriation act, the Russian verdict was
never changed.64 This case alone shows that fair competition conditions in the
energy market are hardly present in the EAEU.
Thirdly, energy markets of the EAEU members are largely monopolized. These
markets are focused on supply-side approach and are not open to competition. Even
when there is not a monopoly, the companies operating in the energy sector come
under tight control of the government. In comparison with the EU, which opened its
market to competition gradually and as a result, now consumers can freely choose
their suppliers, the EAEU has not taken any steps to achieve this goal and therefore,
in the EAEU consumers cannot choose their suppliers. On the contrary, energy
companies in the EAEU are dominated by presence of oligarchs which contribute to
the lack of transparency and competition.65 As a result, the government has not been
63Newnham (2011), p. 134.
64Yukos ruling of Permanent Arbitration Court demanding 50 billion USD is the largest amount of
arbitration award in the world history, which was later rejected by local court in the Hague. See:
Newcombe (2015), p. 283.
65Smith K (2010), Lack of transparency in Russian Energy Trade: The Risks to Europe. Center for
International and Strategic Studies Publication, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/leg
acy_files/files/publication/100702_Smith_LackOfTransparency_Web.pdf (last accessed 11 January
2018), p. 2.
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interested in changing the existing system. Furthermore, energy prices are strictly
regulated by the government and though they are subsidized, these prices are still
high for many households.66
Fourthly, national energy policies of the countries are fragmented and
uncoordinated with each-other. Members do not consult the EAEU Commission
on the development of new energy routes or energy policies. These matters are in the
authority of the national authorities. This trend seems to remain so for the foresee-
able future.
Last but not least, the current national energy policies are largely dependent
on fossil fuels and vulnerable to external shocks. Even in the case of the Kyrgyz
Republic, which uses hydropower, the winter months bring severe shortages of
energy. Renewables, such as solar and wind power cover only little percentage in
the overall energy mix. However, it is worth to note that all of the EAEU members
have signed the Paris Convention and taken relevant commitments to achieve its
goal of taking relevant measures to mitigate climate change.67 Russian Federation
has committed to 75% reduction of greenhouse gas emission to 1990s levels by
2030. Kazakhstan’s commitment is 15% unconditional reduction and further 25%
reduction subject to investments and access to technology and other means. Armenia
did not set its contribution in percentage, rather by the reduction per capita. So, it
aims to reduce by 2050 annually 5.4 ton emissions per capita. Belarus’s contribution
is 28% by 2030. Kyrgyz Republic undertook to reduce 13.75% by 2030 and took
conditional commitment of 30% reduction if necessary investment was attracted.68
As it can be seen, there are different commitment levels across the EAEU countries.
Russia has taken a considerable amount of commitment in this regard, the result of
which is yet to be seen.
The EAEU Treaty has provisions on transparency, facilitation of trade and
competition. However, the law is mostly silent over the issues mentioned above.
Moreover, it is not wide-spread among the members to take disputes to the court.
Most of the cases within the EAEU is settled bilaterally through political consulta-
tions. So far, there has only been one instance where a member state lodged a
complaint about non-compliance of the other member in the EAEU Court (out of
13 cases since the establishment of the EAEU Court).69 This was the case which the
Russian Federation filed against Belarus regarding Belarusian customs restricting the
transit of certain goods. The court in its judgment accepted this measure as being
66Gusev (2013) How to profit from rising energy prices in Russia. Energy post, http://energypost.
eu/how-to-profit-from-rising-energy-prices-in-russia/ (last accessed 27 March 2018).
67Paris convention, adopted within the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change,
aims to put the rise of global temperature below 2 C above pre-industrial levels and avoid further
increase. The agreement is implemented through nationally determined contributions by each party.
68All the commitments of the EAEU members in achieving aims of Paris Convention can be
accessed at Paris Convention INDC submissions portal: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/
Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx (last accessed 27 March 2018).




partly contrary to the EAEU Treaty.70 Moreover, though the EAEU court can adopt a
decision which is mandatory for the parties to implement, it does not have a power to
change the laws and regulations of the EAEU, nor the members.71 So, it means that
even when the EAEU court would rule that certain practice is a violation of the
EAEU Treaty rights and obligations, it cannot require cancellation of it, as it remains
prerogative of the EAEU Commission or national authorities to do so. As a result,
institutional efficiency of the EAEU court is fairly limited.
6 Conclusion
This paper argues that even though EAEU has great ambitions for common energy
market, yet there are certain obstacles for energy integration. These obstacles are the
lack of trust of the EAEU members to each-other and mainly to the Russian
Federation, lack of sufficient transparency and accountability in the energy sector,
existence of state governed energy monopolies, lack of fair competition rules,
uncoordinated energy policies, as well as dependence on single energy source in
the overall energy mix.
While it took EU several decades to gradually create pre-conditions for the
establishment of the common energy market that it is present now, the EAEU is
trying to achieve this in a much accelerated manner. As a result, natural course of
development of integration within the EAEU is hindered. Moreover, there is not
enough political will and commitment from all members to push forward for the full
liberalization of energy services in the common energy market in the EAEU. There is
a great likelihood that if the trajectory remains the same and if the countries do not
see real, tangible benefits of staying in the EAEU, it would become another “only on
paper” functioning entity in the post-Soviet space, like the CIS or former customs
unions established in this region.
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1 Introduction
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is one of the most longstanding regional
integration arrangements. Established in 1973 it continues under its current 2001
Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the CARICOM Single Market and
Economy (RTC).1 Like other regional organisations CARICOM has several
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executive organs representing state interests, a Secretariat providing technical sup-
port and a final treaty-interpreting court, the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ).2
However unlike most other regional organisations the Members of CARICOM
primarily hail from a dualist legal tradition and the regional court also serves as a
final appellate court. These two differences have impacted upon the development of
Caribbean regional integration law in interesting ways.
This chapter introduces readers to Caribbean integration law by briefly examining
both CARICOM and the seminal jurisprudence of the CCJ. After a briefly placing
CARICOM in its historical and economic context, the chapter reviews the CCJ’s
development of regional integration law, looking at many of the seminal original
jurisdiction cases of the Court, in roughly chronological order. This structure allows
us to better grasp the different stages of development of the court’s jurisprudence.
The chapter concludes by comparing some of these Caribbean developments with
parallel developments in the European Union, before offering some final
observations.
2 Brief Historical and Economic Overview
Attempts at regional integration in the Commonwealth Caribbean can be traced back
to the nineteenth century when British authorities sought to create structures to
enable them to more easily administer the region.3 These efforts failed as a result
of lack of support of the plantocracy, amongst other reasons. Indigenous integration
efforts can be traced back to Caribbean labour leaders in the 1930s and post 1945.4
The most ambitious attempt at integration, again linked to colonial imperatives,
was the creation of the West Indies Federation in 1956.5 The West Indies Federation
was founded upon a constitution, which provided for an Executive Council, two
Houses of Parliament, a Prime Minister and Governor General. Shortly after its
inauguration, however, differing views about the purpose and the scope of authority
of the Federation produced conflict, which was inflamed when the leader of the
Jamaican opposition party, Alexander Bustamante, suggested that Jamaica should
seek independence. When Bustamante came to power and started independence
negotiations with the UK, the other major regional power—Trinidad and Tobago—
followed suit. The federal experiment collapsed as a result. This was perhaps
information on the process leading to the entry into force of the RTC, and the regime it creates, see
Berry (2014), pp. 8–67.
2The CCJ was created by the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice (adopted
14 Feb 2001, entered into force 23 Jul 2002) 2255 UNTS 319 [“Agreement”]. The Court was
inaugurated on April 16, 2005. See generally, Berry (2014), pp. 383–436.
3For historical overviews see e.g. Berry (2014), pp. 17–31; Müllerleile (1996), pp. 31–75.
4See e.g. Springer (1962), pp. 3–8.
5For discussions of the Federation see Springer (1962); Müllerleile (1996), pp. 31–75.
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inevitable, since the West Indies Federation generally preserved UK colonial author-
ity. In addition, most of the leaders of the time would have seen federation as a
means to an end (independence) rather than an end in itself. Importantly, this desire
for independence remains a powerful force in Caribbean integration today, with the
dialectic between sovereignty and supranationalism remaining skewed in favour of
sovereignty.
Following the collapse of the West Indies Federation the English-speaking
Caribbean attempted a more limited form of economic integration under the Carib-
bean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) in 1965.6 CARIFTA was transformed into
a Caribbean common market and became part of the Caribbean Community structure
in 1973.7
CARICOM at present has expanded beyond the English-speaking, Common-
wealth Caribbean to include Dutch-speaking (Suriname) and French-speaking
(Haiti) Members. All 15 Members share the bitter experience of colonialism and
the 13 English speaking Members share common law legal systems (Table 1).
Six of the Members of CARICOM are designated as “more developed countries”
(MDC) under Article 4 of the RTC, with the remainder by default falling under the
category of “less developed countries” (LDC). The criteria for this distinction are not
spelled out in the RTC, but the status of a member may be changed under Article 5 of
Table 1 Members and
associate members of the
Caribbean Community
Members (15) Associate members (5)
Antigua and Barbuda Anguilla
The Bahamas Bermuda
Barbados British Virgin Islands
Belize Cayman Islands






St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia




Bold ¼ “more developed countries” as designated by Article 4 of
the RTC
Italics ¼ not yet parties to the RTC but are Members of
CARICOM
6Müllerleile (1996), p. 41.
7See the Treaty. For commentary see Geiser et al. (1976).
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the RTC by a majority decision of the head organ of CARICOM, the Conference of
Heads of Government.
The MDC/LDC distinction for Members is interesting and provides an important
insight about the nature of CARICOM. Although all CARICOM Members would
fall within the category of developing states on a global economic scale, there are
important distinctions between them in terms of resources, size and economic
development. The territory of some CARICOM Members, for example, lies on
continental land masses, whereas others are made up of one or more islands.
Territorial sizes ranging from close to 200,000 square kilometres (Guyana) to
102 square kilometres (Montserrat), and over half of CARICOM’s Members are
smaller in territorial size than New York City.8 Economic data related to Members
also varies widely, ranging from a per capita GDP of nearly US$50,000 (Cayman
Islands, an Associate Member), to just over US$5000 (Jamaica) and to just over US
$800 (Haiti).9 These variations are reflected in the RTC itself, in which an entire
chapter—Chapter 7—makes special provision for, and allows derogations by, “Dis-
advantaged Countries, Regions and Sectors” including LDCs.
In terms of overarching principles, goals and objectives, CARICOM’s Single
Market and Economy (CSME) aims to improve, amongst other things, living
standards, employment, trade, international competitiveness, coordination of foreign
and foreign economic policies, and functional cooperation (Article 6 RTC).10 The
ambition of its trade regime, as set out in Article 78(2)(a) is to achieve “full
integration of the national markets of all Member States of the Community into a
single unified and open market area.” The CSME includes the non-discrimination
and Most Favoured Nation principles (Articles 7–8 RTC), and establishes a general
undertaking to ensure performance of all obligations arising out of the RTC (Article
9).
More generally, the RTC can be seen to establish a common market. This requires
Members to: remove all impediments to trade between themselves, pursue common
commercial relations (such as through a Common External Tariff or CET), allow
free factor mobility, and promote the four freedoms: free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital.11 In terms of promoting the free movement of goods
the RTC prohibits import and export duties, charges of equivalent effect, discrimi-
natory internal taxes, quantitative restrictions and measures equivalent to quantita-
tive restrictions.12
8For an overview of data on CARICOM Members see e.g. Berry (2018).
9Berry (2018).
10See generally, Berry (2014), pp. 247–311.
11See RTC, chapters 3 and 5.
12See RTC Articles 1, 87, 88, 90 and 91.
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3 Nature of the Caribbean Court of Justice
The ultimate legal organ entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring the effective-
ness of Caribbean Community law is the CCJ. The CCJ has two forms of jurisdic-
tion, appellate and original. In its appellate jurisdiction, as set out in the Agreement
Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice [Agreement], the CCJ acts as a final
court of appeal on matters of domestic law.13 In its original jurisdiction—which is so
termed because cases can be filed directly before the CCJ in the first instance—the
CCJ is granted original, compulsory, exclusive, final and binding competence to
interpret and apply the RTC.14 The Court’s original jurisdiction is set out simulta-
neously in the RTC and the Agreement, although in the event of conflict between the
two the court has indicated a preference for the later treaty, the RTC.15
The RTC provides several different bases for the original jurisdiction of the Court,
including jurisdiction over requests for: advisory opinions (Article 212), rulings
related to anti-competitive conduct (either brought by the CARICOM Competition
Commission or a Member State (Articles 175–176)), interim measures (Article 218),
intervention by third parties (Agreement Article XVIII), and for revision of its
judgments (Article 219). The Court’s jurisdiction over contentious cases is set out
in Article 211(1) of the RTC as follows:
1. Subject to this Treaty, the Court shall have compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and determine disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty,
including:
(a) disputes between the Member States parties to the Agreement;
(b) disputes between the Member States parties to the Agreement and the Community;
(c) referrals from national courts of the Member States parties to the Agreement;
(d) applications by persons in accordance with Article 222, concerning the interpretation and
application of this Treaty.
Of these four bases for jurisdiction, the one under which all of the original jurisdic-
tion cases so far have arisen is that of application by persons, as provided for in
Articles 211(1)(d) and 222. No cases have arisen under the other jurisdictional bases.
It is unlikely that many cases will come before the Court under Article 211(1)(a) or
(b) since, on the one hand, litigating disputes between Members will be politically
costly, and on the other, disputes between Members and CARICOMwill more likely
be resolved within the organs themselves. CARICOM itself is unlikely to bring
13See Article XXV of the Agreement.
14See RTC Articles 211 (compulsory and exclusive), 213 (original, meaning disputes may be filed
directly before the CCJ without reference to a prior judicial body), 215 (binding), 216 (compulsory),
219 (final, by implication), 221 (legally binding precedents). See also Agreement Articles III
(2) (final), XII (exclusive), XV (binding), XVI (compulsory), XXI (judgments to constitute legally
binding precedents).
15See Trinidad Cement Ltd and TCL Guyana Inc v Guyana [2009] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave) paras
[25]–[27].
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Members before the CCJ since it is financially dependent upon their contributions.
One promising form of jurisdiction is that over referrals of questions regarding the
interpretation or application of the RTC by national courts (under Articles 211(1)
(c) and 214). Although no matters have been heard under this jurisdiction yet, the
Court’s referral jurisdiction is analogous to, and may have the same potential as, the
European Court of Justice’s preliminary rulings procedure.16
4 Overview of the Decisions of the Caribbean Court
of Justice
Let us examine some of the key cases from the jurisprudence of the Court in its
original jurisdiction in order to understand how it has helped to strengthen and
develop CARICOM’s regional integration movement.17
4.1 Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana
The first case to be brought before the CCJ involved a suit by two companies against
Guyana for the latter’s unilateral suspension of the common external tariff (CET) on
non-Community origin cement, which is set at 15%. This suspension was granted
without the authorisation of the Secretary General or the Council for Trade and
Economic Development (COTED).18 The Trinidadian parent company, Trinidad
Cement Limited, which was in the business of producing cement, and its Guyanese
subsidiary, TCL Guyana Incorporated, which packaged cement, both alleged losses
as a result of the Guyanese waiver.
The case went through a number of different stages. Since it was the first original
jurisdiction case the CCJ expressly invited CARICOM Members and the Commu-
nity to make submissions as third parties.19
16See Article 19(3)(b) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 267 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, both reproduced in the Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 2016 C 202, as
available through http://eur-lex.europa.eu/collection/eu-law/treaties.html (20 June 2018).
17All of the CCJ’s original jurisdiction cases are available through the Court’s website: http://www.
ccj.org/judgments-proceedings/original-jurisdiction-judgments (25 June 2018). In citing these
cases the Court’s neutral citation numbers have been used. An additional, descriptive term in
parentheses has also been included at the end of each citation to indicate the stage of the case
which the judgment concludes.
18Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 5 (OJ) (merits), paras [5]–
[6] and [9].
19Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2008] CCJ 1 (OJ) (interim order). See
also Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave),
paras [6]–[8].
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At the first formal stage of the case the applicant was required to make out a case
for special leave to appear before the Court in its original jurisdiction.20
Guyana admitted that it had waived the CET without permission from the
relevant CARICOM organs, but denied that the applicants had locus standi.21 In
examining its jurisdiction over applications by persons the Court reviewed the RTC
in its context, applied the interpretive principles of the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties,22 and came to the conclusion that the purposes of the RTC
include those of “transforming the CARICOM sub-region into a viable collectivity
of States for the sustainable economic and social development of their peoples.”23
The CCJ also held that in this regard:
the CSME is regarded as an appropriate framework or vehicle for achieving this end and that
private entities, “and in particular the social partners”, are to play a major role in fulfilling the
object and goals of the RTC. The CSME is intended to be private sector driven.24
The CCJ then concluded that the Contracting Parties to the RTC had intended that
private entities should be “important actors in the regime established by the RTC;
[and] that they should have conferred upon them and be entitled to enjoy rights
capable of being enforced directly on the international plane.”25
The Court next assessed the mechanism through which private entities may
enforce their rights at the regional level, namely, Article 222 of the RTC:
ARTICLE 222
Locus Standi of Private Entities
Persons, natural or juridical, of a Contracting Party may, with the special leave of the Court,
be allowed to appear as parties in proceedings before the Court where:
(a) the Court has determined in any particular case that this Treaty intended that a right or
benefit conferred by or under this Treaty on a Contracting Party shall enure to the benefit
of such persons directly; and
(b) the persons concerned have established that such persons have been prejudiced in
respect of the enjoyment of the right or benefit mentioned in paragraph (a) of this
Article; and
(c) the Contracting Party entitled to espouse the claim in proceedings before the Court has:
(i) omitted or declined to espouse the claim, or
20Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave).
21Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave),
para [34].
22Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave),
paras [10]–[13]; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, in force 27 Jan
1980) 1155 UNTS 331.
23Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave),
para [13].
24Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave),
para [13].
25Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave),
para [18].
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(ii) expressly agreed that the persons concerned may espouse the claim instead of the
Contracting Party so entitled; and
(d) the Court has found that the interest of justice requires that the persons be allowed to
espouse the claim.
The first challenge raised by Guyana was regarding the required status of the
applicant. Guyana argued that the use of the term “national” in the parallel provision
of the Agreement required satisfaction of the test for nationality set out in Article
32 of the RTC. The Court rejected this argument.26 The requirement is simply that
one fall within the category of “Persons, natural or juridical, of a Contracting Party”
as stated in Article 222 itself. For juridical persons the Court held that it was
sufficient that a company “be incorporated or registered in a Contracting Party”,
and both applicants satisfied this requirement.27
The Court applied Article 222 to the applicants. Article 222(a) requires proof, at
the level of an “arguable case”,28 that a right or benefit accrues to a person directly.
This would have been a challenge to the applicants on a textual interpretation of the
RTC, since the vast majority of its provisions are addressed to Members or the
Community, not to persons. However in a seminal move, in paragraph [32] of its
decision, the Court held that the RTC could create correlative rights for persons:
Rights and benefits under the RTC are not always expressly conferred although some of
them are, for example the rights referred to in Articles 32 and 46. Many of the rights,
however, are to be derived or inferred from correlative obligations imposed upon the
Contracting Parties. Unless specifically otherwise indicated, the obligations set out in the
RTC are imposed on Member States (or a class of Member States) collectively. Where an
obligation is thus imposed, it is capable of yielding a correlative right that enures directly to
the benefit of private entities throughout the entire Community.
This correlative rights doctrine is fundamental to Community law. With it the Court
arguably transformed a treaty which creates rights and obligations for states and a
regional organisation into one which creates rights for Caribbean citizens.
A challenge arose in relation to one of the applicants and the requirements of
Article 222(c). Under a textual or literal interpretation it would have been hard to see
how TCL Guyana Inc could bring a claim against its state of nationality, Guyana.29
However the Court examined the provision in its context and employed the teleo-
logical approach in order to determine that the wording of Article 222(c) was meant
26Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave),
paras [25]–[28].
27Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave),
paras [28] and [29].
28Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave),
para [33].
29See Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave),
para [38].
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to avoid duplication of suits.30 The Court therefore held that TCL Guyana Inc had
standing under the provision.
At the merits hearing the claims of the applicants were aided considerably by
Guyana’s express admission that it had breached the RTC.31 As a result the case
became focused on issues related to liability, loss, proof of loss, and available
remedies.32 The first major issue was simply whether Guyana could be liable for
its admitted breach of the RTC. In answering this question the CCJ relied upon the
European Court of Justice’s (ECJ’s) decision in Francovich and Others v Italian
State and held that a similar form of state liability applies under the RTC:
This Court holds that a similar principle applies under the RTC and that the new Single
Market based on the rule of law implies the remedy of compensation where rights which
enure to individuals and private entities under the Treaty are infringed by a Member State.
But State liability in damages is not automatic. A party will have to demonstrate that the
provision alleged to be breached was intended to benefit that person, that such breach is
serious, that there is substantial loss and that there is a causal link between the breach by the
State and the loss or damage to that person.33
This form of state liability differs substantially from that in the Francovich case,
which concerned a directive which was not directly effective, and gave rise to
liability in national law. Instead, at least for the present, state liability in CARICOM
exists only at the regional level under the CCJ’s original jurisdiction.
Applying the test for liability the Court was unable to find sufficient evidence of
loss causally connected (sufficiently proximate) to Guyana’s breach, and thus the
applicants were not eligible for damages34 (let alone exemplary or punitive damages,
which the Court held are not accepted at international law).35 The Court did,
however, make a coercive order against Guyana requiring it “to re-impose the
CET within 28 days of the date of this order and to maintain it thereafter until and
unless a suspension is authorised by COTED or the Secretary-General pursuant to
Article 83.”36
The case did not end at this point, however, since Guyana applied to the Court for
a stay of execution (interpreted to be a request for a stay of proceedings or extension
of time for compliance) 1 day before the deadline for re-imposition of the CET.37
30Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave),
paras [38]–[44].
31Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 5 (OJ) (merits), para [18].
32Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 5 (OJ) (merits), para [23].
33Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 5 (OJ) (merits), para
[27] [citing Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others v Italian State [1991] ECR I-5357
(ECJ)]. See also ibid paras [24]–[26].
34Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 5 (OJ) (merits), paras [33]–
[34].
35Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 5 (OJ) (merits), paras [35]–
[40].
36Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 5 (OJ) (merits), para [43].
37Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 6 (OJ) (stay of execution).
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The Court refused this request, but Guyana did not fully comply with the Court’s
order until January 8, 2010, 4 months after the deadline.38 This led the applicants to
bring contempt proceedings. The Court refused to make a contempt order and
instead issued a declaration that Guyana was in breach of Article 215 of the RTC,
the provision requiring compliance with judgments of the Court.39
It is interesting to note that although Guyana delayed its compliance with the
Court’s order (and later did in the Rudisa Beverages case), it did eventually comply
in full.40 In this sense the CCJ has proved relatively effective in enforcing Commu-
nity law.41
4.2 Trinidad Cement Limited v. CARICOM
The second original jurisdiction case to be heard by the Court was the one brought by
Trinidad Cement Limited against CARICOM, this time challenging the granting of
two suspensions of the CET on cement by organs of the Community, one in relation
to Jamaica and the other in relation to Suriname and six Eastern Caribbean states.42
In granting special leave, the Court responded decisively to an assertion that
allowing a challenge by a private party to CARICOM would hinder its development
and constrain state sovereignty. The court flatly rejected such an idea and held that
CARICOM operates under the rule of law:
By signing and ratifying the Revised Treaty and thereby conferring on this Court ipso facto a
compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes concerning the
interpretation and application of the Revised Treaty, the Member States transformed the
erstwhile voluntary arrangements in CARICOM into a rule-based system, thus creating and
accepting a regional system under the rule of law. A challenge by a private party to decisions
of the Community is therefore not only not precluded, but is a manifestation of such a
system. Therefore it is not correct to say that by such challenge the functioning of the
Community will be greatly hindered or that the exercise of state sovereignty by Member
States parties to the Revised Treaty would be unduly constrained. The rule of law brings with
it legal certainty and protection of rights of states and individuals alike, but at the same time
of necessity it creates legal accountability. Even if such accountability imposes some
constraint upon the exercise of sovereign rights of states, the very acceptance of such a
constraint in a treaty is in itself an act of sovereignty.43
38Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2010] CCJ 1 (OJ) (contempt).
39Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana [2010] CCJ 1 (OJ) (contempt),
para [25].
40Rudisa Beverages & Juices NV v Guyana [2014] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits).
41For comparisons of the more difficult experiences of other regional tribunals see e.g. Madsen et al.
(2018) and Alter et al. (2016).
42Trinidad Cement Limited v. CARICOM [2009] CCJ 2 (OJ) (special leave), [2009] CCJ
4 (OJ) (merits).
43Trinidad Cement Limited v. CARICOM [2009] CCJ 2 (OJ) (special leave), para [32].
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This is a powerful statement and provided a firm base for the Court’s adoption of
doctrines such as state liability, seen above, and judicial review in the context of
Community law.
In the merits phase of the case the Court was required to assess the scope of its
jurisdiction over CARICOM. The CCJ held that the scope of disputes set out in
Article 187 of the RTC was not limited to inter-state disputes, and could embrace
disputes involving the Community.44 Citing its previous statement about the appli-
cability of the rule of law to CARICOM—a principle which the Court highlights is
“a fundamental principle accepted by all the Member States of the Caribbean
Community”—the Court held that the power of judicial review of discretionary
decisions of CARICOM organs is implicit in its mandate.45 The CCJ also indicated
that its power of judicial review includes a power to issue coercive remedies.46
In coming to such a position the Court extended the rule of law to the main
participants in Community law—the Members and the Community itself. Since no
decision of the CCJ has recognised an obligation of Community law attaching to an
individual, the court has not been required to extend the rule of law principle to cover
other actors. However this would be a logical extension of the principle.
Two other matters are notable from the Court’s judgment on the merits of this
case. First, in examining the rules related to suspension of the CET the Court
clarified the appropriate procedures and competences of Community organs related
to suspension. It also expanded upon existing competences. For example, the Court
extended the grounds for suspension to include a new ground of timeliness of supply
(adding to grounds of non-production, non-production of sufficient quantities and
non-production of sufficient quality).47 Second, the Court robustly interpreted the
requirement of consultation by the Community with national authorities, as set out in
Article 26 of the RTC. In fact the Court chastised the Secretary General for not
undertaking proper consultation before authorising a suspension.48
4.3 Johnson v. CARICAD
The third case involved a suit by a natural person, Doreen Johnson, against the
Caribbean Centre for Developmental Administration (CARICAD), for her wrongful
44Trinidad Cement Limited v. CARICOM [2009] CCJ 2 (OJ) (special leave), para [36].
45See Trinidad Cement Limited v. CARICOM [2009] CCJ 2 (OJ) (special leave), paras
[38] and [41].
46Trinidad Cement Limited v. CARICOM [2009] CCJ 2 (OJ) (special leave), para [43].
47Trinidad Cement Limited v. CARICOM [2009] CCJ 2 (OJ) (special leave), paras [52] and [55]–
[56].
48Trinidad Cement Limited v. CARICOM [2009] CCJ 2 (OJ) (special leave), para [68].
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dismissal, other alleged contractual and Constitutional law breaches, and discrimi-
nation on grounds of nationality.49
Although this could have been the first potential suit from a natural person,
special leave was denied to Ms Johnson because CARICAD was held not to be a
valid respondent under the RTC. The Court noted that the RTC allows suits to be
brought against the Community for actions of its organs or bodies, and against
Members. It does not allow suits to be brought against Institutions, including
CARICAD, which unlike organs do not act on behalf of the Community and cannot
bind it.50 The Court also noted that even if CARICAD were a proper defendant, the
only issues justiciable before the Court would be rights and obligations arising under
the RTC.51 As a result this case clarified which entities could be sued before the
Court in its original jurisdiction, and the subject matter of such suits.
4.4 Hummingbird Rice Mills v. Suriname and CARICOM
The Hummingbird case involved a challenge by the applicant to the unilateral
suspension of the CET by Suriname on wheat or meslin flour from the
Netherlands.52 The applicant also sued CARICOM for doing little to stop or correct
the suspension. In a manner similar to the case of Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL
Guyana Inc v. Guyana the Court held that the defendant state, Suriname, had
breached its obligations under Article 82 of the RTC by suspending the CET without
authorisation from CARICOM, and so declared.53 In relation to Hummingbird’s
allegations about the inadequacy of the actions taken by Community organs, the
Court held that the Secretary General did not authorise the suspensions, and COTED
had in fact refused them.54 However the question arose as to whether the relative
inaction of either organ amounted to dereliction of duty. The Court examined the
competences of the Secretary General under Article 24 but was pressed to find a duty
placed upon the Secretary General to do more than he had done, namely, “to keep
reminding Suriname of the decisions of the COTED requiring that Suriname impose
the CET on flour.”55 The CCJ therefore dismissed the allegation of unlawful conduct
in relation to the Secretary General.56 With respect to COTED, although the Court
49Johnson v. CARICAD [2009] CCJ 3 (OJ) (special leave), para [3].
50Johnson v. CARICAD [2009] CCJ 3 (OJ) (special leave), paras [14]–[15].
51Johnson v. CARICAD [2009] CCJ 3 (OJ) (special leave), para [19].
52Hummingbird Rice Mills v. Suriname and CARICOM [2011] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave), [2012]
CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), [2012] CCJ 2 (OJ) (costs).
53Hummingbird Rice Mills v. Suriname and CARICOM [2012] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), para [24].
54Hummingbird Rice Mills v. Suriname and CARICOM [2012] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), paras [27]–
[28].
55Hummingbird Rice Mills v. Suriname and CARICOM [2012] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), para [38].
56Hummingbird Rice Mills v. Suriname and CARICOM [2012] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), para [38].
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was sympathetic to the applicant’s views that COTED could have taken a more
robust approach to its institutional responsibilities (and indicated that four and a half
years was too long for a private actor to await the enjoyment of treaty rights), the
CCJ nevertheless was cautious in indicating what more COTED could have done.57
Curiously, the Court identifies the three-quarters majority voting requirement for
COTED’s decisions as being onerous,58 even though this decision-making proce-
dure represents a vast improvement over the unanimity procedures of the original
1973 CARICOM treaty.
The Court also was unable to find any kind of sanctioning authority on the part of
COTED, and indicated that such authority must be stated expressly in the RTC.59
This approach is perhaps overly formalistic and appears to be at odds with the
Court’s earlier jurisprudence. Likewise, the artificial distinction suggested by the
Court between the ability of Members to ask for permission from COTED to adopt
sanctions, and the ability of COTED to require Members to impose sanctions, is far
from persuasive.60 Such a distinction ignores the fact that COTED is itself made up
of Members who can vote with the relevant majorities to decide any matter falling
within the competence of COTED. Such decisions are binding once validly made,
and can be made even if slightly less than one quarter of the membership opposes
them. In other words, a minimum of 12 of the 15 Members on COTED could vote on
whether a particular Member (the 13th) was acting in compliance with the RTC in
relation to the CET. If the vote carries, those Members could then vote to establish a
regime authorising Members to take actions to correct the behaviour of the delin-
quent state.
This unwillingness of the Court to interpret the RTC robustly so as to allow
organs of CARICOM to effectively control the behaviour of Members is noteworthy
for two reasons. Firstly, these passages are remarkable because the CARICOM
Secretariat itself advocated a position of relative powerlessness. This is a far cry
from the ambitious posture usually assumed by the European Commission, for
example, in relation to competences. Secondly, the Court expressly limits
CARICOM organs even though such limitations were not strictly required for the
judgment. This could have a tremendously chilling effect in a legal system where the
Court’s judgments create stare decisis.61
57Hummingbird Rice Mills v. Suriname and CARICOM [2012] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), paras [46]–
[47].
58Hummingbird Rice Mills v. Suriname and CARICOM [2012] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), paras [47]–
[48].
59Hummingbird Rice Mills v. Suriname and CARICOM [2012] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), para [49].
60Hummingbird Rice Mills v. Suriname and CARICOM [2012] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), para [50].
61For more on stare decisis and the CCJ see Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2012] CCJ
3 (OJ) (intervention).
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4.5 Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission
The next case demonstrates the perhaps unanticipated side effect of Trinidad Cement
Limited’s aggressive litigation strategy—the increased attention paid to the company
by regional authorities, including CARICOM’s Competition Commission
(Commission).62
In its application Trinidad Cement Limited challenged the Commission’s deci-
sion to initiate an investigation under Article 175 of the RTC of anti-competitive
business conduct with respect to the TCL Group of Companies. Trinidad Cement
Limited “alleged that the Commission acted wrongly in initiating and conducting the
investigation in two main regards: (a) there had been no proper request for the
investigation; and (b) the Commission had failed to respect the rights of TCL as ‘an
interested party’within the meaning of Article 175 of the [RTC].”63 In its defence the
Commission argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction, inter alia, because the Com-
mission was excluded from being a respondent under the Johnson v CARICAD
rule—as not being an Organ or Body of the Community.64 It withdrew this submis-
sion but the Court nevertheless considered the status of the Commission under the
RTC and other instruments and determined that it had the capacity to be sued in the
Court’s original jurisdiction.65
In answer to the first question posed by the applicant the Court reviewed the
correspondence between, and decisions of, COTED, the Secretary General and the
Commission in relation to the request for an investigation.66 Although there may
have been irregularities, these had been remedied to the extent of making the request
valid.67 With respect to the applicant’s assertion that it fell within the category of
“interested parties” as described in Article 175, the Court reviewed the different
stages of a Commission investigation. The CCJ held that, at least at the preliminary
stage where the Commission is required to consult with interested parties to deter-
mine whether or not to commence an investigation, Trinidad Cement Limited would
not fall under that term.68 More broadly the Court held that “[i]n principle, therefore,
the Court finds that a party complained of does not fall within the expression ‘an
interested party’ as that expression is used in the Revised Treaty.”69
Such a conclusion should come as no surprise to readers familiar with investiga-
tions of competition authorities in other regions of the world. As the CCJ itself
62Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission [2012] CCJ 4 (OJ) (merits).
63Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission [2012] CCJ 4 (OJ) (merits), para [3].
64Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission [2012] CCJ 4 (OJ) (merits), para [10].
65Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission [2012] CCJ 4 (OJ) (merits), paras [11]–
[13].
66Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission [2012] CCJ 4 (OJ) (merits), paras [29]–
[37].
67Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission [2012] CCJ 4 (OJ) (merits), para [37].
68Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission [2012] CCJ 4 (OJ) (merits), para [25].
69Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission [2012] CCJ 4 (OJ) (merits), para [26].
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highlighted, there may be prudent reasons not to notify a potential target in order to
safeguard the effectiveness of the investigation.70
As a final point it should be mentioned that the Court spent some time at the end
of its judgment providing “observations” on the work of the Commission and its
Rules of Procedure.71 The Court criticised areas of the Rules of Procedure where
appropriate safeguards had not been provided or where the Rules deviated from the
authorising provisions of the RTC. The CCJ noted that it was “axiomatic that the
Rules must conform to the letter and spirit of the Revised Treaty and that this Court,
as guardian of the Treaty, is entitled to pronounce on the validity of any rule that is in
conflict with the Treaty.”72
Two things should be highlighted about this section of the judgment. First, it
reveals the willingness of the Court to engage in detailed analysis of issues not
central to the judgment (to engage in ‘obiter dicta’, to use a common law term). This
strategy may be explained by the Court’s desire to assist the Community during its
early stages of development. Secondly, the Court arrogates to itself the role of
“guardian” of the RTC. This may be contrasted with the EU system, where the
Commission exercises this role.
4.6 Shanique Myrie v Barbados
The next case, the first one successfully brought by a natural person—Ms Shanique
Myrie—did more to draw the attention of the people of the region to the Court’s
original jurisdiction than any of the previous cases.73 It provided the Court with the
opportunity to pronounce on a range of issues, clarify many areas of Community
law, and foreshadow potential future developments.
The facts are summarised by the Court in paragraph [2] of its judgment on the
merits as follows:
On 14 March 2011, the Claimant, Ms Shanique Myrie, then 22 years old, arrived at the
Grantley Adams International Airport (the “GAIA”) in Barbados. Far from being welcomed,
she was denied entry. According to her testimony she was never told why. She claims that in
the process she was subjected to insults based on her nationality and to an unlawful body
cavity search in demeaning and unsanitary conditions. Her luggage was also searched but
none of these searches revealed any contraband substances. Ultimately, Ms Myrie was not
allowed to enter Barbados and was instead detained overnight in a cell at the airport and
deported to Jamaica the next day.74
70Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission [2012] CCJ 4 (OJ) (merits), para [25].
71Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission [2012] CCJ 4 (OJ) (merits), paras [45]–
[48].
72Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission [2012] CCJ 4 (OJ) (merits), para [45].
For a similar statement about the Court’s role see Rudisa Beverages & Juices NV v Guyana [2014]
CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), para [27].
73Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2012] CCJ 3 (OJ) (intervention), [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits).
74Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), para [2].
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MsMyrie sued Barbados for violation of a range of rights, from international human
rights, to her right to free movement under Articles 45–46 of the RTC and a 2007
Decision of the Conference of Head of Government, to discrimination contrary to
Article 7 of the RTC, to violation of her MFN status under Article 8 of the RTC.75
The first judgment of the Court in the case dealt with Jamaica’s application to
intervene. Ms Myrie had been granted special leave to appear before the Court and
her state of nationality, Jamaica, had “expressly agreed that she should herself bring
her claim against Barbados in lieu of Jamaica espousing it on her behalf.”76
However, rather than seeking to be a party in the case, Jamaica applied to intervene.
The respondent state, Barbados, objected. The Court permitted the intervention and
invited other CARICOMMembers and the Community to participate in the matter as
third parties.77
A critical issue that was addressed in the Court’s intervention judgment—in
addition to providing guidance on the powers of, and restrictions attaching to,
intervenor78—was the applicability of the doctrine of stare decisis to judgments of
the Court in its original jurisdiction. The meaning of Article 221 of the RTC, which is
subtitled “Judgment of the Court to Constitute Stare Decisis”, had to be addressed
because Jamaica’s ability to intervene depended upon its being able to demonstrate
that it had a “substantial interest of a legal nature” which would be affected by the
case.79 If Article 221 created a true system of stare decisis, then Jamaica and all other
Members would be affected by a decision of the Court, since it would create a
binding precedent for all similar future cases.
The text of Article 221 provides that “[j]udgments of the Court shall constitute
legally binding precedents for parties in proceedings before the Court unless such
judgments have been revised in accordance with Article 219.” Such text could be
read literally so as to limit the binding force of decisions to the parties in the case
before the Court. However the CCJ held that Article 221 was not so restricted and
instead created a system of stare decisis.80 This makes the CCJ’s original jurisdiction
novel, if not unique, for international courts and tribunals.
In its judgment on the merits the Court substantially developed Community law
in a number of areas.81 In relation to decisions of organs of CARICOM, the Court
interpreted Article 240 of the RTC—the provision allowing for transformation of
regional decisions into national law before they become effective at the national
75See Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), paras [3]–[4].
76Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2012] CCJ 3 (OJ) (intervention), para [2].
77Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2012] CCJ 3 (OJ) (intervention), paras [35]–[36].
78Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2012] CCJ 3 (OJ) (intervention), paras [33]–[34].
79Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2012] CCJ 3 (OJ) (intervention), paras [8]–[9].
80Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2012] CCJ 3 (OJ) (intervention), para [20].
81Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits).
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level—so as not to affect the immediately binding nature of Community decisions at
the regional level.82 As summarised by the CCJ in its judgment:
[51] Although it is evident that a State with a dualist approach to international law sometimes
may need to incorporate decisions taken under a treaty and thus enact them into municipal
law in order to make them enforceable at the domestic level, it is inconceivable that such a
transformation would be necessary in order to create binding rights and obligations at the
Community level.
[52] Article 240 RTC is not concerned with the creation of rights and obligations at the
Community level. The Article speaks to giving effect to such rights and obligations in
domestic law. . .
[55] . . . in the absence of any indication to the contrary a valid decision of a Community
Organ or Body taken in fulfilment or furtherance of the RTC or to achieve the objectives of
the Community is immediately binding at the Community level.83
This point is critical to ensure the uniformity and effectiveness of Community law.
The binding force of a decision cannot be dependent upon subsequent transforma-
tion of that decision into the domestic legal systems of all Members.
The Court also reiterates the point made in Johnson v CARICAD that the Court’s
original jurisdiction is limited to issues of Community law. It therefore has no
jurisdiction to hear the applicant’s claims related to potential violations of interna-
tional human rights treaties.84 However the Court does reserve the right to apply
rules of international law, as expressly authorised by Article 217 of the RTC, and this
means that the Court “can and must take into account principles of international
human rights law when seeking to shape and develop relevant Community law.”85
In relation to the free movement rights asserted by the applicant, the Court closely
examined the 2007 Decision of the Conference, which provided:
THE CONFERENCE
AGREED that all CARICOM nationals should be entitled to an automatic stay of six
months upon arrival in order to enhance their sense that they belong to, and can move in
the Caribbean Community, subject to the rights of Member States to refuse undesirable
persons entry and to prevent persons from becoming a charge on public funds.
NOTED the reservation entered by Antigua and Barbuda in this regard.86
The Court held that although the text of the decision did not use operative words like
“decided” it nevertheless represented a binding decision.87 The “reservation” entered
82Article 240(1) of the RTC reads: “Decisions of competent Organs taken under this Treaty shall be
subject to the relevant constitutional procedures of the Member States before creating legally
binding rights and obligations for nationals of such States.”
83Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), paras [51]–[52] and [55].
84Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), para [10].
85Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), para [10].
86As reproduced in Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), at para [43] (emphasis
in the original).
87Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), para [45].
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by Antigua and Barbuda had not amounted to a veto and the subsequent practice of
Members of the Community demonstrated acceptance that a binding decision had
been made.88
In looking at the effect of the Conference decision, the Court placed it within the
context of other provisions of the RTC which allow free movement of persons, such
as Article 45 (goal of free movement) and Article 46 (right to seek employment by
CARICOM Skilled Nationals), and the articles related to the right of establishment
and provision of services, both as set out in Chapter 3 of the RTC.89 These provisions
allow free movement to defined groups of Community nationals. The Conference
decision, in contrast, extends a particular form of free movement to all Community
nationals.90
The Court held that the Conference decision gave “every Community national the
right to enter any Member State and stay there for up to six months. The right
conferred is expressed as an entitlement to ‘an automatic stay’ or ‘a definite entry’ of
six months upon arrival.”91 Such movement also must be hassle free.92 With respect
to the two restrictions to movement set out in the Conference decision—undesir-
ability or being a charge on public funds—the CCJ held that as exceptions to, or
restrictions upon, a right, arguments justifying actions taken on these grounds must
be interpreted narrowly and strictly, with the burden of proof resting firmly upon the
defendant state seeking to justify refusal of entry.93
In order for a state to justify refusal on grounds of undesirability, as a threat to
public morals, national security and safety, or national health, the Court held that a
state must be able to demonstrate that the Community “national presents a genuine,
present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of
society” and “actually pose[s] or can reasonably be expected to pose such a threat.”94
In addition the threat must be “genuine, present and sufficiently serious”, must be to
do something prohibited by law, and must be one for which nationals “are routinely
prosecuted or otherwise subjected to some legal sanction.”95 In applying this test, the
Court held that Barbados had not proved that Ms Myrie fell under this category of
being an undesirable person, and therefore she could not be refused entry on this
basis.96
In relation to the second potential ground for refusal, being a charge upon public
funds, the Court held that the relevant factors to consider would be the level of funds
possessed, or which could be made available, to the person seeking entry for their
88Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), para [47].
89Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), paras [58]–[61].
90Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), para [62].
91Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), para [62].
92Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), para [63].
93Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), paras [65] and [67].
94Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), para [70].
95Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), para [71].
96Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), paras [73]–[74].
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period of intended stay.97 The Court therefore rejected the necessity of showing
funds for the total period of stay guaranteed by the Conference decision
(6 months).98
The Court also set out the procedural guarantees which must be made available to
a CARICOM national seeking entry to another Community state. Such a national
(1) must be promptly provided with the reasons for his or her refusal in writing
(although there may be an exception if vital security interests are affected and
justifiable under Article 225 of the RTC), (2) and must have the right to consult an
attorney, consular official of his or her own country, or family member, and (3) must
be accorded the right to challenge the decision before both a higher-placed official
(at the airport) or before a judge.99 These procedural guarantees are far-reaching and
they dramatically change the way in which visitors must be treated by immigration
and customs officials when travelling in the CARICOM region. Importantly, they
also can be argued to set out a kind of model for treatment of Community nationals
when a state seeks to deny CARICOM rights—a model that could be transposed to
other areas of Community law (for example, to a refusal of the right of establishment,
or refusal of the right to provide services). In such cases it would be reasonable to
expect that a national official must justify a denial in writing, that the person whose
right has been denied will have the ability to contact a legal representative, and that
the denial must be challengeable immediately before a higher placed official and
ultimately before a court of law.
The Court did not uphold other aspects of Ms Myrie’s claim, including violations
of her rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the RTC, primarily as a result of lack of
proof of discrimination.100 In relation to her denial of entry, however, she was
awarded both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, the former in compensation
for financial losses and the latter as damages for the serious breaches of her right of
entry into Barbados without hassle and harassment.101 The Court expressly rejected
the availability of exemplary or punitive damages in Community law.102 This was
the first case in which the Court granted damages, a matter for which the Court
had been criticised in the past, and was notable for also allowing non-pecuniary
damages.
Before leaving theMyrie case it should also be noted that the Court foreshadowed
two possible future developments for Community law, without actually
implementing them in the case at hand. The first was a hint by the Court about the
possibility of supremacy of Community law. The Court held, at paragraph 69 of its
judgment, that
97Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), para [75].
98Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), para [76].
99Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), paras [77]–[83].
100Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), paras [88]–[92].
101Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), paras [94]–[100].
102Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), para [94].
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Implementation of the very idea and concept of a Community of States necessarily entails as
an exercise of sovereignty the creation of a new legal order and certain self-imposed, albeit
perhaps relatively modest, limits to particular areas of State sovereignty. Community law and
the limits it imposes on the Member States must take precedence over national legislation, in
any event at the Community level. It follows from the above that a refusal on the basis of
“undesirability”may be based on national law and on Community law, with the proviso that
where national law does not conform with the parameters laid down by Community law, it
will be the latter that ultimately must prevail.103
The above highlighted passage is particularly striking when juxtaposed against the
dualist legal systems of most CARICOM Members, which would require transfor-
mation of Community law in order to give it any force in domestic law. However,
this passage does not give rise to the kind of supremacy of Community law found in
the EU as a result of ECJ cases like Costa and Simmenthal, because of the wording
after the comma.104 Supremacy in CARICOM, at least for the present, is restricted to
the Community level; it does not apply at the national level.
The second development foreshadowed in theMyrie case is the availability of the
principle of indirect effect or conform interpretation. This is suggested in paragraph
80 of the judgment where the Court states:
A violation of Community law is not so much caused by the existence of domestic laws that
seemingly contradict it but by whether and how these laws are applied in practice. The Court
observes in this respect that the domestic courts of Barbados, including this Court in its
appellate jurisdiction, are constrained to interpret domestic laws so as, if possible, to render
them consistent with international treaties such as the RTC.105
Again, however, the Court does not go quite as far as the ECJ. Domestic law is to be
interpreted “if possible” so as to be consistent with the RTC.106
4.7 Maurice Tomlinson v Belize and Trinidad and Tobago
The idea of administrative implementation of legal obligations, raised by the phrase
“how these laws are applied in practice” in the quotation from theMyrie case above,
gave rise to challenges in the subsequent case of Maurice Tomlinson v Belize and
Trinidad and Tobago.107 In that case Mr Tomlinson identified what he argued were
103Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), para [69] (emphasis added).
104CJEU, Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 and CJEU, Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle
Finanze v Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629.
105Shanique Myrie v Barbados [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) (merits), para [80] (emphasis added but citations
omitted).
106Compare, for example, CJEU, Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfa-
len [1984] ECR 1891, para [26], or CJEU, Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Bernhard Pfeiffer
v. Deutsches Rotes Kreuz [2004] ECR I-8835.
107Maurice Tomlinson v Belize and Trinidad and Tobago [2014] CCJ 2 (OJ) (special leave) [2016]
CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits).
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clear inconsistencies between domestic statutes and Community law, inconsistencies
which created great legal uncertainty.
The Court ultimately held that the practices of Belize and Trinidad and Tobago
were compliant with the RTC and that in any event Tomlinson had not proved a
violation of his rights as a result of application of the laws on the part of either
state.108 However it could be argued that the Court should have gone further and
required states to amend or repeal laws which were in apparent conflict with the RTC
(rather than simply suggest that in principle such legislation should be
harmonised).109
4.8 Rudisa Beverages & Juices NV v Guyana
The Rudisa Beverages case was the first to involve a challenge to a charge of
equivalent effect to an import duty.110 The applicants alleged that an environmental
tax which was levied on all non-returnable beverage containers imported into
Guyana, including Community-origin goods, but which was not also applied to
Guyanese products, violated the RTC. The 1995 tax pre-dated the RTC, of which
Guyana is a party; Guyana transformed the RTC into its domestic law by means of a
Caribbean Community Act 2006.111
Guyana conceded that the tax was illegal so long as it was discriminatory, but
sought to excuse itself by indicating that the Government had tried to pass amending
legislation but had been thwarted in Parliament.112 The Court rejected this submis-
sion and noted that the pacta sunt servanda rule applies to the entire state, including
all of its organs. The Court also reminded Guyana that a state cannot invoke its
108Maurice Tomlinson v Belize and Trinidad and Tobago [2016] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), paras [30]–
[38] (Belize) and [39]–[55] (Trinidad).
109In Maurice Tomlinson v Belize and Trinidad and Tobago [2016] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), at para
[56] the CCJ explained:
[T]he Court wishes to state that it is not to be taken as condoning the indefinite retention on
the statute book of a national law which in appearance seems to conflict with obligations
under Community law. Member States should ensure that national laws, subsidiary legisla-
tion and administrative practices are transparent in their support of the free movement of all
CARICOM nationals. This is a necessary aspect of the rule of law, which, as the Court has
indicated, is the basic notion underlying the Caribbean Community. In principle, national
legislation should expressly be harmonized with Community law. Any permanent or
indefinite discord between administrative practices and the literal reading of legislation is
undesirable as the rule of law requires clarity and certainty especially for nationals of other
Member States who are to be guided by such legislation and practice. [Citations omitted].
110Rudisa Beverages & Juices NV v Guyana [2014] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits).
111Rudisa Beverages & Juices NV v Guyana [2014] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), para [7].
112Rudisa Beverages & Juices NV v Guyana [2014] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), para [17].
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internal laws for failing to comply with its treaty obligations.113 In addition the CCJ
reminded Guyana of the binding obligation which it had accepted when it ratified the
RTC, as expressed in Article 9.114
Interestingly, the Court suggested that Guyana could have disapplied the
offending section through the doctrine of implied repeal. The Caribbean Community
Act, as a later piece of Guyanese legislation, could have had that effect.115 This
suggestion could prove to be a useful tool for national courts if confronted with
similar challenges. However it can be argued to fall prey to the same level of
uncertainty raised in the Tomlinson case: a person would not know whether an
inconsistent law would be upheld, or be deemed to have been repealed, until the
matter was finally decided by a court of law.
In looking at the tax the Court noted that its “noble purpose” cannot excuse its
discriminatory impact. The CCJ held that it was a prohibited import duty under
Article 87(1).116 In its judgment the Court ordered Guyana “to adopt such legislative
or other measures necessary to ensure that goods of Community origin are not
subjected to the tax in question”,117 and ordered Guyana to refund the taxes wrongly
collected, with interest, to a total of over US $6 million.118 This amount represented
a significant sum for Guyana. Repayment was delayed and the amount ultimately
was subject to further negotiations between the parties.119 However, as with the
earlier Trinidad Cement case, Guyana eventually complied with the Court’s
judgment.
4.9 SM Jaleel & Co Ltd & Guyana Beverages Inc v Guyana
Perhaps because of such challenges, in its most recent original jurisdiction case, one
which involved a nearly identical factual matrix—SM Jaleel & Co Ltd & Guyana
Beverages Inc v Guyana—the CCJ produced a slightly different result.120 The
applicant companies in this case had been subject to the same illegal environmental
113Rudisa Beverages & Juices NV v Guyana [2014] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), paras [17]–[18].
114Rudisa Beverages & Juices NV v Guyana [2014] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), paras [19]–[20].
115Rudisa Beverages & Juices NV v Guyana [2014] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), para [20].
116Rudisa Beverages & Juices NV v Guyana [2014] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), para [22]. Note that the
definition of “import duties” is defined in Article 1 of the RTC as including “any other charges of
equivalent effect”.
117Rudisa Beverages & Juices NV v Guyana [2014] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), para [27].
118Rudisa Beverages & Juices NV v Guyana [2014] CCJ 1 (OJ) (merits), para [39].
119Guyana’s difficulties in paying the total of US $7.72 million in reimbursement and interest
ordered by the Court led to negotiations between the parties and an eventual mutually-agreed
settlement for US $6.22 million. See e.g., ‘Gov’t still paying off balance on RUDISA settlement’,
Stabroek News, February 18, 2016, available at http://www.stabroeknews.com/2016/news/stories/
02/18/govt-still-paying-off-balance-rudisa-settlement/ (24 June 2018).
120SM Jaleel & Co Ltd & Guyana Beverages Inc v Guyana [2017] CCJ 2 (OJ) (merits).
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tax and sought reimbursement of the amounts paid.121 Guyana, however, offered a
more robust two-pronged defence. Firstly, it claimed that the companies should not
be reimbursed the taxes wrongly paid because they would have passed them off to
their consumers in their pricing; secondly, the companies should not be entitled to a
full reimbursement because they had failed to challenge the tax at the earliest
opportunity (the “laches” defence).122 After analysing the law related to unjust
enrichment, including the jurisprudence of the ECJ, the CCJ rejected the first
defence.123 Guyana itself had been unjustly enriched.124
With respect to the laches defence, Guyana was more successful. The CCJ
discussed the international legal rules related to prescription, due diligence in
asserting rights, and limitation periods.125 Taking into account practices in
CARICOM Members, the Court determined that a reasonable period to allow a
claimant to commence proceedings before the CCJ in its original jurisdiction would
be a period of five (5) years:
Leaving aside the position in Suriname which is a clear outlier in this regard, the Court finds
that a period of five years is neither too long nor unduly short for a claimant to commence
proceedings. The Court considers that this time limit will protect states from being vexed by
claims relating to long-past incidents about which their records may no longer be in
existence and as to which their witnesses may well have no accurate recollection. It will
above all encourage claimants to bestir themselves and file suit in a timely fashion. This
5-year period permits adequate access to justice and is consistent with both international and
regional standards. It will run from the time that the claimant knew or at the very least
reasonably should have known that the defendant State was in breach of the treaty.126
Applying this limitation to the case, the CCJ determined that the applicants could
claim reimbursement of taxes paid during the period from 5 years preceding the date
upon which they brought their action to the date of their last payment (just before
bringing the action), plus interest.127
This is an unusual position—perhaps unique for an international tribunal to take
in relation to claims brought before it, in the absence of restrictions in its constituent
treaty. It could be criticised as unjustly enriching the state which imposed the illegal
121SM Jaleel & Co Ltd & Guyana Beverages Inc v Guyana [2017] CCJ 2 (OJ) (merits), paras [1]–
[5].
122SM Jaleel & Co Ltd & Guyana Beverages Inc v Guyana [2017] CCJ 2 (OJ) (merits), para [5].
123SM Jaleel & Co Ltd & Guyana Beverages Inc v Guyana [2017] CCJ 2 (OJ) (merits), paras [14]–
[37].
124Cf SM Jaleel & Co Ltd & Guyana Beverages Inc v Guyana [2017] CCJ 2 (OJ) (merits), paras
[38]–[39].
125SM Jaleel & Co Ltd & Guyana Beverages Inc v Guyana [2017] CCJ 2 (OJ) (merits), paras [40]–
[55].
126SM Jaleel & Co Ltd & Guyana Beverages Inc v Guyana [2017] CCJ 2 (OJ) (merits), para [56].
127SM Jaleel & Co Ltd & Guyana Beverages Inc v Guyana [2017] CCJ 2 (OJ) (merits), para [58].
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tax. It could also be criticised on grounds of retroactively, and it is interesting that the
Court did not choose to make its ruling prospective.128
4.10 Cabral Douglas v Dominica
The final case involved a claim by a natural person regarding an attempt to exercise
the right of free movement of services under the RTC.129 Interestingly, the case never
made it to the merits stage, since special leave was denied by the Court. Leave was
denied even though the arguments canvassed appear to have gone beyond the
“arguable case” threshold previously applied by the Court for special leave. This
was unfortunate for the applicant, who no doubt would have benefited from the
expanded argument allowed at the merits phase. It suggests a possible raising of the
threshold for applications by persons by the CCJ.
The applicant, Cabral Douglas, challenged the refusal of Dominica to allow a
Jamaican entertainer known as “Tommy Lee Sparta” to enter the country to perform
at a concert he had organised. The Court assessed his claim but rejected it on the
basis that he was not able to demonstrate a right enuring directly to himself, as
required under Article 222(a) of the RTC.130 The Court held that the applicant could
not demonstrate a right arising under either Article 36 or 37 of the RTC. The former
prohibited new restrictions, and the latter required removal of restrictions, on the
provision of services. The Court noted that Article 36 requires cross-border provi-
sion of services, in a similar manner to the four modes set out in the regime of the
GATS, but that the applicant in the case had been merely a middleman, a local
service supplier, and not a cross-border provider of entertainment services.131 The
CCJ also rejected the applicant’s argument about having a correlative right to receive
services since his position could not be assimilated to that of a patron, and in any
event such a right was contingent upon the lawful entry of the performer into the
state.132
128For an example of prospective application of a decision by the ECJ, one which would have had
far-reaching economic consequences, see e.g., CJEU, Case 43/75 Defrenne v SABENA [1976] ECR
455.
129Cabral Douglas v Dominica [2017] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave).
130Cabral Douglas v Dominica [2017] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave), para [35].
131Cabral Douglas v Dominica [2017] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave), paras [20]–[22]. In this regard,
however, it should be noted that the Court analysis of Article 36(4)(b) of the RTC could be argued as
being too restrictive. This provision protects the supply of services “(b) in the territory of one
Member State to the service consumer of another Member State.” Given that the applicant was
organising (in the Court’s own words in ibid para [1]), “an international concert to mark the opening
of the annual carnival in Portsmouth,” it would appear likely that some of the concert goers would
have been from other CARICOM Members.
132Cabral Douglas v Dominica [2017] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave), para [28].
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5 Conclusions and Comparisons with the EU
As a way of rounding off the above analysis of the jurisprudence of the CCJ it might
be useful to focus more clearly on some of the similarities and differences between
its jurisprudence and that of the ECJ.
The first, most striking difference is (for the present) the limitation of the
enforceability of Community law to the regional level, via the CCJ’s original
jurisdiction. This limitation is supported by the CARICOM’s vision of the CCJ as
the exclusive interpreter and applier of the RTC, but is challenged by the existence of
the Court’s own referral jurisdiction under Article 214 (which parallels the ECJ’s
preliminary rulings procedure).133 Further, although some of the essential founda-
tions of the EU’s doctrine of direct effect already may be found in the CCJ’s
jurisprudence (e.g., the creation of a new legal order and correlative rights accruing
to persons),134 some doubts appear justified in the Caribbean context. This context
includes a CARICOM made up primarily of Commonwealth Caribbean states and
territories, which are wedded to their sovereignty, and which demonstrate a firm
commitment to the dualist conception of the relation between international and
domestic law. It also includes a difference in jurisdictions of the two regional
tribunals, with the CCJ having jurisdiction over claims brought by persons for
breaches of the RTC and Community law.
A second difference between the Caribbean and EU, directly related to the first, is
the limitation on the scope of state liability in the Caribbean. As seen above, the
CCJ’s notion of state liability is one restricted to liability at the regional level—to
claims in the original jurisdiction. State liability, at least for now, does not exist at the
national level in the same way as in the EU.
Thirdly, although one could argue that the foundations have been laid for two
developments, namely, supremacy of Community law and indirect effect/conform
interpretation, at least for now the relevant passages in the CCJ’s jurisprudence can
be argued to represent foreshadowing rather than implementation.
These differences will ensure that the study of Caribbean integration law remains
fascinating for some time to come. The CCJ has demonstrated an ability carve its
own unique path in developing regional economic integration, one that carefully
balances the need to enforce the RTC in a manner than ensures uniformity of
Community law, on the one hand, and the need to respect the sovereignty of
Members and their common law legal systems, on the other. The CCJ has been
remarkably successful, in a short period of time, and has shown itself adept at using a
range of regional and international legal material, from decisions of the ECJ, to the
law of treaties, to general public international law.
It would be remiss, however, to conclude without acknowledging what may
appear to be a slight change in direction in the final two original jurisdiction cases
mentioned above. The SM Jaleel and Douglas cases could be argued to reveal a
133See RTC Article 211 (compulsory and exclusive) and Agreement Article XII (exclusive).
134See Trinidad Cement Ltd and TCL Guyana Inc v Guyana [2009] CCJ 1 (OJ) (special leave).
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slight cooling off, or slowing down, in the development of regional integration law
by the Court. The imposition of a retroactive limitation on the scope of claims in SM
Jaleel and the refusal of special leave in Douglas (despite what appears to be an
arguable case), could be argued to be a sign that the Court is taking a pause in what
has otherwise been a very rapid development of Community law.
This may indeed be the case. However it is hoped that the use of mechanisms such
as pauses and foreshadowing (rather than concrete implementation), do not represent
a change in direction. The CCJ, in a manner similar to other regional courts and
tribunals, may simply be giving Members the chance to catch up and make the
changes that will be necessary to ensure the effective functioning of Community law.
It is hoped that the CCJ quickly regains its momentum and moves to promote ever
deeper integration in the CARICOM region.
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1 Negotiations, Ratifications, Terminations
In 2016, 37 new international investment agreements (IIAs) were concluded, com-
prising 30 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 7 treaties with investment pro-
visions (TIPs).1 This brought the total number of IIAs to 3324 by the end of 2016.2
Among the IIAs concluded in 2016, two were megaregionals: the EU-Canada
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the Trans-Pacific
Due to space limitations, a discussion of substantive protection standards in new investment treaties
and outcomes in investment arbitration are outside the scope of the present chapter.
1UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2017, UN, p. 111.
2UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2017, UN, p. 111. UNCTAD has replaced the term ‘other
international investment agreements’ with ‘treaties with investment provisions’. This is more
appropriate given that UNCTAD’s database contains not only BITs and agreements with invest-
ment chapters, but also agreements that may make only passing mention of investments, and which
therefore could not be considered, properly speaking, to be ‘international investment agreements’.
However, for the sake of simplicity, the term ‘international investment agreements’ is used.
C. Titi (*)
French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS)–CERSA, University Paris II Panthéon-
Assas, Paris, France
e-mail: cathy_titi@hotmail.com
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018
M. Bungenberg et al. (eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2018,
European Yearbook of International Economic Law (2019) 9: 383–404,
https://doi.org/10.1007/8165_2018_13, Published online: 6 November 2018
383
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
Partnership (TPP). Negotiations of other megaregionals, such as the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), continue to be underway.3 Between
January and June 2017, ten additional IIAs were signed. Of these, five were BITs.4
At the regional level, 2017 saw the conclusion of the intra-MERCOSUR (Mercado
Común Sudamericano) Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement, opera-
tional within the framework of the Treaty of Asunción,5 and signed on 4 April 2017.6
The intra-MERCOSUR Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Protocol was
negotiated on the basis of the Brazilian model cooperation and facilitation invest-
ment agreement (CFIA) finalised in 2015. Brazil concluded its first CFIA on
30 March 2015 with Mozambique. Between April and November 2015, five more
CFIAs came into being, respectively with Angola, Mexico, Malawi, Colombia, and
Chile. In 2016 and 2017, Brazil continued negotiations on the basis of its model
CFIA. Besides the intra-MERCOSUR Cooperation and Facilitation Investment
Agreement, the Brazilian CFIA served as model for the Economic and Trade
Expansion Agreement (ETEA) signed between Brazil and Peru on 29 April 2016.
Negotiations are also said to be concluded with India and Jordan.7
Until very recently, Brazil had been known for its reluctance to embrace invest-
ment protection obligations through international investment treaties. Although it
signed a number of BITs in the 1990s, these treaties were never ratified. The model
CFIA aimed to remove traditional barriers to the congressional ratification of BITs,
notably through an exclusion of ISDS and a limitation of the expropriation standard
to direct expropriation.8 This has created an expectation that the CFIAs should be
ratified. Although at the time of writing such ratification is pending, it is worth noting
Presidential Decree No. 8863 of 28 September 2016, which formally established the
national focal points or ombudsman for foreign investments provided for in Brazil-
ian CFIAs.9 It seems further that Brazil’s CFIAs with Mexico and Peru have become
the first Brazilian IIAs to be approved by the Brazilian Congress.10
While Brazil is re-evaluating its traditional absence from the international invest-
ment law scene, in 2016 and 2017, some states continued to question their
3Megaregionals are discussed in Sect. 2 below.
4See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/ (last accessed 19 June 2018).
5Article 26(1) of the MERCOSUR Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Protocol.
6See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (last accessed 19 June 2018).
7Martins J, Brazil’s Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreements (CFIA) and Recent
Developments, Investment Treaty News, 12 June 2017, https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/06/12/
brazils-cooperation-facilitation-investment-agreements-cfia-recent-developments-jose-henrique-
vieira-martins/ (last accessed 19 June 2018).
8Titi (2016) and passim.
9The Decree is available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivi_03/_ato2015-2018/2016/decreto/
D8863.htm (last accessed 19 June 2018).
10Martins J, Brazil’s Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreements (CFIA) and Recent
Developments, Investment Treaty News, 12 June 2017, https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/06/12/
brazils-cooperation-facilitation-investment-agreements-cfia-recent-developments-jose-henrique-
vieira-martins/ (last accessed 19 June 2018).
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engagement with the system. In 2016, at least 18 IIAs were terminated. Thirteen of
these were unilaterally terminated, one was terminated by consent, and four were
replaced by a new treaty. Between January and September 2017, at least 30 IIAs
were terminated.11 Twenty-eight of these were unilaterally terminated and two were
replaced by a new treaty. Between 2016 and September 2017, all known termina-
tions but three concerned BITs. None of the terminated BITs was replaced by a new
treaty. The two most active countries in terminating IIAs were Ecuador (16 termina-
tions), India (15 terminations) and Indonesia (12 terminations). Between them, the
three countries unilaterally terminated 41 BITs, thus clearly raising doubts as to their
engagement with the system.
Ecuador’s case is probably the most striking. On 16 May 2017, Ecuadorian
President Rafael Correa put an end to 16 Ecuadorian BITs concluded with Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Peru,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezu-
ela.12 Ecuador had previously terminated ten BITs; nine BITs in 2008 (with Cuba,
the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay,
Romania and Uruguay) and one BIT in 2010 (with Finland).13 With the 2017 BIT
terminations, Ecuador has put an end to all its BITs. With the exception of Ecuador’s
BITs with the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Uruguay, all other BITs are still
in force due to survival clauses.14 Ecuador’s most recent BIT denunciations follow a
period of heightened questioning of the international system of investment pro-
tections: in 2009, Ecuador became the second out of three states to denounce the
ICSID Convention15; a 2008 constitutional reform introduced, inter alia, a provision
in the Ecuadorean Constitution, according to which ‘[t]reaties or international
instruments where the Ecuadorian State yields its sovereign jurisdiction to interna-
tional arbitration entities in disputes involving contracts or trade between the State
and natural persons or legal entities cannot be entered into’16; subsequent
11The information provided in this paragraph is based on UNCTAD’s IIA Navigator, with the
exception of 16 terminations of Ecuadorean BITs, which, at the time of writing, are not yet reflected
in the IIA Navigator http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (last accessed 10 July 2018).
12Ecuador, Presidential Decrees Nos 1399-1414 of 16 May 2017. On this Muñoz (2017); See
further Ecuador denounces its remaining 16 BITs and publishes CAITISA audit report, Investment
Treaty News, 12 June 2017, https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/06/12/ecuador-denounces-its-
remaining-16-bits-and-publishes-caitisa-audit-report/ (last accessed 19 June 2018).
13See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (last accessed 10 July 2018).
14Ecuador denounces its remaining 16 BITs and publishes CAITISA audit report, Investment Treaty
News, 12 June 2017, https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/06/12/ecuador-denounces-its-remaining-16-
bits-and-publishes-caitisa-audit-report/ (last accessed 19 June 2018).
15See ICSID, List of Contracting States and other Signatories of the Convention (as of April
12, 2016), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/List%20of%
20Contracting%20States%20and%20Other%20Signatories%20of%20the%20Convention%20-%
20Latest.pdf (last accessed 19 June 2018).
16Article 422 of Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution. The text of the Constitution is available at http://
pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador08.html (last accessed 19 June 2018), an
English translation is available at: http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.
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jurisprudence of Ecuador’s Constitutional Court held that a number of arbitration
clauses in Ecuadorian BITs were unconstitutional.17 Significantly, the above con-
stitutional provision does not object to ‘regional arbitration entities’ and Ecuador has
been the main driver behind ongoing negotiations in the context of the Union of
South American Nations (UNASUR) on the creation of a regional dispute settlement
centre for investment disputes.18
Ecuador’s 2017 BIT denunciations follow the recommendation of the report of
the Ecuadorian Commission for a Comprehensive Audit of Investment Protection
Treaties and of the International Investment Arbitration System (Comisión para la
Auditoría Integral Ciudadana de los Tratados de Protección Recíproca de
Inversiones y del Sistema de Arbitraje Internacional en Materia de Inversiones—
CAITISA).19 CAITISA’s report was published in May 2017.20 CAITISA was
constituted in 2013 to ‘audit’ Ecuador’s BITs; its members included some prominent
investment law personalities, such as Argentina’s former Attorney General, Osvaldo
Guglielmino, and known sceptics, such as Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah.21
India came second in the number of recent BIT denunciations. The country is said
to have sent notices of termination to 58 countries in order to put an end to respective
BITs. It is uncertain at this stage whether the purpose of these terminations is to
renegotiate new investment instruments on the basis of India’s new model BIT of
2015.22 In the case of 25 BITs that cannot as yet be unilaterally terminated, India has
proposed a Joint Interpretative Statement23 intended to amend investment provisions
html (last accessed 19 June 2018); On the revision of Ecuador’s Constitution, see Nowrot K,
International Investment Law and the Republic of Ecuador: From Arbitral Bilateralism to Judicial
Regionalism, Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht 96, 2010. See further Titi (2014);
Fach Gómez (2011), pp. 447–483; For an account of more recent developments in Ecuador, see
Muñoz (2017).
17Titi (2014). For a detailed account, Muñoz (2017).
18For recent developments in this respect, see Fach Gómez and Titi (2016b), pp. 511–514; Fach
Gómez K and Titi C, El centro de solución de controversias en materia de inversiones de Unasur,
Investment Treaty News 7 (3), August 2016a.
19See in general http://www.caitisa.org (last accessed 19 June 2018).
20CAITISA, Auditoría integral ciudadanade los tratados de protección recíproca de inversionesy del
sistema de arbitraje en materiade inversiones en Ecuador, informe ejecutivo, May 2017, http://
caitisa.org/index.php/home/enlaces-de-interes (last accessed 19 June 2018); For a discussion, see
this Muñoz (2017).
21The list of CAITISA’s members is available at http://caitisa.org/index.php/home/2015-06-29-09-
48-53 (last accessed 19 June 2018).
22See Freehills HS, Mixed Messages to Investors as India Quietly Terminates Bilateral Investment
Treaties with 58 Countries, Arbitration Note, 16 March 2017, http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2017/
03/16/mixed-messages-to-investors-as-india-quietly-terminates-bilateral-investment-treaties-with-
58-countries/ (last accessed 19 June 2018).





in order to bring them in line with its 2015 Model BIT.24 Indonesia is the third
country in the number of recent BIT denunciations, although it participates in the
RCEP negotiations and it is put about that it may be developing a model BIT. In
2016, Indonesia was reported to be preparing a Draft Government Regulation on the
settlement of investment disputes purportedly aimed to ‘enhance legal certainty in
terms of ease of doing business and investment in Indonesia’.25
Lastly, it is worth noting two further revisions of, respectively, an investment
treaty and a model investment treaty. In 2016, the South African Development
Community (SADC) revised Annex 1 of the SADC Finance and Investment Proto-
col. Amendments comprise, inter alia, the introduction of an article on the right to
regulate,26 provisions on ‘regional cooperation on investment’ and on investment
promotion agencies,27 and removal of ISDS28; under the new rules state-state pro-
cedures only are available before the SADC Tribunal.29 In 2016, Russia issued a
Regulation on Entering into International Treaties on the Encouragement and
Mutual Protection of Investments, which replaced the Russian Model BIT and
established new guidelines for the negotiations of investment agreements.30 It is of
interest to note that the Regulation appears to exclude application of the UNCITRAL
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration.
2 Megaregionals
Negotiations on CETA were formally concluded in 2014 but the agreement changed
substantially after ‘legal scrubbing’. On 29 February 2016, the new text of CETA
was released. In the meantime, the European Union had presented its proposal for an
international investment court in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP). As far as it was publicly known, CETA had until that stage provided for
24Joint Interpretative Statement, 8 February 2016, http://indiainbusiness.nic.in/newdesign/upload/
Consolidated_Interpretive-Statement.pdf (last accessed 19 June 2018).
25Indonesia, Ministry of Finance, Government Currently Preparing Draft of Government Regula-
tion on Settlement of Investment Dispute, 21 June 2016.
26Article 12 of Annex 1 of the Agreement amending Annex 1 of the SADC Finance and Investment
Protocol.
27Articles 20 and 21 of Annex 1 of the Agreement amending Annex 1 of the SADC Finance and
Investment Protocol.
28Article 26 of Annex 1 of the Agreement amending Annex 1 of the SADC Finance and Investment
Protocol.
29Article 26 of Annex 1 of the Agreement amending Annex 1 of the SADC Finance and Investment
Protocol. See further Peterson LE, Investigation: in aftermath of investor arbitration against
Lesotho, SADC member-states amend investment treaty so as to remove ISDS and limit pro-
tections, Investment Arbitration Reporter, 20 February 2017.
30Klimov Y and Panov A, Russia’s new guidelines on future bilateral investment treaties, Norton
Rose Fulbright International arbitration report, 2017, Issue 8, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/
files/international-arbitration-review-issue-8-148807.pdf, pp. 30–31 (last accessed 19 June 2018).
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traditional ISDS, i.e. investment arbitration, but in the text unveiled in February
2016, the ISDS mechanism had been redefined and provisions on an international
investment court formed now part of the agreement. The European Union’s inter-
national investment court is discussed below in Sect. 3. In October 2016, Canada, the
European Union and its member states issued a Joint Interpretative Instrument to
accompany CETA relating among others to the right to regulate and investment
protection.31
One of the thorny issues between the European Union and its member states was
the question of whether EU investment agreements are to be concluded as pure EU
agreements without member state participation or whether such agreements rely on a
shared competence, and therefore need to be jointly concluded by both the EU and
the member states (‘mixed’ agreements). To allow for a swift signature, the Com-
mission decided to propose CETA as a mixed agreement.32 According to EU Trade
Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, ‘[f]rom a strict legal standpoint, the Commission
considers this agreement to fall under exclusive EU competence. However, the
political situation in the Council is clear, and [the European Commission under-
stands] the need for proposing it as a ‘mixed’ agreement, in order to allow for a
speedy signature’.33 After initial opposition from the Walloon regional govern-
ment,34 CETA was eventually signed on 30 October 2016 and part of it came into
provisional application on 21 September 2017. The investment chapter and the
investment court system are outside the scope of the treaty’s provisional applica-
tion.35 The road to CETA’s ratification may know yet further hurdles. At the time of
writing, the CJEU is seised of the question of whether CETA’s investment dispute
settlement mechanism is compatible with EU law. This is discussed below in Sect. 3.
The issue of EU competence, exclusive or shared, to conclude international
investment agreements was discussed more thoroughly in 2016 and 2017 in relation
to the European Union-Singapore free trade agreement (FTA), although negotiations
on its investment chapter were concluded in October 2014.36 In June 2015, the
Commission informed the Trade Policy Committee that the agreement had been
31Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)
between Canada and the European Union and its Member States, 27 October 2016, http://data.
consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13541-2016-INIT/en/pdf (last accessed 19 June 2018).
32European Commission, Press release, European Commission proposes signature and conclusion
of EU-Canada trade deal, 5 July 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2371_en.htm (last
accessed 19 June 2018).
33European Commission, Press release, European Commission proposes signature and conclusion
of EU-Canada trade deal, 5 July 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2371_en.htm (last
accessed 19 June 2018).
34Bartunek RJ and Blenkinsop P, Belgium Breaks Deadlock over EU-Canada Trade Pact, Reuters,
27 October 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-canada-trade-idUSKCN12R0XQ (last accessed
19 June 2018).
35European Commission, CETA explained, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-
explained/ (last accessed 19 June 2018).
36CJEU, Opinion 2/15 of the Court, 16 May 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:376, para. 8.
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initialled.37 Consequently, the Commission sought an Opinion from the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) under Article 218(11) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) concerning the apportioning of compe-
tences between the Union and its Member States.38 The Commission contended that
the European Union had exclusive competence to sign and conclude the
EU-Singapore FTA.39 In her Opinion issued on 21 December 2016, Advocate
General Sharpston considered that the EU-Singapore FTA could only be concluded
jointly by the EU and the Member States, i.e. as a mixed agreement.40 The CJEU
issued its Opinion 2/15 on 16 May 2017. According to this, the EU-Singapore FTA
falls in its greater part within the exclusive competence of the European Union,
except for the following provisions which fall within the shared competence of the
EU and its Member States: (a) the provisions on investment protection insomuch as
they relate to forms of non-direct investment, such as portfolio investment; (b) the
provisions on investor-state dispute settlement; and the provisions of Chapters
1 (Objectives and General Definitions), 14 (Transparency), 15 (Dispute Settlement
between the Parties), 16 (Mediation Mechanism) and 17 (Institutional, General and
Final Provisions) insomuch as these provisions relate to the agreement’s investment
chapter (Chapter 9) and to the extent that the latter relate to issues of a competence
shared between the EU and the Member States.41 In other words, following Opinion
2/15, the European Union’s competence with respect to investment protection has
been defined as ‘partly exclusive and partly shared’.42 Following Opinion 2/15, the
European Commission appears to be considering splitting its FTAs from interna-
tional investment agreements, in a reversal of the proclaimed trend towards more
preferential trade and investment agreements, so that it can conclude FTAs on the
basis of its exclusive competence and investment treaties on the basis of its newly-
defined mixed competence.43
37CJEU, Opinion 2/15 of the Court, 16 May 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:376, para. 9.
38Court of Justice of the European Union, Press release No. 147/16, Advocate General Sharpston
considers that the Singapore Free Trade Agreement can only be concluded by the European Union
and the Member States acting jointly, 21 December 2016, https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/
application/pdf/2016-12/cp160147en.pdf (last accessed 19 June 2018).
39CJEU, Opinion 2/15 of the Court, 16 May 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:3.
40CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Opinion procedure 2/15, 21 December 2016,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:992.
41CJEU, Opinion 2/15 of the Court, 16 May 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:376, para. 305.
42European Commission, Recommendation for a Council decision authorising the opening of
negotiations for a Convention establishing a multilateral court for the settlement of investment
disputes, COM(2017) 493 final, 13 September 2017, p. 4.
43von der Burchard H, Juncker proposes fast-tracking EU trade deals, Politico, 31 August 2017,
Updated 4 September 2017, http://www.politico.eu/article/juncker-proposes-fast-tracking-eu-trade-
deals/ (last accessed 19 June 2018). See further European Commission, Proposed new architecture
for splitting EU FTAs and EU investment agreements, http://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1.wpengine.
netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/COM-proposal-splitting-trade-deals.pdf (last
accessed 19 June 2018).
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It is worth noting that the European Commission is holding discussions with
Singapore in order to align the ‘investment protection provisions in the draft
agreement’ with the EU’s new approach.44 This statement should be understood to
refer among others to the introduction of the EU’s international investment court.
EU-Japan negotiations are also afoot. On 6 July 2017, the European Union and
Japan reached ‘an agreement in principle on the main elements of an Economic
Partnership Agreement’.45 However, negotiations on the treaty’s investment chapter
are ongoing and the EU has ‘put its reformed Investment Court System on the table’
as well as its ‘work towards the setting up of a Multilateral Investment Court’.46
In parallel, the future of a number of investment treaties, especially
megaregionals, engaging the United States has become uncertain under the Trump
administration. Despite an EU-US joint report published on 17 January 2017,47
TTIP negotiations are on hold and no formal engagement has taken place with the
new US administration.48
Beyond the European Union, the signing of TPP on 4 February 2016 by 12 states,
including all three parties to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
was soon eclipsed in the US by the state’s withdrawal from the agreement. On
23 January 2017, soon after US President Trump assumed office, a Presidential
Memorandum was issued ‘Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement’.49 Consequently, and
according to the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), a letter was issued
‘to signatories of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement that the United States has
formally withdrawn from the agreement per guidance from the President of the
United States. The letter emphasizes the commitment of the United States to free and
fair trade, and encourages future discussions on “measures designed to promote
more efficient markets and higher levels of economic growth.”’50 The text of the
TPP agreement is made available on the website of the USTR ‘for reference
44See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf (last accessed
19 June 2018).
45See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf (last accessed
19 June 2018).
46See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf (last accessed
19 June 2018).
47European Commission and Executive Office of the President of the United States, US-EU Joint
Report on TTIP Progress to Date, 17 January 2017, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/
january/tradoc_155242.pdf (last accessed 19 June 2018).
48European Commission, Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership Advisory Group, Meeting
report, 9 March 2017, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/april/tradoc_155484.pdf, p. 2 (last
accessed 19 June 2018).
49Trump DJ, Memorandum for the United States Trade Representative, Withdrawal of the United
States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, 23 January 2017.
50See https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership (last
accessed 19 June 2018).
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purposes’ only.51 Following US withdrawal from the agreement, the 11 remaining
TPP states are moving forward with TPP, and their representatives have agreed that
should the US decide to rejoin the agreement they shall help it do so.52
At the same time, on 2 February 2017, US President Trump announced the United
States’ intention to renegotiate NAFTA.53 In a letter dated 18 May 2017, United
States Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer notified the US Congress that the
President intends to open negotiations with Canada and Mexico to modernise
NAFTA. Accordingly, NAFTA should:
include new provisions to address intellectual property rights, regulatory practices, state-
owned enterprises, services, customs procedures, sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
labor, environment, and small and medium enterprises. Moreover, establishing effective
implementation and aggressive enforcement of the commitments made by [US] trading
partners under [US] trade agreements is vital to the success of those agreements and should
be improved in the context of NAFTA.54
Outside Europe and North America, negotiations have continued on RCEP. Nego-
tiations on RCEP were initially launched in 2012. RCEP is a prospective agreement
among the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
i.e. Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Sin-
gapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, and Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and
New Zealand. It involves a number of negotiating parties that are also parties to TPP.
The 19th meeting of the RCEP Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) was held in
July 2017 in Hyderabad, India and the next RCEP TNC at the time of writing will be
held from 17 to 28 October 2017 in Songdo, Incheon, Korea.55 During the 5th RCEP
Ministerial Meeting, held on 10 September 2017 in Pasay City, in the Philippines,
RCEPMinisters agreed to ‘make utmost effort to achieve significant outcomes of the
RCEP by end of 2017 to bring negotiation closer to its successful conclusion’.56
51See https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership (last
accessed 19 June 2018).
52BBC News, TPP trade deal will continue without Trump, 21 May 2017, http://www.bbc.com/
news/39990686 (last accessed 19 June 2018).
53See https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/may/ustr-trump-
administration-announces (last accessed 19 June 2018).
54The letter is available at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/NAFTA%20Noti
fication.pdf (last accessed 19 June 2018); See also USTR: Trump Administration Announces Intent
to Renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement, May 2017, https://ustr.gov/about-us/
policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/may/ustr-trump-administration-announces (last
accessed 19 June 2018).
55Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Nineteenth Round of Negotiations—18 to
28 July 2017, Hyderabad, India, 3 August 2017.
56Joint Media Statement, The Fifth Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)
Ministerial Meeting, 10 September 2017, Pasay City, Philippines.
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3 The Establishment of an International Investment Court
and Multilateral Reform of ISDS
In 2016 and 2017, the European Union intensified its endeavours to create an
investment court system (ICS), first bilateral, then multilateral.57 The investment
court proposal was first unveiled on 16 September 2015, when the European
Commission revealed an informal negotiating text for TTIP between the EU and
the United States on the creation of a permanent investment court; the court’s
vocation would be to replace the current system of investor-state dispute settle-
ment.58 The Commission’s text served as the blueprint for the official proposal
which was endorsed by the EU and became public on 12 November 2015.59 On
2 December 2015, the European Commission announced that negotiations on an
EU-Vietnam FTA were completed and that the new agreement contains a permanent
dispute resolution mechanism with an appellate body.60 In February 2016, the new
text of CETA was released, amending the earlier text’s dispute settlement mecha-
nism to include the EU’s international investment court. A particularity of CETA is
that the agreement commits both the EU and Canada to pursue negotiations on the
creation of a multilateral investment court. According to Article 8.29 of CETA, ‘[t]
he Parties shall pursue with other trading partners the establishment of a multilateral
investment tribunal and appellate mechanism for the resolution of investment dis-
putes. Upon establishment of such a multilateral mechanism, the CETA Joint
Committee shall adopt a decision providing that investment disputes under this
Section will be decided pursuant to the multilateral mechanism and make appropri-
ate transitional arrangements’.61 The ambition to establish a multilateral investment
court was reiterated in the EU-Canada Joint Interpretative Instrument accompanying
CETA, according to which:
CETA represents an important and radical change in investment rules and dispute resolution.
It lays the basis for a multilateral effort to develop further this new approach to investment
dispute resolution into a Multilateral Investment Court. The EU and Canada will work
expeditiously towards the creation of the Multilateral Investment Court. It should be set up
57On the EU’s proposal for a permanent investment court, see in general Titi (2017b).
58European Commission draft TTIP text on investment, 16 September 2015. The draft proposal is
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5652_en.htm (last accessed 19 June
2018). For an overview of this early draft, see Titi (2015); Masiá EF, Hacia la creación de un
Tribunal Internacional de Inversiones, La Ley 6612/2015.
59The proposal is available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.
pdf.
60European Commission, News, EU and Vietnam finalise landmark trade deal, 2 December 2015,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id¼1409 (last accessed 19 June 2018).
61For a discussion on the multilateral investment court, see Titi (2017b); Kaufmann-Kohler G and
Potestà M, Can the Mauritius Convention serve as a model for the reform of investor-State
arbitration in connection with the introduction of a permanent investment tribunal or an appeal
mechanism?, CIDS Research Paper, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/CIDS_Research_Paper_
Mauritius.pdf (last accessed 19 June 2018); Titi (2018).
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once a minimum critical mass of participants is established, and immediately replace
bilateral systems such as the one in CETA, and be fully open to accession by any country
that subscribes to the principles underlying the Court.62
In a statement in late October 2017 entered on the occasion of the adoption by the
Council of the decision authorising the signature of CETA, the European Commis-
sion and the Council noted that ‘the Council supports the European Commission’s
efforts to work towards the establishment of a multilateral investment court, which
will replace the bilateral system established by CETA, once established’.63 On
21 December 2016, the European Commission launched a public consultation on
its proposal for a multilateral reform of investment dispute resolution,64 which built
on the European Commission’s Inception Impact Assessment of 1 August 2016.65
The consultation aimed to collect stakeholders’ views on the EU’s approach to
investment dispute settlement and options for multilateral reform, including notably
the establishment of a permanent Multilateral Investment Court (MIC). The consul-
tation also included questions on the possible establishment of a Multilateral Appeal
Tribunal.66 The consultation was completed on 15 March 2017 and revealed ‘overall
broad support for a multilateral reform of investment dispute settlement’, although
the European Commission acknowledged that some questions are pending, espe-
cially in relation to ‘technical aspects’.67 The summary report of the public consul-
tation was documented in the European Commission’s Impact Assessment report
that was released on 13 September 2017.68
62Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)
between Canada and the European Union and its Member States, 27 October 2016, http://data.
consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13541-2016-INIT/en/pdf, p. 6 (last accessed 19 June 2018).
63Statement 36 (Statement by the Commission and the Council on investment protection and the
Investment Court System (‘ICS’) of the Statements and Declarations to be entered on the occasion
of the adoption by the Council of the decision authorising the signature of CETA, 27 October 2016,
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13463-2016-REV-1/en/pdf (last accessed
19 June 2018).
64European Commission, Questionnaire on options for a multilateral reform of investment dispute
resolution, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id¼233 (last accessed
19 June 2018).
65European Commission, Questionnaire on options for a multilateral reform of investment dispute
resolution, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id¼233 (last accessed 19 June
2018); See also European Commission, Consultation Strategy, Impact Assessment on the Estab-
lishment of a Multilateral Investment Court for investment dispute resolution, 1 August 2016, http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/october/tradoc_154997.pdf (last accessed 19 June 2018).
66European Commission, Questionnaire on options for a multilateral reform of investment dispute
resolution, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id¼233 (last accessed
19 June 2018).
67European Commission, Recommendation for a Council decision authorising the opening of
negotiations for a Convention establishing a multilateral court for the settlement of investment
disputes, COM(2017) 493 final, 13 September 2017, p. 5.
68European Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment on Multilateral reform of
investment dispute resolution, annexed to the Recommendation for a Council decision authorising
the opening of negotiations for a Convention establishing a multilateral court for the settlement of
investment disputes, SWD(2017) 302 final, 13 September 2017.
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Simultaneously with the launch of the European Commission’s public consulta-
tion, in December 2016, the European Commission and Canada co-hosted an inter-
governmental expert meeting in order to facilitate the creation of a permanent
multilateral investment court, available for disputes under existing and future invest-
ment treaties.69 The EU’s intention has been to allow transition to the Multilateral
Investment Court not only for future EU investment agreements but also for EU
member state BITs authorised under Regulation No. EU 1219/2012.70 On
13 September 2017, the European Commission issued a Recommendation for a
Council decision authorising the opening of negotiations for a Convention
establishing a multilateral court for the settlement of investment disputes.71
At the same time, while the Union is actively pursuing the establishment of the
investment court system, on 6 September 2017, Belgium submitted a request for an
Opinion to the CJEU on the compatibility of the European Union’s investment court
system with EU law.72 The concern is pertinent in light of recent opinions by the
CJEU, including Opinion 1/09 on the European and Community Patents Court73 and
Opinion 2/13 on the EU’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR).74 These opinions focus on whether the proposed dispute settlement sys-
tems are compatible with the interpretive monopoly of the CJEU over EU law. The
European Commission has aimed to draft the investment court system in a way so as
to ‘bypass’ the CJEU’s Opinions’ objections.75 It is also worth noting that the
European Union is already party, together with the member states, to the Energy
Charter Treaty (ECT), which provides for ISDS.
Belgium’s request for an Opinion follows an internal agreement between the
Federal Government and the Governments of the federated entities that was reached
on 27 October 2016 on the signing of CETA.76 In particular, the agreement
contained ‘a national unilateral declaration regarding the Belgian conditions for
69European Commission, Press release: European Commission and Canadian Government co-host
discussions on a multilateral investment court, Brussels, 13 December 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-16-4349_en.htm (last accessed 19 June 2018).
70European Commission, Inception Impact Assessment, Establishment of a Multilateral Investment
Court for investment dispute resolution, 1 August 2016, p. 3.
71European Commission, Recommendation for a Council decision authorising the opening of
negotiations for a Convention establishing a multilateral court for the settlement of investment
disputes, COM(2017) 493 final, 13 September 2017.
72Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Minister
Reynders submits request for opinion on CETA, https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/newsroom/news/
2017/minister_reynders_submits_request_opinion_ceta (last accessed 19 June 2018).
73CJEU, Opinion 1/09, European and Community Patents Court, 2011, ECR I-1137.
74CJEU, Opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 18 December 2014.
75Titi (2017b).
76Titi (2017b); See also Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development





signing CETA, for which the undertaking was made to request an opinion from the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the compatibility of
certain aspects of CETA with the European Treaties, in particular with [regard] to
Opinion 2/15’.77 Consequently, Belgium’s request for an Opinion had been in
preparation since December 2016 by a working group made up of representatives
of the Federal Government and the Governments of the federated entities.78 Con-
cretely, Belgium’s request for an Opinion concerns the compatibility of the EU’s
investment court system with: (a) the exclusive competence of the CJEU to interpret
EU law; (b) the general principle of equality and the ‘practical effect’ requirement of
EU law; (c) the right of access to courts; and (d) the right to an independent and
impartial judiciary.79 The questions submitted to the CJEU extend beyond the
‘traditional’ concerns about the proposed dispute settlement system’s compatibility
with the jurisdictional autonomy of the CJEU. The Belgian request for an Opinion
further notes that Belgium does not take any position regarding the questions that
have been put to the CJEU and that it ‘is also conscious of the fact that the ICS is the
first step towards the creation of a multilateral Investment Court which, in the long
run, shall become the responsible legal institution to resolve conflicts between
investors and states’.80
Following the European Union’s proposal for the establishment of a multilateral
investment court, multilateral reform of investment dispute settlement and the
creation of a multilateral investment court have started to be discussed also in
different contexts. On 14 July 2017, at its 50th session, the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) entrusted its Working Group III
with a mandate to study the possible reform of investor-state dispute settlement.81
Working Group III will (a) identify and examine concerns regarding the current
machinery of investment dispute settlement; (b) consider whether reform is desirable
in light of the identified concerns; and (c) if so, ‘develop any relevant solutions’ to be
recommended to UNCITRAL.82 It was agreed that in discharging its mandate the
Working Group should dispose broad discretion and that ‘any solutions devised
77Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, CETA—
Belgian Request for an Opinion from the European Court of Justice, https://diplomatie.belgium.be/
sites/default/files/downloads/ceta_summary.pdf (last accessed 19 June 2018).
78Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Minister
Reynders submits request for opinion on CETA, https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/newsroom/news/
2017/minister_reynders_submits_request_opinion_ceta (last accessed 19 June 2018).
79Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, CETA—
Belgian Request for an Opinion from the European Court of Justice, https://diplomatie.belgium.be/
sites/default/files/downloads/ceta_summary.pdf (last accessed 19 June 2018).
80Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, CETA—
Belgian Request for an Opinion from the European Court of Justice, https://diplomatie.belgium.be/
sites/default/files/downloads/ceta_summary.pdf (last accessed 19 June 2018).
81United Nations, Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Fiftieth
session (3–21 July 2017), A/72/17, para. 264.
82United Nations, Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Fiftieth
session (3–21 July 2017), A/72/17, para. 264.
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would be designed taking into account the ongoing work of relevant international
organizations and with a view to allowing each State the choice of whether and to
what extent it wished to adopt the relevant solution(s)’.83 The latter observation is
aligned with UNCITRAL’s working methods.
At the multilateral level, UNCITRAL has already produced in recent years its
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration84 and the United
Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration
(Mauritius Convention). Since the beginning of 2016, six more states have signed
the Mauritius Convention, bringing the total of signatories to 22.85 In December
2016, Canada became the second state to ratify the Mauritius Convention, following
Mauritius’s 2015 ratification. In April 2017, Switzerland became the third country to
ratify the Mauritius Convention, thus triggering the clock for the Convention’s
entry-into-force on 18 October 2017.86
4 Alternatives to ISDS
As the debate about ISDS deepens, a minority of states have started to opt for
alternatives to ISDS and to introduce dispute prevention policies (DPPs) in their
investment agreements. DPPs aim to minimise the number of conflicts that escalate
into formal disputes.87 Dispute prevention can require the establishment of institu-
tional structures,88 it can be pursued unilaterally but also bilaterally, and it can
involve cooperation between the contracting parties.
One of the innovations ‘introduced’ by Brazilian CFIAs is the establishment of
ombudsmen or, so-called, focal points. Dispute prevention in CFIAs is made
possible through two institutions, a joint committee and national focal points or
ombudsmen. The latter are the focus of the present discussion. According to the
Brazilian model, national focal points are designated by each party.89 In Brazil, they
are established within the Chamber of Foreign Trade (CAMEX),90 the Council of
Ministers of the Brazilian Chamber of Commerce, an inter-ministerial body for
foreign trade, presided by the Minister of Development, Industry and Foreign
83United Nations, Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Fiftieth
session (3–21 July 2017), A/72/17, para. 264.
84UNCITRAL’s Transparency Rules came into effect on 1 April 2014.
85See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency_Conven
tion_status.html (last accessed 19 June 2018).
86See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency_Conven
tion_status.html (last accessed 19 June 2018).
87UNCTAD (2010), p. xiv.
88UNCTAD (2010), p. xiv.
89Article 17(1) of the Brazilian Model CFIA of 3 March 2016 (version 2.3.1) (hereinafter Brazilian
Model CFIA).
90Article 17(2) of the Brazilian Model CFIA.
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Trade.91 Focal points’ main task is to assist investors from the other party in their
territory.92 Their role is simultaneously one of dispute prevention as it is one of
investment promotion and facilitation. Their responsibilities include: endeavouring
to follow the recommendations of the Joint Committee and interact with their
counterpart in the other contracting party; following up on requests and enquiries
of the other party or of investors of the other party with the competent authorities;
assessing, in consultation with relevant public authorities, suggestions and com-
plaints of the other party or investors of the other party and recommending actions to
improve the investment environment; seeking to prevent disputes in investment
matters, in collaboration with public authorities and relevant private entities; and
providing information on regulatory issues.93 The contracting parties shall use the
focal points, and the Joint Committee, to exchange information on business oppor-
tunities, procedures and requirements for investment.94 The focal points ‘shall
promptly reply to notifications and requests’ by the other party or its investors,95
and they ‘shall act in coordination with each other and with the Joint Committee in
order to prevent, manage and resolve any disputes between the Parties’.96 Although
the model CFIA provides for state-state dispute settlement,97 this does not become
available until the dispute has become ‘the object of consultations and negotiations
between the Parties’ and has been examined by the Joint Committee.98 The Brazilian
model’s national focal points or ombudsmen are inspired by the Korean Office of the
Foreign Investment Ombudsman.99 However, an important difference exists
between the two: while the Korean Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman
is a unilateral mechanism established without need for reciprocity, focal points
according to the Brazilian model are conventional mechanisms that need to be
established in both contracting states. Certainly, the challenge that remains in this
framework is the pending ratification of Brazilian CFIAs.
Another mechanism that has been used in recent IIAs and offers an ‘alternative’ to
ISDS is the so-called filter mechanism.100 Filters are perceived as forming part of
states’ endeavours to narrow the scope for arbitral review of host state policies.101
The European Commission’s 2014 Public consultation on modalities for investment
91CAMEX’s functions are established by Decree n. 4.732/2003.
92Article 17(1) of the Brazilian Model CFIA.
93Article 17(4) of the Brazilian Model CFIA.
94Article 18(1) of the Brazilian Model CFIA.
95Article 17(6) of the Brazilian Model CFIA.
96Article 22(1) of the Brazilian Model CFIA.
97Article 23 of the Brazilian Model CFIA. See further e.g. Article 15 of the Brazil-Mozambique
CFIA; Article 15 the Brazil-Angola CFIA; Article 13(6) of the Brazil-Malawi CFIA.
98Article 22(2) of the Brazilian Model CFIA.
99See http://ombudsman.kotra.or.kr/eng/index.do (last accessed 19 June 2018).
100On filters in general, see Titi (2017a).
101Johnson et al. (2016), p. 44.
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protection and ISDS in TTIP, one of the first official documents to make use of the
term ‘filter’, referred to the mechanism in the following terms:
[S]ome investment agreements have introduced mechanisms which grant the regulators of
the Parties to the agreement the possibility to intervene (through a so-called “filter” to ISDS)
in particular ISDS cases that involve measures ostensibly taken for prudential reasons. The
mechanism enables the Parties to decide whether a measure is indeed taken for prudential
reasons, and thus if the impact on the investor concerned is justified. On this basis, the Parties
may therefore agree that a claim should not proceed.102
Filters in that context were limited to prudential measures. More generally, filters
allow contracting parties to intervene in investment dispute settlement involving
sensitive measures and to determine whether these measures have been taken for the
stated reasons. Where a filter exists, it is up to the contracting parties to decide
whether a treaty exception applies. The investment tribunal seised of the dispute may
not proceed until the parties, or the parties’ financial authorities or tax authorities,
etc., or a state-state tribunal have delivered their report or decision. Filters resemble
provisions on joint interpretations by the parties, since determination of a given
question is remitted to the parties. However, in contrast with joint interpretations of
treaty provisions in abstracto and binding on tribunals for all subsequent cases,
filters concern the concrete application rather than interpretation of a given rule, and
most notably an exception or defence. Some very recent treaties to incorporate filters
include CETA,103 the Canada-Mongolia BIT (2016)104 and the Canada-Hong Kong
BIT (2016).105 Filters in some Canadian treaties provide for recourse to interstate
arbitration where the parties cannot agree between them on whether an exception is a
valid defence to the claim of the investor.106 In these cases, the ‘report’ of the
interstate tribunal is binding on the investor-state tribunal.107
Beyond DPPs and filters, an alternative to ‘traditional’ ISDS that is gaining some
currency in recent years, in name if not yet in practice, is mediation. At the
institutional level, in July 2016, the Energy Charter Conference adopted a Guide
on Investment Mediation, an explanatory document to help investors and govern-
ments decide whether to use mediation and how to prepare for it.108 The Guide,
which was prepared with the support of the International Mediation Institute (IMI),
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the
102See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc_152280.pdf (last accessed
19 June 2018).
103E.g. Article 13.21(3) and Annex 13-B (Understanding on the application of art 13.16.1 and
13.21) of CETA.
104E.g. Article 21 of the Canada-Mongolia BIT.
105E.g. Article 14 of the Canada-Hong Kong BIT.
106E.g. Article 22 of the Canada-Hong Kong BIT.
107Article 22(4) of the Canada-Hong Kong BIT.
108Energy Charter Secretariat, Guide on Investment Mediation, 19 July 2016, http://www.
energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/CCDECS/2016/CCDEC201612.pdf (last accessed
19 June 2018); See also http://www.energycharter.org/media/news/article/conference-endorses-
guide-on-investment-mediation/ (last accessed 19 June 2018).
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Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), the Interna-
tional Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),
UNCITRAL and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), is designed to facilitate
the amicable settlement of investment disputes, encourage contracting states to
consider the use of mediation on a voluntary basis and ‘to consider the good offices
of the Energy Charter Secretariat’.109 The initiative of the Energy Charter Confer-
ence builds on recent institutional attempts to encourage and expand on mediation or
conciliation (consider for instance the 2012 Investor-State Mediation Rules of the
International Bar Association (IBA), the 2014 International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) Mediation Rules, and the 2014 SCC Mediation Rules). Provisions on medi-
ation are also included in CETA.110
5 Intra-EU BITs
The last topic discussed in this chapter concerns continuing developments in relation
to the fate of bilateral investment treaties between EU Member States (intra-EU
BITs). The majority of EU member states’ BITs have been concluded with countries
outside the European Union, since investments within the Union are subject to a
system of multilevel protection that comprises, among others, the fundamental
freedoms of the internal market, the protection of fundamental rights in EU law
and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).111 However, a minority of
BITs, initially about 190 in number, often concluded between EU Member States
and Central and Eastern European countries prior to the latter’s accession to the
European Union, are BITs engaging as treaty partners on both sides EU member
states.112 These treaties have formed the centre of a heated debate, notably with
respect to the question of their compatibility with EU law, sometimes raised in the
context of investment disputes brought on the basis of intra-EU BITs.113 In the
course of this debate, the European Commission has had ample opportunity to make
its view known that intra-EU BITs are incompatible with EU law. Two EU Member
States, Italy and Ireland terminated all their intra-EU BITs; in the case of Ireland, this
meant terminating all its BITs.114 Nonetheless, and despite some erratic termina-
tions, intra-EU BITs continued and continue to exist.
109Energy Charter Secretariat, Guide on Investment Mediation, 19 July 2016, http://www.
energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/CCDECS/2016/CCDEC201612.pdf (last accessed
19 June 2018); See also http://www.energycharter.org/media/news/article/conference-endorses-
guide-on-investment-mediation/ (last accessed 19 June 2018).
110Article 8.20 of CETA.
111Bungenberg and Titi (2014), pp. 316–322.
112Bungenberg and Titi (2014), pp. 316–322.
113For a discussion, see Bungenberg and Titi (2014).
114See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (last accessed 19 June 2018).
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On 18 June 2015, the European Commission initiated infringement proceedings
against five Member States (Austria, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and
Sweden) in order to request that they bring their intra-EU BITs to an end.115 The
letters of formal notice sent to the Member States in question followed earlier
exchanges with the European Commission which resulted in no action being taken
on the part of the Member States.116 At the same time that the infringement pro-
ceedings were initiated, the European Commission aimed to initiate an ‘administra-
tive dialogue’ with the remaining 21 Member States with intra-EU BITs in force.
On 7 April 2016, Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands
published a ‘non-paper’ on intra-EU investment treaties.117 The ‘non-paper’
comes from five among the EU’s most active investment treaty negotiators, of
whom some have been targeted by the Commission’s infringement proceedings
and some have strongly opposed in the past the exercise of the EU competence.
The ‘non-paper’ suggests that the member states are motivated by a wish to reach ‘a
compromise solution’ for the termination of intra-EU BITs.118 It proposes the
conclusion of an agreement among all EU member states that would foresee the
phasing out of existing intra-EU BITs and, significantly, would ‘afford European
investors operating within the internal market appropriate guarantees, both as a
matter of substantive and procedural protection’.119 Concretely, the five delegations
considered that it would be necessary to provide for ‘a binding and enforceable
settlement mechanism for investment disputes’,120 and identified three main options:
(a) the CJEU; (b) modelling the proposed dispute settlement system on the Unified
Patent Court; (c) the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).121 In the latter case, EU
member states could agree on a special compromis for intra-EU investment disputes,
which could be drafted on the basis of the ‘the EU proposal for an Investment Court
System in TTIP and other EU trade agreements (permanent arbitrators, strict ethic
rules, appeal facility, etc.)’.122 The delegations signing the ‘non-paper’ considered
115European Commission, Press release, Commission asks Member States to terminate their intra-
EU bilateral investment treaties, 18 June 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5198_en.
htm (last accessed 19 June 2018).
116European Commission, Press release, Commission asks Member States to terminate their intra-
EU bilateral investment treaties, 18 June 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5198_en.
htm (last accessed 19 June 2018).
117Non-paper from Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands, Intra-EU Investment
Treaties, 7 April 2016. The publicly available version of the non-paper is undated.
118Non-paper from Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands, Intra-EU Investment
Treaties, 7 April 2016, para. 1.
119Non-paper from Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands, Intra-EU Investment
Treaties, 7 April 2016, para. 2.
120Non-paper from Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands, Intra-EU Investment
Treaties, 7 April 2016, para. 11, emphasis in original.
121Non-paper from Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands, Intra-EU Investment
Treaties, 7 April 2016, para. 12.
122Non-paper from Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands, Intra-EU Investment
Treaties, 7 April 2016, para. 12.
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that given the ‘time and legal constraints deriving from the first two options, [. . .] an
alternative dispute settlement scheme built upon an already existing framework such
as the PCA would be preferable in order to achieve the phasing out of intra-EU BITs
within a reasonable timeframe’.123 In other words, the delegations appear to condi-
tion the phasing out of intra-EU BITs on giving investors access to arbitration for all
intra-EU investment disputes. To mitigate the impact of this statement, the ‘non-
paper’ suggests that this would be only a ‘provisional scheme that would be
subsequently replaced by a permanent solution for investment disputes within the
internal market’.124 It is interesting to note that some of the signatories of the ‘non-
paper’ have vociferously opposed ISDS in EU investment treaties, however appear
to fully endorse it at home for intra-EU investment disputes. No continuation has
been given to the ‘non-paper’s’ proposal.
On 29 September 2016, the European Commission sent a reasoned opinion to
Austria, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden in relation to their intra-
EU BITs.125 Pursuant to Article 258 of the TFEU, the Commission delivers a
reasoned opinion if it considers that a member state has failed to comply with an
obligation under the EU Treaties, and reasoned opinions are only one step prior to
bringing the matter before the CJEU. According to a European Commission Fact
Sheet summarising the issue:
Many of these intra-EU BITs were agreed in the 1990s. They were mainly struck between
existing members of the EU and those who would become the “EU 12”, the Member States
joining in 2004 and 2007. They were aimed at reassuring investors at a time when private
investors - sometimes for historical and political reasons – might have been wary of
investing in those countries. Since the enlargement, such ‘extra’ reassurances should not
be necessary, because EU rules in the single market, such as the freedom of establishment
and the free movement of capital, already provide a legal framework for cross-border
investments. All Member States are subject to the same EU rules, which equally provide
protection for EU investors.126
The saga of the fate of intra-EU BITs continues.
6 Conclusions
International investment law has continued to grow, to animate discussions and
debates, and create challenges in 2016 and 2017. The role of the European Union has
been particularly significant, dominating policy decisions through continuing nego-
tiations of megaregionals, its proposal for an international investment court and its
123Non-paper from Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands, Intra-EU Investment
Treaties, 7 April 2016, para. 13, emphasis added.
124Non-paper from Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands, Intra-EU Investment
Treaties, 7 April 2016, para. 13.
125See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-3125_en.htm (last accessed 19 June 2018).
126See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-3125_en.htm (last accessed 19 June 2018).
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insistence on the need for multilateral reform of ISDS, but also through the prom-
inence of its internal dilemmas on issues that require involvement of the CJEU. The
new scepticism of the United States, a traditional proponent of international invest-
ment protections, vis-à-vis investment treaties and especially megaregionals is an
outlier among North American trends but it is likely that it reflects a temporary
policy shift. Finally, although some states continue to display hostility vis-à-vis
investment protections, and increasingly BIT terminations testify to such hostility,
the majority of states continue to engage with international investment law. Some
reconsider the drafting of their investment protection standards. Such reconsidera-
tion is a normal process in order to amend investment treaties in light of acquired
experience and new global legal settings and challenges. It is probable that invest-
ment treaty provisions and investment treaty models will continue to change
advancing new trends in international investment law.
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1 Introduction
The Special Drawing Right (SDR) was created by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF or the Fund) in 1969 as a supplementary reserve asset in response to a shortage
of official reserves. Separate from the IMF’s other resources, the so-called SDR
Department was established, and SDRs have periodically been “allocated” to the
participants in the SDR Department (currently all 189 IMF members) in a total
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amount of SDR 204.2 billion (currently about US$290 billion).1 The reserve asset
nature of the SDR results from the fact that under the rules of the SDR Department,
participants with a balance of payments need can request the exchange of their SDRs
for the freely usable currencies of other participants (thus providing them with access
to “unconditional liquidity”).
The value of the SDR is based on a basket of currencies. As determined by the
IMF’s Executive Board (the Executive Board), currencies in the SDR basket must be
issued by largest exporters and “freely usable”. In the IMF’s 2015 review of the SDR
valuation (the “2015 Review”), the Chinese renminbi (RMB) was determined to be a
freely usable currency and was included in the SDR basket.
The 2015 Review may likely have lasting impact on the international monetary
system. It has triggered new interest to explore the broader role for the SDR. For
China, it reflected international recognition of the RMB among top-rank interna-
tional currencies as well as the country as an economic and financial superpower.
Further, it was viewed as providing impetus, and is expected to continue helping, to
promote the country’s further economic liberalization. The 2015 Review’s decisions
also have significant operational implications for the IMF and its members.
This article provides background on the SDR and analyzes the 2015 Review
decisions. Section 2 provides an overview on the establishment of the SDR and the
functioning of the SDR Department. Section 3 briefly summarizes the evolution of
the SDR valuation prior to the 2015 Review and analyzes the legal framework that
guided the Executive Board in its 2015 decisions regarding the RMB. It discusses in
particular the “freely usable currency” requirement that a currency has to meet under
the current valuation framework for the SDR basket and that is of great significance
for IMF financial operations. Section 4 concludes with an assessment of the deci-
sions and the outlook going forward.
2 Creation of the SDR and Establishment of the SDR
Department
2.1 Creation of the SDR
In 1969, through an amendment of its Articles of Agreement (the “Articles”), the
IMF created the SDR as a supplementary international reserve asset, in the context of
the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system. Under the fixed exchange rate
system, countries needed official reserves to defend their exchange rate. However,
the international supply of two key reserve assets – gold and the US dollar – proved
inadequate for supporting the expansion of world trade and financial flows that was
1This amount is very small compared to about US$9 trillion of the total global holdings of
international reserves. The SDR has so far played a relatively minor role in the international
monetary system, well underperforming its intended purpose as a global reserve asset.
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taking place. Therefore, the international community decided to create a new
international reserve asset under the auspices of the IMF. Soon after the creation
of the SDR, the fixed exchange rate system collapsed and the world’s major
currencies shifted to floating exchange rate regimes. Additionally, the growth in
international capital markets facilitated borrowing by creditworthy governments and
many countries accumulated significant amounts of international reserves. These
developments decreased the reliance on the SDR as a global reserve asset.2
2.2 SDR Department, SDR Allocations and the SDR Interest
Basket
The 1969 amendment to the Articles established the SDR Department, separate from
the IMF’s quota and other resources which are held in the General Department.3
Membership in the SDR Department is voluntary, and as of today, all IMF members
are participants in the SDR Department. In addition, the IMF can authorize certain
other official entities to hold and transact in SDRs (the so-called “prescribed
holders”).4 Only the IMF, participants in the SDR Department, and prescribed
holders may hold and transact in official SDRs, while other entities can denominate
assets and liabilities in SDR but have no access to the SDR Department.
SDRs may be allocated by the IMF’s Board of Governors only to participants in
the SDR Department (and not to the IMF or prescribed holders) when there is a “long
term global need. . . to supplement existing reserve assets.”5 A total of 204.2 billion
SDRs have been allocated by the IMF to its members to date, including most
recently, an allocation of SDR 182.6 billion in 2009. Allocations are made in
proportion to members’ quotas at the time of the allocation.
The allocation of SDRs is at no cost to participants, but the use of SDRs can give
rise to net creditor or net debtor positions in the SDR Department. As participants
transact in SDRs, their holdings would fall below or rise above their allocation,
2See http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/14/51/Special-Drawing-Right-
SDR (last accessed 4 October 2018). Under the Second Amendment that became effective on
April 1, 1978 it was envisaged that the SDR would become the principal reserve asset of the
international monetary system; see Article VIII, Section 7.
3For background on the IMF’s financial structure and operations, see IMF Financial Operations
2015, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/finop/2015/ (last accessed 4 October 2018).
4The IMF has authorized 15 institutions that perform the function of a central bank for more than
one member and other official entities to hold SDRs. SDRs cannot be held by private entities or
individuals. In the drafting of the First and Second Amendments, “there was strong resistance to the
inclusion of private parties among the possible holders of SDRs” due to the concern that it would
lead to the creation of a private market “in which SDRs were traded at a discount or a premium
compared with the controlled values at which official holders may transfer SDRs”. Gold
(1981), p. 35.
5Article XVIII, Section 1(a). In the reverse circumstances, the IMF could also cancel allocated
SDRs, wiping out a portion of global reserves.
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giving rise to either a net debtor position or a net creditor position, respectively.
Participants would then have to pay a charge on their net debtor position or receive a
payment on their net creditor position, both at the SDR interest rate. A small annual
fee for the IMF’s expenses in managing the SDR Department is also assessed to
participants in proportion to their share in total allocations.6
The SDR interest rate is determined by the IMF. Under the IMF’s current
methodology, it is calculated weekly based on a 3-month interest rate instrument
for each of the currencies in the basket. It has a floor of 0.05% (5 basis points) but
otherwise fluctuates based on the market rates of the instruments in the basket.7
Beyond its role in the SDR Department, the SDR interest rate plays a broader role in
the IMF’s finances. In particular, the basic interest rate for IMF credit (the so-called
basic rate of charge) is established as the SDR interest rate plus a margin (currently
100 basis points). The SDR interest rate is also used to remunerate creditor positions
in the General Resources Account resulting from the IMF’s use of a member’s
currency,8 and as the interest rate for IMF borrowing under the New Arrangements
to Borrow and bilateral borrowing agreements.
2.3 The Use of SDR
The SDR is not a currency and does not give rise to a claim on the IMF. Rather, a
participant in the SDR Department with SDR holdings has potential claim to obtain
balances of freely usable currencies from other participants.9 Specifically, partici-
pants can obtain freely usable currencies in exchange for their SDR holdings through
voluntary exchanges or under a mandatory mechanism where IMF would designate
members with strong external positions to accept SDRs from members with weak
external positions in exchange for a freely usable currency.10 In addition to this
exchange of SDRs for currencies envisaged under the Articles, SDRs may only be
used for operations and transactions that are authorized either expressly under the
Articles, such as for quota subscription payments11 and interest payments on IMF
6Article XX.
7Article XX, Section 3 and https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr14484 (last
accessed 4 October 2018).
8The rate of remuneration is not more than, nor less than four-fifth of, the SDR interest rate; see
Article V, Section 9(a).
9Article XXX defines “freely usable currency”.
10The SDR has the same properties as a swap line in that it allows holders access to foreign currency
liquidity but without reliance on a single counterpart or specific currency. As a matter of practice, since
1987, all transactions in the SDR Department have taken place on a voluntary basis, with a significant
number of participants buying and selling SDR under their voluntary standing arrangements.
11When a country joins the IMF, it is assigned a quota in the same range as the quotas of existing
members of broadly comparable economic size and characteristics, and quotas are adjusted peri-
odically to reflect members’ evolving relative economic position in the world economy. A quota
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lending or reserve positions in the General Resources Account, or under decisions of
the Executive Board, including the use of SDR in loans, to settle obligations, and
also swaps.
The SDR also serves as the unit of account of the IMF and other international
organizations such as the World Bank and the Bank for International Settlement
(BIS), and IMF lending and borrowing are denominated in SDR. While third parties
can also use the SDR as a unit of account or as denomination of financial assets (for
example SDR denominated bonds), they are generally not permitted to hold official
SDRs.12
3 SDR Valuation and the 2015 Review
The Articles do not set a value for the SDR, nor do they prescribe a specific method
to be used for SDR valuation. Instead the Articles provide that the methodology
for SDR valuation is determined by the Fund, subject to special majority
requirements.13
The value of the SDR was initially linked to gold. Since 1974, the SDR value has
been based on a weighted value of a basket of members’ currencies, which is
reviewed by the Executive Board at regular intervals of normally 5 years. First,
the SDR valuation basket consisted of currencies of the 16 countries each of which
had a share in world exports of goods and services in excess of 1%. In 1980, the IMF
reduced the number of currencies in the SDR valuation basket to currencies of the
five largest exporting members – then the US dollar, the British pound, the Japanese
yen, Deutsch mark and French franc. Between 1980 and 2016, this basket was
relatively stable, except for the replacement of the French franc and the Deutsch
mark by the euro in 1999, and changes to the basket were limited to adjusting the
weights of the currencies. In the context of the 2015 Review, a major change was
determines a members’ contribution to the capital of the IMF, its voting power in the IMF, its
proportionate share in the IMF’s allocation of SDRs to IMF members, and has a bearing on its
access to IMF resources. For more information on quotas, see https://www.imf.org/en/About/
Factsheets/Sheets/2016/07/14/12/21/IMF-Quotas (last accessed 4 October 2018).
12See also footnote 4 on “prescribed holders”.
13Article XV, Section 2. SDR valuation decisions require a 70% majority of the total voting power
or an 85% majority in case of fundamental changes. SDR valuation decisions are taken by the
Executive Board. Under the Articles, the power to decide most matters is vested in the IMF’s Board
of Governors, the IMF’s highest decision-making body consisting of one Governor per member
(i.e. currently, 189 Governors). Except those matters for which power is directly conferred on the
Board of Governors under the Articles, the Board of Governors has delegated all decision making,
including the authority to determine the SDR valuation methodology, to the Executive Board,
consisting currently of 24 Executive Directors. The Executive Board is responsible for conducting
the IMF’s business, and selecting the IMF’s Managing Director who conducts, under the direction
of the Executive Board, the ordinary business of the IMF. See for more background: Gianviti
(1999), pp. 31–67.
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made when the Executive Board determined that the RMB would be a “freely usable
currency” for IMF operations, and decided to add the RMB to the SDR basket, both
with effect from October 1, 2016.
3.1 The Selection Criteria: Exports and Freely Usable
Currency
The Executive Board adopted the export and freely usable currency criteria as the
basis for selecting SDR basket currencies at the regular 5-yearly review of the SDR
valuation in 2000. Specifically, the 2000 review decision provided that the curren-
cies included in the SDR basket must be those (a) that are issued by the four IMF
members, or by monetary unions that include IMF members, whose exports of goods
and services during the past 5-year period had the largest value (the exports
criterion); and (b) which have been determined by the IMF to be “freely usable
currencies” (the freely usable criterion).
Until 2000, the export criterion had served as the sole criterion in the selection of
the SDR basket currencies. Being a size-based criterion established on the basis of
balance of payments data, the export criterion is intended to reflect a country’s
relative importance in global commerce, ensure an adequate supply of reserve assets,
and limit the number of currencies in the basket.14
The freely usable criterion was introduced as a second criterion for currency
selection for the SDR basket in 2000 to recognize the importance of financial
transactions. Introducing the freely usable criterion into SDR valuation was seen
as a way to ensure that the SDR contained those currencies that were most repre-
sentative of use in the world trading and financial systems.
At the outset of the 2015 Review, it was agreed that the two criteria remained
appropriate and that no major change in the currency selection criteria was required.
As one of the world’s largest exporters, China had already met the first of the two
criteria in 2010 and had become the third largest exporter by 2015. Whether China
could be considered to meet the second criterion, namely that the currencies used for
SDR valuation be “freely usable” as determined by the IMF, was thus at the center of
the 2015 Review.
14It should also be noted that a currency can only be replaced in the basket by another currency if the
value of exports of the member or monetary union whose currency is not included during the
relevant period exceeds those of a member or monetary union whose currency is included in the
basket by at least 1%. This safeguards against temporary and minor fluctuations in export trends.
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3.2 Exports Criterion and Currency Based Approach
A refinement was made to the application of the export criterion at the time of the
2015 Review. In 2000, following the inclusion of the euro, the calculation of the
value of exports of goods and services of the Euro Area excluded intra-currency
union trade (i.e., trade of goods and services among members that are part of the
union is not counted). Underlying this approach was the rationale that since the SDR
should reflect the characteristics of the currencies rather than those of the issuing
members, the currency should be the focus and not the member. This was referred to
as the “currency based approach”. The 2015 Review affirmed that the same currency
based approach should be followed for members with more than one currency. This
meant that for China, the value of exports was assessed at the mainland China level
(where the RMB is issued), and excluded the exports of Hong Kong SAR, Macao
SAR and Taiwan Province of China, which issue their own currencies. This adjust-
ment made no difference to China’s position as the world’s third largest exporter of
goods and services.
3.3 Freely Usable Currency Criterion
The key question for the 2015 Review was whether the RMB could be determined a
“freely usable currency”. The freely usable currency concept was introduced through
the Second Amendment as a key operational concept for IMF operations but had
effectively not been looked at in detail since 1978. That year, as part of the decisions
taken in the context of the entry into force of the Second Amendment, the Fund
determined the US dollar, the Deutsch mark, the French franc, the British pound and
the Japanese yen as freely usable currencies. Following this initial determination,
there was no major review thereafter, including when the euro was determined to be
a freely usable currency, replacing the Deutsch mark and French franc in 1999.
The RMB was first reviewed for inclusion in the SDR basket in the context of the
2010 SDR review (when China for the first time had met the export criterion), but at
the time there was broad agreement that the RMB could not yet be considered a
freely usable currency.15 As the internationalization of the RMB had progressed
significantly between 2010 and 2015, the assessment of the RMB in 2015 required a
comprehensive and in depth review of the origins, rationale, and operational impli-
cations of the freely usable concept as the backdrop for the assessment of the RMB.
15See http://www.imf.org/en/publications/policy-papers/issues/2016/12/31/review-of-the-method-
of-valuation-of-the-sdr-pp4502 (last accessed 4 October 2018).
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3.3.1 The “Freely Usable Currency” Concept Under the Second
Amendment
One of the key mandates of the IMF is to provide temporary financing under
adequate safeguards to assist members “to correct maladjustments in their balance
of payments”.16 IMF financing is not provided in a form of loans but rather
structured as purchase transactions, under which a member receiving IMF financing
(i.e., the purchasing member) would purchase from the IMF the currencies of other
IMF members (i.e., the creditor members) with balances of its own currency.17 The
purchasing member would then use the purchased currencies to address its balance
of payments need.18
To ensure that currencies obtained from the Fund are of actual use for the
purchasing member, and to help maximize the usability of IMF resources, the
concept of “freely usable currency” was introduced into the Articles of Agreement
with the Second Amendment effective April 1, 1978.19 Under this concept, the
Articles define what a freely usable currency is and require creditor members whose
currencies are not freely usable to exchange balances of their own currencies, if sold
by the IMF, for a freely usable currency of their choice.
Article XXX (f) adopted under the Second Amendment defines “freely usable
currency” to be a member’s currency that “the Fund determines (i) is, in fact, widely
used to make payments for international transactions, and (ii) is widely traded in the
principal exchange markets”. Under this definition, the “widely used” element is
intended to ensure that the purchasing member can directly use the obtained cur-
rency to meet the member’s balance of payment need (e.g., to pay for imports or
repay external debts). The “widely traded” element is intended to ensure that if the
purchasing member needs to exchange the obtained currency for other currencies to
meet its balance of payment need (i.e., indirect use), there are markets with sufficient
depth and liquidity to allow it to sell the obtained currency, even in a large amount,
16See Article I(v).
17The purchasing member would pay interest to the IMF on the purchased amount, and the IMF
would remunerate each creditor member by paying interest on the amount of its currency sold to the
purchasing member.
18See Article V, Section 3(b). Conversely, upon maturity, the purchasing member would be
obligated to repurchase its own currency with payments in SDRs or the currencies of other members
specified by the IMF. See Article V, Section 7(i). For further explanation of how IMF financial
assistance works, see https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2009/eng/pdf/webbox33.pdf (last
accessed 4 October 2018).
19Prior to the Second Amendment, creditor members had no obligation to convert balances of their
currencies purchased in an IMF financing transaction into a currency that the purchasing member
could actually use to deal with its balance of payment needs, which were typically a limited number
of reserve currencies. If a creditor member was unwilling to make such conversion, the IMF would
unlikely sell balances of that member’s currency and the IMF’s holding of that currency would be
effectively unusable. See Gold (1978).
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without substantial adverse exchange rate effect.20 The reference to “principal
exchange markets” in the wide trading element is understood to mean more than
one principal exchange market, but not all principal exchange markets.
To provide a purchasing member with the assurance that it will receive a freely
usable currency, a creditor member whose currency is not a freely usable currency is
legally obligated at the time of its currency being sold by the IMF to provide a freely
usable currency of its choice if so requested by the purchasing member.21 As an
operational practice, the purchasing members always receive a freely usable cur-
rency under arrangements that each member whose currency is used for purchase has
put in place with the IMF indicating which freely usable currency it is willing to
provide.22 In a repurchase context similar obligations apply, i.e., when a
repurchasing member needs to obtain a non-freely usable of another member, as
specified by the IMF, to repurchase from the IMF the balances of its own currency,
such other member is also under the legal obligation to ensure that its currency can
be obtained against a freely usable currency of its choice.23
To be freely usable, a currency must be both “widely used” and “widely traded in
principal exchange markets” and the key question is what each of these elements
means. The interpretation is guided by the purpose of the “freely usable” concept in
the context of IMF financing operations, namely to ensure that a currency purchased
from the IMF can either be used by the purchasing member directly to meet its
balance of payments needs (because it is “widely used”) or it can be exchange into a
currency that the purchasing member needs (because it is “widely traded in principal
exchange markets”).
20The concept of “freely usable” thus relates to market convertibility not official convertibility – in
other words, it is not sufficient that a member stands ready to convert its currency into other
currencies, but the conversion should be possible in foreign exchange markets. However, full
convertibility is not required. A freely usable currency may be not fully convertible, e.g., if the
issuing member maintains capital account restrictions. Indeed, in 1978 the Deutsch mark and the
French franc were determined to be freely usable even Germany and France did not allow their
currencies to be converted for certain capital transactions. Conversely, a fully convertible currency
may not be “freely usable” because the demand for it may not be sufficient to be considered widely
used and widely traded (e.g., the Swedish krona is fully convertible, but not freely usable).
21See Article V, Section 3(e)(i).
22A creditor member, whose currency is freely usable, is under no legal obligation to exchange the
balance of its currency into another freely usable currency at the request of a purchasing member,
but is only required to collaborate with the IMF and other members to enable the exchange (e.g., to
facilitate the transfer of its currency to one or more third members that are willing to make the
exchange). In addition, if the purchasing member is interested in such exchange, the creditor
member has the right to request the exchange to be made through the creditor member for another
freely usable currency selected by the creditor member. See Article V, Sections 3(e)(i) and (iv).
23See Article V, Section 7(j)(i) of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. All exchanges in both the
purchase and repurchase transactions take place at the IMF official exchange rate for the currencies
in question.
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3.3.2 Widely Used
The “widely-used” element is best measured by examining the degree to which
payments for international trade, services, and financial account transactions are
undertaken in a currency. It should be noted, however, that such data are not readily
available on a systemic basis (e.g., there is only limited data on invoicing for
international trade and service). Even where such data is available, it may not be
reliable, because, for example, the lack of a uniform definition of “domestic” versus
“international” transactions leads to inconsistent approaches in categorizing these
transactions. The data issue is resolved by relying on indicators that serve as proxies
(see below).
3.3.3 What Are “International Transactions”?
During the 2015 Review, a question on the meaning of “international transactions”
in the phrase “in fact, widely used to make payments for international transactions”
arose. How “international transactions” is defined is relevant for all indicators of the
“widely used” element of the freely usable currency concept. An international
transaction may refer, for example, to a transaction between residents of different
countries or to a transaction between residents of the same country that use a foreign
currency for the transaction. The question gained importance in the 2015 Review
because of the focus on assessing whether the RMB is freely usable. Specifically, the
People’s Republic of China consists of four territories, mainland China, Hong Kong,
Macao and Taiwan, each issues its own currency. Given the large volumes of
transactions between residents of these four territories, whether or not these trans-
actions are considered “international”would affect the assessment of how widely the
RMB is used.
The answer is derived from the purpose of the “widely used” element of the freely
usable currency definition, which is to ensure that a member purchasing another
member’s currency under IMF financing will be able to use it directly to meet its
balance of payments need. The relevant balance of payments need for IMF financing
is the balance of payments need between IMF members (i.e., reflecting the shortfall
of the member, including all of its territories, in its trading and financing vis-a-vis
other members). It is not, for example, the balance of payments need between
various currency areas of the same member. As such, the type of payments that
can provide an indication on the usability of a currency sold by the IMF in its
financing are the payment transactions between members. Keeping in mind this
overall objective and design of the wide use element, it was concluded that the
“international transactions” in this context refer to transactions between members.24
24In the IMF’s Articles, the term “international transactions” is also used in Article VIII, Section 2
(a) which prohibits IMF members, without the IMF’s approval, to impose “restrictions on the
making of payments and transfers for current international transactions”. Under this Article, this
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3.3.4 Widely Traded
The “widely traded” element also needs to be interpreted from the objective of the
freely usable currency concept, namely to ensure that a freely usable currency can be
exchanged in markets for another currency to address balance of payments need
without facing substantial adverse exchange rate effect. This is best assessed through
observing across different markets the depth of trade of a currency and how
exchange rates react upon the conversion of currency amounts in magnitudes
common for IMF financing transactions.25 It should also be noted here that as trading
of foreign exchange is rather decentralized (i.e., over the counter), the availability of
such data is limited. Moreover, there is no fully objective mechanism to test the
market price reaction to the conversion of a large amount of a currency, since there
could be multiple factors affecting market prices at each point and any large
conversion would likely be broken up into smaller transactions to minimize price
effects. As for the “wide use” element, proxies are required to assess wide use (see
below).
3.3.5 What Are “Principal Exchange Markets”?
At the 2015 Review, the IMF also re-examined the characteristics of “principal
exchange markets” (“widely traded in the principal exchange markets”). Until the
mid-1990s, most foreign exchange transactions were conducted over telephone or in
person and confirmed later by mail, telex or fax. This enabled the concentration of
trading in certain geographical locations, such as London, New York and Frankfurt,
which are major financial hubs with necessary supportive infrastructure for foreign
currency trading. However, the evolution of modern market infrastructure, espe-
cially electronic trading, has helped integrate the trading hubs and transformed
foreign exchange trading into a round-the-clock market. This evolution has allowed
for foreign exchange trading to take place at any time without regard to location,
thanks to a wide array of electronic networks, single-bank proprietary trading
systems or other electronic communication networks. At the same time, however,
foreign exchange trading volumes continue to be highest during the business hours
of the major financial centers in Asia, Europe and North America.
term has also been interpreted by the IMF to mean a transaction between residents of different IMF
members, and not residents of the same member.
25A sizable IMF financing transaction, as assessed in the 2015 Review, could be, e.g. about SDR
5 billion (based on the actual five largest purchases between 2010–2015), or SDR 50 billion based
on the then largest potential one time purchase by a member. Under the IMF’s policy, the IMF
would assign the amount of each large purchase to all members with strong balance of payment or
reserve positions in proportion to their quota shares. All of these members may end up providing
different freely usable currencies, and as a result, the amount of a particular freely usable currency
received by the purchasing member may be uncertain.
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In light of the evolution of the market structure and consistent the purpose of
assessing currency-specific market depth and liquidity, it was determined that
“principal exchange markets” need to be considered in terms of three broad time
zones, correspondingly roughly to the Asian, European and North American market
hours, instead of geographical market locations.26 Accordingly, for a currency to be
widely traded, it needs to have sufficient market depth and liquidity in at least two of
these three time zones.
3.3.6 The Role of Indicators and the Need for Judgment
Given there is no direct objective measurement of the use of a currency in payment
for international transactions and the trading in principal exchange markets, the
Executive Board has since 1978 relied on quantitative indicators as proxies for
assessing wide use and wide trading. Prior to the 2015 Review, to assess wide use,
the IMF relied on data of: (1) the currency composition of official foreign exchange
reserves, reflecting the expectation that the larger the share of a currency in reserve,
the more likely that currency is used for external payments, and (2) international
banking liabilities and international debt securities denominated in a currency,
measuring how widely a currency is used in international financial transactions.
To assess wide trading, the IMF has relied on the data on volumes of currency
trading as high volumes indicate market depth. For the 2015 Review these indicators
were retained and refined, and a number of new indicators were added to assess the
wide use element: (1) official holdings of foreign currency assets, (2) issuance of
international debt securities (to complement the existing indicator on the stock
outstanding), (3) cross-border payments, and (4) use of letters of credit for trade
finance.
To determine whether a currency is freely usable, the Executive Board, however,
ultimately needs to exercise its qualitative judgement in evaluating the quantitative
indicators.27 Since the quantitative indicators are only proxies to measure wide use
and wide trading, they cannot be applied mechanistically. Further, the Articles do not
prescribe a threshold or minimum levels of “use” and “trading” based on which a
currency may be determined to be freely usable. Nor does the definition state “the
most widely used” and “the most widely traded”. In short, the Executive Board has a
certain discretion in determining a currency to be freely usable.
26As previously described, the requirement that a freely usable currency be a currency “widely
traded in principal exchange markets” is designed to ensure that there would always be principal
exchange markets with sufficient depth and liquidity for a purchasing member in IMF financing to
exchange the obtained currency, even in a large amount, for other currencies, without substantial
adverse exchange rate effect.
27The Executive Board’s determination of whether a currency is freely usable may be made by a
majority of the votes cast. It should also be noted that under the IMF’s rules and regulations, the
IMF is required to consult with a member before its currency is put on, or removed from, the list of
freely usable currencies. See Rule O-3(b) of the IMF’s Rules and Regulations, adopted in 1978.
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That said, there are strong considerations for the Executive Board to keep the list
of freely usable currencies short rather than long. A longer list would more likely
include currencies that conform less fully with the wide use and wide trading
requirements. Moreover, it is desirable that freely usable currencies be close sub-
stitutes so that no purchasing member would be at a disadvantage by receiving one
freely usable currency rather than another freely usable currency in a Fund-related
transaction.28
3.3.7 Determining the Free Usability of the RMB
Based on the clarified concept of the freely usable currency and informed by multiple
indicators on wide use and wide trade, the Executive Board concluded that the RMB
met both elements of wide use and wide trade, and determined the RMB to be a
freely usable currency effective October 1, 2016.29 The use of the RMB in interna-
tional transactions has increased substantially in the last few years and, even
excluding transactions among residents of China’s territories, reached a sufficient
level for the IMF to determine the RMB met the widely used requirement. Specif-
ically, based on the then most recently available data, the RMB ranked 7th as the
currency denomination of official foreign currency assets, accounting for about 1.1%
of the global share at end-2014; 5th as the currency denomination of international
banking liabilities, accounting for 1.8% of the global share by mid-2015; 9th as the
currency denomination of outstanding international debt securities, accounting for
0.4% of the global share by mid-2015; 6th as the currency denomination of inter-
national debt securities issued during the first half of 2015, accounting for 1.0% of
the global share during this period; 8th as the currency denomination of cross-border
payments, accounting for 1.1% of the global share by mid-2015; and 3rd as the
currency denomination of trade finance (letters of credit), accounting for 3.4% of the
global share by mid-2015.30
28The standard used for the purposes of determining the RMB to be freely usable would also apply
to other currencies if a more comprehensive review of freely usable currencies were to be
undertaken.
29The IMF made its determination in November 2015, but decided to delay the effectiveness of the
freely usable determination until October 1, 2016 to provide sufficient lead time for the IMF and its
members to enter necessary arrangements to prepare for the new role of the RMB as a freely usable
currency in IMF financing and as a currency of the SDR basket.
30The RMB was not ranked in the wide use indicator of “official reserves” in the 2015 Review
because there was no data in 2015 on IMF members’ holding of RMB in their official reserves. The
source of this data comes from the IMF’s Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange
Reserves (COFER), the IMF’s database to which 146 IMF members, non-member economies and
other reserve-holding entities provide quarterly data of their reserves on a voluntary and confidential
basis. Only from October 1, 2016, reporters began to provide to the COFER database separate data
on their official holdings of the RMB, together with other separately identified currencies
(US dollar, Euro, British pounds, Japanese yen, Swiss franc, Canadian dollar and Australian dollar).
At the end of both the fourth quarter of 2016 and the first quarter of 2017, the RMB ranked
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The IMF also determined that the RMBmeet the widely traded requirement as the
trading of the RMB in Asian and European time zones were considered to be
sufficiently deep to allow for the absorption of the RMB amounts in the magnitudes
that could be sold in an IMF financing transaction.31 In Asia, the RMB was among
the most-traded currencies in the Asian time zone, with its average daily turnover
measured in April 2015 of about US$205 billion. In Europe, the trading of the RMB,
while growing, still constituted a small share; however, it was considered reasonably
deep in the first part of the trading date in the European time zone as the daily RMB
trading recorded in London already averages over US$40 billion (Table 1).
3.4 Addition of the RMB in the SDR Basket
The assessment of the RMB as a freely usable allowed the Executive Board to add
the RMB to the SDR basket. Important considerations for its decision on basket
inclusion were also that suitable market exchange rates, a 3-month interest rate
instrument, and adequate hedging instruments were found to be available for the
RMB. While these are not a formal requirement under the SDR valuation decision,
they are critical aspects from an operational perspective for any SDR basket cur-
rency. The Chinese authorities also provided assurances on the free access of central

















2015: Q2 2015: Q2 2015: Q2 2016: Q2
USD 43.8 42.7 52.8 42.6 63.4
EUR 15.6 35.4 28.5 39.0 20.2
GBP 6.4 4.1 5.8 9.9 4.7
JPY 10.8 3.4 2.6 1.9 4.5
RMB
1/
2.0 1.1 1.8 0.4 n.a.
Other 21.4 13.2 8.6 6.3 7.2
Sources: IMF staff calculations based on data from Bank for International Settlements; Haver
Analytics; national sources; transactions values from SWIFT messages MT103 and MT202 exclud-
ing MT202COV; and IMF, Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves survey.
1/RMB ranked 8th in foreign exchange market turnover and cross-border payments, and 9th in
international debt securities outstanding. It was not separately identified in data on reserves
no. 7 among these top 8 currencies, accounting for about 0.8% of the total reported foreign
exchange reserves. See http://data.imf.org/?sk¼E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4
(last accessed 4 October 2018).
31See footnote 25 above.
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bank and other official SDR users to the on-shore foreign exchange and bond
markets and the free transferability of RMB between mainland China and
Hong Kong.
3.4.1 Exchange Rates
The daily valuation of the SDR requires the use of two exchange rates: an exchange
rate from an international market for the determination of the SDR valuation in USD
terms, and a second ‘representative’ rate for determination of the SDR value in local
currency terms provided by the local authorities.32 Under the relevant Executive
Board decision, the value of the SDR in terms of the U.S. dollar is calculated daily by
summing the values in U.S. dollars based on market exchange rates of the SDR
basket currencies (USD, EUR, JPY, GBP and RMB) which are generally
mid-market rates based on spot exchange rates observed at around noon London
time, as provided by the Bank of England.33 The representative rates, typically based
on representative (local market) rates, are provided by the relevant central bank.
Both rates, as being applied to each freely usable currency, need to be market-
based and used in markets to which IMF members, SDR users and their agents have
access. This is because the daily calculation of the SDR exchange rate against the
USD requires an exchange rate that is representative of exchange rates at which Fund
members and other SDR users can execute transactions for the purposes of Fund
operations and transactions, and for foreign exchange (FX) reserves management
purposes. Likewise, the representative rates for the freely usable currencies should
be market rates to ensure that no member is disadvantaged, regardless of which
freely usable currency is used in Fund operations.
Due to capital controls applicable on mainland China, which do not apply to the
special administrative region of Hong Kong, the RMB rates can vary even within
China. The restricted access onshore rate (generally known as the CNY rate) and the
unrestricted access offshore rate used in SAR Hong Kong (and outside China,
generally known as the CNH rate) have typically tracked each other closely, but
periodically there have been spikes in the spreads between the two exchange rates.
This raised concerns for SDR valuation as the RMB rate used for valuation of the
SDR in USD terms would need to be sourced from the Bank of England/FRBNY/
ECB (for which there would need to be sufficient RMB trading and liquidity in those
markets) and this rate would necessarily be the CNH (offshore) rate, whereas the
representative rate provided by the People Bank of China for valuation of the SDR in
local currency terms would be the CNY (onshore) rate. An additional concern for
32Rule O-2 of the IMF’s Rules.
33An Executive Board decision (Decision No. 16069-(16/95), adopted October 26, 2016) states that
mid-market rates at noon in the London exchange market as provided by the Bank of England will
be used in the first instance. If the London markets are closed, New York market rates provided by
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York will be used; and if both London and New York markets are
closed, rates provided by the European Central Bank will be used.
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IMF members who are required by their domestic legislation to hedge foreign
exchange exposures was that significant deviations between the two rates would
imply that the CNH would provide a less perfect hedge for CNY exposures.
The impact of any divergence between CNH and CNY rates on SDR users would,
however, largely be mitigated if SDR users have access to both the onshore and
offshore markets for conducting investment and hedging transactions. In the context
of the 2015 Review, China worked closely with IMF members to ensure such access
and the authorities undertook critical steps to reform then existing capital controls.
3.4.2 Components of the SDR Interest Rate
While there is no legal requirement to do so, the SDR interest basket matches the
SDR valuation basket in that short-term instruments for each currency in the basket
are included in the interest rate basket and weighted according to the currency
weights in the SDR basket so that return on SDRs closely tracks the return of its
component currencies. Instruments in the SDR interest rate basket are expected to
have certain characteristics, namely: (1) be broadly representative of the range of
financial instruments that are actually available to investors in a particular currency,
and the interest rate on the instruments should be responsive to changes in underly-
ing credit conditions in the corresponding money market; and (2) have risk charac-
teristics that are similar to the official standing of the SDR itself, i.e., have a credit
risk profile of the highest quality, fully comparable to that of government paper
available in the market or, in the absence of appropriate official paper, comparable to
the credit risk on prime financial instruments. The instruments should also reflect the
actual reserve asset choice of reserve managers, for example, as regards the form of
the financial instrument, its liquidity, and maturity.
Identifying an appropriate 3-month RMB interest rate instrument for inclusion in
the SDR interest rate basket was an additional operational requirement. A range of
instruments were assessed (including the Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate or
SHIBOR, the inter-bank repo market rate, the commercial bank certificates of
deposit) before settling on the 3-month benchmark yield for treasury bonds
published daily by the China Central Depository and Clearing Company (CCDC)
for inclusion in the SDR interest rate basket.34
34The SHIBOR, repo rates, and certificate of deposit rates were considered not to reflect sovereign
credit risk, and the latter two rates did not always move closely with underlying money market
conditions. The 3-month benchmark yield for China Treasury bonds, on the other hand, was
deemed the most directly comparable in terms of risk characteristics to the other instruments in
the SDR basket as it is broadly responsive to changes in underlying credit conditions in mainland
China’s market (i.e., onshore market).
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3.4.3 Size of the SDR Basket
The SDR basket was expanded from four to five currencies with the addition of the
RMB. This was intended to balance the need for a relatively small basket avoiding
undue costs and complexity for users, with a basket that sufficiently represented
currencies’ use in international transactions. Equally importantly, retaining a four-
currency basket in the event the RMB met the freely usable criteria would mean that
one of the four existing currencies in the SDR basket at the time would need to be
removed. Maintaining the basket at four currencies could have posed risks to the
stability of the composition of the basket as the export shares of the fourth-largest
(Japan) and fifth-largest (United Kingdom) exporters were close and their relative
rankings had switched in the past. At the same time, the gap between them and the
sixth-largest exporter (Korea) was substantial. The Executive Board thus determined
it appropriate to expand the SDR basket to five currencies.
3.5 Currency Weights and Amounts in the SDR Basket
Once the currencies for the SDR basket are identified, their relative weights in the
SDR basket need to be determined. At the 2015 Review, the Executive Board
replaced the old weighting formula adopted since the 2000 Review of SDR valuation
with a new formula taking into account exports (50%), reserves (16.66%), FX
market turnover (16.66%) and international banking liabilities and international
debt securities (16.66%). The currency based approach described above was used
in the currency weighting calculations, meaning that the variables used in the
weighting formula were measured: (1) for the euro, at the level of the European
Union, treating intra-European Union as domestic, and (2) for the RMB, at the level
of mainland China, treating Hong Kong, Macao SAR and Taiwan as international.
To facilitate a smooth transition between baskets, the SDR valuation methodol-
ogy provides that on the first day of the new basket (transition day), the value of the
SDR in U.S. dollars (and thus in all other currencies) be the same under the old SDR
basket and the new SDR basket. As a matter of practice, the currency amounts of
each currency in the SDR basket are determined on the last business day before the
new SDR basket becomes effective and remain fixed over the SDR valuation
period.35 Each day during the valuation period thereafter, the value of the SDR
(in U.S. dollars) is calculated as the sum of the currency amounts, valued at daily
exchange rates of the currencies against the U.S. dollar.
35Currency amounts are determined such that, using average exchange rates for the 3-month period
ending on the transition date, the share of each currency in the SDR corresponds to its weight as
determined by the IMF. On the transition day, calculations are made to ensure that currency
amounts correspond to the currency weights determined by the Board with minimal deviations
while observing the principle that the value of the basket remains stable on transition day.
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4 Conclusion
The inclusion of the RMB in the SDR basket recognizes the important progress in
the internationalization of the RMB over the last decade. While the RMB’s role in
the global economy is not at par with the US Dollar or the euro, the IMF membership
through the Executive Board considered it sufficiently widely used and widely
traded to determine it a freely usable currency and include it in the SDR basket.
Operational concerns were also addressed in the review, in part through the Chinese
authorities providing unimpeded access to RMB interest rate and exchange rate
instruments for investment and hedging purposes to Fund members’ central banks,
and other SDR users, and the availability of a short-term instrument for the SDR
interest rate basket.
The 2015 Review raised substantive legal and policy issues, many of which had
not been considered since the late 1970s. Changes in how financial markets now
work and data points currently available were factored into the discussions on legal
interpretation, which were guided by the underlying purposes of the provisions in the
Articles. The critical role of judgment in decision making by the Executive Board
was highlighted at many points in the process.
The transition to the new SDR basket on October 1, 2016 was smooth. The
introduction of the new SDR interest rate basket resulted in a small (9 basis points)
increase in the SDR interest rate. The RMB can now be used in IMF financial
transactions as a freely usable currency with no significant operational issues so far.
The SDR interest rate which was hovering around its established floor of 0.05%
before the 2015 Review has increased following the inclusion of an RMB interest
rate instrument but not significantly. The next SDR valuation review is scheduled for
2021 when the IMF will again assess the appropriateness of the SDR valuation
methodology and the currency composition of the SDR basket.
In the lead up to the 2015 Review, the Chinese authorities promoted the interna-
tional use of the RMB in several ways including by entering into several bilateral
currency swap arrangements and using the RMB as the currency of settlement in
trade, and most importantly, by undertaking several far reaching domestic reforms
towards liberalization of mainland China markets. In addition, following inclusion of
the RMB in the SDR basket, China has promoted the use of the SDR. For instance,
the World Bank issued SDR denominated bonds in China which were
oversubscribed.36
The renewed interest in the SDR has also, once again, sparked a discussion of the
role the SDR should or could play in the international monetary system. Various
ideas on revamping the SDR are being explored, such as to optimize SDR alloca-
tions, to facilitate the issuance of SDR-denominated official and private financial
instruments, and to increase the use of SDRs as a unit of account in international
36See https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/08/31/world-bank-successfully-
prices-oversubscribed-landmark-sdr-denominated-bond-in-china (last accessed 4 October 2018).
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trade pricing. Thus, despite the somewhat esoteric nature of the SDR, the 2015
Review may have left a long-term, significant impact on the international monetary
system, as well as the IMF and its membership.
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1 EU – Fatty Alcohols: Panel Report
1.1 Facts of the Dispute
In this dispute, Indonesia challenged an anti-dumping determination by the EU
concerning “fatty alcohols” imported into the EU from a number of countries,
including Indonesia. “Fatty alcohols” is the collective name for chemical compounds
that are used in the production of detergents, surfactants and personal care products.
The most important claim of this dispute—from a commercial as well as legal
perspective—concerned a calculation adjustment that the European Commission
(the anti-dumping investigating authority in this case) made to the export price of
one of the Indonesian investigated companies. In anti-dumping investigations, the
determination of dumping is based on a comparison of the normal value—the sales
price or the cost of the product in its home market—and the export price, the sales
price in the export market. Dumping exists if the export price is lower than normal
value. Numerical adjustments by the investigating authority that increase normal
value or that reduce the export price are of particular interest because they mathe-
matically either increase a dumping margin or create one in the first place, which has
significant commercial repercussions for both the exporter and the importing com-
panies in the export market.
In this case, the EU Commission reduced the calculated export price by making a
deduction to reflect the intervention of a sales entity related to the Indonesian
producer and located in Singapore. The logic behind the Commission’s adjustment
was that, when a producer hires a trader to arrange its sales, it must pay the trader a
commission or some other form of fee. The Commission initially made this
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adjustment for the two investigated Indonesian producers and subjected both com-
panies to anti-dumping duties, emphasizing that, in this respect, the two producers
were in an identical set of circumstances. However, following a judgment by the
European Court of Justice in an unrelated case under EU law, the Commission
re-opened the fatty alcohols investigation and determined that the two companies
were in a fundamentally different situation. Based on this new assessment, the
Commission cancelled the adjustment for one company (thereby eliminating the
finding of dumping), but maintained the deduction for the other company.
1.2 Salient Legal Findings
1.2.1 Adjustment to the Export Price Under Article 2.4
Adjustments of the kind applied by the Commission to the export price of the
investigated company fall under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Indonesia argued that the Commission had acted inconsistently with that provision.
The thrust of the argument was that the Singapore-based entity was the producer’s
sales department for the product at issue, in that it negotiated, arranged and
conducted all sales and marketing activities. The Indonesia-based producer merely
shipped the products to their final destination. Both companies were owned by the
same group entity. Functionally, the two companies were thus, according to Indo-
nesia, one single economic unit, albeit split up formally into legally separate entities.
Indonesia argued that this was not a situation where an independent trader (for
instance, a company like Cargill), unrelated to the producer, is hired by an unrelated
producer to arrange that producer’s sales. Indonesia also argued that the fact that the
Singapore based entity retained a percentage of the sales price under a written
transfer-pricing agreement, in order to ensure its own financing and cash-flow, this
monetary flows/retention of this kind between related companies must be examined
from the perspective whether the two companies are so closely intertwined that these
monetary flows amount merely to shifting resources from one “pocket” to another
“pocket” of a single entity. Further, in Indonesia’s view, what matters for the
adjustment under Article 2.4 is whether a genuine expense exists. Only in that
case may an adjustment be made. A genuine expense exists when monetary funds
leave an entity, such as when an independent trucking company is hired or when an
independent trader organises a sale. However, if the trading entity (or a wholly-
owned trucking department/company) is merely a formally separate part of the larger
company, then monetary flows between the production and trading entities are
merely company-internal allocation of funds, and selling expenses like salesmen
salaries, are indirect selling expenses that cannot be adjusted for. Hence, Indonesia
argued, it is crucial for the investigating authority to examine the structural, corpo-
rate, managerial and control links between the two entities, to determine if they
should be treated as one or, instead, as operating at arm’s length.
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The Panel rejected Indonesia’s claim. The ruling relied, in part, on the finding of
the Commission that, while the Singaporean entity intervened on the export side,
there was no equivalent intervention of the Singapore sales entity on the domestic
sales side (no written contract/transfer pricing agreement). This meant that a differ-
ence existed between the domestic and the foreign sales, a difference that in the
Panel’s view the investigating authority could legitimately adjust for. Beyond this
fact, the Panel stated that the existence of what Indonesia referred to as a “single
economic entity” is not dispositive of how the transaction should be treated, and that,
even among closely related parties, the intervention of a “downstream participant” in
a sales transaction may result in additional costs that may be adjusted for. The Panel
concluded that the Commission had a sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude that, in
this particular dispute, the adjustment was appropriate.
1.2.2 Non-attribution Under Article 3.5 and Disclosure of Verification
Results Under Article 6.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
In addition to the Article 2.4 claim, the Panel rejected Indonesia’s challenges
concerning the Commission non-attribution determination. Indonesia argued that
the Commission had inadequately analysed whether, in addition to dumped imports,
other factors were causing harm to the EU domestic fatty alcohols industry. For
instance, Indonesia pointed out that the Commission had dismissed arguments
concerning the effects of the pervasive 2008–2009 economic crisis in a single
paragraph. Indonesia also pointed to other actual or potential factors. The Panel
rejected each of these claims, holding the Commission’s analysis to be adequate.
However, the Panel found the EU determination inconsistent for lack of a proper
disclosure of the results of the on-the-spot verification, in violation of Article 6.7 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Panel rejected the core of the EU’s defense that
equated the results of the verification, on the one hand, with the “essential facts”
under Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, on the other hand. Because WTO
Members have the option of disclosing the results of the verification at the same time
as they disclose the essential facts, the EU argued that the results of the verification
can be read to reflect only those results that are essential, within the meaning of
Article 6.9. The Panel found that these two categories of facts are distinct. The Panel
then found that disclosure under Article 6.9 required, at a minimum, the part of the
questionnaire response or other information for which supporting information was
requested (during the verification visit), whether any further information was
requested, and whether further documents were collected by the authorities. More-
over, the verification results should state whether the producer made available the
evidence and additional information requested and indicate whether the investigat-
ing authorities were or were not able to confirm the accuracy of the information
supplied by the verified companies, in particular, in their questionnaire responses.
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1.3 Appeal
Indonesia appealed the panel report with respect to the Article 2.4 finding, and the
EU cross-appealed the Panel’s finding under Article 6.7. The Appellate Body upheld
both panel findings. A more detailed description of the Appellate Body Report will
be provided in next year’s EYIEL issue.
1.4 Observations on the Salient Aspects of the Panel Report
There is only very limited case law concerning the treatment of related companies
under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Previous instances include the US – Hot-rolled
Steel and, more relevantly for this dispute, the unappealed panel report in Korea –
Paper. The latter case concerned the discretion of the investigating authority to treat
two formally separate entities at once. In that dispute, the panel enumerated certain
criteria relating to common management, ownership and control as the key indicia of
whether two companies could be treated as a single entity. In the instant case,
Indonesia argued that the investigating authority was required to examine these
criteria in order to determine whether a flow of financial resources between two
entities was an expense for the paying entity (the Indonesia-based producer), rather
than a shifting of resources between two formally separate entities that, in reality,
form one single economic entity.
Unfortunately, the Panel decided this dispute without ever directly addressing
Indonesia’s central argument. The Panel report provides practically no guidance on
how to treat payments between related parties. The Panel accepts that some pay-
ments will result in adjustable expenses, and other payments will not; states that
everything depends on case-specific circumstances; and the corporate ownership,
management and control criteria proposed by Indonesia are not dispositive. More-
over, the panel report can even be understood to suggest that every time a separate
“downstream” entity intervenes in a transaction, an adjustment can be made as if that
entity were operating at arm’s length, without the investigating authority having to
verify whether that is indeed the case. But other than agreeing with the EU’s
determination in this particular case, the Panel does not interpret Article 2.4 and
apply its interpretation to the facts before it to determine what then the proper
(dispositive) criteria are that an investigating authority should examine by virtue of
Article 2.4. The panel ruling is thus very unsatisfactory from both the case-specific
and the broader systemic perspective.
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2 EU – Biodiesel: Panel Report and Appellate Body Report
2.1 Facts of the Case
The measure at issue in this dispute was again an EU Commission’s dumping
determination, this time on imports of biodiesel from Argentina. Argentine biodiesel
is produced from soy bean oil, and the competing EU industry produces (less
efficiently) mostly from rapeseed oil. Under a separate investigation, anti-dumping
measures were also imposed on imports from Indonesia, which produces biodiesel
from palm oil; Indonesia challenged that determination as a separate WTO dispute.
In addition to the biodiesel anti-dumping duties (“as applied”), Argentina also
challenged “as such” a provision under the EU’s Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation,
which is the legal framework under EU law that governs anti-dumping
investigations.
2.2 Salient Legal Findings
2.2.1 Legal Foundations
The by far most important aspect of this case concerns the EU’s adjustment
methodology when calculating the cost of production of the investigated product.
By way of background, when an investigating authority determines the normal
value on the basis of cost of production, it may occasionally disagree with the
investigated company on the figures contained in the company’s financial records.
Under Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the investigating authority
must, in principle, use the financial data as it finds them in the company’s financial
records. However, the authority is entitled to depart from these recorded costs, inter
alia, when these costs do not “reasonably reflect” the costs of production. In practice,
a frequent point of disagreement between companies and investigating authorities
are issues concerning allocation of overhead costs to different products. Another
practical example is transfer pricing between related entities. These examples,
broadly speaking, concern technical accounting practices.
In contrast, in this dispute, the EU Commission rejected the costs of soy bean oil
(the main raw ingredient for producing soy bean-based biodiesel) as recorded in the
exporting companies’ books for a much more fundamental reason. The Commission
reasoned that the soy bean price in the Argentine domestic market was distorted, due
to governmentally-imposed export restrictions that artificially lowered its price. Put
differently, the Commission rejected the accurately recorded price/cost, without any
objection to the accounting process or standard, but rather on the ground that, on the
Argentina market writ large, the price of soybean oil was not what—according to the
Commission—it should have been. The Commission then replaced the recorded
value with a surrogate value, taken from internationally-quoted soy bean prices.
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Argentina challenged this cost calculation methodology under Article 2.2.1.1 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, arguing that an investigating authority’s objections
about a market price in a WTO Member’s market do not feature among the
legitimate reasons under Article 2.2.1.1 for which a recorded value can be rejected.
The Panel agreed with Argentina. It found that Article 2.2.1.1 focusses on costs
actually incurred, and not on costs that would have been incurred under an alterna-
tive set of circumstances in an allegedly undistorted market. The Panel found that the
phrase “reasonably reflect” connotes the faithful and accurate depiction of informa-
tion and refers to records of a producer/exporter that depict all the costs that the
producer/exporter has incurred in a manner that is—within acceptable limits—
accurate and reliable. The Panel also found support in other provisions of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement (e.g. Article 6.10) that suggest that the cost of production
are individual to each producer and thus cannot, in principle, be subject a standard-
ized cost benchmark that would apply equally to all producers. The Panel also
refused to follow the EU’s argument to extrapolate from Article VI of the GATT
the proposition “that the concept of ‘dumping’ is generally intended to cover any
distortion arising out of government action or circumstances such as those surround-
ing Argentina’s export tax system and its impact on soybean prices as an input
material for biodiesel.”
The Panel thus found a violation of Article 2.2.1.1. The Panel went on to make a
consequential finding that the EU had also violated Article 2.2, because it had
applied a value that did not reflect the cost of production in the country of Argentina;
the Panel pointed out that the EU’s surrogate value had the explicit purpose to
remove the alleged distortion in the Argentine market and was a cost benchmark
from outside of Argentina.
The Panel nevertheless rejected Argentina’s “as such” claim against a provision
in the EU’s Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation. Specifically, Argentina claimed that
the same violation found under its “as applied” claim was effectively mandated by
Article 2(5), second paragraph, of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation. Argentina
argued that Article 2(5) required the EU, whenever it found that costs/prices were
distorted, to discard the data in the producers’ financial records and to resort to
surrogate values. The Panel rejected Argentina’s reading of EU law, finding that
Article 2(5), second paragraph, became relevant only if (and after) the Commission
found that the producer’s records did not “reasonably reflect” the cost of production,
and did not inform the Commission’s inquiry whether the records indeed did
reasonably reflect the cost of production.
On appeal, the Appellate Body upheld all of these Panel findings. On the “as
applied” claims of Argentina, it found that the “reasonably reflect” condition in
Article 2.2.1.1 refers to a situation in which the records sufficiently correspond or
reproduce the costs incurred by the producer. It also rejected the EU’s argument that
the word “reasonably” in Article 2.2.1.1 introduced a general standard of “reason-
ableness” for all costs used in the cost-of-production benchmark. Rather, the Appel-
late Body found that an investigating authority has no “unfettered discretion to
define subjectively” a benchmark of “reasonableness” in order to assess whether a
producer’s recorded costs are unreasonable.
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The Appellate Body also agreed with the findings under Article 2.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. Here, both the EU and Argentina appealed. The EU argued
that the Panel had found incorrectly that the costs used by the EU did not relate to
cost of production in Argentina; the Appellate Body pointed out that the costs/prices
used by the EU had been taken from an international pricing sources and were
applied by the EU without any attempt to adjust these international values to the
realities of the Argentine market.
Argentina, for its turn, argued that the Panel erred by accepting that, under Article
2.2, an investigating authority can use out-of-country cost benchmarks (even if it
subsequently adjusts these benchmarks to the reality in the country of production).
The Appellate Body again agreed with the Panel and distinguished between (inter-
national) information and costs. It found that, as long as the investigating authority
adjusts international values/information to the specific circumstances of the country
of production, it can act consistently with Article 2.2 by determining cost of
production in the country of production all the while using international information.
The Appellate Body did not have an opportunity provide guidance on how this
adjustment would occur.
However, the Appellate Body explicitly limited the use of out-of-country infor-
mation under Article 2.2 to situations in which the obligation under Article 2.2.1.1
does not apply or where relevant information from the exporter or producer under
investigation is not available. Put differently, the Appellate Body’s interpretation of
Article 2.2 and the permissibility of relying on out-of-country information does not
affect the duty of an investigating authority to fully comply with Article 2.2.1.1.
Thus, Article 2.2 does not entitle an investigating authority to do under Article 2.2
what it is precluded from doing under Article 2.2.1.1.
The Appellate Body subsequently also upheld the Panel’s findings on Argentina’s
as such claims, rejecting Argentina’s arguments, which were based on a particular
reading of the text of the EU’s Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation. Like the Panel
before it, the Appellate Body disagreed with Argentina’s reading, stating that the
relevant provisions did not mandate the investigating authority (the Commission) to
act inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
2.2.2 Other Findings
The Panel rejected a number of additional claims by Argentina, concerning the
determination of an appropriate profit margin for Argentine producers in the con-
struction of cost of production under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as
well claims concerning the Commission’s non-attribution analysis under Article 3.5
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In contrast, the Panel found a violation by the EU
of Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Panel also found that
the EU violated Article 9.3, because it applied a duty that exceeded the dumping
margin. On appeal, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding under Articles 3.5
and 9.3.
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2.3 Treaties
The cost adjustment methodology addressed in this dispute is but one incarnation of
a broader trend in anti-dumping policies around the world. To a large extent—
although not exclusively—these practices reflect the phasing out of the Accession
Protocol of the People’s Republic of China. Under Article 15 of the Accession
Protocol, China could be treated as a non-market economy, and its normal value
could be determined by alternative methodologies, usually involving surrogate
countries. Without this legal basis, recourse to non-market calculation methodolo-
gies is possible only pursuant to the Ad Note Article VI, which requires that the
country at issue essentially be a Stalinist command-style economy.
In order to address perceived market distortions (primarily in China, but also
potentially in other exporting countries), investigating authorities have developed
cost-adjustment methodologies that apply not to the exporting country as a whole,
but rather to a specific industry, either that of the product at issue or an input product.
Recorded costs are rejected, on the grounds that the market price is distorted due to
governmental intervention such as subsidies, operation of state-owned enterprises,
price controls and similar policies.
These cost adjustment methodologies will no doubt keep the dispute settlement
system busy in the following years. The EU’s implementation of the EU – Biodiesel
ruling has consisted in elaborating a new cost adjustment methodology that does not
appear very different from the old one. Essentially equivalent cost adjustment
methodologies are used by investigating authority in a plethora of WTO Members.
Based on the Appellate Body’s findings in EU – Biodiesel, it is arguably very
difficult to imagine that any of these methodologies—at least on an “as applied”
basis—could withstand a WTO challenge. No matter what the technical details of
any given methodology may be, any cost adjustment on the grounds typically put
forward—distortions of the market—can be squared with the Appellate Body’s
ruling under Article 2.2.1.1 in EU – Biodiesel.
The real underlying problem is that, historically, dumping determinations have
focussed on corporate pricing behaviour. Governmental distortions of the market
could be taken into account under subsidies disciplines. The cost adjustment meth-
odologies operate in a grey, interstitial zone between these two sets of policy areas.
The policy justification of the users of these disciplines is that a country like China,
with its idiosyncratic system sometimes dubbed as “state capitalism”, with numerous
subtle and less-subtle interventions, challenges the traditional distinction between
corporate and state behaviour and between a market economy and a non-market
economy. WTO dumping-related case law will remain fascinating for years to come
(assuming the current US anti-WTO stance does not destroy the dispute settlement
system before that).
Overview of WTO Jurisprudence in 2016 433
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
3 US – Washers: Panel Report and Appellate Body Report
3.1 Factual Background
This dispute concerns a challenge by Korea of certain United States “as such” and
“as applied” anti-dumping measures as well as aspects of a countervailing duty
(CVD) determination. Primarily, this dispute concerns the so-called third or asym-
metrical comparison methodology under the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. This methodology is intended to be exceptional, to be
used when the two “normal” methodologies cannot take into account “appropri-
ately” the factual circumstances at hand. The raison d’être of this methodology is to
“unmask” “targeted dumping”. In trade remedy policy, the term “targeted dumping”
implies that an exporter will (deliberately) sell at low, dumped prices only to certain
customers, or to customers within a certain region or during a certain time period; in
the remainder of sales scenarios, the exporter will charge normal or higher prices,
which allegedly serve to “cover up” the previously-mentioned, abnormally low sales
to the targeted customers, regions or in the targeted time periods. Calculating
country-wide averages would, in these circumstances, vindicate the evil dumper’s
nefarious designs, as average figures would “cover up” or “mask” the dumping by
offsetting the dumped transactions with non-dumped transactions. Hence, the third
methodology is intended to assist the investigating authority in “un-masking” this
otherwise hidden targeted dumping.
Recourse to this third methodology greatly increased in the past years, in partic-
ular in the United States. The key driver of this trend has been the Appellate Body’s
outlawing of zeroing under the first and second methodologies in original dumping
investigations. Manifestly, therefore, the third methodology is not being used for the
purpose for which it had been designed—that is, for addressing the special case of
targeted dumping. Instead, the true motivation has been to drive up the calculated
dumping margins as much as possible, and to burden imports accordingly, by using
the last remaining methodology under which—at least according to a view held by
some in the trade remedy community—zeroing was still permitted.
In that sense, this dispute was also another episode of the broader zeroing saga in
WTO dispute settlement. After a raft of disputes in the 2000s and early 2010s, the
Appellate Body had clearly ruled that the practice of zeroing in anti-dumping
investigation is inconsistent with multiple provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agree-
ment. The term “zeroing” denotes a dumping margin calculation approach that, in
various different incarnations and different procedural contexts, sets certain inter-
mediate figures to zero instead of using the actually-obtained values. By modifying
(or “manipulating”, as some would say) intermediate figures in this manner, inves-
tigating authorities can calculate dumping margins that are higher than would
otherwise be the case or the authorities create dumping margins in the first place.
Because the third methodology had previously been used very sparsely and thus
many details concerning its application had not been elaborated in detail, the US
Department of Commerce (USDOC) had to develop the applicable methodologies
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over time. Thus, over a certain period, the various parameters of the third method-
ology evolved under United States law. This included, for instance, the methodology
to determine the existence of a “pattern” that justifies the use of the third method-
ology. For a while, the third methodology under United States law was something
akin to a “moving target”. It is for this reason that Korea’s challenge related to two
distinct tests or methodologies, one of which was referred to as the “Nails II” test
(named after an investigation involving the product nails) as well as the successor of
that methodology, the so-called differential pricing methodology (DPM). Both
methodologies carry a strong mathematical or statistical component, neither of
which can be explained in detail within the limits set for this article.
3.2 Salient Legal Issues
3.2.1 Interpretation of Article 2.4.2 Second Sentence
The Panel and the Appellate Body interpreted Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement with respect to multiple aspects of the third (asymmetrical) comparison
methodology, thereby providing important guidance for future investigations. Below
we provide a few highlights. The below discussion does not cover all of the technical
details of the methodologies, due to the limited scope and overview nature of this
article. It may also be noted that the findings below extend to both the Washers
investigation (“as applied”) as well as to the United States “as such” measures, as
appropriate.
Existence of a Pattern of Significantly Differing Prices, Within the Meaning
of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
One of the key questions addressed by the panel and the Appellate Body concerns
the existence of a “pattern” of prices that differ significantly between purchasers,
regions or time periods. It is the existence of that pattern that permits an investigating
authority to avoid the application of the first two “normal” comparison methodolo-
gies. The first comparison methodology under Article 2.4.2 entails comparing a
weighted-average normal value to a weighted-average export price (W-to-W meth-
odology). The second methodology entails comparing the normal value and the
export price of individual transactions (and subsequently combining them into one
overall margin/result). An investigating authority is free to choose between one of
these two “normal” methodologies.
In contrast, the third comparison methodology involves a comparison between
a weighted-average normal value to individual export prices (hence the term
“asymmetric”). Beyond determining the existence of a “pattern” of transaction prices
that differ “significantly”, the investigating authority must provide an explanation
for why it (the authority) was unable to address this form of pricing behaviour
through one of the “normal” comparison methodologies (W-to-W or T-to-T).
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By and large, the case raised two questions surrounding the existence of a
“pattern”. First, is it sufficient for the investigating authority to point purely to
numerical/quantitative variations in the relevant prices or is something else required?
Korea argued that an investigating authority must find numerically significantly
differing prices, but in addition must also discuss potential reasons for these price
differences. For instance, the differences may be explained by discounted sales
during a particular holiday period, which in Korea’s view should preclude a finding
of targeted dumping. However, the panel held that a quantitative approach by the
authority is sufficient, and that the investigating authority need not explore the
reasons for the pricing pattern. The Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the
investigating authority need not investigate the reasons behind the pricing pattern.
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body corrected the panel and found that both a quanti-
tative and qualitative explanations are required to determine the existence of a
pattern; for instance the nature of the product or the markets may be relevant. Put
differently, the Appellate Body appears to have struck a middle ground between the
panel’s and Korea’s approach to identifying a pattern.
The second question related to the nature of the price variations assessed under
the DPM, the United States second (and later in time) methodology. Under the DPM,
USDOC as the investigating authority would combine all price variations (that is,
both those higher and those lower than a benchmark value), as well as all price
variations across purchasers, regions and time periods. By combining all of these
price variations, the USDOC increased the likelihood of a “pattern” finding. Both the
panel and the Appellate Body held that, in so doing, the United States had aggre-
gated “random and unrelated price variations”, thereby making an improper finding
of a pattern. In a nutshell, both the panel and the Appellate Body held that only
export prices lower than the benchmark should count for the pattern (and not those
higher, because these sales do not qualify as dumped), and the price variations
should be assessed separately for any chosen parameter (purchaser, region or time
period), rather than combining them. The United States approach constituted a
violation of Article 2.4.2, and the Appellate Body upheld that ruling. In that way,
the panel and the Appellate Body raised the bar—in comparison to the US method-
ologies—for identifying a pattern under Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
Application of the W-to-T Methodology Outside of the Pricing Pattern
Another issue concerned the universe of export transactions to which the W-to-T
methodology should be applied. The “pattern” of transactions with different prices
will be only a subset of the total universe of export transactions. Should the W-to-T
methodology be then applied to all export transactions or, instead, only to the
“pattern” export transactions? Both the panel and the Appellate Body found that
only the “pattern” transactions, rather than all export transactions, should be subject
to the W-to-T methodology. They based themselves largely on the phrase “individ-
ual export transactions” in Article 2.4.2, drawing from this phrase the conclusion that
the third methodology should be applied only to the transactions that justify its use.
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Because in some instances the United States had applied the W-to-T terminology to
all export transactions, the United States was found to have violated Article 2.4.2, b.
Recourse to Zeroing in the Context of the W-to-T Methodology
Another important question was the use of zeroing under the W-to-T methodology.
The United States had applied zeroing in the underlying investigation, which meant
that it had converted to zero the margins of transactions in which the export price was
higher than normal value. The Panel found that, because the focus of the W-to-T
methodology was on “individual export transactions” within the pattern, each
transaction should be considered in its own right and with equal weight, without
regard for whether the export price is above or below normal value. Because the
United States had, in contrast, privileged the weight of the transactions whose price
was below normal value, it had failed to give all transactions the requisite equal
weight. The Panel thus found a violation of Article 2.4.2 also on this count.
The Appellate Body upheld the ruling of the Panel. In a nutshell, the Appellate
Body’s reasoning followed that of the Panel, relying on the term “individual export
transaction”. It found that zeroing was not necessary in order to unmask dumping,
contrary to what the United States argued, because the unmasking of targeted
dumping was achieved already by limiting the W-to-T methodology to the export
transactions within the pattern. The Appellate Body also rejected the United States’
“mathematical equivalence” argument, according to which the use of the W-to-T
methodology without zeroing would be equivalent to using the W-to-W methodol-
ogy to the same subset of transactions, which would render the application of the W-
to-T methodology meaningless and would reduce the second sentence of Article
2.4.2 to a nullity. The Appellate Body did not consider this argument valid, since the
use of the third methodology in its view was properly to be confined to the “pattern”
transaction only, rather than to all export transactions, unlike under the W-to-W
methodology would have to be. Against this backdrop, any accidental mathematical
equivalence in a particular case could not detract from the proper interpretation of the
second sentence of Article 2.4.2.
One Appellate Body Member dissented from the majority view on this point, and
found that zeroing was permissible under the third methodology. The dissenting
Member built his argument on the exceptional nature of the third methodology and
on the need to prevent “re-masking” of the targeted dumping (within the pattern), by
requiring the investigating authority to offset below normal value transactions with
above normal value transactions. Moreover, according to that Member, the phrase
“prices of individual transactions” also supported this approach.
Requirement to Explain Why the Dumping Could Not Be Properly Taken into
Account Through the W-to-W or T-to-T Comparison Methodologies
The final aspect discussed in this article is the duty of the investigating authority to
justify its use of the third, exceptional methodology, by explaining why the price
differences under Article 2.4.2 “cannot be taken into account appropriately by the
use of a weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-transaction com-
parison”. In essence, the investigating authority must explain why the targeted
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dumping cannot be meaningfully “un-masked” by one of the two normal comparison
methodologies.
In the Washers investigation, the USDOC’s explanation focused on the W-to-W
comparison methodology. The USDOC did not make a reference and did not
provide any explanation with respect to the T-to-T methodology. The panel found
this approach to be consistent with Article 2.4.2. In its view, the authority need not
provide an explanation with respect to both “normal” comparison methods. The
panel’s reasoning revolved around the indefinite article “a” before the mention of the
W-to-W and T-to-T methodologies, read in conjunction with the word “or” which is
considered to be disjunctive and the word “comparison” in the singular. The panel
also reasoned that requiring an explanation with respect to both normal methodol-
ogies would affect the initial discretion that an investigating authority has in
choosing between these two methodologies.
The Appellate Body—rightly, in the authors’ view—reversed the panel and held
that the authority must provide an explanation with respect to both normal method-
ologies. The Appellate Body pointed out the panel’s mistake in emphasizing the
singular in “a comparison”, because the equally authentic French version refers to
the plural (“les comparaisons”). Moreover, requiring an explanation with respect to
both the W-to-W and T-to-T before resorting to the W-to-T methodology is more in
keeping with the “normal” nature of the first two methodologies and the exceptional
nature of the third methodology.
An additional aspect was the “appropriateness” standard concerning of the United
States’ explanation pertaining to the W-to-W methodology. Under Article 2.4.2,
USDOC was required to explain why the pricing differences could not be “appro-
priately” taken into account by using the “normal” comparison methodologies.
USDOC had explained that the targeted dumping could not be meaningfully
addressed by means of the W-to-W methodology because of the averaging effect
of that comparison methodology, and because the first and third methodology
yielded substantially different results. In the panel’s view, this was insufficient,
because averaging was in the very nature of the W-to-W methodology; the panels
appears to have suggested that the investigating authority should examine, in this
context, whether the pricing differences at issue might be due to circumstances other
than targeted dumping. This is because investigating authorities should avoid apply-
ing the second sentence in factual circumstances that have nothing to do with
targeted dumping. This finding was not appealed.
3.2.2 Regional Specificity Under Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement1
Besides the many aspects of the third dumping comparison methodology, the dispute
also included certain claims under the SCM Agreement. In a nutshell, the panel
1Panel Report, US –Washers, paras. 7.256 to 7.289. Appellate Body Report, US – Washers, paras.
5.206 to 5.241.
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rejected Korea’s claims concerning the USDOC’s CVD determination, which
revolved around specificity and aspects of the calculation of the CVD. The Appellate
Body, among other things, reversed two of the panel’s three findings and instead
found that USDOC had acted inconsistently with certain provisions of the SCM
Agreement and the GATT 1994.
One interesting finding in this context—on which both the panel and the Appel-
late Body agreed—concerns regional specificity. Under Article 2 of the SCM
Agreement, a subsidy has to be specific to be subject to the disciplines of the SCM
Agreement; thus, an investigating authority in a CVD investigation must determine
that a subsidy is specific. Specificity means that the subsidy is not spread across and
broadly available throughout the entire economy, but instead is skewed to the benefit
of a certain company or industry (or a subset of companies or industries).
Under Article 2.2, if a subsidy is available only to enterprises in a particular
region, the subsidy is considered to be specific. In this dispute, the panel and the
Appellate Body clarified that regional specificity exists even when the subsidy
depends on a company having any assets, including those without legal personality
(office, branch, production facility) in the specifically designated area, while the
headquarters remain in a non-designated area. Put differently, if a subsidy is tied to a
company’s assets being in a particular region, the subsidy does not cease to be
regionally-specific simply because these assets are not formally incorporated.
Another interesting clarification was that the relative size of the designated area is
irrelevant. In the instant case, Korea had excluded access to a tax break for assets
located in the Seoul Metropolitan area. Put differently, the Korean government
created an incentive for companies to locate assets (factories, offices, etc.) outside
of the Seoul Metropolitan area, to address the overcrowding of the Metropolitan
area. Both the panel and the Appellate Body rejected the argument that a subsidy
available throughout 98% of a country’s territory should be deemed, effectively, to
be as a good as a subsidy that is available throughout 100% of the territory. The
territorial size of the region was held not to constitute a relevant criterion for
rejecting regional specificity, because this interpretation reflects the function of the
specificity criterion—to capture subsidy schemes that “direct resources to certain
geographical regions within [a WTO Member’s] jurisdiction[], thereby interfering
with the market’s allocation of resources”.2
3.3 Observations on the Salient Aspects of the Panel
and Appellate Body Report
This report is noteworthy for providing a first, but thorough interpretation of the
second sentence of Article 2.4.2. It adds to the anti-zeroing case law and is likely to
irritate further the pro-zeroing lobby in the United States; it fits into the broader
2Panel Report, US – Washers, para. 7.273. Appellate Body Report, US – Washers, para. 5.236.
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landscape of trade remedy case law that, by holding investigating authorities to the
letter of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and circumscribing their already wide dis-
cretion, is unfortunately responsible for the current anti-WTO mood in the rather
frighteningly myopic current United States administration and USTR leadership.
From that perspective, it is somewhat unfortunate that the Appellate Body report
includes a dissenting opinion on the use of zeroing under the third methodology.
4 US – Anti-Dumping Methodologies: Panel Report
4.1 Factual Background
This dispute concerns three different sets of measures. The first relates to the use of
the so-called “targeted dumping” methodology in which the United States’ Depart-
ment of Commerce (USDOC) calculated the margin of dumping in three anti-
dumping determinations on the basis of a weighted average-to-transaction (WA-T)
methodology for the calculation of the margin of dumping. The second set of
measures relates to the so-called “Single Rate Presumption” by which the USDOC
presumes that all non-market economy (NME) exporters form part of a single entity
controlled by the government, and therefore imposes a country-wide antidumping
duty rate, unless each exporter individually proves that it operates under market
conditions. This challenge was both “as such” and “as applied” in 13 original
investigations and 25 administrative reviews. The third set of measures relates to
what China calls “the AFA norm”, which means that, “whenever the USDOC made
a finding that an NME-wide entity failed to cooperate to the best of its ability, it
adopted adverse inferences and, in determining the duty rate for the NME-wide
entity, selected facts from the record that were adverse to the interests of such entity,
and the exporters included within it”. This challenge was both “as such” and “as
applied” in 13 original investigations and 17 administrative reviews.
4.2 Salient Legal Findings
The Panel report covers a comprehensive analysis of each of the three sets of
measures listed above. The Panel found that the USDOC had acted inconsistently
with Article 2.4.2 in its application of the WA-T methodology in the three chal-
lenged determinations. Moreover, the Panel found that the Single Rate Presumption
was inconsistent, as such and as applied, with Articles 6.10 and 9.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. With respect to the AFA norm, the Panel found that the
measure as such that China challenged did not constitute a norm of “general and
prospective application” and declined to rule on the substantive claims. Moreover,
the Panel exercised judicial economy with respect to the as applied claims
concerning the AFA norm.
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4.2.1 The Use of the WA-TMethodology in Dumping Calculations (with
Zeroing)
The Panel addressed several arguments by China under Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. Most of these arguments were about the specific calculations
made in the challenged determinations. The Panel found that the USDOC had made
mistakes in its statistical model that led it to conclude erroneously that there existed a
“pattern of export prices which differ significantly among different purchasers,
regions or time periods” within the meaning of Article 2.4.2. Therefore, the Panel
found that the USDOC had acted inconsistently with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement by deciding to apply the exceptional WA-T methodology.
There are at least three relevant issues addressed by the Panel that have systemic
implications. First, Article 2.4.2, second sentence, requires that, in using the excep-
tional WA-T methodology, an investigating authority must provide “an explanation
as to why” the differences among purchasers, regions or time periods “cannot be
taken into account appropriately by the use of a weighted average-to-weighted
average or transaction-to-transaction comparison”. China argued that the USDOC
provided such an explanation with respect to weighed average-to-weighted average
(WA-WA) but failed to provide an explanation regarding transaction-to-transaction
(T-T).
The Panel recalled that a few months earlier, the panel in US –WashingMachines
was confronted with the same question—i.e. whether an authority must provide
explanations as to why both WA-WA and T-T are not appropriate to account for the
differences among purchasers, regions or time periods. That panel had concluded
that “the use of the indefinite article ‘a’ in the explanation clause of Article 2.4.2,
combined with the disjunctive ‘or,’ and the use of the term ‘comparison’ in the
singular . . ., shows that the requisite explanation needs to be provided only in respect
of one type of comparison methodology, be it the WA-WA ‘or’ the T-T
methodology”.
In this dispute, the Panel took a different approach. It considered that the WA-T
methodology in the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 is couched as an “exception” to
both “normal” WA-WA and T-T methodologies. Relying on Appellate Body juris-
prudence, the Panel concluded that the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 requires that
“the explanation needs to be provided with respect to both of the normal methodol-
ogies”, that is, both the WA-WA and T-T methodologies. Therefore, the Panel
interpreted the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
differently from the panel in US – Washing Machines.
Second, China challenged the fact that the USDOC applied the WA-T compar-
ison to all export transactions as opposed to the “pattern of export prices which differ
significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods”. The Panel noted
that the use of the word “individual” in the second sentence of Article 2.4.2
“suggests that the WA-T methodology will apply only to certain ‘individual export
transactions’ and not all export transactions”. These “individual export transactions”
are those falling within the pattern of export prices that differs among purchasers,
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regions or time periods. Accordingly, the Panel found that the USDOC had acted
inconsistently with the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 by applying the WA-T
comparison to all export transactions.
Third, the Panel addressed whether the use of zeroing in the WA-T comparison
was inconsistent with Article 2.4.2, second sentence, of the Anti-Dumping Agree-
ment. The Panel recalled that the Appellate Body had found that the use of zeroing in
the WA-WA and T-T methodologies was inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994. Turning to the analysis of the second
sentence of Article 2.4.2, the Panel found that this provision requires an investigating
authority to compare the weighted average normal value with the prices of “indi-
vidual” export transactions. This suggests that an investigating authority needs to
have “particular regard to the price of each such export transaction, and particularly
the intermediate comparison results generated from a comparison of the weighted
average normal value with each such transaction, so as to not disregard the ‘indi-
vidual’ characteristics of the prices of such transactions”. The Panel concluded that
the use of zeroing is “proscribed” under the WA-T methodology because “an
investigating authority fails to have proper regard to the ‘individual’ characteristics
of the prices of those export transactions which are found to be higher than the
normal value”.
In concluding that zeroing is impermissible under Article 2.4.2, second sentence,
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Panel rejected the United States’ argument
that, in the absence of zeroing under the WA-T methodology, the second sentence of
Article 2.4.2 would “be rendered inutile” as the margins of dumping calculated
through the WA-T methodology will be “mathematically equivalent to those calcu-
lated through the WA-WA methodology”. The Panel concluded that the “mathe-
matical equivalence advocated by the United States holds only in specific
circumstances”—i.e. when the authority uses a WA-T for the in-pattern transactions
and WA-WA for the out-of-pattern transactions on the basis of the same normal
value under both methodologies. The Panel noted that authorities may use normal
values under each of these methodologies on the basis of different time periods, in
which case the alleged “mathematical equivalence” would not arise.
4.2.2 The Country-Wide Duty Rate for NME Countries
The “As Such” Challenge
China challenged that the USDOC adopted a norm of general and prospective
application, called the Single Rate Presumption, which presumes that all of the
NME exporters are part of a single entity under government control, and thereby
assigned a single, country-wide anti-dumping duty rate, unless each exporter proves
to the USDOC that it operates under market conditions. If such showing is made, the
exporter would be entitled to an individual anti-dumping duty rate. According to
China, the Single Rate Presumption is inconsistent with Articles 6.10 and 9.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement.
442 J. Bohanes et al.
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
The Panel began by assessing whether the alleged “norm of general and prospective
application” existed. The Panel analysed over 100 USDOC determinations, the
USDOC Policy Bulletin No. 05.1, the Antidumping Manual, a number of Court
decisions, and the templates for NME exporters to apply for separate rates to
conclude that the Single Rate Presumption, as described by China, constitutes a
norm of general and prospective application.
The Panel then assessed China’s substantive claims. It took note that a very
similar measure imposed by the European Union—i.e. the Individual Treatment
test—had been addressed by the panel in EC – Fasteners (China) and EU – Footwear
(China), and that the very same USDOC measure challenged by China had already
been addressed by the panel in US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam). These panels had all
found those measures to be inconsistent with Articles 6.10 and 9.4 of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement.
The Panel observed that Article 6.10 requires that, “as a general rule”, exporters
be entitled to an individual margin of dumping and that this obligation is subject to
the limited exceptions set out in the WTO covered agreements. The Panel then set
out to ascertain whether paragraph 15 of China’s Accession Protocol contained one
such exception and recalled that the Appellate Body had already held that paragraph
15 “establishes special rules regarding the domestic price aspect of price compara-
bility”, but does not contain “an open-ended exception that allowsWTOMembers to
treat China differently for other purposes such as the determination of export prices
or individual versus country-wide margins and duties”.
On the basis of the existing WTO jurisprudence, the Panel concluded that nothing
in the covered agreements allows authorities to depart from the general rule to grant
individual margins of dumping to exporters on the grounds that those exporters do
not operate under market conditions. The Panel thus found that the Single Rate
Presumption is inconsistent with Article 6.10 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Similarly, because the Single Rate Presumption precludes the USDOC from spec-
ifying individual antidumping duties and name the individual suppliers of the
product concerned, as required under Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,
the Panel found that the measure at issue is also inconsistent with that provision.
On the one hand, it could be said that this Panel report limited itself to reapplying
the existing body of jurisprudence that had been developed in relation NME-wide
duty rates—i.e. in EC – Fasteners (China), EU – Footwear (China), and US – Shrimp
II (Viet Nam). On the other hand, the Panel report addressed novel arguments
concerning the interactions between different paragraphs of the Working Party
Report on China’s WTO accession, such as paragraphs 26, 43 through 49, 171
through 176, and 147 through 152. The analysis of these paragraphs, however, did
not change the conclusion that the Single Rate Presumption is inconsistent with
Articles 6.10 and 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
The “As Applied” Challenge
As explained, China also challenged the application of the Single Rate Presumption
in 38 anti-dumping determinations—i.e. 13 original investigations and 25 adminis-
trative reviews. The Panel found that the Single Rate Presumption was effectively
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applied in these determinations and therefore concluded that such application was
inconsistent with Articles 6.10 and 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
4.2.3 Whether the AFA Norm Constitutes a Norm of “General
and Prospective Application”
The “As Such” Challenge
China also challenged the so-called AFA norm, which is an “unwritten” norm by
which, “whenever the USDOC made a finding that an NME-wide entity failed to
cooperate to the best of its ability, it adopted adverse inferences and, in determining
the duty rate for the NME-wide entity, selected facts from the record that were
adverse to the interests of such entity, and the exporters included within it”. The
Panel analysed the relevant excerpts in the Anti-Dumping Manual, decisions by the
US Court of International Trade and 73 USDOC anti-dumping determinations to
conclude that China had established the “precise content” of the unwritten norm it
was challenged.
Next, the Panel assessed whether that unwritten norm had “general and prospective
application”. The Panel found that the Antidumping Manual was couched in per-
missive terms, whereas the decisions by the US Court of International Trade could
not support China’s assertion that the alleged AFA norm had general and prospective
application. With respect to the 73 USDOC determinations, the Panel “agree with
China that the USDOC’s treatment of a non-cooperating NME-wide entity in the
73 determinations reflects more than mere repetition of conduct”. However, relying
on the Appellate Body report in Argentina – Import Measures, the Panel noted that
the “prospective application” of a measure “must achieve a certain degree of security
and predictability typically associated with rules or norms” that goes beyond mere
practice. The Panel did not see that “degree of security and predictability” in the
evidence provided by China and therefore concluded that China had failed to
establish that the AFA norm constituted a norm of general and prospective applica-
tion. As a consequence, the Panel declined to rule on the substantive claims under
Article 6.8 and paragraph 7 to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
The “As Applied” Challenge
With respect to China’s claim concerning the application of the AFA norm in
30 anti-dumping determinations—i.e. 13 original investigations and 17 administra-
tive reviews—the Panel first recalled that these 30 determinations were part of the
38 determinations in respect of which the Panel had previously found to be incon-
sistent with Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the
determination that an NME-wide entity existed was incorrectly based on a
presumption—i.e. the Single Rate Presumption.
Moreover, the Panel took note of the fact that the application of the AFA norm in
the 30 challenged determinations proceeded on the premise that there was an
NME-wide entity to which adverse facts available would be applied. Therefore,
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since the existence of the NME-wide entity in each of these determinations was
incorrectly presumed, the Panel found no need to address the additional claims
regarding the inconsistency of the AFA norm with Article 6.8 and paragraph 7 to
the Anti-Dumping Agreement. For the Panel, “[a]ny new or modified measure that
the United States may adopt to implement the Panel’s findings regarding the
application of the Single Rate Presumption in the 30 challenged determinations
must accord with Articles 6.1 and 6.8, paragraphs 1 and 7 of Annex II, and the
first sentence of Article 9.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement”. Therefore, the Panel
exercised judicial economy with respect to the application of the alleged AFA norm
in 30 anti-dumping determinations.
5 EC – Fasteners (21.5): Appellate Body Report
5.1 Facts of the Case
This is a compliance proceeding regarding an anti-dumping measure taken to
comply with recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
in EC – Fasteners (China). “Fasteners” is generic term for bolts, screws and washers.
Upon the adoption of the panel and the Appellate Body reports in the original
dispute on 23 July 2012, the European Union initiated a “review investigation” to
implement the DSB recommendations and rulings. The review investigation resulted
in Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 924/2012 (the implementing mea-
sure), which concluded that “the injurious dumping determined in the original
investigation [wa]s confirmed”, and revised the anti-dumping rates applicable to
certain fasteners from China.
China filed a WTO complaint under Article 21.5 of the DSU arguing that the
implementing measure was inconsistent with Articles 2.4, 2.4.2, 3.1, 4.1, 6.1.2, 6.2,
6.4, 6.5, 6.5.1 and Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994.
The Panel found that the implementing measure was inconsistent with Articles
2.4, 2.4.2, 3.1, 4.1, 6.2, 6.4, and 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The European
Union appealed all of the Panel findings under these provisions. In its report,
Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s findings of inconsistency.
5.2 Salient Legal Findings
The Appellate Body report addressed a vast array of issues under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. However, this dispute generally concerned legal issues on which there is
already extensive jurisprudence, including in the original panel and Appellate Body
reports. The following sections highlight certain discrete developments that the
Appellate Body report in this dispute presented.
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5.2.1 Ex Post Explanations in Confidential Information Under Article
6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
The Panel concluded that the European Commission (the Commission) acted incon-
sistently with Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by according confidential
treatment to information concerning the list and characteristics of the Indian
company’s fasteners. This information was the basis on which the Commission
calculated normal value. The Panel found that the Commission accorded confidential
treatment to this information without conducting an objective assessment of whether
such information was confidential by nature or whether the Indian company had
provided good cause.
The European Union appealed that finding arguing, inter alia, that it had
“explained repeatedly” to the Panel that there was “strong competition between
Pooja Forge and the Chinese producers in the after-sales market in India”, and that a
“significant” risk existed “in view of the particularly competitive situation in the
India market”. The Appellate Body observed that the European Union’s argument
constituted “ex post rationalization” and that “it would have been incongruous with
the applicable standard of review for the Panel to have determined whether the
Commission had objectively assessed whether Pooja Forge had shown good cause
for the confidential treatment of the information at issue on the basis of ex post
rationales provided by the European Union in the course of the current WTO dispute
settlement proceedings”.
The Appellate Body thus concluded that the requirement in Article 6.5 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement to provide “good cause” before granting confidential
treatment is violated if such showing is lacking in the request for confidential
treatment and in the authority’s published reports and related supporting documents.
5.2.2 The “Dialogue” Required in Article 2.4, Last Sentence,
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
The Panel found that the Commission had acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement by failing to put the Chinese producers on notice with
regard to the type information that was required for purposes of the comparison
between normal value and export prices for purposes of the last sentence of Article
2.4.
On appeal, the Appellate Body observed that Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement consists of several sentences. The first refers to the obligation “to ensure
a fair comparison” between export price and normal value. The Appellate Body also
held that exporters play a role in this process—specifically they “bear the burden of
substantiating, ‘as constructively as possible’, their requests for adjustments
reflecting the ‘due allowance’ within the meaning of Article 2.4”.
The Appellate Body then went on to analyse the last sentence of Article 2.4,
which requires that the authority “indicate to the parties in question what information
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is necessary to ensure a fair comparison”. This provision provides for a “dialogue”
between the authority and the interested parties as to what information is required to
substantiate requests for adjustments in the comparison under the first sentence of
Article 2.4.
In addition, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel in finding that this dialogue
under the last sentence of Article 2.4 is of “particular relevance” in the context of an
investigation involving an NME, given that normal value is not based on prices or
costs in the country under investigation.
The Appellate Body further considered that, normally, the dialogue under the last
sentence of Article 2.4 must take place prior to issuing the essential facts under
Article 6.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. However, it did not foreclose the
possibility that, on certain occasions, the essential facts letter could be the appropri-
ate vehicle through which to comply with the procedural requirements in the last
sentence of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Accordingly, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s interpretation of the last
sentence of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
5.2.3 The Issue of Whether the Authority May Disregard Certain
Product Models in Conducting the Comparison Required
in Article 2.4.2
Another interesting issue in this dispute is the fact that the Commission disregarded
transactions in relation to certain product types which did not match any of products
sold by the Indian company, whose data was used to calculate the normal value. The
Panel found that the Commission’s approach was inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement because, in its view, once a product has been defined
by the authority, “a margin of dumping that excludes certain export transactions
[within the like product] cannot be said to have been calculated for the investigated
product as a whole” as required under Article 2.4.2.
On appeal, the Appellate Body recalled that an authority may, in using the
WA-WA methodology, adopt the “multiple averaging” approach whereby the like
product is divided into several categories or products types. However, the Appellate
Body agreed with the Panel that “the term ‘all comparable export transactions’
means that a Member ‘may only compare those export transactions which are
comparable, but [] it must compare all such transactions’”, and that, “where an
investigating authority has chosen to undertake multiple comparisons, the results of
all of those comparisons must be taken into account in order to establish margins of
dumping for the product as a whole”.
For the Appellate Body, once the like product has been defined, an authority is
not allowed to exclude transactions of products within that definition since this
would not be consistent with the requirement in Article 2.4.2 that “all comparable
export transactions” be taken into account. If for certain products, no matching
transactions are found on the export price side of the comparison, the Appellate
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Body recalled that the authority could under Article 2.4 make adjustments to account
for the differences that affected price comparability.
Accordingly, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s interpretation and applica-
tion of Article 2.4 with respect to a situation in which an authority excluded certain
transactions of products falling within the like product on the grounds that no
matching transactions are available.
5.2.4 The Domestic Industry Defined as Those Companies That Were
Cooperating and Agreed to Be Included in the Injury Sample
The Panel found that the Commission acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 4.1
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by defining the domestic industry by reference to
the domestic producers that explicitly stated their agreement to be part of the injury
sample. The Panel considered that the Commission’s approach suffered from “a self-
selection process that introduced a material risk of distortion” in the definition of
domestic industry.
In upholding the Panel, the Appellate Body recalled its previous jurisprudence to
the effect that the conditioning of inclusion in the domestic industry definition on the
willingness to be included in the injury sample creates a “material risk of distortion”
because it only takes into account those producers willing to cooperate and excludes
those that oppose the investigation or do not wish to cooperate. For the Appellate
Body, the Commission’s approach conflates the definition of the domestic industry
and the selection of the injury sample; the former is the universe of producers that is
by definition wider than the sample of cooperating producers.
Accordingly, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding that the Commis-
sion’s approach to the definition of the domestic industry is inconsistent with Article
4.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it introduced “a material risk of
distortion”; and with Article 3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because the injury
determination was based on an erroneously defined domestic industry.
The Panel and the Appellate Body reports were adopted by the DSB on
12 February 2016. At the DSB meeting of 23 March 2016, the European Union
informed the DSB that it had repealed the anti-dumping duties on fasteners from
China.
6 India – Solar Panels: Panel Report and Appellate Body
Report
6.1 Factual Background
The measures at issue in this dispute were local content requirements imposed by
India under the so-called Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission. The declared
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objective of the Indian government was to turn India into a global leader in solar
energy as well as to contribute to efforts to combat climate change. The Solar
Mission in turn was part of the broader “Made in India” campaign, aiming to
encourage both Indian and foreign companies to produce in India.
The measures carried a strong sense of déjà-vu for those familiar with the Canada –
Feed-In Tariff dispute, decided in 2013. The Indian government would enter into
long-term power purchase agreements with solar power developers, guaranteeing a
certain rate of return for 25 years. In order to be eligible for these contracts, the
energy producers at issue were compelled to use in their production facilities certain
Indian-manufactured cells and modules. These local content requirements were
tightened over time. In the early stages of the Solar Mission programme, a portion
of solar cells and modules was permitted to be sourced from abroad; in the later
stages, the local content requirement became more extensive, until virtually no
foreign energy-generating equipment could be used without losing access to the
long-term power purchase agreement. The dispute was brought by the United States.
The dispute was brought due to the significant size of the Indian market; in addition,
the United States expected a strong precedential effect, given that local content rules
of this type (including in the renewable energy arena) are wide-spread among WTO
Members.
6.2 Salient Legal Findings
6.2.1 Article 2 of the TRIMS Agreement and Articles III:4 and III:8(a)
of the GATT 1994
The United States challenged the measures under Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement
which provides that “no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the
provisions of Article III of the GATT 1994”. The TRIMs Agreement includes an
“illustrative list” of measures that are inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT
1994. The type of measures relevant for this dispute were “those which are manda-
tory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compli-
ance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require the purchase
or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source”.
The Panel therefore examined Article III:4. Among India’s arguments, a prom-
inent line of defense was that the measures at issue were government procurement
measures within the meaning of Article III:8(a), which would have removed them
from the scope of Article III:4 and thus from the scope of the illustrative list under
the TRIMS Agreement. India’s main problem was that—even assuming the gov-
ernment’s purchase and resale of electricity could be qualified as “purchased for
governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale”—the Appellate
Body had held in Canada – Feed-in Tariffs that the product procured and the product
discriminated had to be in a “competitive relationship”. In the India – Solar Panels
dispute, just like in Canada – Feed-in Tariffs, the product discriminated against and
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the product procured were not the same and did not appear to be in a competitive
relationship. The product discriminated against was the energy-generating equip-
ment, whereas the product procured by the government was electricity. India’s
creative arguments that the generation equipment was an “integral input” to the
purchased electricity and that, by purchasing electricity generated from the cells and
modules at issue, the Indian government was effectively procuring the cells and
modules, fell on deaf ears. The panel thus found that the Indian local content
requirements violated India’s obligations under the GATT Article III:4 and the
TRIMs Agreement, and were not covered by the government procurement deroga-
tion in Article III:8(a).
The Appellate Body upheld the Panel finding. It emphasized that, although inputs
can play a role in the determination whether two products are in a competitive
relationship, a consideration of inputs does not displace the competitive relationship
standard. The Appellate Body also found that the measures at issue were not
distinguishable from those at issue in Canada – Feed-In Tariffs.
6.2.2 India’s Defense Under Article XX(j)
As another line of defense, India relied on the rarely-invoked sub-paragraph (j) under
Article XX. Article XX(j) provides that WTO Members may maintain measures
“essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short
supply”. The historical purpose of this provision was to ensure that, in the post-
World War II period, governments would be able to restrict (in particular) exports, in
order to ensure that products in short supply would be available for the local
population. The operation of Article XX(j) is subject to a proviso that that all
contracting parties are entitled to an equitable share of the international supply of
such products, and that any such measures “shall be discontinued as soon as the
conditions giving rise to them have ceased to exist.” Moreover, the last sentence of
Article XX(j) envisaged a review process by the GATT Membership, which had
been extended multiple times—in an inconclusive manner—during the GATT era.
India argued before the Panel that solar cells and modules are “products in general
or local short supply” in India, within the meaning of Article XX(j) on account of its
lack of domestic manufacturing capacity. The panel rejected this defense. In essence,
the panel reasoned that lack of domestic manufacturing capacity was distinct from a
shortage of a particular product, because Article XX(j) does not distinguish between
domestic and imported products. Thus, as long as imported products are available to
meet local demand, short supply within the meaning of Article XX(j) does not exist.
The Panel also rejected India’s argument that Article XX(j) could cover products that
could, at some point in the future, become in short supply.
The Panel findings were upheld by the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body
agreed with the Panel that Article XX(j) does not limit the scope of potential sources
of supply to “domestic” products manufactured in a particular country. It thus
rejected India’s argument that a lack of “sufficient” domestic manufacturing capacity
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will necessarily constitute a product “shortage” in a particular market. It also found
that India had not identified any disruptions in imports, such that it was not clear why
domestic manufacturing capacity would be required to address future demand. Like
the Panel, the Appellate Body therefore dismissed India’s defence under Article XX
(j).
6.2.3 India’s Defense Under Article XX(d)
India also invoked as a defense Article XX(d). Under this provision, the defendant
has to demonstrate that the incriminated measure is a tool to enforce another,
WTO-consistent measure. India argued that the local content requirements were
measures necessary to enforce certain both domestic and international legal pro-
visions related to energy security and renewable energy targets.
The case offered an interesting opportunity for the panel and the Appellate Body
to define the scope of measures that qualify as “laws and regulations” to be enforced
through the challenged measure.
Among the international measures listed by India featured the preamble of the
WTO Agreement, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Rio
Declaration. The main question was whether these instruments had been incorpo-
rated into Indian law or had direct effect, as this was found by the Panel to be the
key criterion under Article XX(d) in the light of the Appellate Body’s findings in
Mexico – Softdrinks. The panel denied that question. On the domestic side, the main
issue was whether the measures invoked by India constituted legally enforceable
rules of conduct in the Indian legal system, as opposed merely programmatic
objectives and hortatory norms that would have to be further specified and elabo-
rated on by the Indian legislature or regulatory agencies. Applying this criterion, the
panel rejected the National Electricity Policy, the National Electricity Plan and the
National Action Plan on Climate Change as “laws or regulations” under Article XX
(d). It found only Article 3 of the Indian Electricity Act to be relevant, which was a
provision that mandates the Government to prepare a national Electricity Policy and
tariff policy. The panel was sceptical whether Article XX(d) covered measures taken
by the Government towards its own compliance with a provision (as opposed to
measures taken to ensure compliance of legal subjects other than the Government,
such as corporations or private citizens). In any event, the panel found that it could
not discern any link between Article 3 of the Electricity Act and the domestic content
requirements at issue.
Here again, the Appellate Body largely confirmed the panel’s approach. The
Appellate Body noted that in determining whether a responding party had identified
a rule that falls within the scope of ‘laws or regulations’ under GATT Article XX(d),
a panel should consider factors such as the degree of normativity of the instrument
and the extent to which the instrument operates to set out a rule of conduct or course
of action that is to be observed within the domestic legal system of a Member. The
panel should also consider the degree of specificity of the relevant rule, whether the
rule is legally enforceable, including, e.g. before a court of law; whether the rule has
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been adopted or recognized by a competent authority possessing the necessary
powers under the domestic legal system of a Member; the form and title given to
any instrument or instruments containing the rule under the domestic legal system of
a Member; and the penalties or sanctions that may accompany the relevant rule. If
based on these criteria the measure appeared to be “hortatory, aspirational, declar-
atory, and at times solely descriptive”, it did not qualify under Article XX(d). The
Appellate Body cautioned, however, that to the extent that the panel may have
suggested that the laws or regulations were limited solely to legally enforceable
rules of conduct, this would be incorrect. It is not entirely clear what precisely the
Appellate Body meant in this context, and the Appellate Body Report does not
contain an example to illustrate this distinction.
The Appellate Body also agreed with the panel ruling on the international
measures, finding that the international instruments India identified were not rules
that form part of its domestic legal system and fall within the scope of “laws or
regulations” under Article XX(d).
6.2.4 Reflections on the Salient Aspects of the Panel and Appellate Body
Report
This case is interesting as a rare and probably only occasion on which Article XX
(j) was analyzed by the WTO dispute settlement bodies. Given its narrow scope and
the interpretation resulting from this dispute—that “shortage” is to be assessed
taking into account imports—Article XX(j) will likely return to its existence of
dormant oblivion in the dark recesses of Article XX.
The case also confirmed the previous findings under Article III:8(a) of the GATT
1994, that for the government procurement exception to become applicable, the
product discriminated against must be the same as, or in a competitive relationship
with, the product procured. The one remaining question remaining open in this area
is, as the Appellate Body indicated in footnote 523 of the Report in Canada – Feed-in
Tariffs, whether Article III:8(a) applies in the context of inputs incorporated into the
procured goods. For instance, assume that the government procures cars, but stipu-
lates that only cars with domestic tires are eligible. Under the Appellate Body’s
“competitive relationship” standard, this scenario may not benefit from the Article
III:8(a) derogation, because the discriminated product is tires, but tires are not in a
competitive relationship with cars. On one view, this is desirable, because the scope
of Article III:8(a) should not be stretched too far. On another view, excluding this
scenario from the derogation effectively requires the procuring government to
exclude foreign cars altogether from the procurement process, rather than only the
foreign tires. Hence, a procuring government (not subject to the Government
Procurement Agreement) wishing to support its domestic tire makers cannot choose
to limit the protectionist effect of its procurement policies to those tires, but must
instead move the discrimination to the much higher level of discriminating against
foreign cars. It is not clear that this is a good idea from a policy stand-point; it may
make sense to permit a government to limit the discrimination to an input. The
452 J. Bohanes et al.
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
Appellate Body may have been hinting at this scenario in footnote 523. While this
expands the scope of application of Article III:8(a), this expansion can be clearly
policed and does not lead to a slippery slope, at the end of which a scenario like in
India – Solar Panels would escape the strictures of Article III:4. There is a distinction
between expanding Article III:8(a) to cover inputs, on the one hand, and expanding it
to cover upstream generation equipment, on the other hand.
Finally, this case is interesting in how it further clarifies the scope of “laws or
regulations” under Article XX(d), both with respect to domestic and international
measures.
7 EC – Large Civil Aircraft (21.5): Panel Report
7.1 Facts of the Case
This dispute concerns the EU’s alleged failure to comply with the findings of the
Panel and the Appellate Body in the EC – Large Civil Aircraft case, which
concerned certain illegal subsidies granted by the EU to Airbus large civil aircraft.
In particular, the US argued in this compliance dispute that (1) the EU had failed to
take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or withdraw the subsidies under
dispute in the original proceedings; and that (2) two series of measures bearing a
close connection with the original proceedings, the “Launch Aid”/“Member State
Financing” (LA/MSF) contracts for Airbus A350XWB and A380 respectively,
constituted new prohibited export and/or import substitution subsidies.
7.2 Salient Legal Findings
The Panel conducted a four-step analysis of the US’ claims. First, it reviewed a series
of actions which the EU claimed to constitute “steps” taken to secure compliance
with the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in the
original proceedings (Sect. 7.2.1); thereafter, it examined whether the A350XWB
LA/MSF measures fell within the scope of the dispute (Sect. 7.2.2), to then proceed
with the merits of the prohibited subsidy claims in respect of the A350XWB and
A380 LA/MSF measures (Sect. 7.2.3). Finally, the Panel addressed the EU’s alleged
failure to “withdraw” the subsidies under dispute or “take appropriate steps to
remove [their] adverse effects” (Sect. 7.2.4).
7.2.1 EU Actions Constituting Actual Compliance Steps
In its compliance communication of 1 December 2011, the EU had identified no less
than 36 actions allegedly taken to comply with the DSB recommendations and
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rulings. After carefully examining the purported compliance steps, the Panel opined
that only two of them could be said to be grounded in any specific conduct related to
the subsidies or their adverse effects, i.e. the imposition of additional fees for the use
by Airbus of the Bremen Airport runway extension, and the revision of the terms of
Airbus’ lease agreement regarding on use of the Mühlenberger Loch industrial site in
Hamburg.
With respect to the remaining 34 actions, the Panel noted that, rather than
constituting actual compliance steps, they represented but an assertion of facts or
presentation of arguments in support of the following positions on the law advanced
by the EU: “(a) the adopted rulings and recommendations give rise to no compliance
obligation at all, under the terms of Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement, with respect
to expired subsidies; (b) an expired subsidy means that it has been “withdrawn” for
the purpose of Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement; (c) an expired subsidy cannot
cause adverse effects in the context of a proceeding initiated under Article 21.5 of the
DSU; and (d) the passage of time, and events that have taken place over the passage
of time, have diluted the causal link established in the original proceeding such that
the challenged subsidies are no longer a ‘genuine and substantial’ cause of adverse
effects in the post-implementation period.”
7.2.2 Scope of the Compliance Dispute
In the original dispute, the US had failed to establish the existence, as of July 2005,
of an LA/MSF commitment measure for the Original A350 constituting a specific
subsidy within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). Subsequently, Airbus abandoned the
A350 programme, and the governments of France, Germany, Spain as well as the
UK turned began to support the A350XWB programme instead. As LA/MSF for the
A350XWB did not exist at the time of the original dispute, naturally, no findings
were made in the respect to the same.
As the A350XWB LA/MSF measures had not, nor could they have been,
declared by the EU to constitute measures taken to comply with the original pro-
ceedings, in order to determine whether any claims related thereto pertained to the
compliance dispute the Panel was called upon to apply the ‘close nexus’ text,
requiring the existence of a ‘particularly close relationship’ between the declared
measures, the measures in casu and the original recommendations and rulings. As a
threshold issue, the Panel clarified that this was not to be equated to an alleged
requirement of an existence of “an overarching measure derived from the identifi-
cation of an alleged pattern in instances of the application of such measure”. The
Panel determined that, in the instant case, such “particularly close relationship”
existed since: (1) both the A350 and A350XWB measures were loan agreements;
(2) they contained the same core repayment terms; (3) they had been concluded
between virtually the same parties, for the same purpose of financing Airbus large
civil aircraft; (4) the effects of the new measures could undermine the compliance
with the original ruling; (5) the new aircraft would replace the aircraft under dispute
454 J. Bohanes et al.
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
in the original proceedings; and (6) the adoption of the A350XWB measures before
the ruling on the A350 measures was not capable of severing the link of the nature
and effects of the A350XZB measures with and the original recommendations and
rulings and the EU’s compliance acts.
7.2.3 Issues Concerning Prohibited Subsidies
As a preliminary matter, the Panel was first required to determine whether the United
States’ prohibited subsidy claims fell within the scope of the proceedings. With
respect to the claims under Article 3.1(a) of the SCMAgreement in relation to certain
A380 LA/MSF measures, the Panel reasoned that, even though the Appellate Body
had addressed but not completed the analysis of the same in the original proceedings,
those could be brought before the compliance Panel, for “to accept that the United
States’ unresolved Article 3.1(a) claims should be excluded because of the absence
of any relevant ‘measures taken to comply’, in a situation where the A380 LA/MSF
measures are already properly before us would unduly elevate form over substance.”
In contrast, the Panel found that claims brought under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM
Agreement in relation to the A380 LA/MSF measures, which had neither been
introduced before the original Panel nor did they relate to measures taken to comply
with the latter’s findings, were outside the scope of the dispute.
On substance, the Panel rejected both the 3.1(a) (for A380 and A350XWB
LA/MSF) and 3.1(b) (A350XWB) subsidy claims. In this connection, it first exam-
ined whether the A350XWB measures conferred a benefit (as the US did not dispute
their characterization as financial contributions), concluding after a long analysis of
the general corporate borrowing rates and project-specific risk premia that the rates
expected under the A350XWB LA/MSF contracts were lower than the relevant
market benchmark.
Having found that the A350XWB measures constituted subsidies, and the A380
measures constituting subsidies as per the findings of the original Panel and the
Appellate Body, the 21.5 Panel turned to its de facto contingency analysis under
Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. It found that, while the subsidies were granted
in anticipation of export performance, the relevant Ratios Analyses did not demon-
strate that the measures were contingent upon it. On Article 3.1(b), the Panel noted
that payment under the contracts so long as the manufacturer engaged in domestic
production activities was neither evidence of de jure nor of de facto contingency. In
particular, drawing on Article III:8(b) GATT 1994 as relevant context, the Panel held
in so many words that “[the provision] confirms that, without more, the mere
payment of subsidies to firms so long as they engage in domestic production
activities should not be interpreted as imparting to such subsidies a discriminatory
element as among domestic and foreign goods in a manner that Article III may
discipline.” As such, the Panel dismissed the claim of contingency on import
substitution under Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.
Overview of WTO Jurisprudence in 2016 455
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
7.2.4 The EU’s Failure to Take Appropriate Steps to Withdraw
the Subsidy or Remove Its Adverse Effects
Upon dismissing the prohibited subsidy claims, the Panel turned to Article 7.8 of the
SCM Agreement and the US’ contention that the EU had not taken “appropriate
steps to remove the adverse effects or withdraw the subsidy”, as required by that
provision. In essence, the Panel was requested to determine whether the EU had
brought its measures into conformity with its obligation under Article 5 of the SCM
Agreement not to cause adverse effects to the interests of other Members though its
subsidies.
The EU averred that it had complied with its obligations under Article 5, and
consequently Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement, as the lives of the French, German
and Spanish LA/MSF subsidies for Airbus A300B/B2/B4, A300–600, A310, A320,
A330/A340 as well as the UK subsidies for A320 and A330/A340 had come to an
end. This raised the question of whether the coming to an end of the life of a subsidy
is tantamount to withdrawal for the purposes of Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement,
where the subsidy’s long-term adverse effects persist.
The Panel reasoned that, where a subsidy ceases to exist not due to an “interven-
ing event”, such as its repayment or alignment with a market benchmark, but rather,
because the total period of time over which its projected value is expected to
materialize passively transpires, such subsidy is not “withdrawn” for the purposes
of Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement. By and large, the Panel suggested that it
would be absurd to equate the materialization, i.e. the full granting of a subsidy, to a
withdrawal. This line of reasoning appears to blur the distinction between the
withdrawal of a subsidy and the removal of its adverse effects. Indeed, in the instant
dispute, it was the long-term adverse effect of the subsidies that continued to exist,
rather than the subsidy itself. The above interpretation essentially reads into Article
7.8 of the SCM Agreement a requirement to remove the subsidy and its adverse
effects, rather than providing Members with a choice between the two options.
Moreover, and in support of the above, the Panel stressed the fact that Article 5 of
the SCM Agreement, with which compliance was sought, was “effects-based”; as
such, compliance with the same could not be found where the subsidy in question
expired before the implementation period, yet its effects persisted. In consequence,
the Panel found that the EU had failed to comply with its obligation to withdraw the
relevant subsidies under Article 7.8 of the SCM Agreement.
The Panel then proceeded to an examination of the adverse effects produced by
the LA/MSF subsidies, to ultimately conclude that the EU had failed to take
appropriate steps to remove the same since:
a) the “product” effects of the challenged LA/MSF subsidies were a “genuine and
substantial” cause of displacement and/or impedance of United States LCA in
the markets for single-aisle LCA in the EU, Australia, China and India; twin-
aisle LCA in the EU, China, Korea and Singapore; and very large LCA in the
EU, Australia, China, Korea, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates;
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b) the “product” effects of the LA/MSF were a “genuine and substantial” cause of
significant lost sales in the global markets for single-aisle, twin-aisle and very
large LCA;
c) the effects of the aggregated capital contribution subsidies and certain regional
development grants “complemented and supplemented” the “product” effects of
the aggregated LA/MSF subsidies and, therefore, were a “genuine” cause of
serious prejudice to the interests of the US.
8 US – Tax Incentives: Panel Report and Appellate Body
Report
8.1 Facts of the Case
This is one of a series of disputes arising in connection with subsidies granted by the
EU and the US to their respective civil aircraft industries. In this case, the EU
challenged seven tax measures for civil aircraft introduced by the state of
Washington under Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill (ESSB) 5952. The latter
amended and extended measures introduced in 2003 under House Bill (HB) 2294,
which had previously formed the basis of the US – Large Civil Aircraft dispute (2nd
complaint).
In particular, the EU challenged three measures pertaining to the state of
Washington’s business and occupation (B&O) tax, i.e.: a low B&O tax rate of
0.2904% for specified business activities; B&O tax credits for aerospace product
development; and B&O tax credits for property and leasehold excise taxes (property
taxes on the use of public property by a private party, the property in this case being
commercial airplane manufacturing facilities). Further, the EU challenged two
measures pertaining to its retail sales tax, i.e. its principal source of tax revenue,
collected from customers by businesses making retail sales in Washington State, as
well as its use tax, i.e. a tax on the use of goods or certain services when sales tax has
not been paid. The EU specifically took issue with exemptions from such taxes for
certain computer hardware, software, and peripherals, as well as certain construction
services and materials. Finally, the EU complained against exemptions from lease-
hold excise and personal property taxes, both in connection with port district
facilities used to manufacture superefficient airplanes.
The EU maintained that all seven measures identified above constituted subsidies
contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods, contrary to Articles 3.1
(b) and 3.2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM
Agreement). The EU developed its argumentation by reference to two ‘siting’ pro-
visions under ESSB 5952, i.e. provisions governing the availability of the aerospace
tax measures. The First Siting Provision related to all of the measures, rendering
them contingent upon the siting of a significant commercial airplane manufacturing
program in the state of Washington. In this connection, the parties agreed that the
Boeing 777X was the relevant version or variant of commercial airplane that served
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as the basis for fulfilment of the First Siting Provision, and that the latter had in fact
been fulfilled. The Second Siting Provision concerned specifically the continued
availability of the B&O aerospace tax rate, which it made contingent upon the siting
of “any final assembly or wing assembly” of that commercial airplane which served
as the basis for fulfilment of the First Siting Provision.
8.2 Salient Legal Findings
The Panel found that a financial contribution existed under all measures, and that a
benefit was thereby conferred to the domestic industry (Sect. 8.2.1). Moreover, the
Panel determined that the First and Second Siting Provisions, whether considered
separately (Sects. 8.2.2 and 8.2.3) or jointly (Sect. 8.2.4), did not make any of the
subsidies de jure contingent upon the use domestic over imported goods. Ultimately,
the Panel found that the Siting Provisions, considered jointly, made the reduced B&O
tax rate de facto contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods (Sect. 8.2.5).
8.2.1 The Aerospace Tax Measures Are Subsidies Within the Meaning
of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement
The EU argued that the aerospace tax measures amounted to financial contributions
in the form of revenue foregone under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement.
As a preliminary matter, the Panel clarified that when challenged “as such”, “[t]he
foregoing of revenue is constituted by the government’s promise to do so, and not
only by particular instances of it being done”, concluding that the foregoing of
revenue in the future, as it had been pleaded in casu, could amount to a financial
contribution. Thereafter, it determined whether each of the challenged measures
amounted to such foregoing of revenue. First, it addressed the B&O tax rate of
0.2904% applicable to the manufacture and sales of commercial airplanes and
components, as well as the manufacture and sale of tooling for use in manufacturing
of commercial airplanes and components. It determined that the general B&O rates
applying to the activities in question should serve as the benchmark against which
the 0.2904% rate should be juxtaposed. The latter being significantly higher than the
former, the Panel concluded that the rate at issue accounted for revenue foregone.
The Panel then addressed the B&O tax credit for aerospace product development,
i.e. a credit applied against a taxpayer’s B&O tax liability, calculated as 1.5% of
expenditures on the development of commercial airplanes and their components, as
well as machinery and equipment used in relation to commercial airplanes and their
components. As with the B&O aerospace tax rate, the general B&O tax regime
(rather than other types of taxation that existed in Washington State) was found to
constitute the appropriate benchmark for the B&O tax credit for aerospace product
development. The Panel then readily found that the credit offset B&O tax liability
that would otherwise be due in the absence of the credit, thus being tantamount to
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revenue foregone. In respect of the B&O tax credit for property and leasehold excise
taxes, the Panel followed the same line of reasoning and reached the same
conclusion.
Thereupon, the Panel turned to the computer sales and use tax exemptions. It
acknowledged that the sales and use taxes evidenced a tax regime structure with
specific exemptions targeted at defined beneficiaries. It observed, however, that
exemptions should not be of greater value than the rules; consequently, it determined
that the generally applicable sales and use taxes should serve as a benchmark for
comparison, and that exemptions therefrom amounted to revenue foregone. In
respect of the construction sales and use tax exemptions, the Panel largely followed
the same reasoning.
Lastly, the Panel addressed the leasehold excise tax exemption, and determined
the relevant benchmark to be the 12.84% leasehold excise tax that would otherwise
apply. Following an analysis similar to that performed for the computer and con-
struction sales and use tax exemptions, the Panel concluded that a financial contri-
bution existed in the form of revenue foregone. The same conclusion was then
reached in respect of the leaseholder property tax exemption. The Panel, finally,
determined that a benefit was conferred under all measures, since the relief from
taxation otherwise was neither generally available to market participants, nor did it
exist as a general condition in the marketplace, which was enough to satisfy the
“better off” test. Consequently, all measures constituted subsidies under Article 1 of
the SCM Agreement.
8.2.2 The First Siting Provision, Considered Separately, Does Not Make
the Measures De Jure Contingent
The Panel then turned to the examination of the element of contingency upon the use
of domestic over imported goods, to ascertain whether the subsidies were prohibited
under Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. It first examined the EU’s claim that the
subsidies were de jure contingent as per the text of ESSB 5952, and in this context, it
first looked into whether the subsidies were contingent by virtue of the First Siting
Provision, considered separately. It found that contingency could neither be read
directly into the law, nor made out of it by necessary implication.
In particular, the Panel determined that the ESSB 5952 made the measures
contingent upon a positive determination by the Department of Revenue of the
state of Washington that a “significant commercial airplane manufacturing program”
had been sited, between 1 November 2013 and 30 June 2017, in the state of
Washington. I.e., upon the manufacture within the state of Washington of (1) a
commercial airplane with a carbon fibre composite fuselage, or carbon fibre com-
posite wings, or both; and (2) fuselages and wings for such commercial airplanes.
The Panel did not see in the text of the First Siting Provision a requirement that
would make the measures contingent upon a determination that domestic goods will
be used, noting that, rather, the Provision was silent as to the use of imported or
domestic goods. Further, it reasoned that nothing in the language of the First Siting
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Provision would per se and necessarily exclude the possibility for the airplane
manufacturer to use wings or fuselages from outside the state of Washington. Lastly,
it observed that the First Provision did not prevent the manufacturer from terminat-
ing all production of wings or fuselages and only using wings and fuselages
manufactured outside the state of Washington, upon having received the relevant
financial contributions. In essence, the only contingency the Panel could detect was
that the manufacturing be sited within the state of Washington, rather than that
domestic products be used; as such, it found no de jure contingency within the
meaning of Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.
8.2.3 The Second Siting Provision, Considered Separately, Does Not
Make the Measures De Jure Contingent
Next, the Panel considered whether the Second Siting Provision, analyzed sepa-
rately, was de jure contingent. It found that contingency could not be read directly
into the law, nor made out of it by necessary implication. It noted that the Provision
stipulated that the 0.2904% B&O aerospace tax rate would cease to apply if any final
assembly of an airplane or wing assembly that was the object of a positive siting
determination by the Department of Revenue under the First Siting Provision were to
be subsequently sited outside the state of Washington. The Provision was therefore
silent as to the use of imported or domestic goods, and the only contingency was that
the manufacturing (including by final assembly) of all these products not be sited
outside the state of Washington.
8.2.4 The First and Second Siting Provisions, Considered Jointly, Do
Not Make the Measures De Jure Contingent
The Panel then examined EU’s contention that the two Provisions “act[ed] together
to maximize trade distortions in favour of domestic goods and to the detriment of
competitive opportunities for imported goods.” It summarily dismissed the claim
reiterating its previous conclusions that the First and Second Siting Provisions were
silent as to the use of imported or domestic goods. It determined that considering
them jointly would “not produce any elements that might have been obscured by
considering them separately.”
8.2.5 The First and Second Siting Provisions, Considered Jointly, Make
the B&O Tax Rate De Facto Contingent
For the purposes of its de facto contingency analysis, the Panel determined that it
would be “artificial” to look into the siting provisions separately, and proceeded only
to a joint analysis. In this context, it emphasized the Second Siting Provision’s
reference to wing assembly, observing that, “if the manufacturer were to relocate
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outside Washington State the wing assembly of the ‘significant commercial airplane
manufacturing program’ that had been previously sited in Washington State in
accordance with the First Siting Provision (namely, the 777X programme), the
legal consequence would be the termination of the availability of the B&O aerospace
tax rate for the manufacturing or sale of commercial airplanes under that
programme.” The Panel was thus convinced that the use by the manufacturer of
wings produced outside of Washington State would likely result in a determination
by the Department of Revenue that some wing assembly had been sited outside of
Washington State, which would in turn lead to the loss of the B&O aerospace
tax rate.
The Panel observed, moreover, that rather than aiming at preventing Boeing from
relocating the 777X aircraft entirely outside Washington State, or from establishing a
parallel 777X production program outside Washington State, the Second Siting
Provision concerned the “use” of goods that entered into the production process
for the 777X, as a condition for the continued availability of a subsidy. Lastly, the
Panel addressed the argument that wings, as identifiable and complete products,
never come into existence in the production process of the 777X. It summarily
dismissed the argument, noting that Article 3.1(b) does not require the identification
of a specific good in order to be applied to a particular situation.
Consequently, the Panel found that, being a subsidy contingent upon the use of
domestic over imported wings, the reduced B&O tax rate violated Article 3.1(b) of
the SCM Agreement.
8.3 Appellate Body Report
The EU appealed the Panel’s negative findings on de jure and de facto contingency,
whereas the US filed a cross-appeal, targeting the Panel’s positive finding on de facto
contingency, specifically with respect to the First and Second Siting Provisions
considered jointly. The Appellate Body report was circulated on 4 September
2017. The findings contained therein will be described in further detail in the next
volume of the European Yearbook of International Economic Law.
In relation to the EU’s arguments on contingency, the Appellate Body opined that
the Panel had merely found the First and Second Siting Provisions to relate to the
location of certain assembly operations within Washington and to be silent as to the
use of domestic or imported goods, rather than articulating a legal standard that
required the use of domestic goods to the complete exclusion of imported goods.
Moreover, the Appellate Body observed that even if Boeing were to use domesti-
cally produced wings, this would not denote a condition, reflected in the text of the
Siting Provisions, or arising by necessary implication therefrom, requiring the use of
domestic over imported goods. As such, it upheld the Panel’s negative findings on
contingency.
On the US’ cross-appeal, the Appellate Body reiterated that the loss of the B&O
aerospace tax rate was triggered by the location of the siting of the wings, rather than
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their origin. It then determined that the Panel had not sufficiently addressed argu-
ments raised by the US in support of this contention and, in consequence, reversed
the Panel’s finding on de facto contingency in respect of the First and Second Siting
Provisions.
9 Colombia – Textiles: Appellate Body Report
9.1 Facts of the Case
This dispute concerns the imposition by Colombia of a “compound tariff” on the
importation of certain textiles, apparel, and footwear classified under Chapters
61 through 64 of Colombia’s Customs Tariff. The compound tariff was composed
of an ad valorem levy of 10% of the customs value of goods, and a specific levy,
which varied according to the customs classification of the goods and their import
price. Colombia established price thresholds to distinguish between imports that it
considered had artificially low prices (“illicit imports”), and all other imports (“licit
imports”).
In the panel proceedings, the Panel did not consider it necessary to rule on
Colombia’s claim that the obligations contained in Article II:1(a) and (b) of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) were not applicable to “illicit
trade” because the compound tariff applied to all the relevant imports without
distinguishing as to whether the operations were considered licit or illicit; and
found that the compound tariff exceeded the levels bound in Colombia’s Schedule
of Concessions (Schedule) (40% and 35% ad valorem, as applicable) in violation of
Articles II:1(b), first sentence, and accorded less favourable treatment to imports
than that provided in Colombia’s Schedule, contrary to Article II:1(a). The Panel
further found that Colombia had failed to demonstrate that the compound tariff was
justified under Articles XX(a) or XX(d) of the GATT 1994. Colombia appealed
these findings.
9.2 Salient Legal Findings
The Appellate Body found that the Panel acted inconsistently with its duty under
Article 11 of the Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of
disputes (DSU) to make an objective assessment of the matter, including an objec-
tive assessment of the applicability of the relevant covered agreements, in finding
that it was unnecessary to rule on Colombia’s claim that Article II:1(a) and (b) of the
GATT 1994 were not applicable to “illicit trade”. The Appellate Body concluded
that Article II:1(a) and (b) does not exclude what Colombia classifies as “illicit
trade”, and upheld that, in the instances identified in the Panel Report, the compound
tariff exceeds the bound tariff rates in Colombia’s Schedule, and is therefore
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inconsistent with Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994. In addition, the Appellate
Body reversed the Panel’s findings under Article XX. It found that the compound
tariff was “designed” but not “necessary” to protect public morals under Articles XX
(a), or to ensure compliance with Article 323 of Colombia’s Criminal Code (which
prohibits money laundering) under Article XX(d).
9.2.1 The Appellate Body Concluded That the Text of Article II:1(a)
and (b) of the GATT 1994 Does Not Exclude What Colombia
Classifies as “Illicit Trade”, and Upheld the Panel’s Finding That
the Compound Tariff Was Inconsistent with These Provisions
The Appellate Body found that the Panel had acted contrary to Article 11 of the DSU
by concluding that it was not necessary to interpret whether Article II:1(a) and (b) of
the GATT 1994 applied to what Colombia considers “illicit trade”. According to the
Appellate Body, the Panel’s statement that the measure does not apply “solely” to
illicit trade operations implies that the measure applied, or could apply, to some
transactions classified by Colombia as illicit trade, and therefore, the Panel was
required to address the interpretative issue before it.
In completing the legal analysis, the Appellate Body rejected Colombia’s claim
that Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 apply to what Colombia considered
“illicit trade”. Article II:1(a) provides that a Member shall accord to the “commerce”
of other Members treatment no less favourable than that provided for in its Schedule.
Article II:1(b) provides that the products described in a Member’s Schedule may not,
on their “importation”, be subject to ordinary customs duties, or other duties or
charges, that exceed that Member’s bound tariff rates. Colombia argued that the
terms “commerce” and “importation” do not cover what Colombia considers to be
“illicit trade” because “it would make no sense for Article II to oblige a Member to
accord favourable treatment to the entry of goods that violate the legal formalities
and requirements of the destination country”. The Appellate Body agreed with
Panama’s argument that the scope of the terms “importation” and “commerce” in
Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 is not qualified with respect to the nature or
type of “commerce” or “importation”, or the reason or function of the transaction, in
a manner that excludes what Colombia considers to be illicit trade; and that a
Member seeking to address concerns regarding money laundering may do so
through the general exceptions of Article XX of the GATT 1994.
The Appellate Body further dismissed Colombia’s additional arguments that,
inter alia, the object and purpose of the Preamble of the GATT 1994, as well as
other provisions of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Implementation of Article
VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Customs Valuation
Agreement) supported Colombia’s interpretation of the relevant provisions. In
consequence, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding that, in the instances
identified in the Panel Report, the compound tariff exceeded the bound tariff rates in
Colombia’s Schedule, and it was therefore inconsistent with Article II:1(a) and (b) of
the GATT 1994.
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9.2.2 The Appellate Body Found That the Compound Tariff Was
“Designed” but Not “Necessary” to Protect Public Morals
For a measure to be justified under Article XX, if must be provisionally justified
under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX, and it must comply with the
requirements of the chapeau of the same provisions. With respect to the provisional
justification under Article XX(a), the measure must be “designed” to protect public
morals, and it must be “necessary” to protect such public morals. Colombia argued
that the Panel applied an “overly demanding” standard in assessing whether the
compound tariff was designed to protect public morals, by requiring it to demon-
strate the “effectiveness” of the challenged measure. The Appellate Body found in
favour of Colombia, and stated that the examination of the “design” of a measure is
not a “particularly demanding step” of the Article XX(a) analysis in comparison to
the assessment of the “necessity” of the measure. The Appellate Body further stated
that a measure is “designed” to protect public morals when there is a “relationship
between th[e] measure and the protection of public morals”, that is, when the
measure is “not incapable of” protecting public morals. According to the Appellate
Body, when several Panel’s findings are read together, it was clear that the com-
pound tariff was not incapable of combating money laundering. In consequence, the
Appellate Body found that the compound tariff was “designed” to protect public
morals under Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994. With respect to the “necessity” of the
compound tariff, however, the Appellate Body found that there was a lack of
sufficient clarity regarding the degree of contribution of the measure to the objective
of combating money laundering and the degree of trade-restrictiveness of the
measure. Based on the foregoing, the Appellate Body found that Colombia had
not demonstrated that the measure was “necessary” to protect public morals.
9.2.3 The Appellate Body Found That the Compound Tariff Was
“Designed” but Not Necessary to Ensure Compliance with Article
323 of Colombia’s Criminal Code
For a measure to be provisionally justified under Article XX(d), the measure must be
“designed” to secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not themselves
inconsistent with the GATT 1994; and the measure must be “necessary” to secure
such compliance. The Appellate Body found that the Panel erred in concluding that
Colombia had failed to demonstrate that the measure was “designed” to secure
compliance with Article 323 of Colombia’s Criminal Code (which prohibits
money laundering). According to the Appellate Body, when several Panel’s findings
are read together, it was clear that the compound tariff was not incapable of securing
compliance with the relevant provision. In consequence, the Appellate Body found
that the compound tariff was “designed” to secure compliance with Article 323 of
Colombia’s Criminal Code. The Appellate Body further noted that the Panel erred in
failing to assess the “necessity” of the measure. In completing the legal analysis, the
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Appellate Body found, however, that there was a lack of sufficient clarity regarding
the degree of contribution of the measure and its trade-restrictiveness. Based on the
foregoing, the Appellate Body found that Colombia had not demonstrated that the
compound tariff was “necessary” to ensure compliance with Article 323 of
Colombia’s Criminal Code.
9.3 Observations on Salient Aspects of the Appellate Body
Report
The Appellate Body’s finding that the text of Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT
1994 does not exclude what Colombia classifies as “illicit trade”, clarifies that WTO
Members may not unilaterally qualify multilateral obligations. Rather, a Member
seeking to address concerns regarding money laundering or any other legitimate
policy objective may do so through the general exceptions of Article XX of the
GATT 1994.
This Appellate Body Report also clarified the legal standard for the determination
of whether a measure is “designed” to fulfil a certain policy objective under Article
XX of the GATT 1994. Before this report, the legal standard to determine “whether
the measure [was] one designed to achieve that [] policy objective” was unclear.
In this report, the Appellate Body clarified that a measure is “designed” to fulfil a
certain policy objective, if there is a relationship between the measure and the
relevant policy objective, that is, if the measure is “not incapable of” fulfilling that
policy objective. This standard seems to make it easier for the defendant to discharge
its burden of proving that a measure is “designed” to fulfil a certain policy objective.
To successfully justify a measure under Article XX, however, a Member must still
prove that the measure is “necessary” to fulfil the relevant policy objective. The
necessity analysis involves a more in-depth and holistic analysis of the relationship
between the measure and the relevant policy objective, which requires the weighing
and balancing of different factors usually including the assessment of reasonably
alternative measures.
10 Russia – Tariff Treatment: Panel Report
10.1 Facts of the Case
In this dispute, the European Union (EU) challenged 12 measures related to Russia’s
tariff treatment of certain agricultural and manufacturing products. The EU
argued that the Common Customs Tariff of the Eurasian Economic Community
(CCT) of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) required Russia to impose duty
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rates in excess of its bound duty rates in its Schedule of Concessions (Schedule).
The EU argued, therefore, that Russia was acting contrary to its obligations
under Article II:1 (b), first sentence, and Article II:1(a) of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994). The first 11 measures challenged by the EU
were customs duties provided for in the CCT. Measure 12 concerned an unwritten
measure, the “systematic duty variation” (SDV), which consisted in “systematically
according certain clearly described types of tariff treatment that lead, in each
individual instance of such tariff treatment, to duties being levied in excess of
bound rates”.
The Panel divided its analysis of the EU’s claims in three categories: (1) claims
that Russia imposed ad valorem duty rates in excess of Russia’s bound ad valorem
duty rates (concerning measures 1–6); (2) claims that Russia imposed combined duty
rates in excess of Russia’s bound duty rates (concerning measures 7–11); and
(3) claim that Russia imposed the SDV resulting in an unspecified number of
combined duty rates in excess of Russia’s bound duty rates. “Combined” duty
rates are “mixed” duty rates, i.e. “expressed in terms of alternative rates, one as an
ad valorem rate and the other as a specific rate that serve[s] as a minimum rate of
duty”.
10.2 Salient Legal Findings
The Panel found that, with respect to measures 1–11, Russia was required to impose
duties that were in some instances “in excess” of its bound duty rates, contrary to
Article II:1(b), first sentence. Since the Panel had found that measures 1–11 were
inconsistent with Article II:1(b), first sentence, it exercised judicial economy with
respect to the EU’s consequential claim under Article II:1(a) of the GATT 1994, with
the exception of measure 6, for which the EU provided an independent claim. In that
respect, the Panel found that the EU had failed to demonstrate that measure
6 accorded treatment less favourable to imports than that provided for in Russia’s
Schedule. With respect to measure 12, the Panel found that the evidence submitted
by the EU had failed to establish the existence of the SDV, and in consequence, that
the EU had failed to establish that the SDV was inconsistent with Article II:1(b), first
sentence, or with Article II:1(a).
10.2.1 The Panel Found That Article II:1(b), First Sentence,
of the GATT 1994 Prohibits Any “Excess” in the Imposition
of Duties, Even If That Excess Is Balanced or Offset by
the Imposition of Lower Duties
Before addressing the EU’s specific claims, the Panel addressed some preliminary
issues concerning the interpretation of Article II:1(b), first sentence. In particular,
the Panel found that the term “in excess of” in Article III:2 of the GATT 1994, which
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provides for non-discriminatory internal taxation, should be interpreted harmoni-
ously with the term “in excess of” in Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. In light of the
foregoing, the Panel found that Article II:1(b) admits no de minimis exception.
Accordingly, any excess in the imposition of duties is prohibited, even if minimal,
and even if the excess is balanced or offset (at the same time or later) by duties
imposed on identical products that are below a WTO Member’s bound duty.
10.2.2 The Panel Found That Measures 1–11 Were Inconsistent
with Russia’s Obligations Under Article II:1(b), First Sentence,
of the GATT 1994
The determination of whether WTO Members impose excessive duties requires a
comparison between the tariff treatment accorded by the challenged measure, and
the bound level established in the responding Member’s Schedule. This comparison
is straightforward when the applied and bound duty rates are both expressed in ad
valorem terms. For example, with respect to measures 1–6, it was straightforward for
the Panel to find that the ad valorem duty rates required to be imposed by the CCT
were in excess of Russia’s ad valorem bound duty rates.
In contrast, this comparison is less straightforward when the challenged measure
consists in combined duty rates, (i.e. rates expressed in terms of alternative rates, one
as an ad valorem rate, and the other as a specific rate that serves as a minimum rate of
duty), and the bound duties are expressed in ad valorem terms. In those cases, an ad
valorem equivalent of the combined duty rate has to be obtained by calculating an
import price level in relation to which the ad valorem duty rate would be the same as
the ad valorem equivalent of the combined duty rate (so called, break-even price).
After assessing the break-even prices calculated by the EU, the Panel found that the
combined duty rates required by the CCT with respect to measures 7–11 were higher
than Russia’s bound levels for imports at or below specified break-even prices. The
Panel further found that there was no evidence that Russia applied a ceiling or cap
that would prevent such duties from being applied.
10.2.3 The Panel Made Findings on a Measure That Provided
for the Future Application of a Duty Rate and Was Not
Implemented at the Time of Panel’s Establishment
The parties disagreed on whether measure 6 existed at the time of Panel’s establish-
ment, and, if it existed, on whether the Panel should make findings on the measure as
it existed at the time of the Panel’s establishment, or as amended. Measure 6 imposed
an ad valorem duty rate (15%) to be applied as of 1 January 2016 (some 9 months
after the Panel’s establishment). This duty rate exceeded Russia’s bound duty rate
(5%). However, this duty rate was never implemented. Before its implementation,
Russia imposed a temporary ad valorem duty reduction (5%) until the end of 2015.
Following the Panel’s establishment, Russia imposed a constant ad valorem duty
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rate (5%) applicable as of 1 September 2015. Thus, in essence, measure 6 was never
implemented.
Russia argued that by virtue of the temporary duty reduction (5%), measure 6 did
not exist as described by the EU, and requested the Panel to examine the amended
measure. The EU did not dispute that measure 6 was amended, but insisted, that at
the time of the Panel’s establishment, both the future applied duty rate (15%) and the
temporarily reduced rate (5%) existed and were contained in a binding legal instru-
ment, and thus, requested the Panel to make findings on measure 6 from the “vantage
point” of the Panel’s establishment. The Panel found in favour of the EU, and stated
that it was “unable to agree with Russia that a measure in force on the date of the
Panel’s establishment ‘does not exist’ simply because it will be implemented at a
later time”. The Panel declined to make findings on the amended measure in the
absence of a specific request from the EU to do so, but it reflected the amendment of
the measure in its recommendations under Article 19.1 of the DSU.
Before addressing the WTO-consistency of measure 6 at the time of Panel’s
establishment, the Panel determined, among others, whether it could make findings
with respect to the future applied duty rate (15%); and whether the temporary
reduction of the duty rate (5%) could eliminate a possible finding of inconsistency
with respect to the future applied duty rate (15%). In US – Superfund, a GATT panel
determined that a mandatory measure that is not yet into force can be challenged “as
such” where the entry into force of the measure is automatic at a future date and does
not depend on further legislative action. In light of this GATT panel report, and the
text of the legal instrument containing measure 6, the Panel found that the future
applied duty rate (15%) was “definitive, and was expressed as occurring automati-
cally and by virtue of the measure itself, without any need for implementing or other
intervening action. The fact that the EAEU could, and in fact did, pass a new
Decision modifying the duty rate for the tariff line in question does not demonstrate
that the future applied duty rate was discretionary. To the contrary, if it was not for
the adoption of Decision No. 85, the applied duty rate as from 1 January 2016 would
have been 15%”. In light of the foregoing, the Panel concluded that, in principle, an
existing measure may be challenged “as such”, even if that measure mandates
WTO-inconsistent action that will take place only in the future. The Panel further
noted that such a challenge is of particular importance in the context of Article II:1
(b), first sentence, that it is intended to protect not only existing trade, but also the
security and predictability needed to conduct future trade.
Furthermore, the Panel assessed whether the temporary reduction of the duty rate
(5%) could eliminate a possible finding of inconsistency with respect to the future
applied duty rate (15%). Russia argued that the Panel should find no inconsistency
with Article II:1(b), first sentence, because the temporary reduction of the duty rate
(5%) suspended the application of the future duty rate (15%). The Panel rejected
Russia’s argument because the EU’s challenge focused on the imposition of the
future applied duty rate (15%) once the temporary reduction of the duty rate (5%)
would cease to exist, not during its application. Based on the foregoing, the Panel
found that measure 6 existed at the time of Panel’s establishment; and that this
measure mandated the imposition from 1 January 2016 of a future applied duty rate
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(15%) in excess of Russia’s bound duty rate (5%) contrary to Article II:1(b), first
sentence.
10.2.4 The Panel Found That the EU Failed to Prove the Existence
of the SDV
The Panel rejected the EU’s claim that Russia imposed the so-called SDV (measure
12). The Appellate Body noted in Argentina – Import measures that “the constituent
elements that must be substantiated with evidence and arguments in order to prove
the existence of a measure challenged will be informed by how such measure is
described or characterized by the complainant”. According to the EU, the SDV
consisted in “the systematic application of particular types of tariff treatment to a
significant number of tariff lines [of the CCT], resulting in a general practice”
inconsistent with Russia’s tariff bindings. To determine that the SDV existed,
these elements had to be proven cumulatively.
The Panel noted that the EU had used the term “systematic” for describing
different elements of measure 12. In particular, it used the expressions “systematic
application” and “systematic duty variation”. The Panel considered that it was
important when dealing with a term that is a definitional characteristic of a measure
to identify a clear and unchanging meaning of the term, so that it would be possible
to “pin down, as it were, the measure whose consistency with the covered agree-
ments is contested.” The Panel found that the term “systematic” in the EU’s
expressions meant “done according to a system, plan, or organized method or
effort”, referring to “a situation where individual instances of application of certain
types of tariff treatment, or individual instances of duty variation, are connected by a
system, plan, or organized method or effort”. Furthermore, the Panel interpreted the
term “general” in the context of the EU’s claim as “not limited to only specific parts
of the CCT.” The Panel considered that the evidence provided by the EU failed to
show the “systematic” nature or “general” application of the measure. Rather, it only
showed the repeated application of certain tariff treatment with respect to 23 tariff
lines. Therefore, the Panel found that the EU had failed to prove that the relevant
tariff treatment was accorded in a “systematic” fashion in such a way as to constitute
a “general” practice reflected in the CCT.
10.3 Observations on Salient Aspects of the Panel Report
This Panel Report is very useful as it provides a detailed description of the legal
standard under Article II:1(b), first sentence, of the GATT 1994, and explains how
break-even prices are calculated for combined duty rates.
In addition, this Panel Report addresses the treatment of “as such” challenges of
mandatory measures. Originally, “as such” claims were brought against measures
that had not entered into force but that were nevertheless deemed to be contrary to
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the GATT, and against discretionary legislation. Several GATT panels, including the
GATT panel in US – Superfund, found that only mandatory legislation,
i.e. legislation that mandates a violation of GATT obligations, can be found to be
“as such” inconsistent. This difference in treatment between mandatory and discre-
tionary legislation is commonly referred to as the “mandatory/discretionary distinc-
tion”. WTO jurisprudence provides no clear answer as to whether this distinction
developed by GATT panels remains relevant in WTO dispute settlement. The
Appellate Body has cautioned against the application of this distinction in a mech-
anistic fashion. This Panel Report supports the view that the “mandatory/discretion-
ary distinction” remains relevant in WTO dispute settlement.
This Panel Report is also interesting because it provides for an interpretation of
the term “systematic”, which was defined as “done according to a system, plan, or
organized method or effort”. This term may be used in the future as an analytical tool
in order to facilitate the understanding of certain types of measures, and prove their
existence. However, judging by the Panel’s analysis in this case, this analytical tool
seems to involve a high evidentiary burden for the complainant to show that
something is “done according to a system, plan, or organized method or effort”.
11 Russia – Pigs: Panel Report
11.1 Facts of the Case
In this dispute, the European Union (EU) challenged certain measures imposed by
Russia adopting, maintaining or applying an import ban or import restrictions based
on concerns related to the African Swine Fever (ASF), which prevented the impor-
tation of live pigs and their genetic material, pork and certain other pig products from
the EU into Russia. ASF is a highly contagious haemorrhagic disease of pigs,
warthogs, European wild boar, and American wild pigs, equally susceptible to
both genders and all age groups. It is a disease covered by Chapter 15.1 of the
Terrestrial Code and must be reported to the World Organization for Animal Health
(OIE). ASF was not present in the EU, except for the island of Sardinia. On
24 January 2014, this situation changed with the outbreak of ASF in Lithuania.
Following the outbreak of ASF in Lithuania, ASF was reported in Estonia, Latvia
and Poland. ASF was introduced in Russia in November–December 2007, and was
still present in certain areas of Russia during the Panel’s proceedings.
The measures at issue consisted in the “refusal by Russia to accept imports for the
products at issue from the entire EU” (EU-wide ban); and individual import bans on
live pigs and pig products from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The EU
challenged these measures under Articles 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6,
5.7, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 7 (and Annex B paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 6) and 8 (and Annex C.1(a),
(b) and (c)) of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement). To defend its measures, Russia invoked Articles 3.1,
3.2, 5.7 and 6.3 of that Agreement.
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11.2 Salient Legal Findings
The Panel found that the EU had demonstrated the existence of the “EU-wide ban”,
and that there was no limitation in Russia’s Protocol of Accession to the Panel’s
assessment of the merits of the EU’s claims against this measure. In addition, the
Panel found that despite not being referred to specifically in the EU’s panel request,
the restrictions on the imports of the products at issue from Latvia and Estonia fell
within its terms of reference. The Panel further found that the EU-wide ban, as well
as the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
and Poland were inconsistent with Russia’s obligations under Articles 2.2, 2.3, 3.1,
3.2, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.6, 6.1, and 8, and Annexes C(1)(a) and C(1)(c) of the SPS
Agreement. In essence, the Panel found that the challenged measures did not
“conform to”, or were “based on” the relevant international standard (Terrestrial
Code); that although Russia recognized the concepts of pest- or disease-free areas
and areas of low pest or disease prevalence in respect of ASF under Article 6.2 of the
SPS Agreement, it did not adapt its measures to the SPS characteristics related to
ASF of the areas where the products subject to that measure originated nor to the SPS
characteristics related to ASF in Russia; that Russia did not conduct a risk-
assessment when there was sufficient scientific evidence to do so; and that the
challenged measures discriminated between Members where identical or similar
SPS conditions prevailed.
This Panel Report was appealed by Russia and the EU. The Appellate Body
Report was circulated on 23 February 2017. In general terms, the Appellate Body
agreed with most of the Panel’s findings with the exception of the Panel’s findings
under Article 6 of the SPS Agreement. In particular, the Appellate Body reversed the
Panel’s finding that Russia recognized the concepts of pest- or disease-free areas and
areas of low pest or disease prevalence in respect of the ASF, and that, therefore, the
EU-wide ban and the bans on the imports of the products at issue from Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, were not inconsistent with Russia’s obligations under
Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement.
11.2.1 The Panel Found That the EU Had Demonstrated the Existence
of the EU-Wide Ban, and That There Was No Limitation
in Russia’s Protocol of Accession to the Panel’s Assessment
of the Merits of the EU’s Claims Against This Measure
The parties disagreed on the existence of the EU-wide ban measure, and the extent to
which Russia’s terms of accession were relevant for the Panel’s assessment of the
measure. In WTO law, a measure is “any act or omission attributable to a WTO
Member.” The EU described the EU-wide ban “as an action (an import ban or
restriction) and, in the alternative, as an omission (failure to accept imports from the
EU)” in its Panel Request. To import the relevant products to Russia, importers were
required to submit veterinary certificates. Template veterinary certificates were
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agreed bilaterally between the EU and Russia. Accordingly, importers had to certify
that the entire EU (with the exception of Sardinia) was free from ASF during the
previous 3 years to importation. Following the ASF outbreaks in Lithuania on
24 January 2014, Russia stopped accepting relevant imports from all EU member
States.
Russia argued that the alleged EU-wide ban was not attributable to it. It argued
that imports were rejected as a consequence of the EU’s veterinary officials’ inability
to certify compliance of the relevant imports with the conditions set out in the
veterinary certificates. In turn, the EU provided evidence showing Russia’s rejection
of its relevant imports. This evidence included letters and other documents from
Russian authorities announcing that imports from the EU Member States would be
rejected, as well as instances of the refusal to accept relevant imports from the EU
Member States after 25 January 2014. In light of this evidence, the Panel concluded
that the EU had demonstrated the existence of the EU-wide ban “as a composite
measure which reflects Russia’s refusal to accept certain imports of the products at
issue from the European Union.” In addition, the Panel found that the measure was
attributable to Russia. It stated that the evidence submitted by the EU indicated that
Russia was in fact “undertaking specific actions that rendered it impossible to import
products at issue from the European Union into Russia”, including “informing the
European Union that if veterinary doctors in the EU member States did not stop
certification of the products at issue these products would not be allowed into the
territory of the member States of the Customs Union and would be subject to
returns”. The Panel, therefore, concluded that “the actions by Russia to apply this
general requirement [certification that the entire EU (with the exception of Sardinia)
was free from ASF during the previous three years to importation] to the current
situation in the European Union result[ed] in an EU-wide ban of the products at issue
attributable to Russia”.
The Panel then examined whether Russia could rely on its terms of accession to
effectively shield the measure at issue from scrutiny under the DSU and the SPS
Agreement. Paragraph 983 of Russia’s Working Party Report on the Accession of
Russia provided that “[b]ilateral veterinary export certificates [between a Eurasian
Economic Union (CU) Party and another country] . . .would remain valid for exports
from the relevant country into the customs territory of the CU until an export
certificate was agreed with a CU Party based on the agreed positions of the other
CU Parties.” Russia argued that the validity of the veterinary certificates was a term
of Russia’s accession to the WTO; and that by adopting Russia’s Accession Proto-
col, the EU had agreed that the form of veterinary certificates concluded between the
EU and Russia shall remain valid until the new certificates between the CU and the
EU were agreed. Since no new certificates were agreed, Russia was under the
obligation, pursuant to the terms of its WTO accession, to require the relevant
veterinary certificates. The EU argued that the reference to the veterinary certificates
in Russia’s accession documents should be understood in the context of Russia’s
continuing obligation to adapt its measures to regional SPS characteristics. In the
EU’s view, the terms of Russia’s accession to the WTO could not be construed as
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preventing the adaptation of bilateral certificates to the ASF regionalization mea-
sures in the EU.
The Panel found that Russia’s Accession Protocol did not refer in any way to
Russia’s substantive obligations under the SPS Agreement; and that the text and
context of paragraph 893 do not provide that the direct or indirect application of the
veterinary requirements was automatically consistent with Russia’s rights and obli-
gations under the SPS Agreement. Therefore, the Panel concluded that Russia could
not rely on its terms of accession to effectively shield the measure at issue from the
Panel’s scrutiny.
11.2.2 The Panel Found That Although Russia Recognized the Concepts
Under Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement, It Did Not Adapt Its
Measures to the SPS Characteristics Related to ASF
in the Importing Countries nor to the SPS Characteristics
Related to ASF in Russia
Article 6 of the SPS Agreement addresses the recognition of pest or disease-free
areas and areas of low prevalence of pests or diseases, and different aspects of the
process of adaptation of a WTO Member’s measure to regional SPS characteristics.
Article 6.2, first sentence, requires WTO Members to “recognize” the concepts of
pest- or disease-free areas and area of low pest or disease prevalence. Article 6.3
specifies what must be objectively demonstrated by a Member requesting recogni-
tion of a specific area within its territory as a pest- or disease-free area or an area of
low pest or disease prevalence. Article 6.1 requires importing Members to “adapt”
their SPS measures, to the regional characteristics of the areas from which the
product originated and to which the product is destined, provided that there is
sufficient evidence to reach a determination as to the disease status of the relevant
areas.
In these proceedings, Russia argued that the obligation to “recognize” the con-
cepts set out in Article 6.2 relates to an “abstract idea and is not linked to specific
areas of a given exporting Member”. Russia provided evidence, including CU
legislation, a 2006 Memorandum between Russia and the EU, and the bilaterally
agreed veterinary certificates to show that it expressly recognized the concept of
regionalization. The EU argued that Russia’s abstract understanding of “recogni-
tion” contradicted the guidance from the Appellate Body in India – Agricultural
Products. According to the EU, what matters “is not the abstract, distinct from and
taken prior to, recognition of the concept of disease-free areas in the Russian
legislation, but the recognition of this concept through and upon adoption of the
very SPS measure that is required to be adapted to the SPS characteristics of the
relevant areas.” The EU also referred to the existence of the EU-wide ban as
evidence that Russia had failed to distinguish between ASF-free areas and areas
considered infected with ASF.
The Panel distinguished the facts in this dispute from the facts in India –
Agricultural Products. According to the Panel, the Appellate Body’s findings in
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India – Agricultural Products addressed a situation where an SPS measure adopted
by a Member could recognize the concepts mentioned in Article 6.2 even in the
absence of a pre-existing regulatory framework that did so. In contrast, in the current
dispute, the Panel stated that it was faced with a different situation: “a set of
measures that were adopted in the context of a regulatory framework that, in [its]
view, provide[d] a general recognition of the concepts mentioned in the first sentence
of Article 6.2.” The Panel concluded that Article 6.2 sets out a less stringent
obligation as compared to Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement, requiring merely an
abstract acknowledgement of the concept of regionalization. Based on the foregoing,
the Panel found that Russia recognized the concepts mentioned in the first sentence
of Article 6.2 in respect of ASF and as a consequence, the EU-wide ban as well as the
EU Member States’ individual bans were not inconsistent with Russia’s obligations
under the first sentence of Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement. These findings were
reversed by the Appellate Body.
The Panel further found that the EU had demonstrated that in the period between
7 February 2014 and 11 September 2014, the EU objectively demonstrated to Russia
that there were areas within the EU, outside of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Poland, which were free of ASF and were likely to remain so; and also, that there
were areas within Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland, which were free of ASF and were
likely to remain so. In contrast, the Panel found that the EU had failed to demonstrate
that there were areas within Latvia, which were free of ASF and were likely to
remain so.
Based on the Panel’s findings that the EU had demonstrated to Russia that it had
ASF free areas, and the fact that the ASF was present in some areas in Russia, the
Panel found that Russia had failed to adapt its measures to the SPS characteristics
related to ASF in the importing countries, and to the SPS characteristics related to
ASF in Russia, in violation of Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement. The Panel noted
that this breach was further corroborated by Russia’s failure to conduct a risk
assessment, where it could have evaluated the relevant elements to determine the
SPS characteristics of the areas from which the products at issue originated.
11.3 Observations on Salient Aspects of the Panel Report
The Panel’s analysis of “attribution” is illustrative. The Panel concluded that
Russia’s refusal of the relevant imports was attributable to it without addressing
whether these actions were partially attributable to the EU’s failure of submitting the
relevant veterinary certificates. The Panel’s focus on the content of Russia’s actions,
irrespective of their rationale, clarifies that the motivation of a measure is usually
irrelevant for the question of attribution.
The Panel interpreted the obligation in Article 6.2 so as to merely require the
abstract recognition of the principle of regionalization. The Panel’s interpretation of
this provision was reversed by the Appellate Body. Accordingly, Article 6.2 contains
an obligation that goes beyond abstract recognition, and requires WTO Members to
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“render operational” the concepts of pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest
or disease prevalence by providing an “effective opportunity” for the exporting
Member to make a regionalization claim.
12 Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes (New Zealand)
(United States): Panel Report
12.1 Facts of the Case
In this dispute, New Zealand and the United States (the co-complainants) brought
identical claims under Article XI:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT 1994) and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture against 18 Indonesian
measures concerning Indonesia’s import licensing regimes for horticultural prod-
ucts, animals and animal products. Measures 1–8 consisted in individual compo-
nents of Indonesia’s import licensing regime for horticultural products. Measure
10–16 consisted in individual components of Indonesia’s import licensing regime
for animals and animal products. Measures 9 and 17 consisted in Indonesia’s import
licensing regimes “as a whole”, defined as the individual elements of the regimes
operating in conjunction. Measure 18 concerned the requirement of self-sufficiency.
Accordingly, importation was only permitted when domestic supply for consump-
tion and/or government food reserves of the relevant products were insufficient. The
co-complainants challenged this measure “as such” and “as applied”.
Indonesia’s import licensing regimes for the relevant products shared common
features. Importers were required to apply for import licenses during limited appli-
cation periods, indicating, among others, the quantity, port of entry and intended use
of imported goods. Once the relevant import licenses were approved, they were valid
for limited validity periods, and the terms of importation could not be modified
(so called, fixed license terms). Moreover, the regimes provided for 80% realization
requirements and reference price requirements for certain products. Accordingly,
importers were required to import at least 80% of the approved quantities; and, when
the reference price of certain products fell below the pre-established price, importa-
tion was suspended until the market price reached the established reference price.
Indonesia submitted that the 18 challenged measures were not subject to Article
XI:1 of the GATT 1994 because, inter alia, they were automatic import licensing
procedures. Moreover, Indonesia argued that measures 4, 7, and 16 were covered
under Article XI:2(c)(ii) of the GATT 1994, and that, in any event measures 1–17
were justified under Articles XX(a), (b) and (d) of the GATT 1994, as applicable.
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12.2 Salient Legal Findings
The Panel found that measures 1–17 were inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the
GATT 1994, and not justified under Article XX of the GATT 1994. The Panel also
found that Measure 18 was inconsistent “as such” with Article XI:1 of the GATT
1994, but declined to rule on whether this measure was inconsistent “as applied”
with this provision. Moreover, the Panel found that Article XI:2(c) of the GATT
1994 had been rendered inoperative by the entry into force of the Agreement on
Agriculture. The Panel exercised judicial economy with respect to the
co-complaints’ claims under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, and
certain other claims under the Import Licensing Agreement and Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994. The Panel Report was appealed by Indonesia. In general, the Appellate
Body upheld the Panel’s findings.
12.2.1 The Panel Concluded That Automatic Import Licensing Regimes
Are Not Excluded from the Scope of Article XI:1 of the GATT
1994
Indonesia argued that its import licensing regimes were “automatic” regimes
expressly permitted under Article 2.2(a) of the Import Licensing Agreement, and
thus, excluded from the scope of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. The
co-complainants responded that the characterization of a measure as an “automatic”
or “non-automatic” licensing regime was irrelevant under Article XI:1 of the GATT
1994; that the text of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 is explicit in that “import or
export licences” can impose restrictions on importation within the meaning of
Article XI:1; and that, in any event, Indonesia’s import licensing regimes were not
“automatic”. The Panel agreed with the co-complainants’ argument that there is
nothing in the text of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 that suggests that import
licensing regimes, automatic or non-automatic, are outside the scope of this provi-
sion. On the contrary, the Panel noted that import licences are expressly included in
the indicative list of measures covered by this provision. The Panel considered that
the essence of an analysis under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 does not depend on
how a measure is labelled, but rather on whether it imposes a restriction or prohi-
bition on importation. It therefore concluded that a determination of whether
Indonesia’s import licensing regimes were automatic import licensing procedures
was not a necessary threshold in its analysis under Article XI:1.
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12.2.2 The Panel Concluded That Article XI:2(c) of the GATT 1994 Had
Been Rendered Inoperative by the Entry into Force of Article 4.2
of the Agreement on Agriculture
Article XI:2(c)(ii) provides that “[t]he provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall
not extend to the following: [i]mport restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries
product, imported in any form,* necessary to the enforcement of governmental
measures which operate: (ii) to remove a temporary surplus of the like domestic
product..” (notes omitted, emphasis added). Indonesia argued that measures 4, 7, and
16 were necessary to remove a temporary surplus of horticultural products, animals
and animal products in Indonesia’s domestic market in accordance with this
provision.
The co-complainants responded that Article XI:2(c)(ii) was no longer available
with respect to agricultural products by the entry into force of Article 4.2 of the
Agreement on Agriculture. Footnote 1 to this provision sets out an illustrative list of
measures that have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties, and
excludes measures maintained “under other general, non-agriculture-specific pro-
visions of the of GATT 1994” (emphasis added). The co-complaints argued that
Article XI:2(c) applies explicitly to “import restrictions on any agricultural or
fisheries product”, and therefore, it was not a “general, non-agriculture-specific
provision” of the GATT 1994. Therefore, according to the co-complainants, such
measures have not been excluded from the types of measures which were required to
be converted to ordinary customs duties under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on
Agriculture. The co-complainants further submitted that even if Article XI:2(c)(ii) of
the GATT 1994 was applicable, Indonesia failed to demonstrate its constitutive
elements.
The Panel agreed with the co-complainants’ argument that Article XI:2(c) had
been rendered inoperative with respect to agricultural measures by the entry into
force of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. It stated that this interpretation
was confirmed by Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture, which provides that
“[t]he provisions of GATT 1994”, including Article XI:2(c)(ii) of the GATT 1994,
“shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement”. Therefore, the Panel
concluded that Indonesia could not rely upon Article XI:2(c)(ii).
12.2.3 The Panel Found That Measures 1–17 Were Not Justified Under
Article XX of the GATT 1994
Indonesia argued that measures 1–17 were justified under Articles XX(a), (b) and
(d) of the GATT 1994. Article XX of the GATT 1994 involves a two-tiered analysis.
A measure must, first, be provisionally justified under one of the subparagraphs of
Article XX, and, second, comply with the requirements of the chapeau of Article
XX. Indonesia provided arguments on a measure by measure basis with respect to
the first tier of the analysis; for the second tier, however, it provided arguments for its
import licensing regime as a whole, making no distinctions between measures.
A measure is provisionally justified under Articles XX(a), (b) or (d), if it is
“designed” and “necessary” to fulfil the relevant policy objective. The Panel found
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that measures 1–7 were not provisionally justified under Articles XX(a), (b) or (d),
and, therefore, it did not further analyse these measures under the chapeau. With
respect to measure 8, the Panel concluded that this measure was “designed”, but not
“necessary” to protect human health. Even though the Panel concluded that measure
8 was not provisionally justified under Article XX(b), it decided to analyse this
measure under the chapeau anyway “given that this finding may be appealed”. In its
examination of whether measure 8 was applied in a manner consistent with the
chapeau, the Panel also examined the application of measures 1–17. The Panel stated
that because Indonesia presented its arguments under the chapeau with respect to the
import licensing regime as a whole, it was “driven” to follow the same approach. The
Panel concluded that Indonesia’s import licensing regimes for horticultural products,
animals and animal products as a whole, as well as the individual measures therein,
failed to comply with the requirements of the chapeau. Bearing in mind that
compliance with the chapeau of Article XX is a necessary requirement in order for
a measure to find justification under this provision, the Panel refrained from exam-
ining whether measures 9–17 were provisionally justified under the relevant sub-
paragraphs of Article XX. The Panel then found that Indonesia had failed to
demonstrate that measure 8 was justified under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994,
and transposed its findings under measure 8 to find that Indonesia had failed to
demonstrate that measures 9–17 were justified under Article XX(a), (b) or (d) of the
GATT 1994, as applicable.
12.3 Observations on Salient Aspects of the Panel Report
The Panel’s conclusion that Article XI:2(c) of the GATT 1994 has been rendered
inoperative by virtue of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture may conflict
with the principle of effective treaty interpretation. This principle provides that “[a]n
interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses
or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility”. Notably, Article 3.2 of the DSU
provides that “[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to, or diminish
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements”. Arguably, if the
drafters of the Agreement on Agriculture intended to make Article XI:2
(c) inoperative, they could have removed it from the GATT 1994.
The Panel’s analysis under Article XX of the GATT 1994 is unusual. In US –
Gasoline, the Appellate Body established the two-tier sequence under Article XX,
i.e., first, provisional justification, second, analysis under the chapeau. Since then, all
WTO panels, with one exception (US – Shrimp), have followed that approach. In its
report, the Panel first analysed measures 9–17 under the chapeau, and then, after
finding that these measures were not applied in a manner consistent with the chapeau
requirements, the Panel refrained from examining the provisional justification of
these measures. On appeal, the Appellate Body considered that a panel that deviates
from the sequence of analysis under Article XX of the GATT 1994 might, not
necessarily, for that reason alone, commit a reversible legal error provided the Panel
has made findings on those elements under the applicable paragraphs that are
relevant for the analysis of the requirements of the chapeau. However, following
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the normal sequence of analysis under Article XX of the GATT 1994 provides
Panels with the necessary tools to assess the requirements of the chapeau.
13 Argentina – Financial Services: Appellate Body Report
13.1 Facts of the Case
This dispute brought by Panama concerns “eight financial, taxation, foreign
exchange and registration measures imposed by Argentina, mostly on services and
service suppliers from countries which Argentina terms ‘countries not cooperating
for tax transparency purposes’”. Panama argued that all eight measures were incon-
sistent with the most-favoured nation obligation in Article II:1 of General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS), and that measures 2, 3 and 4 were inconsistent with
the national treatment obligation in Article XVII of the GATS. Panama further
claimed that measure 5 was inconsistent with the market access obligation in Article
XVI:1 and XVI:2(a) of the GATS and that measures 2 and 3 were inconsistent with
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and measure 3 also inconsistent with Article III:4 of
the GATT 1994.
The Panel found that measures 1 through 8 were inconsistent with Article II:1 of
the GATS because they did not accord, immediately and unconditionally, to services
and service suppliers of non-cooperative countries treatment no less favourable than
that which they accord to like services and service suppliers of cooperative countries.
It further found that measures 2 through 4 were not inconsistent with Article XVII of
the GATS because they accord to services and service suppliers of non-cooperative
countries treatment no less favourable than that which they accord to like Argentine
services and service suppliers, in the relevant services and modes in which Argentina
has undertaken specific commitments. Moreover, the Panel found that measures
1 through 4 as well as measures 7 and 8 were not justified under Article XIV(c) of the
GATS because their application constitutes arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimina-
tion. Finally, the Panel found that measures 5 and 6 were not covered by paragraph 2
(a) of the Annex on Financial Services because they were not taken for “prudential
reasons” within the meaning of that provision.
13.2 Salient Legal Findings
The Panel and Appellate Body reports in this dispute addressed issues under the
GATS of systemic import, notably the interpretation of likeness and “treatment no
less favourable” under Articles II:1 and XVII; and the interpretation of the general
exceptions in Article XIV, in particular the issue of the “design” of a measure to
achieve a listed objective. As importantly, these reports addressed for the first time
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the so-called “prudential exception” in paragraph 2(a) of Annex on Financial
Services to the GATS.
13.2.1 The Interpretation of “Likeness” in Articles II:1 and XVII
of the GATS
As noted above, the Panel concluded that measures 1 through 8 were inconsistent
with the most-favoured nation obligation in Article II:1 of the GATS. It further found
that measures 2 through 4 were not inconsistent with the national treatment obliga-
tion in Article XVII of the same agreement.
The Appellate Body reversed the findings under Articles II:1 and XVI of the
GATS. Specifically, it considered that the Panel’s finding that services and service
suppliers of non-cooperative countries were “like” service suppliers of so-called
“cooperating countries”. For the Appellate Body, a Panel may find that a service or
service supplier may be presumed to be “like” another if it finds that the measure at
issue provides for a distinction based exclusively on origin. However, in this dispute,
the Panel did not make such a finding and, therefore, it was required to assess “the
competitive relationship of the services and service suppliers of cooperative and
non-cooperative countries”. Put differently, the Panel erred in presuming “likeness”
in the absence of a finding that the measures at issue provide for a distinction based
exclusively on origin.
The Appellate Body noted that the reversal of the Panel’s “likeness” analysis
rendered the subsequent analysis of “treatment no less favourable” moot as it was
predicated on foreign and domestic services and service suppliers being “like”.
However, the Appellate Body stated that Panama’s appeal against the Panel’s
“treatment no less favourable” analysis was an “issue of law” within the meaning
of Article 17.6 of the DSU and decided to address this other ground of appeal.
13.2.2 The Interpretation of “Treatment No Less Favourable”
in Articles II:1 and XVII of the GATS
Turning to its analysis of the phrase “treatment no less favourable” in Articles II:1
and XVII of the GATS, the Appellate Body understood the Panel’s interpretation of
this phrase as requiring an analysis of whether the measure at issue modifies the
conditions of competition between foreign and domestic services and service sup-
pliers. As part of this analysis, the Panel considered that it had to “take into account
regulatory aspects relating to services and service suppliers that may affect the
conditions of competition; in particular, whether Argentina is able to have access
to tax information on foreign suppliers”.
The Appellate Body concurred with the Panel that the phrase “treatment no less
favourable” requires assessing whether the measure modifies the conditions of
competition to the detriment of services or service suppliers of any other Member
in comparison to like services or service suppliers of, respectively, any other country
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or the Member imposing the contested measure. However, the Appellate Body
faulted the Panel for considering that this analysis required assessing the “regulatory
aspects” of the measure. The Appellate Body juxtaposed the relevant legal standard
under Articles II:1 and XVII of the GATS with that of Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 to conclude that, under the GATS
provisions, the regulatory intent of the measure is irrelevant to the issue of whether a
measure accords treatment less favourable to foreign services and service suppliers.
13.2.3 The Issue of Whether a Measure Is “Designed” to Achieve
a Listed Objective Under Article XIV of the GATS
In addressing Panama’s appeal under Article XIV(c) of the GATS, the Appellate
Body recalled that, for a respondent to justify its measure under that provision, “[f]
irst, the measure must be one designed to secure compliance with laws or regulations
that are not themselves inconsistent with some provision of the [GATS]. Second, the
measure must be” necessary “to secure such compliance”.
With respect to the first element (“designed to secure compliance”), the Appellate
Body introduced a somewhat new standard. In particular, it noted that the assessment
of whether a measure is “designed” to secure compliance with laws or regulations
requires an “initial examination of the relationship between the inconsistent measure
and the relevant laws or regulations”. The Appellate Body considered that a measure
would not be “designed” under Article XIV(c) if it “is incapable of securing
compliance with specific rules, obligations, or requirements under the relevant law
or regulation” identified by the respondent. A measure could still be “designed” even
if there is uncertainty as to whether it actually achieves the objective.
This development of the first element of the analysis of Article XIV(c) of the
GATT has been applied in subsequent disputes in the context of Article XX of the
GATT 1994. It stands for the proposition that the assessment of whether a measure is
“designed” to meet a listed objective does not require that this objective be achieved
“with absolute certainty”. Thus, in the words of the Appellate Body in a subsequent
appeal, the requirement that a measure be “designed” to pursue a listed objective is
not “a particularly demanding step” of the analysis. The more “in-depth, holistic
analysis of the relationship between the inconsistent measure and the relevant laws
or regulations” is under the second element of the sub-paragraphs under Article XIV
of the GATS (and Article XX of the GATT)—whether the measure is “necessary” to
achieve an objective.
It appears, therefore, that the analysis of whether a measure is “designed” to
achieve a listed objective in Article XIV of the GATS (and Article XX of the GATT
1994) requires inquiring into whether the measure “is not incapable” to achieve that
objective. This is not to be confused with the degree of contribution to achieving the
objective, which must be assessed under the second step of the analysis—i.e. the
necessity test.
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13.2.4 The Interpretation of the Prudential Exception in Paragraph 2
(a) of the Annex on Financial Services
Before the Panel, Argentina argued that even if measure 5 (requirements relating to
reinsurance services) and measure 6 (requirements for access to the Argentine capital
market) were inconsistent with Article II:1 of the GATS, these measures were
justified under the prudential exception in paragraph 2(a) of the Annex on Financial
Services.
The Panel found that measures 5 and 6 were inconsistent with the most-favoured
nation obligation in Article II:1 of the GATS. The Panel then assessed whether these
measures were justified under paragraph 2(a) of the Annex on Financial Services. In
its analysis, the Panel first assessed whether these measures were adopted for
“prudential reasons”; and, second, whether Argentina had demonstrated that there
is “a rational relationship of cause and effect” between the measures 5 and 6 and the
prudential reason provided for adopting those measures. The Panel found that
measures 5 and 6 do not have such a rational relationship with the prudential reasons
identified by Argentina and, accordingly, that these measures were not taken for
prudential reasons within the meaning of paragraph 2(a).
Panama appealed the specific Panel’s finding that “paragraph 2(a) of the Annex
on Financial Services ‘covers all types of measures affecting the supply of financial
services’”. For Panama, the prudential exception only applies to domestic regula-
tions within the meaning of Article VI of the GATS as opposed to market access
restrictions under Article XVI of the GATS.
The Appellate Body recalled that this is the first dispute in which a Member has
invoked paragraph 2(a) of the Annex on Financial Services. As an issue of first
impression, the Appellate Body addressed the limited issue raised by Panama
concerning the type of measures that may be justified under the prudential exception
in paragraph 2(a). In its analysis, the Appellate Body noted that the reference to
“measures affecting the supply of financial services” “suggests that paragraph 2
(a) does not impose specific restrictions on the types of measures falling within its
scope”. It therefore agreed with the Panel, and dismissed Panama’s appeal, that
paragraph 2(a) of the Annex on Financial Services “covers all types of measures
affecting the supply of financial services”.
In brief, although this is the first time that the Appellate Body analysed the
“prudential exception”, the scope of the appeal was limited to the determining the
type of measures subject to that exception.
The Panel and Appellate Body Reports were adopted by the DSB on 9 May 2016.
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The current system of international investment protection, consisting mostly of
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interests while neglecting competing values and public interests such as human
rights, environmental concerns, and in particular sustainable development. It is
against this background that the author, Manjiao Chi, asks to what degree sustainable
development concerns have so far found their way into the investment treaty system
and what possible improvements in this respect might look like within future
investment agreements.
The book is very enjoyable to read as it is well-structured and guides the reader
through all its stimulating and well-reasoned parts. Alongside an introduction, the
book comprises three parts as well as final remarks. Within the concise introduction,
the author explains the objective of his analysis. The methods applied for this
purpose are equally introduced. Beside rule analysis and comparative studies, the
book approaches its topic in particular from a governance perspective. Furthermore,
the introduction reveals the book’s central argument, that investment treaties for
various reasons only insufficiently and ineffectively address sustainable develop-
ment concerns. From the many convincing reasons given for bringing investment
protection and sustainable development in line, a need for reform is derived. It is
against this background that the book evaluates the means for addressing the
sustainable development deficit in currently negotiated and future investment
treaties.
J. Griebel (*)
University of Siegen, Siegen, Germany
e-mail: griebel@recht.uni-siegen.de
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018
M. Bungenberg et al. (eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2018,
European Yearbook of International Economic Law (2019) 9: 487–492,
https://doi.org/10.1007/8165_2018_16, Published online: 6 November 2018
487
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
Part 1 of the book, entitled “The sustainable development challenge for IIAs,”
describes, in Chapter 1, the status quo of sustainable development as an international
law concept as well as the development of today’s investment treaty regime. With
regard to sustainable development, the author convincingly argues that it “should be
perceived as a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction
of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional
change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet
human needs and aspirations” (p. 10). Furthermore, the “treatification” of sustain-
able development resulting from an increasing number of references to the concept
either within a treaty’s preamble or the functional provisions of an agreement is
addressed. Here it is, however, found that such “treatification” mostly takes place
within international environmental law. Consequently, the concept of sustainable
development cannot be characterized as an international law concept de lege lata yet.
The concept is, however, in a process of emerging as a part of either customary
international law or general principles of law. Regarding the development of con-
temporary international investment law, the author not only provides a short over-
view on the system’s origins, but also presents a brief description on how sustainable
development concerns have previously been reflected in IIAs as well as within the
ICSID Convention. In doing so, Chi lays the foundation for the more comprehensive
analysis of such provisions provided in part 2 of the book.
Chapter 2 presents selected proposals on how to reform the current system to the
effect that sustainable development interests are more prominently addressed.
Although the selected approaches are—as the author recognises—very different in
their respective focus, it is convincingly argued that they share certain common
concerns, starting from the shared view that reform is indeed required for recogniz-
ing sustainable development concerns more prominently, and that a more appropri-
ate balance of the investors’ (economic) interests and the host States’ (regulatory)
interests needs to be established. At the same time, it is ascertained that the concepts
of sustainable development as well as the long-term objectives vary considerably
between the approaches.
Part 2 is concerned with identifying those rules within IIAs which—as already
indicated in Part 1—have an impact on sustainable development concerns. Here, the
author distinguishes, within Chapters 3–6, between four different normative catego-
ries. Starting with substantive provisions in Chapter 3, the author examines the
prohibition of unlawful expropriation as well as the fair and equitable treatment
standard in several IIAs, as both standards potentially limit a State’s freedom to
implement measures motivated by sustainable development concerns. The author
submits that both substantial standards, while serving the interests of investors,
“have profound restraining effects on state regulatory power” and consequently
“may impede states’ efforts in pursuing legitimate sustainable development goals”
(p. 60). This view is arguably convincing when considering older generations of
IIAs. The author suggests (p. 58), however, that more recent IIAs are equally prone
to normatively attaching little value to legitimate regulatory policies, even if they
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feature “balancing provisions” such as Annex B of the 2012 US Model BIT.1 While
the author acknowledges that such provisions should strengthen a State’s regulatory
leeway in theory,2 the need for interpretation of such provisions by arbitrators causes
the author to doubt their effectiveness (p. 60).
The second category consists of exceptive provisions (Chapter 4). The author
comprehensively describes the various general and special exceptions to be found
within IIAs, such as general exceptions modelled after the well-known Art. XX
GATT, and security exceptions similar to Art. XXI GATT. Each section also
features a detailed description of the arbitral application of the respective exceptive
provision in the past. Regarding the rather uncommon general exceptions, the author
convincingly submits that arbitrators should interpret clauses modelled after Art. XX
GATT in line with WTO jurisprudence, as the clauses “share the same origin, similar
contents and almost identical structure” and both concern the conflict of domestic
regulatory measures with international law standards (p. 72). Turning to security
exceptions, a discussion of the Argentine cases between 2001 and 2002 reveals that
despite a very similar factual and legal background different tribunals “had different
findings with regard to the severity of the financial crisis” (p. 80). In this context, the
author correctly points out that security clauses may fall short of preserving a State’s
regulatory power when they are not ostensibly self-judging in nature and instead
open to diverging or even contradictory interpretations by arbitrators (p. 81). One
should keep in mind, however, that it is in line with the object and purpose of
security exceptions to interpret their terms, in particular “essential security interests”,
restrictively. While both general and special exceptions share functional similarities,
security exceptions—contrary to clauses modelled after Art. XX GATT—will
usually have little impact on domestic regulations fostering sustainable development
in times of relative peace and stability.
A third category of rules is described by the author as “public interest provisions”
(Chapter 5). This notion covers a very broad variety of rules referring in different
ways to interests competing with economic concerns, such as the environment,
human rights, labour standards, or even CSR rules. While such rules are obviously
related to the concept of sustainable development, some of them are rather uncom-
mon within IIAs. Furthermore, regarding the existing provisions, the author con-
cludes that they are “largely insufficient, ineffective and fragmented” (pp. 105
et seq.). As an alternative, the author submits that “[i]t would be helpful to have a
general public interest provision in IIAs”, similar to Art. 8.9 CETA, which he praises
1Annex B of the 2012 US Model BIT stipulates that “non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a
Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives” do not constitute
an indirect expropriation “[e]xcept in rare circumstances”.
2Regarding Annex B of the 2012 US Model BIT, the author concludes that the provision “can be a
helpful tool for states in pursuing sustainable development goals without being excessively
restrained by the indirect expropriation clause” (p. 58).
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“to be quite outstanding in catering for public interest” (p. 106).3 Admitting that
general public interest provisions face difficulties “due to the lack of an international
consensus on the definition and scope of public interest”, he expresses hope that their
incorporation may imply a trend in future IIA-making (pp. 107–108). While the
author’s argument for an explicit public interest provision is convincing at its core, it
is not entirely clear how such broad terms as in Art. 8.9 CETA would be preferable
over a clause modelled after Art. XX GATT,4 in particular when considering the
ensuing interpretative uncertainty after granting States such a wide margin of
appreciation.
The provisions addressed in Chapter 6 are of a procedural character, as the author
employs a broad understanding of sustainable development, which derives in part
from good governance in general. Accordingly, he also examines whether the ways
in/by which investment disputes are settled are in line with the concept of sustainable
development, which at times appears as an overly wide understanding of said
concept. The author concludes that there is in inherent conflict between the public
nature of investment disputes on the one hand and the arbitration system on the
other, as the latter shares many principles with commercial arbitration (p. 137). He
acknowledges, however, that major changes regarding transparency, third party
participation, legal review etc., are already on their way to improve the system
(p. 138). Within the chapter, a special emphasis is also laid on the role of inter-State
dispute resolution and clauses allowing the State parties to intervene within investor-
State-proceedings or prevent them completely. However, the settlement of disputes
between investors and States, while needing reform in its current state, provides us
with a remarkably effective mechanism for the enforcement of international law.
Such mechanisms should be extended to other fields of international law, rather than
be restricted by means of inter-State cooperation.
Finally, Part 3 consists of Chapters 7 (Reconceptualizing IIAs from the gover-
nance perspective) and Chapter 8 (Filling the compatibility gap between IIAs and
sustainable development). In Chapter 7, the author elaborates on the concept of
global governance. He argues that global governance and contemporary IIAs are
incompatible: the fragmentation of international law isolates investment consider-
ations, while the State-centric international law insufficiently engages with non-State
actors (p. 153). Furthermore, he asserts a structural imbalance of IIAs, which “fail to
draw a proper balance between the rights of foreign investors and those of the host
states” (p. 154). The author accordingly calls for a reconceptualization of investment
protection combined with further reform.
The author’s efforts culminate in the instructive Chapter 8, in which he supple-
ments the various normative reform proposals outlined in Part 2, by drawing insights
3Art. 8.9 CETA stipulates that “[. . .] the Parties reaffirm their right to regulate within their territories
to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of public health, safety, the environ-
ment or public morals, social or consumer protection or the promotion and protection of cultural
diversity.[. . .]”.
4Cf. Art. 28.3(1) CETA, which incorporates Art. XX GATT into CETA, but is only applicable to
rules on the establishment of investment and non-discriminatory treatment of investments.
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from the governance perspective introduced in Chapter 7. He argues that three major
changes are due. Firstly, the supply of sustainable development norms in investment
treaties should be enhanced by a hardening of soft-law rules, as well as incorporating
more balancing and good governance provisions. Secondly, it is proposed that
sustainable development provisions in IIAs should be harmonized on a global
level to achieve a greater normative convergence. Inasmuch as other international
treaties aim to strengthen sustainable development, the author suggests their sys-
temic integration by interpreting IIAs in light of those rules of international law
(p. 164, referring to Art. 31(3)(c) VCLT). And thirdly, the influence of non-State
actors in the process of treaty-making should be enhanced to remedy what the author
perceives as an existing democratic deficit. While the representation of different
societal groups during treaty negotiations may arguably improve the acceptance of
the resulting agreement on a domestic level, the reasoning of course relies on the
author’s premise of States’ vanishing “territory-based” authority, which in turn
necessitates a concept of global governance (cf. pp. 149 et seq.). It may, however,
be quite challenging to reconcile this rather progressive approach with the prevalent
concepts of contemporary international law.
Within his final remarks, the author again raises the key question of whether
future IIAs can be made more compatible with sustainable development concerns.
Against the background of his excellent analysis in the previous Chapters, he points
out that the answer can be derived from a conceptual, a normative, and a governance
perspective. From the conceptual perspective, the author proposes an extensive
understanding of sustainable development. Normatively speaking, sustainable
development provisions within IIAs should be strengthened considerably. Finally,
from a governance perspective, he argues that a greater number of stakeholders—
like investors, arbitrators, and civil society in general—should act alongside States in
designing a more balanced system.
In conclusion, this very remarkable book makes an important contribution to our
understanding of the major shortcomings of contemporary IIAs from the perspective
of sustainable development concerns. The author equally provides us with different
perspectives on well explained problems and a great number of reflected and creative
ways for improving the system. The book is well-worth reading and can be strongly
recommended.
Jörn Griebel is Professor of Public Law and International Economic Law at the University of
Siegen. He gained the qualification diplôme d’etudes supérieures from the Institut Universitaire de
Hautes Études International (Geneva) and holds a Ph.D. degree from the University of Cologne. He
regularly publishes in various fields of law, in particular international law, European Law and
international investment law.
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Ben Saul, The International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Travaux Préparatoires
Oxford University Press, 2016, ISBN 9780198758327
Ibrahim Kanalan
In 2016, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) marked the 50th anniversary of its adoption and the 40th anniversary of
coming into force. The ICESCR and its counterpart, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), were meant to implement the Universal Declar-
ation of Human Rights (UDHR) and, taken together, form the so-called International
Bill of Rights.
The initial idea had been to cover the most important and basic civil, political as
well as economic, social and cultural rights in one treaty, and to establish a judicial
procedure to implement and monitor these core human rights. As it is common
knowledge, this initial idea could not be realized. Instead of having one single
covenant, the United Nations General Assembly adopted two covenants in
December 1966, which entered into force 10 years later (1976). The division of
the core human rights into two groups, as well as the fact that the ICCPR from the
beginning included a monitoring body competent to receive individual complaints,
whereas the ICESCR did not, has resulted in much discussion about the nature,
implementation, binding character and justiciability of economic, social and cultural
rights. Since the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR in December
2008, which entered into force in 2013, individual complaints can be lodged with the
Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (Committee). It is hoped that
this step will put to an end the long-lasting debate just referred to. In any event, the
formidable work of the Committee in the last three decades, especially through its
General Comments on the ICESCR, the increased interest of scholars, activists and
state institutions in the implementation and protection of economic and social rights
and the adoption of the individual complaint procedure has (enormously) changed
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the relevance and the role of economic, social and cultural rights enshrined in the
ICESCR.
A further step towards the promotion of economic, social and cultural rights can
be accomplished through the engagement with the Travaux Préparatoires. It can
offer useful guidance on how to enforce and monitor ICESCR rights, and clarify
their content, especially as the travaux, according to the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, can be relied upon as supplementary means of interpretation (Art.
32). Beyond doctrinal questions, and arguably more importantly, the travaux help
put some of the on-going debates about economic, social and cultural rights in
perspective. From their perusal, it becomes apparent that, over the course of the
Covenant’s 20-year elaboration, the drafters engaged with many objections and
arguments against economic, social and cultural rights and nevertheless produced
a remarkable work of enormous importance for the marginalized, discriminated and
excluded individuals and collectives. Against this background, the undertaking of
Ben Saul to, for the first time, include and make available detailed chronological
documents of the drafting procedure and history of the ICESCR deserves special
attention.
In his book, Saul—who holds the Challis Chair of International Law at the
University of Sydney, is one of the authors of the Oxford Commentary on the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2014) and a
barrister and an Associate Fellow of Chatham House in London—in two volumes
running to 2750 pages presents a huge corpus of important materials on the
ICESCR’s drafting history, dating from 1948 to 1966. The collection grew out of
the work towards the above-mentioned Oxford Commentary and compiles docu-
ments that were previously only partly available in archives. The collection contains,
among others, detailed contents—title(s) of documents, the summary of their content
and the page number—which makes it easy to quickly find the documents needed.
Furthermore, it includes a short list of abbreviations; an introduction by the author
followed by two short Annexes and in its main part the selected documents.
In the introduction, Ben Saul provides important background information on the
drafting of the Covenant. In particular, he highlights the origins of economic, social
and cultural rights, offers a summary of the debate on their codification on the
international level, contextualizes the drafting procedure, and draws attention to
existing international documents and drafts addressing economic and social rights.
By sketching out objections against the codification of economic, social and cultural
rights, he enables readers to follow and understand the debates and arguments that
accompanied the drafting of the ICESCR and that are reflected in the Travaux
Préparatoires.
The main part of the book chronologically systematizes the Travaux Préparatoires
in two volumes: from 1947 to 1952 (Vol. I) and from 1953 to 1966 (Vol. II). In this
main part, Ben Saul offers a selection of key materials drawn from thousands of
pages of documents stemming from the Commission on Human Rights, the Eco-
nomic and Social Council and the UN General Assembly, the numerous drafts of
Working Groups and States’ proposals, amendments, statements and interventions,
the statements and suggestions of international organizations, NGOs and experts, as
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well as the summary records of meetings (which seem countless). In doing so, he
provides an insight into arguments that shaped the drafting process and gives both an
overview of the general discussion and detailed information on specific questions
and aspects. The book also provides information about the states’ decisions regard-
ing drafts, proposals and amendments. This huge selection of documents enables
readers not only to follow the sequence and progress of the drafting of the ICESCR
in general, but also to comprehend the statements and discussions on the codification
and implementation of economic, social and cultural rights, the reason for the
decision to draft and adopt two separate Covenants, the objections concerning the
nature and content of provisions of the ICESCR and, additionally, the response to
these objections etc.
While Vol. I contains documents that deal with the general aspects and questions
(among them the implementation of human rights in general and economic, social
and cultural rights in particular, the nature and fundamental character of these rights,
and the decision to opt for two Covenants rather than a single one), Vol. II contains
documents more specifically focusing on the questions concerning the ICESCR.
These include the character of the provisions (individual rights vs. state obligations),
the idea of the progressive realization of Covenant rights, the content of the regu-
lations in question, monitoring system etc. Overall, the book is comprehensive and a
very good collection of valuable documents with respect to the most important
questions regarding the history of the Covenant. It is precious source of information
not only for scholars but also for other experts working in this field.
That said, a few minor shortcomings should be mentioned. One of them concerns
the omissions of the sections of the text and titles of the original documents. Some
documents are presented as if they were complete, whereas in reality, they are
excerpts. The omitted sections of the text have not always been marked up, for
example see the 42nd Meeting of the HRC (at p. 3), summary record of the 212th
Meeting of the ECOSOC (p. 326) and the excerpt of the GA Meetings (pp. 1616
et seq.). Therefore, it is not always clear that the reproduced document is only an
excerpt.
Furthermore, frequently useful titles of the original documents are omitted in the
reproduced version found in the book. This applies, for example, for the document of
the 29th Meeting of the HRC (p. 11),1 the summary records of the 205th Meeting of
HCR (p. 290), of the 206th Meeting of HRC (p. 297) and of the 212th Meeting of the
HRC (p. 326). Titles, however, can be useful since they enable faster comprehension
of the context and the content of the document. Without the title, the reader has to
read at least a few pages of the respective document or look into the detailed contents
in order to figure out what the subject of the document is.
A further minor shortcoming is the lack of a Guide or detailed contents page
containing the main relevant Travaux Préparatoires regarding the preamble and
single provisions of the ICESCR. Since the book is organized chronologically, it
1Cf. http://hr-travaux.law.virginia.edu/document/iccpr/ecn4ac1sr29/nid-1680 (last accessed
14 May 2018).
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would have been helpful and user-friendly to have such a Guide or list containing the
most relevant documents. Given that many academics, and especially practitioners,
might be more interested in the drafting process with regard to the preamble and
single provisions, the chronological organization does not aid the speedy location of
particular documents of interest. This cannot be provided by detailed contents since
it is time-consuming to search within more than 50 pages for the documents of
interest. The Index cannot provide this either, firstly because it includes many more
keywords than provisions of the Covenant and, secondly, because there are many
page numbers for each keyword, many of which may often be of little relevance.
These, however, are only trifles, which do not significantly affect the merits of
Ben Saul’s valuable and laudable work. In the end, the decisive question is,
especially for young scholars (e.g. PhD students): is it necessary in times of digital
age when one can find many documents online—even though it may take some
time—to spend a considerable amount of money (£325.00) on a collection of
Travaux Préparatoires? In the reviewer’s view, the answer to this is positive. Since
not everything is available online and it is not always possible to consult library
archives around the world, it is a worthwhile investment to acquire the current
collection of Ben Saul. Whatever the position for individual readers, it is clear that
for institutional purchasers (libraries, international organizations, governments), and
professionals working in the area of economic, social and cultural rights, Ben Saul’s
collection can be highly recommended.
Ibrahim Kanalan (Dr. iur.) is Research Associate at the Centre for Human Rights Erlangen-
Nuremberg (CHREN) and Research Associate at the Chair for Public Law and Public International
Law at University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany, since April 2015. He studied law at the
University of Berlin (Freie Universität Berlin) and received his doctorate in law from the University
of Bremen in 2014. His particular areas of interest include Public International Law, International
Human Rights Law, Social Law, Migration and Refugee Law.
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Yun-I Kim
Corporate structuring and restructuring occur for multiple reasons. One of the effects
of corporate structuring may be access to more favourable jurisdiction due to a
change of nationality. But where to draw the line between, as the author calls it,
‘legitimate nationality planning’ and ‘treaty abuse’?
The author’s main objective consists of exploring this area of conflict by closely
analysing the practice of treaty shopping in customary international law and inter-
national investment law, scrutinising developments to the present in a systematic
manner.
Baumgartner sets out in a very methodical manner by defining the meaning of
treaty shopping, as no universally accepted definition exists as of yet. Part I of the
book is thus largely an introduction to the subject of treaty shopping and nationality
planning. The author identifies areas of concern as well as corporate motives and
advantages of nationality planning.
Part II contains the centrepiece of the work with a systematic examination of
the practice of treaty shopping in (customary) international law and in particular
investment law. The author places under close scrutiny the legal approaches
taken by arbitral tribunals. Her conclusions on which issues arbitral tribunals have
consolidated while others remain unsettled (leaving an overall inconsistent juris-
prudence as of yet) are sound. She reaches them through a thorough discussion
and analysis of the approaches tribunals have taken in order to draw the line
between objectionable and unobjectionable treaty shopping. Baumgartner examines
the validity of claims concerning treaty shopping by scrutinising the conclusions
tribunals have reached with regard to the criteria of ratione personae, ratione materiae,
and ratione temporis in caseswhere nationality planning has been subject to discussion.
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With regard to jurisdiction, a most interesting point is the discussion of its scope
ratione temporis. During her analysis of the case law the author observes that a
distinction between jurisdiction ratione temporis and objections due to an abuse of
rights/abuse of process is made. According to her analysis, whether or not a dispute
existed when the restructuring took place is a question of jurisdiction ratione
temporis. If no dispute existed at the time of the change of nationality, the question
of jurisdiction ratione temporis is not triggered. Rather, the matter at hand is then a
question of abuse of treaty, i.e. when an entity changes nationality before an actual
dispute arises, but where there is a future foreseeable dispute. Baumgartner carefully
analyses the investment case law on how arbitral tribunals have approached this
issue and finds that differing tests have been used to assess whether a (then future)
dispute was foreseeable. Since different arbitral tribunals have approached the matter
differently, the exact contours of the foreseeability test remain diffuse for the
moment. As Baumgartner shows, two factors need to be verified when applying
this test: first, the existence of a dispute, and second, the foreseeability of the dispute.
The author rightly points to an inherently high ‘risk of subjectivity’ when attempting
to make that determination; this of course is compounded by the existence of
differing foreseeability tests. She herself supports a ‘reasonably foreseeable’
approach, pursuant to which a future dispute must be foreseeable not only from
the standpoint of the investor who is a party to the dispute, but from the standpoint of
a reasonable investor. This, in Baumgartner’s view, introduces a more objective
approach, helping shift emphasis from the subjective horizon of a particular investor.
Whether this test will find larger acceptance in attempting to determine an objection
due to treaty abuse remains to be seen. Baumgartner’s analysis, however, is coherent
and should help to better attenuate the risk of subjectivity, operating as an ‘objecti-
fying element’.
For similar reasons, the author proposes to put the ‘sole purpose’ doctrine to rest,
which seeks to approach the question of whether a change of nationality was
undertaken for the single purpose of obtaining a more opportune forum to bring a
claim. Such an approach is dismissed for being too subjective and predominantly
depending on conduct in the sphere of the investor, leaving no tangible criteria to
permit proof of bad faith. This seems like a step in the right direction towards the
introduction of a more objective approach, when exploring the motives for corporate
structuring and restructuring and when examining whether treaty shopping has
occurred in bad faith.
Part III then makes proposals de lege ferenda on how to reform international
investment agreements to make them less susceptible to treaty shopping. More
careful treaty drafting constitutes an effective means to that end, but will always
depend to some extent on policy issues and approaches. Baumgartner first identifies
policy approaches which include the negotiation of a multilateral investment frame-
work and the ‘prescription’ of mailbox companies, suggesting that the use of
mailbox companies should be further restricted, if not prohibited at all. Baumgartner
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readily admits, however, that both approaches are not very likely to succeed in the
near future. Another of Baumgartner’s proposals is to exclude investor-state dispute
settlement clauses in future investment agreements which according to her could
prove highly effective to prevent treaty shopping – provided that a majority of states
decided to opt out. She concedes that the odds are not highly in favour of this
approach either.
The author then goes on to examine approaches regarding the drafting of
specific treaty clauses that could restrain treaty shopping. In general, Baumgartner
advocates more restricted clauses with clear language to curtail the issue. Some
examples include introducing a requirement of ‘effective and dominant’ nationality
in cases of dual nationality where the investor is a natural person, and establishing
the requirement of substantial business activities or a denial of benefits clause
where legal persons occur as the investor. Further proposals are to clarify the
terms ‘control’ and ‘foreign control’. Baumgartner also suggests naming the
circumstances under which corporate restructuring is permitted and acceptable
under an investment agreement. She advocates clear language when setting the
temporal scope of an investment agreement, be it e.g. by excluding disputes having
arisen before the entry into force of the latter from its temporal scope or by
explicitly regulating the situation of pre-existing disputes and foreseeable ones in a
different manner in the treaty itself.
Seemingly a little out of context, the author ultimately discusses the role of the
principle of good faith in treaty shopping in the last chapter of the book. At first sight,
this appears slightly odd, especially considering that the author has aimed for an
overall more objective approach regarding treaty shopping which e.g. the ‘genuine
link’ test and the theory of ‘piercing the corporate veil’ can surely provide. Taking
recourse to the principle of good faith seems to run counter to the author’s objective,
exposing the issue to further arbitral subjectivity. Baumgartner concedes that such a
risk always exists, however, she insists that it may be confined by using the methods
and principles identified in her work, i.e. with regard to the notion of dispute and its
foreseeability, and much better so than other legal tools which according to her do
not adequately capture the complex problems of treaty shopping as is discussed
extensively by her.
Lastly, a quite remarkable part of the book is the annex which lists the most
important arbitral decisions on the subject, sorted in clusters according to their key
legal statements. Within each category, the decisions are listed in chronological
order. This is a highly useful tool which can be used to quickly verify statements and
positions taken by tribunals in certain cases on the issue.
Overall, the study provides the reader with a systematic analysis of the
relevant jurisprudence so far, prudently distinguishing between policy and legal
arguments and presenting in a comprehensive and articulate manner which issues
seem to be settled already and those which remain open to further debate and
exploration. Remaining inconsistencies in the jurisprudence are clearly identified;
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this sparks the reader’s interest to keep following this topical debate and its future
developments.
Yun-I Kim holds a law degree from Cologne University and is currently a PhD candidate at the
Friedrich Alexander University of Erlangen-Nürnberg. She has worked as case assistant on
numerous international arbitration proceedings and has served as secretary to arbitral tribunals in
inter-State as well as investor-State and commercial arbitration proceedings. She has also assisted
counsel in several investment arbitration cases.
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A World of Struggle by David Kennedy is a timely exploration on the nature of
expertise and the role, influence, and, struggle of and between, experts. Though it
has been so suggested elsewhere,1 this is not a book about yesterday that may
become relevant tomorrow. Rather, Kennedy writes of longstanding issues,
persisting today, regarding experts which have not always been identified in main-
stream international legal scholarship. The proliferation of ‘people pursuing pro-
jects’ (at 5)—a central theme of Kennedy’s depiction of the essential nature of
expertise—endures, regardless of the way in which experts are otherwise depicted
by elected politicians. Instead, his central claim stands in today’s current political
climate; after all, the railing against ‘expertise’ during the US Presidential elections
and the Brexit debate can actually be interpreted as ‘people with projects’ in the
background of political discussion and public debate. This is the backdrop against
which A World of Struggle will be read by many. Although there may indeed be a
global ‘backlash’ against an expert elite, Kennedy effectively highlights how wide-
spread, long-relied upon, and entrenched expertise is.
This book’s relevance to current issues makes it a good addition to any holiday
reading list and important for international lawyers to read, not least so as to
understand and reflect better upon their role as experts. But those who would benefit
the most are those not already familiar with legal realism and the sociology of law.
International economic lawyers, who come to the study on the ‘distributive impact of
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law’ (217) for the first time, will certainly find it thought-provoking reading. For
those readers, however, who are more well-versed in these traditions, the book will
not seem methodologically or theoretically ground-breaking. However, they may
still find individual chapters, such as ‘the machinery of global reason’ (Chapter 4)
and ‘expertise in action’ (Chapter 5) of justifiable interest and value.
In a sense, this was my central take-away from A World of Struggle: as a text, this
book lends itself to a variety of different uses and does not require to be read cover to
cover. The book is divided into three parts, and it is possible to read each of these
parts, and even many of the chapters, as stand-alone interventions. In my reading,
there was little effort made to argue in what way the different individual sections
came together to form part of a coherent whole.
Chapter 1 seeks to lay some ground work by setting out the case that experts tell
stories and in doing so ‘make the world’ we live in. The central point Kennedy
makes here is to emphasise this capacity of experts so as to better critically analyse
the expertise given. It is an important and, in many ways, a very welcome under-
taking. However Kennedy’s writing style which is fairly abstract and conversational,
despite being accessible and fluid, may unfortunately undermine his broader project
in the eyes of some readers; it is by no means your traditional fully-referenced
academic writing and sometimes the type of claims made in A World of Struggle
demand this approach.
The broader narrative may also be undermined by whether a reader deems
Kennedy trustworthy as a story-teller. I was frustrated by his obvious creation of a
straw man in Chapter 1 (26–27) in order to prove a point about a tendency Kennedy
has observed to ‘focus on institutional design’ (27) in classic discussions regarding
the problem of economic globalization leaving people behind or them being ‘too
small to count’ (26) in the face of global markets. Kennedy ‘cobble[s] together from
a variety of recent left liberal and progressive opinion pieces and news articles’
(26) a story without references to such articles. This is important because Kennedy
then asks, ‘if we accept this interpretation of globalization and want to do something
to change it, the story suggests we focus on institutional design’ (27) which he
argues, and I agree, would be a mistake. However, this interpretation was one
entirely set up by Kennedy. The broader point Kennedy touches on is the well-
known agency vs. structure argument. Except, we have had no real proof these
opinion pieces and news articles encourage such a focus on institutions rather than
people, other than our own intuition that it is plausible that Kennedy is right on this
one. This unreliability is needlessly exasperating because, in my opinion, the
argument is essential to make, not least because as Kennedy himself says a focus
on institutions and structures ‘lets many people off the hook’ (27). It is a frustration I
have with the book overall; Kennedy makes intuitively plausible individual points
but rarely evidences them.
Herein lies the problem: all of Kennedy’s points are entirely plausible. Kennedy
writes on numerous occasions of the idea of the plausible: that there is a ‘shared
professional sense for the plausible’ that allows an argument to be ‘cluster[ed] within
boundaries’ of a hegemonic expert discourse (156); and that the agency of experts is
‘deniable so long as what they add is plausible given the conventions of their
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expertise and the practices of their profession’ (112). Kennedy criticises this, as it
hides that there is always a ‘range of interpretations’ (112), allowing experts to
escape responsibility for their expertise; if an ‘answer’ lies waiting to be discovered,
as opposed to chosen from this range of interpretations, it removes the agency of the
expert. Kennedy does this seemingly without being aware that much of what he
offers is itself plausible argumentation—that he himself is an expert making an
argument. He seems to only explicitly make this connection in his introduction to the
very short Epilogue in the context of his job as a law professor training experts (277).
This lack of self-reflexivity toward the very object of study namely that Kennedy’s
arguments rely on their being plausible—and ones which are more plausible to
experts already well-versed in structuralism and the sociology of law—may under-
mine Kennedy’s contribution.
Chapter 2 entitled ‘Struggle: Toward a Cartography of Engagement’ lays further
ground work for Kennedy’s argument about the role of experts in influencing
decisions and why it is important that we pay attention to this role. It is here that
Kennedy introduces the imagery of the backpack which every expert comes to their
job carrying. These backpacks are filled with ‘legal or other entitlements, powers,
and vulnerabilities’ (67) making experts subjective and asymmetrical in their strug-
gle with one another, and instead maybe more or less empowered to articulate their
interpretation of an issue. Accepting the premise that regime logics are social pro-
ductions, Kennedy applies this idea in relation to governance experts. The point he
notes is not just that systems are socially constructed but that ‘they are socially
constructed by a particular kind of activity: the work of expertise’ (84). Presumably
because it highlights that expertise is strategic for the regime in the first place.
I found two things frustrating about this chapter. The first is the attempt to use a
metaphor of cartography to envisage the ‘terrain’ of expertise, without acknowledg-
ing that the introduction of this ‘cartography’ and ‘terrain’ is itself a classical tool of
expert discourse. It is another world-making story, just like the view of the earth
from space (see at 91–92) that Kennedy highlights as the image that too many
naively ‘latched onto. . .as evidence of a deep truth’. Cartography is supposed to be
the ‘antidote to the limits of system analytics’ (75) but Kennedy does not acknowl-
edge the highly problematic baggage that comes with cartography as a metaphor—it
too promotes a certain perspective of a world, one where the viewer observes a
smooth or striated surface from above and even when inside the structure, and inside
the map, can still attain this imagined perspective. Kennedy also does not appear to
explore, or think there might be a cause for exploring, his reasons for choosing this
perspective. The second point concerns Kennedy’s lack of precision and fondness
for abstraction. Kennedy says he focuses on “people” rather than ‘abstract and
institutional actors’ (56) yet rarely does he actually speak of any concrete individ-
uals, only individuals, or ‘deciders’ (111), or ‘economists’ (84), in the abstract.
Part II is where Kennedy starts developing the themes of Part I and his analysis of
expertise is more detailed and less familiar to international legal discourse. Chapters
3–5 cover what in many ways may be considered some rich ground. This includes
the value of recognising insider/outsider vocabulary, thoroughly reviewed
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elsewhere.2 The power of language to communicate, as well as to create and to
perform, is well explored in the book. Although the idea is not novel, its application
to the work of experts is insightful. What is a truly valuable contribution is
Kennedy’s treatment of it is the portrayal of expertise as a performative process:
given expertise is carried out through articulation, exposing the particular vocabu-
laries of experts, and how experts frame problems, is certainly worth highlighting
and drawing attention to. Chapter 4 challenges the traditional assumption that there
is a difference between the ‘background’ work of experts, or advisors, and the
‘foreground’ work of decision-makers, such as politicians (111–113) and raises
the issue of responsibility in respect of this new insight, including the questions of
how should or how can those who have ‘fade[d] into the background’ (113) be held
responsible. It prompts some interesting questions such as: Who really decides?
What is the role of lobbyists? How much do politicians or foreground ‘deciders’ rely
on briefings? Kennedy rightly raises the increasingly blurred role of the positions
background and foreground ‘people’ occupy (114).
Chapter 5 turns to a slightly, I think, unfulfilled and still abstract study of
‘expertise in action’ in three areas—development policy and economics, use of
force, and human rights advocacy—before finally discussing the role of international
law itself. Kennedy argues that ‘content boundaries are less important than bound-
aries marked by role and style’ (155), which really points to the dynamics and
asymmetries of power that will ensure success or loss in the struggle to have your
expertise win out. Kennedy makes an interesting observation about international
law: that, because of the discipline’s ‘sophistication’ and ability to draw on all
theories, only the ‘naive’ could ever think there was one particular answer to a
legal question (156). Kennedy, probably fairly boldly to many, claims that ‘the
“bindingness” of rules is. . .not that important anyway’ (157).
Part III brings in the law for those who need it; however, for those who do not,
this Part is only worth skimming. If you have got to this point of the book and
wondered how it relates to international economic law, these chapters contain a great
discussion, or rather a summary, of relevant legal theory. Kennedy articulately
demonstrates that, ‘because it distributes, law has value for people in struggle and
is often also at stake in conflict’ (177) especially in the arena of expert struggle. As
international lawyers, we deal constantly with ideas about ‘trade wars’ in interna-
tional economic law and use the language of the universal. Kennedy exposes the lack
of neutrality of many of the ideas that dominate the practice of international
economic law and the ‘cloak covering the distributive practices [international law]
authorises and accepts’ (198) in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 expands this argument further,
as Kennedy lays out the historical development of international law and legal theory.
This chapter once again has something of value to offer to those less familiar with the
2Özsu U (2018) H-Diplo Roundtable XIX, 26 on A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and
Expertise Shape Global Political Economy. XIX H-Diplo, https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/
discussions/1599029/h-diplo-roundtable-xix-26-world-struggle-how-power-law-and#_
Toc509652530 (last accessed 2 April 2018).
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subject. Other readers are likely to find it unremarkable as it contributes very little to
developing legal theory or in terms of interpreting an account of the history of
international law. I found the Epilogue underwhelming; although a more charitable
interpretation may be that perhaps Kennedy felt there was little room to sum up his
book without essentially reproducing it.
The central point in A World of Struggle, that the stories we tell ‘can let people off
the hook’ if we perceive the world to be at the mercy of the forces of globalisation
(27), is worth retelling and restating. The value of Kennedy’s book is that he offers,
in a simple way, the tools to reverse, as he calls it, the naturalised outcomes of earlier
debates (37), but what might otherwise be thought of as deconstructing,
demystifying, and understanding the background assumptions of legal concepts or
ideas such as ‘market efficiency’ (51) and highlighting the contingency of facts.
In short, the book does offer something to everyone who reads it. A World of
Struggle is a current and relevant book with many plausible arguments. For those in
the field of international economic law it proves an enlightening read, as it explores
the role of experts and nature of the struggle of those who are typically seen in the
background. I sometimes think the value in Kennedy’s work overall is in his ability
to spot trends in international law that few observe, and in his ability to write
accessibly. It is possible to criticise Kennedy’s lack of references or concreteness
but, if the book is compared to other non-academic writing, perhaps even compara-
ble to the style of ‘pop’ economics or legal sociology, then it works in delivering
meaningful, insightful and important research and it works well.
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1 Introduction
Three decades into regulating services trade at the multilateral level, governments,
academics and other stakeholders in the ‘diverse mosaic that services bring
together’—as Sauvé and Roy so aptly put it in their Introduction to their Research
Handbook on Trade in Services—continue to be confronted with substantial chal-
lenges. Most notably, the analysis of services trade and consequently also related
policy making suffer from a lack of economic and legal data. Attempts to tackle this
issue come in the form of more recent databases on services trade and services
regulation at the WTO, the OECD, or the World Bank, among others.
In addition to the scarcity of data in relation to services trade and regulation,
increasing globalisation and digitalisation of the world economy have opened up
new opportunities for services trade while at the same time posing new challenges to
services trade regulation. We are confronted today with new services and new forms
of services trade that did not exist when, some thirty years ago, the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) introduced services trade regulation at
the multilateral level. Most prominently, traditional services trade regulation does
not comprehensively deal with aspects of services trade related with the Internet,
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energy, automation, and more recently the emergence of the so-called sharing
economy.
While services may have been considered to be less vital than goods for global
trade in 1990, it becomes more and more apparent today that global production
chains along with manufacturing industries heavily depend on services in their
functioning and economic performance. While services contribute substantially to
GDP per capita across the world, overall shares in global services trade remain
unequally distributed between industrialised countries and the rest of the world. In
conjunction with demographic considerations, aspects related to services trade such
as the movement of natural service providers across nation borders or the role of
services in fostering economic growth in developing countries increasingly gain
attention.
Finally, the most recent trade negotiations both at the plurilateral level in the form
of the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) and at the regional or bilateral level
(TPP, CETA, EU-Japan, aso.) aim to tackle some of the regulatory and economic
aspects of services trade highlighted above. However, efforts are not—yet—based
on multilateral consensus, whereas implications of a first mover advantage for other
trade negotiations and the future of services trade regulation remain unclear. The
fact that the GATS was initially designed as a stepping stone for subsequent
negotiations—which until today did not materialise—may furthermore raise ques-
tions regarding the role of the WTO in defining the future of services trade vis-à-vis
various regional and plurilateral efforts to do so outside (or alongside) the multilat-
eral forum.
Therefore, the comprehensive Research Handbook on Trade in Services, edited
by Pierre Sauvé and Martin Roy, comes at a particularly interesting and challenging
moment in the history of services trade regulation. It aims to take stock of the lessons
learned to date and explores a range of policy questions that had so far remained
unanswered. The book is divided into three parts: Empirical Perspectives (Part 1),
Legal Perspectives (Part 2) and Political Economy and Development Perspectives
(Part 3). The contributions to the different parts come from a multi-disciplinary
group of distinguished authors, ranging from empirical economics, to law, to global
political economy. Each part features seven individual Chapters, rendering the
Handbook in total more than 600 pages strong. Within the array of topics considered,
the Handbook lays a particular focus on issues related to global value chains,
developing countries and new frontiers in services negotiations. Each of these
three focus topics is considered in-depth and from different angles. The Handbook
furthermore features particularly comprehensive Chapters on digital trade, labour
migration, standardisation and competition. Services-related aspects of energy,
investment, more recent mega-regional trade negotiations, democratic governance,
and automation are touched upon in some of the Chapters, but remain outside of the
main focus of the Handbook. That said, the Handbook offers a comprehensive
overview of services trade today, and also contains a number of gems in the form
of recent insights and innovative ideas in services trade policy and regulation.
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2 The Handbook in More Detail: Empirical Perspectives
The first Part on empirical perspectives starts off with a chapter by Martin Roy on
charting the evolving landscape of services trade policies. The Chapter depicts
changes in services policies since 2000, based on the I-TIP services database and
demonstrates that policy changes worldwide clearly tend to be more liberalising,
rather than trade-restrictive. The chapter discusses trends in policy changes in the
different services sectors, modes of supply, as well as in geographic regions. Roy
concludes the chapter by discussing implications for TiSA negotiations, highlighting
among others, that the majority of liberalising policy changes in recent years have
been undertaken by non-TiSA members. TiSA therefore was unlikely to lock in a
considerable share of more recent liberalisation efforts worldwide.
In the second Chapter of the Handbook, Andreas Maurer, Joscelyn Magdeleine
and Rainer Lanz investigate the extent to which services can be measured in a world
of global value chains. The authors provide an overview over the history of services
trade and most recent economic trends in services sectors worldwide. Furthermore,
they discuss shortfalls and advantages of various databases aiming at depicting the
role of services in today’s global economy. This provides the statistical backbone of
what Sébastien Miroudot and Ben Sheperd then discuss in Chapter 3 of the Hand-
book from a more econometric perspective: Miroudot and Sheperd use the new
databases for the calculation of trade costs in services and find that, with the
exception of financial services, costs of intermediate services and final trade costs
of services are falling. Moreover, they demonstrate that trade costs of intermediate
services react more sensitively to policy changes than final trade costs.
Chapter 4 by Erik van Marel investigates the interdependence between services
sector regulation and comparative advantages in goods: Tailor-made regulation,
which takes into account not only regulatory needs of the service sector itself, but
also of respective services demanding goods industries may create a comparative
advantage. Van Marel highlights the economic implications of services regulation
for goods industries, and emphasises the need for tailor-made, national policies.
Anirudh Shingal endeavours on a challenging mission in Chapter 5 by trying to
estimate the trade effects of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) in services: as a
consequence of the complexity of services trade regulation, existing databases on
PTAs in services do not yet provide a comprehensive overview of the respective
level of liberalisation before and after the implementation of a PTA. Newer data-
bases such as DESTA do, however, cover individual commitments in services
sectors as well as in modes of supply. Shingal’s findings show that a higher number
of provisions in services trade liberalisation does not necessarily correlate with an
increase in trade flows.
The two final Chapters of the ‘empirical perspectives’ part of the Handbook then
turn to economic implications of services trade regulation and policy implementation
at the national level. In Chapter 6 on nurturing the competitiveness of services
exports, Sebastián Sáez and Daria Taglioni present their methodology to assess a
country’s performance and potential in services trade. In particular, it addresses
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avenues of increasing the integration of developing countries in the global market by
adequately aligning services regulation. Martin Molínuevo and Sebastián Sáez then
complement the previous Chapter by turning to the governance of regulatory reform
in services sectors. Based on regulatory failures documented in case-studies and
described in economic literature, they emphasise the need for careful planning and
administration of reforms.
3 The Handbook in More Detail: Legal Perspectives
The first Chapter of the ‘legal perspectives’ part by Eric H. Leroux provides for a
thorough and comprehensive overview over GATS case law to date. It discusses the
extent to which the WTO dispute settlement contributed to developing further and
clarifying the scope and functioning of GATS. Leroux points out in his conclusions
that revising both the single undertaking approach as well as the system of dispute
settlement remedies at the WTO may prove beneficial.
In his Chapter 9 of the Handbook, Markus Krajewski sheds light on another
critical aspect of services trade liberalisation; the tension between international and
national regulation. Recent attempts at negotiating deeper commitments in services
trade liberalisation at the bilateral and plurilateral level are widely perceived as a
challenge to democratic governance at the domestic level. Contrary to this percep-
tion, Krajewski shows that WTO members have—if at all—only cautiously
endeavoured in novel rule-making in services in PTAs to date. In view of the
emergence of novel regulatory elements in individual services sectors
(e.g. e-commerce, postal and courier services), he proposes to focus future research
on assessing the suitability of individual sectors for regulation at the multilateral,
regional, or the domestic level.
The following two Chapters then focus on standardisation in services trade.
Bernhard M. Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroidis discuss in their Chapter 10 the
need for a technical barriers to trade agreement (TBT) in services. They observe that
on the one hand, the current GATS regime insufficiently prevents governments from
using domestic regulation to restrict trade in services. On the other hand, the
embedded approaches of TBT are technically not suitable for standardisation in
services trade. The authors therefore encourage strengthening the operationalization
of important TBT-principles that are already incorporated in GATS, such as the
requirement that domestic regulation must be least trade restrictive. In addition,
Panagiotis Delimatsis focuses in his Chapter 11 on the role of the EU in standard-
setting in services. Lessons learned in the EU internal process of creating a single
services market and abandoning technical barriers to services trade within the EU
may eventually spill over to the regional or multilateral level, either through PTAs of
the EU or because of the first mover advantage of the largest services market today.
Sherry Stephenson and Gary C. Hufbauer then turn to the role of state-owned
enterprises in services markets and highlight the need for adequate regulation. They
point out that the regulation of state-owned enterprises has been taken up in more
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recent services trade negotiations and suggest that novel regulatory elements, like the
ones featured in the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, may find their way
also into TiSA negotiations.
The final two Chapters of the ‘legal perspectives' part of the Handbook focus on
aspects of services trade regulation linked with technological progress. Mira Burri
first presents an overview over the history of digital trade and of its implications for
international economic law. She then assesses and carefully explains the fitness of
the WTO agreements in general and of GATS-rules in particular for dealing with
digital trade. Burri concludes the chapter by looking at the most recent regulatory
proposals in regional and plurilateral negotiations and by emphasizing the need for
WTO members to at least commit to the general principles of e-commerce as
elaborated by the US and the EU. Thereafter, L. Lee Tuthill focuses on the role of
trade rules in the governance of cross-border data flows. She emphasises in particular
the increasing economic weight of cross-border data and information flows. In
consequence, finding an adequate balance between data control and minimisation
of the costs of data regulation may create substantial spill-over effects. Tuthill
comprehensively discusses the suitability of GATS rules to deal with the governance
of data flows, provides for an overview of more recent regional and bilateral
initiatives and concludes by pointing out that regulation in this field will in particular
benefit SMEs.
4 The Handbook in More Detail: Political Economy
and Development Perspectives
In the third and final part, the Handbook then takes up a host of development policy
challenges in conjunction with services trade. In their Chapter 15, Tomer Broude and
Shai Moses investigate the dynamics in trade negotiations leading to positive or
negative listing of commitments. They find that the binary decision-making process
of either or may have led in the past to a preference for positive listing. When
confronted with an increase of options, e.g. new, hybrid approaches to listing
services trade commitments, negotiators are more open to embrace elements of
negative listing.
In Chapter 16, Rupa Chanda investigates the role of temporary movement (mode
4) under the GATS in the realisation of mutual gains from labour surplus in
developing countries and labour shortage in industrialised countries. Chanda pro-
vides for a forward looking analysis of demographics and labour markets, and
discusses challenges for both sending and receiving countries combined also with
case-studies from India and Bangladesh. She points out that a broad ranging, holistic
approach—taking into account education, skilling, or remittances among others—is
needed in order to prevent demographic dividends from becoming a liability.
Andrew Berry, Timon Bohn and Nanno Mulder build their Chapter 17 around the
hypothesis that the growing participation of emerging economies in global trade of
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business services is based on their ability to increase complexity of their exports, and
not on competing on low wages. They investigate various aspects and levels of
upgrading in emerging economies. While China and India dominate other emerging
economies, the latter have also upgraded within and among segments of business
services. The Chapter highlights the key role of workers’ skills in upgrading, as well
as the shortage of statistical data on services segments and modes of supply in
emerging economies.
In a legal case-study on Pakistan in Chapter 18, Joseph Wilson sheds light on the
vital role of domestic competition laws and authorities in successfully opening
services markets in developing countries. Similarly, Craig VanGrasstek and Mina
Mashayekhi highlight in Chapter 19 that for developing countries, concluding
services trade agreements promises the intended results when PTAs are conceived
as complements to domestic economic reforms.
In Chapter 20, Pierre Sauvé and Natasha Ward offer an extensive and in-depth
analysis of the services waiver for Least-Developed Countries (LDCs), introduced in
2011. They discuss the heterogeneity of the LDC group with a focus on their
respective services sectors and analyse opportunities for LDCs along the four
modes of services supply and with a focus on the most relevant services sectors.
In their concluding remarks, they offer six points to be considered in the future,
among them the fact that the waiver may be particularly useful in dealing with
quantitative restrictions, and the reference that next to the waiver, regional or
bilateral and even non-trade instruments ought to be duly recognized.
The Handbook concludes with the final Chapter by Gabriel Gari and the analysis
of the changing nature of services negotiations. Gari notes that barriers to trade in
services differ substantially in their nature from barriers to trade in goods. Never-
theless, services negotiators appear to rely on the practices and procedures used in
goods negotiations. Given that an increasing number of WTO members appear to be
willing to deepen services commitments and further develop the services trade
agenda, Gari suggests to incorporate plurilateral negotiations within the WTO
framework in the future along with alternative negotiation methods and a focus on
transparency measures and regulatory cooperation.
5 Overall Assessment
The multi-disciplinary perspectives on services trade and policy combined in this
Handbook offer insights into a wide array of critical aspects of services trade
regulation today, both at the macro and the micro level. Across the various chapters,
one common denominator is identifiable in the need for a better understanding of the
role and regulation of services at the sectoral level and for more detailed data on a
possibly emerging plurilateral consensus on a new minimum standard in services
trade. The Handbook features new and forward-looking insights in the analysis of
the role of services trade in global value chains, in the role of the GATS in governing
services trade policies, and in discussing the future of services trade negotiations. It
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provides useful and timely guidance for research priorities, and for new approaches
to holistic services policies and negotiations, and should therefore be read by
researchers, policymakers and services negotiators alike.
Charlotte Sieber-Gasser is a PostDoc Fellow at the department of public law of the University of
Lucerne and a lecturer in trade governance at the University of St. Gallen. Her PhD thesis on
developing countries and preferential services trade was published by Cambridge University Press
in 2016.
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1 Overview
This book, examining the issues, challenges and directions in water regulation, is
very timely. Indeed, works that engage with this complex and endless topic are
always opportune. One need not elaborate at length on how critical water is for
human existence or how dramatic water-related problems have become of late. As
this review goes into print, Cape Town, struck by a historic drought, is bracing for
‘Day Zero’ – the day it cuts off running water for four million people. In
South Africa and elsewhere, the magnitude of the problem goes well beyond the
daily provision of a commodity – it includes water shortage and quality problems,
growing demands from industries and urban areas amid population growth, the
intricate nexuses between water, food and energy security, etc. All of these pre-
dicaments call for a re-assessment of water management models.
In this interesting book, several authors engage with the issues and challenges
facing governments, private companies, international organisations, and citizens
(i.e., all of us humans who cannot possibly survive without water) through an
interdisciplinary prism. Countless problems are examined from a myriad of perspec-
tives that are, in the end, deeply intertwined. While many have emphasised the need
for a holistic approach to water issues, that goal is not always achieved: scholars tend
to work in scientific silos and practitioners seldom convey their know-how in
academic outlets. In this book, Professor Julien Chaisse gathers contributions from
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a number of leading academic experts with varied professional backgrounds (trade
and investment lawyers, human rights lawyers, environmental lawyers) but also
practitioners with a background in public administration, disaster governance, public
finance, or international relations. Rather than looking at water-related problems
merely from a legal perspective (discussing domestic and international legal frame-
works and assessing arbitral awards and judicial judgements), the book analyses
other dimensions such as the economic drivers of the water market, and presents
several case studies that add a ‘real-life’ flavour to the discussion.
Three major issues (and related challenges) are discussed in the book: the
challenges that water services pose to public international law frameworks; the
protection and promotion of the much-discussed human right to water, and the
economic determinants of global water markets.
The first two chapters examine the impact of WTO Law on the regulation of water
services. International trade rules can be used to improve the management of water,
but that has not happened thus far. Furthermore, low levels of transparency regarding
subsidies given to the sector result in the unsustainable management of a precious
resource (Ahmad). The private sector is playing an ever-central role in the supply of
water and sanitation services, but the application of the General Agreement on Trade
in Services to this sector remains controversial. The characterisation of these services
as a human right requires special attention in their regulation (Bates).
The next three chapters focus on the interplay between international investment law
and water services. Over the last decades there has been an explosion in the number of
water and sanitation contracts awarded to foreign companies. Disputes between host
states and foreign investors have resulted in multiple arbitration proceedings, produc-
ing a sprouting body of jurisprudence. In deciding these disputes, arbitral tribunals are
shaping the contours of an international water services regime, filling the void left by
the inexistence of a global organisation to supervise the sector. While this can be seen
as a step towards greater regulation of water markets, it also highlights the need for a
global, holistic approach to the field (Chaisse). One of the hottest topics within this
emerging case load is the delimitation of host states’ right to regulate water services.
States are striving to limit the interpretative freedom of arbitral tribunals by invoking
their right to pursue public policies. What standard should arbitral tribunals employ to
strike an appropriate balance between the protection of investors and domestic public
concerns (Titi)? According to Hirano and Hamamoto, arbitral awards have acknowl-
edged the host State’s regulatory power. Investment arbitral tribunals function as a
watchdog for disguised ‘regulatory’ measures and only abusive uses of regulatory
powers are considered incompatible with investment treaties.
The analysis of the public international law landscape is completed by two further
contributions. Turrini discusses the role of the notion of virtual water (a concept also
alluded to by Ahmad). This concept raises awareness about the scarcity of water
resources and the need to exploit them rationally, for instance, as regards food security
and environmental protection. Tassin adds two new perspectives: terrestrial and
maritime viewpoints. In her opinion, the tendency for a sectorized and fragmented
approach to terrestrial and marine uses of water affects the understanding and regu-
lation of water issues.
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A second group of contributions addresses the much-discussed ‘human right to
water’ from different perspectives. Tassin examines the notion as part of a ‘terrestrial
and human’ approach to water issues. Hirano and Hamamoto focus their attention on
human rights considerations by investment arbitral tribunals. Shah contributes to the
discussion by offering a case study on the legal protection and judicial enforcement
of water rights in Pakistan. He concludes that the country continues to fail in meeting
its water-based obligations, due to governmental deficiencies and lack of resources.
Another case study is offered by Emeziem, this time focusing on Nigeria. In his
opinion there is a gap between the perception of water as a human right and the
reality of access to clean water and sanitation. The realization of this right lies
essentially at the local level, hence the need to act locally while thinking globally.
The contribution of the private sector in implementing this right is discussed by
Mahadevan. Transnational corporations play a major role in this regard because of
their global presence. Finally, De Barcellos discusses how public law litigation has
been used to advance human rights in Brazil, examining in particular lawsuits
involving water and sanitation public policies.
A third group of chapters discusses the economic drivers and determinants shaping
the global market for water services in the future. Water and sanitation services are
operated through vast physical networks. The operation of these grids requires
substantial technical expertise, maintenance, and investment. All over the world
governments are faced with deteriorating water systems and the scarcity of capital to
maintain and improve networks. Mukherjee and Chakraborty estimate the demand for
investment in water services infrastructure to achieve the universal access to improved
water supply and sanitation by 2019. Different regions are at different levels of
achievement in securing universal access to safe drinking water and sanitation.
McDonnell analyses residential water charges in Ireland, discussing the multiple
policy objectives pursued by water funding models (environmental sustainability,
financial sustainability, economic efficiency and social concerns, including affordabil-
ity), concluding that there are trade-offs between each of these policy objectives.
Ancev, Azad, and Hernandez-Sancho discuss the role of multinational companies in
providing water services, examining their efficiency, testing the productivity and
efficiency of water utilities in different countries. Finally, Lassa and Yu-Hung Lai
look at microfinance in water and sanitation services and identify best practices,
focusing on a community-based sanitation micro-finance initiative in Indonesia.
2 Key Lessons
The multifarious problems discussed in this book call for a global vision of water
markets. All authors take on the challenge of formulating proposals and offering
recommendations; their views can be distilled into three overarching propositions.
First, WTO Rules can play a greater role in promoting efficient water markets.
The regulatory framework should be reformed with the goal of promoting water-use
efficiency (Ahmad). Bearing in mind the essential role of water and sanitation,
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greater certainty must be provided to ensure the effective operation of trade laws, the
validity of national legislation and the protection of consumers’ interests. The
inclusion of a new subcategory specifically related to water services could afford
greater certainty in the implementation of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (Bates).
Second, looking beyond the WTO framework, it is necessary to ensure that the
human right to water receives consideration in investment arbitration. Governments
must design water-related policies that comply with investment treaties because their
contribution is decisive to improve and expand networks (Chaisse). In some cases
host states may retain the ability to regulate water services without having to
compensate investors. However, they should not be able to forego their investment
commitments for reasons that do not involve the public interest (Titi). Future arbitral
tribunals dealing with water-related cases will have access to materials such as
General Comment no. 15 on the right to water which they can invoke when assessing
the conformity of State measures with investment treaties. Still, it is not likely that
the deference accorded to states will increase (Hirano and Hamamoto). A further
challenge for International Law is to move the concept of virtual water from a
practical elaboration into a practicable policy option. It is necessary to devise
meaningful ways to incorporate virtual water in existing concepts of law and policy,
such as the right to water (Turrini).
Several potential avenues can be used to promote and protect the human right to
water. A social justice approach can be applied as a key tool towards realizing the
human right to water (Emeziem). While multi-stakeholder initiatives are important,
they do not address all problems arising out the interaction between the human right to
water and corporate activities. It is necessary to include state actors in these initiatives
in order to ensure effective compliance standards through state mechanisms
(Mahadevan). Public law litigation can also be used to foster public health policies.
However, it is necessary to reach the most disenfranchised communities, as the worse-
off communities remain the least represented in judicial cases (De Barcellos).
Third, looking into the future, investment is crucial to expand and maintain water
networks. Encouraging private investment in this field is a key part of long-term
solutions. It is necessary to improve the political-legal framework for facilitating
private sector involvement (Mukherjee and Chakraborty). Different water charging
models have diverse advantages and disadvantages, and water affordability is an
important concern. A system that combines a volume-based pricing structure with a
system of income-related water credits may be a good solution to reconcile the four
main policy objectives pursued by water funding models (McDonnell). Private
management of water services is not necessarily more efficient than state-run
utilities. Ancev, Azad, and Hernandez-Sancho conclude that the argument for
opening up a domestic sector to multinational corporations based on expected
productivity and efficiency gains may not be as strong as sometimes advocated. In
the community-based context, micro-finance can be useful if the conditions for
sustainability are controlled by local actors (Lassa and Yu-Hung Lai).
518 F. Dias Simões
andreas.ziegler@unil.ch
3 Contribution to the Literature
Innumerable books have been published over the last decades on the management of
water resources, both at the national, regional, and global level. Authors have
examined the economic and political reasons underpinning the liberalisation of
water services in many countries. Studies have also been published on the interplay
between trade rules, investment laws, and water services. Finally, a growing body of
literature examines the emergence of the human right to water, and how to protect it
at the national and international level, both before national courts and international
arbitration panels. There is an endless ‘sea’ of questions flowing from different fields
of knowledge. An interdisciplinary approach is necessary to understand current
threats and devise sustainable solutions. This entails bringing together policymakers,
managers, technicians, lawyers, economists, and other experts. Chaisse’s Charting
the Water Regulatory Future takes on that challenge, offering suggestions for action
at the national and international level, both in the design of legal frameworks and in
the application of legal standards, taking into account the legal framework but also
the surrounding economic and social context. Such broad, complex issues could not
realistically be fully examined in a single work. However, this book contributes to
this gigantic endeavour by identifying some of the most pressing legal and economic
issues and challenges, and pointing toward some possible future directions. It is
written in a technically accurate yet accessible language and will surely prove useful
to scholars, policymakers, and practitioners alike.
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New Research on the Deep Seabed and Its
Resources
Christian J. Tams
The seabed has long fascinated explorers, adventurers, divers—and international
lawyers. Many a gold rush for the ‘unplumbed riches of the deep’ (as the Economist
put it in 2009) has been announced; and after a quiet period, tension seems to be
building up again. According to the International Seabed Authority’s (ISA) 2016
Annual Report, the “Commercialization of Marine Minerals in Deep Seabed
[is now] Well Within Reach”: deep seabed mining for manganese, copper, nickel
and cobalt is said, once more, to be viable, and rumours of rare earths finds in the
seabed heighten expectations. What is more, quite apart from minerals, the UN
seems to get serious about preparing “an international legally binding instrument . . .
on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas
beyond national jurisdiction” (General Assembly Resolution 69/292 of 19 June
2015): this is meant to regulate access to, and set rules for the exploitation of, marine
genetic resources, commercially attractive notably to pharmaceutical, cosmetic
and biotech companies and referred to as ‘bio-prospecting’. Unsurprisingly, as
with previous gold rushes, the law is a factor in these endeavours: legal regulation
seeks to ensure that exploration and exploitation occur in line with basic societal
concerns, without stoking initiative through overregulation. International legal reg-
ulation, found notably in the 1982 United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) and its 1994 Implementation Agreement, is no exception, but agreement
on globally binding societal standards has not been easy to reach.
The two books under review—two German PhD theses defended in 2016, and
published soon after—address aspects of the legal regime governing the ‘unplumbed
riches of the deep’. They complement each other well. Both look at resources
beyond areas of national jurisdiction, but they do so from different angles: Mario
Starre addresses the exploitation of mineral resources (with a focus on questions of
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liability), while Matthias J. Annweiler’s focus is on marine genetic resources. This
difference shapes their respective approaches. Starre’s book is in essence a work of
consolidation: he assesses the UNCLOS treaty regime that was elaborated during the
1970s–1990s and that is now being tested. Annweiler tackles more fundamental
questions and has to make do without an existing masterplan: he analyses the law
that applies in the absence of a tailor-made regime, and outlines principles for a
future regulation.
Both books offer solid information and succeed in conveying complex scientific
information to a lay audience of lawyer-readers. Starre’s approach is perhaps a bit
too solid; his argument takes rather long to get off the ground. More than a third of
the book is spent spelling out the basics—the UNCLOS zonal regime here, Arvid
Pardo there, the Area as common heritage, resistance by developed countries leading
to the 1994 Implementation Agreement etc. So lengthy is the stage-setting exercise
that a number of Starre’s interesting observations end up buried in two largely
descriptive chapters totalling 150 pages. He does make them, though, notably by
providing up-to-date information about current contracts taken out by companies
and consortia, and by offering detail about the significant costs of exploitation
(as opposed to prospection and exploration): these mean that mining will only
become economically profitable if well over 1mio tons of manganese nodules are
mined over a period of 20–25 years (at 57). But it is only in the third chapter that
Starre zooms in on his real topic, the legal rules governing access to deep seabed
minerals, and the liability regime established under Part XI. His discussion in this
third chapter is useful and detailed. Drawing on a large number of primary and
secondary sources, and engaging with the 2011 advisory opinion of the ITLOS
Seabed Disputes Chamber, it brings out many of the unusual features of the
UNCLOS regime. The awkward role of business actors in a mostly State-centric
regime is highlighted: even where private companies (and no longer State-run
enterprises) today are expected to do the bulk of the actual mining, States remain
relevant as sponsors; without their green light mining cannot go ahead. More
unusual still, the ISA enjoys significant powers: it controls access via licensing
procedures, and its mining codes define the conditions. Despite the clarification
brought about by the 2011 ITLOS advisory opinion, the respective obligations and
responsibilities of the different actors are not easy to disentangle. Starre’s detailed
discussion underlines as much. He largely follows the ITLOS chamber’s approach
and notably does not let sponsoring State’s off the ‘responsibility hook’. His
discussion however suggests that responsibility may not be easy to implement.
Drawing on the text of Article 139(2) UNCLOS, Starre argues that responsibility
for mining activities, unlike under the general regime, depends on the finding of
damage (173 et seq.). What is more (and here he is more cautious than the ITLOS
chamber), Starre is not fully convinced that responsibility, once at issue, could be
invoked by each and every UNCLOS treaty party through some form of public
interest litigation (293 et seq.). Perhaps surprisingly (or at least prematurely), he still
considers the liability regime to be effective (303): might one not wait for it to be
tested in real life?
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Be that as it may, Starre’s PhD certainly offers a useful stocktaking of the
UNCLOS regime, as adjusted through the 1994 Implementation Agreement, and it
is offered at a time when the rules formulated in these treaties begin to be tested in
earnest, with contractors gradually moving towards exploration and eventually
exploitation. What the book does not provide is a detailed engagement with the
ISA mining code, i.e. the rules, regulations and procedures that spell out the finer
details of the mining regime. This is a missed opportunity, as this code (and Starre
acknowledges as much, but in fairly general terms: see 122 et seq.) concretises the
often vague principles found in treaties and clarifies how the international commu-
nity intends to strike a balance between enabling mining and protecting the marine
environment. Given the ISA’s keen desire to adopt new regulations, and the wide
consultation process it has launched over the course of the last years (in which
ecologists have clashed with business), Starre’s decision to focus on the primary
treaty text is a significant limitation; it means that his book does not speak to the
current ‘new frontier’ of deep seabed mining. Its main value, then, is as a helpful and
reliable guide to the deep seabed mining regime of UNCLOS.
Annweiler’s take on deep seabed resources is different. It has to be as the object
of his inquiry—access to and exploration of marine genetic resources—raises
questions of a different nature. Unlike Starre’s work focused on mineral resources,
Annweiler simply cannot engage with a detailed regime; he must address a prelim-
inary question: is there an applicable regime at all—and more particularly, do the
existing rules of UNCLOS apply to bio-prospecting? The latter question needs to be
addressed as Part XI UNCLOS was elaborated with mineral (not genetic) resources
in mind—and Article 133, defining “resources” as “all solid, liquid or gaseous
mineral resources”, says so expressly.
So could the existing principles and rules developed to deal with minerals
(enshrining the idea of a common heritage and implementing it through international
procedures administered by the ISA) be read also to govern bio-prospecting for
genetic resources? And should they? Annweiler seems torn: he thinks they should,
but struggles to see how they could. To his credit, he engages in detail with the
arguments set out by States and scholars—which he summarises and evaluates with
a clear eye, good judgment and a capacity to divide the marine wheat from the chaff.
(No lengthy summaries of the basics here, unlike in Starre’s work: Annweiler’s
treatment is judicious, and he cuts to the chase much more quickly.) But all his
nuanced and detailed inquiries yield the same result; almost mantra-like, he finds that
genetic resources are special and do not fit under existing rules. To illustrate: no, Part
XI cannot be dynamically read to apply to genetic resources (65 e seq.); no, the
common heritage principle (in any tangible form) does not apply as customary
international law (as shown in detail in chapter IV); no, Part XII of UNCLOS on
marine environmental law does not apply either (94–96); but equally no, States
cannot simply go ahead and exploit genetic resources on the basis of an expansive
reading of the freedoms of high seas (86 et seq.). All this is plausible, and all this is
set out on the basis of a detailed and mature discussion.
Two aspects remain puzzling, though. The first is that notwithstanding his firm
views on what regime does not apply, Annweiler is silent on what does. To wit, if
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UNCLOS Part XI only applies to minerals, and no customary regime has emerged,
are States free simply to explore genetic resources? Or are they under a duty to show
caution, perhaps even pre-caution, before bio-prospecting away? Precisely because
Annweiler considers existing regimes not to apply, the question arises acutely—but
in his book, surprisingly, he avoids a firm response (see 224 et seq. for tentative
thoughts).
Also surprising is Annweiler’s take on the recent debates at the UN, where, as
noted above, the process of drafting a treaty is gathering momentum: it has done so
from 2015, and is picking up pace. Annweiler briefly mentions the more recent
developments, notably GA Resolution 69/292, but only in the form of a coda to his
detailed analysis (230 et seq.). Perhaps the recent trend came too late to be fully
integrated—but its relegation to a coda means that some of the more significant
developments are left to a side until the very end. In one important respect, these
bolster Annweiler’s main claim: States seem to share his view that UNCLOS as such
is insufficient to address access to genetic resources; a new regime is required, and
judging from recent developments, it is meant to take the form of a treaty. Whether
that new regime will essentially be copied and pasted from Part XI UNCLOS
remains to be seen. Annweiler outlines principles that should guide any future
regulation, and these bear a uncanny resemblance to those already spelled out for
mineral resources: common heritage, respect for marine biodiversity, the need to
work out access and benefit sharing regimes etc. (see 256 et seq.). Perhaps the wheel
does not need to be reinvented, then; but of course the on-going debates will provide
States and other stakeholders with an opportunity to adjust the balance between
ecological protection and exploitability, State sovereignty and common heritage.
The easy solution of simply transposing the existing regime of Part XI seems no
longer an option; Annweiler’s competent discussion suggests that this is a pity, but
demonstrates that the long road via a new treaty regime offers the legally sound
approach.
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